mirror of
https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor.git
synced 2025-03-04 00:14:44 +01:00
parser: pass rule mode prompt through to backend
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This commit is contained in:
John Johansen
parent
48b727b88a
commit
5c2bd20720
17 changed files with 227 additions and 117 deletions
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@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ int unix_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
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write_to_prot(buffer);
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if ((mask & AA_NET_CREATE) && !has_peer_conds()) {
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buf = buffer.str();
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY,
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode,
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map_perms(AA_NET_CREATE),
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map_perms(audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? AA_NET_CREATE : 0),
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parseopts))
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@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ int unix_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
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tmp << "\\x00";
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buf = tmp.str();
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY,
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode,
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map_perms(AA_NET_BIND),
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map_perms(audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? AA_NET_BIND : 0),
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parseopts))
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@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ int unix_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
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AA_LOCAL_NET_PERMS & ~AA_LOCAL_NET_CMD;
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if (mask & local_mask) {
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buf = buffer.str();
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY,
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode,
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map_perms(mask & local_mask),
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map_perms(audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? mask & local_mask : 0),
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parseopts))
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@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ int unix_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
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/* TODO: backlog conditional: for now match anything*/
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tmp << "..";
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buf = tmp.str();
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY,
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode,
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map_perms(AA_NET_LISTEN),
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map_perms(audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? AA_NET_LISTEN : 0),
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parseopts))
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@ -421,10 +421,12 @@ int unix_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
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/* TODO: sockopt conditional: for now match anything */
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tmp << "..";
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buf = tmp.str();
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY,
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map_perms(mask & AA_NET_OPT),
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map_perms(audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? AA_NET_OPT : 0),
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parseopts))
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(),
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rule_mode,
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map_perms(mask & AA_NET_OPT),
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map_perms(audit == AUDIT_FORCE ?
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AA_NET_OPT : 0),
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parseopts))
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goto fail;
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}
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mask &= ~AA_LOCAL_NET_PERMS | AA_NET_ACCEPT;
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@ -442,7 +444,7 @@ int unix_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
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goto fail;
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buf = buffer.str();
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY, map_perms(perms & AA_PEER_NET_PERMS), map_perms(audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms & AA_PEER_NET_PERMS : 0), parseopts))
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode, map_perms(perms & AA_PEER_NET_PERMS), map_perms(audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms & AA_PEER_NET_PERMS : 0), parseopts))
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goto fail;
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}
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@ -274,20 +274,20 @@ int dbus_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
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}
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if (perms & AA_DBUS_BIND) {
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, perms & AA_DBUS_BIND,
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, perms & AA_DBUS_BIND,
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audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms & AA_DBUS_BIND : 0,
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2, vec, parseopts, false))
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goto fail;
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}
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if (perms & (AA_DBUS_SEND | AA_DBUS_RECEIVE)) {
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY,
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode,
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perms & (AA_DBUS_SEND | AA_DBUS_RECEIVE),
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audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms & (AA_DBUS_SEND | AA_DBUS_RECEIVE) : 0,
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6, vec, parseopts, false))
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goto fail;
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}
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if (perms & AA_DBUS_EAVESDROP) {
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY,
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode,
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perms & AA_DBUS_EAVESDROP,
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audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms & AA_DBUS_EAVESDROP : 0,
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1, vec, parseopts, false))
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@ -122,14 +122,14 @@ int io_uring_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
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}
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if (perms & AA_VALID_IO_URING_PERMS) {
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY, perms,
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode, perms,
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audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
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parseopts))
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goto fail;
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if (perms & AA_IO_URING_OVERRIDE_CREDS) {
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buf = buffer.str(); /* update buf to have label */
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY,
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode,
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perms, audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
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parseopts))
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goto fail;
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@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ aare_rules::~aare_rules(void)
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expr_map.clear();
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}
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bool aare_rules::add_rule(const char *rule, int deny, uint32_t perms,
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bool aare_rules::add_rule(const char *rule, rule_mode_t mode, uint32_t perms,
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uint32_t audit, optflags const &opts)
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{
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return add_rule_vec(deny, perms, audit, 1, &rule, opts, false);
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return add_rule_vec(mode, perms, audit, 1, &rule, opts, false);
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}
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void aare_rules::add_to_rules(Node *tree, Node *perms)
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@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static Node *cat_with_oob_separator(Node *l, Node *r)
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return new CatNode(new CatNode(l, new CharNode(transchar(-1, true))), r);
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}
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bool aare_rules::add_rule_vec(int deny, uint32_t perms, uint32_t audit,
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bool aare_rules::add_rule_vec(rule_mode_t mode, uint32_t perms, uint32_t audit,
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int count, const char **rulev, optflags const &opts,
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bool oob)
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{
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@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ bool aare_rules::add_rule_vec(int deny, uint32_t perms, uint32_t audit,
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if (reverse)
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flip_tree(tree);
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accept = unique_perms.insert(deny, perms, audit, exact_match);
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accept = unique_perms.insert(mode, perms, audit, exact_match);
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if (opts.dump & DUMP_DFA_RULE_EXPR) {
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const char *separator;
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@ -123,8 +123,11 @@ bool aare_rules::add_rule_vec(int deny, uint32_t perms, uint32_t audit,
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}
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cerr << " -> ";
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tree->dump(cerr);
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if (deny)
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// TODO: split out from prefixes class
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if (mode == RULE_DENY)
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cerr << " deny";
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else if (mode == RULE_PROMPT)
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cerr << " prompt";
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cerr << " (0x" << hex << perms <<"/" << audit << dec << ")";
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accept->dump(cerr);
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cerr << "\n\n";
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@ -31,17 +31,18 @@
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#include "expr-tree.h"
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#include "../immunix.h"
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#include "../perms.h"
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#include "../rule.h"
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class UniquePerm {
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public:
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bool deny;
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rule_mode_t mode;
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bool exact_match;
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uint32_t perms;
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uint32_t audit;
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bool operator<(UniquePerm const &rhs)const
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{
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if (deny == rhs.deny) {
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if (mode >= rhs.mode) {
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if (exact_match == rhs.exact_match) {
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if (perms == rhs.perms)
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return audit < rhs.audit;
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@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ public:
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}
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return exact_match;
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}
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return deny;
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return true; // mode < rhs.mode
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}
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};
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@ -70,15 +71,17 @@ public:
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nodes.clear();
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}
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Node *insert(bool deny, uint32_t perms, uint32_t audit,
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Node *insert(rule_mode_t mode, uint32_t perms, uint32_t audit,
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bool exact_match)
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{
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UniquePerm tmp = { deny, exact_match, perms, audit };
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UniquePerm tmp = { mode, exact_match, perms, audit };
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iterator res = nodes.find(tmp);
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if (res == nodes.end()) {
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Node *node;
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if (deny)
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if (mode == RULE_DENY)
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node = new DenyMatchFlag(perms, audit);
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else if (mode == RULE_PROMPT)
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node = new PromptMatchFlag(perms, audit);
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else if (exact_match)
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node = new ExactMatchFlag(perms, audit);
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else
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@ -106,10 +109,11 @@ class aare_rules {
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aare_rules(int reverse): root(NULL), unique_perms(), expr_map(), reverse(reverse), rule_count(0) { };
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~aare_rules();
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bool add_rule(const char *rule, int deny, uint32_t perms,
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bool add_rule(const char *rule, rule_mode_t mode, uint32_t perms,
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uint32_t audit, optflags const &opts);
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bool add_rule_vec(int deny, uint32_t perms, uint32_t audit, int count,
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const char **rulev, optflags const &opts, bool oob);
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bool add_rule_vec(rule_mode_t mode, uint32_t perms, uint32_t audit,
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int count, const char **rulev, optflags const &opts,
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bool oob);
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bool append_rule(const char *rule, bool oob, bool with_perm, optflags const &opts);
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CHFA *create_chfa(int *min_match_len,
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vector <aa_perms> &perms_table,
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@ -911,6 +911,12 @@ public:
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}
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};
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class PromptMatchFlag: public MatchFlag {
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public:
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PromptMatchFlag(uint32_t prompt, uint32_t audit): MatchFlag(prompt, audit) {}
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};
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/* Traverse the syntax tree depth-first in an iterator-like manner. */
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class depth_first_traversal {
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stack<Node *>pos;
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@ -1076,8 +1076,10 @@ void DFA::dump(ostream & os)
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for (Partition::iterator i = states.begin(); i != states.end(); i++) {
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if (*i == start || (*i)->perms.is_accept()) {
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os << **i;
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if (*i == start)
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os << " <== (allow/deny/audit/quiet)";
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if (*i == start) {
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os << " <== ";
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(*i)->perms.dump_header(os);
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}
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if ((*i)->perms.is_accept())
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(*i)->perms.dump(os);
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os << "\n";
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@ -1304,16 +1306,17 @@ void DFA::apply_equivalence_classes(map<transchar, transchar> &eq)
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void DFA::compute_perms_table_ent(State *state, size_t pos,
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vector <aa_perms> &perms_table)
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{
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uint32_t accept1, accept2;
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uint32_t accept1, accept2, accept3;
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state->map_perms_to_accept(accept1, accept2);
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// until front end doesn't map the way it does
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state->map_perms_to_accept(accept1, accept2, accept3);
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if (filedfa) {
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state->idx = pos * 2;
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perms_table[pos*2] = compute_fperms_user(accept1, accept2);
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perms_table[pos*2 + 1] = compute_fperms_other(accept1, accept2);
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perms_table[pos*2] = compute_fperms_user(accept1, accept2, accept3);
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perms_table[pos*2 + 1] = compute_fperms_other(accept1, accept2, accept3);
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} else {
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state->idx = pos;
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perms_table[pos] = compute_perms_entry(accept1, accept2);
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perms_table[pos] = compute_perms_entry(accept1, accept2, accept3);
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}
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}
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@ -1383,6 +1386,7 @@ int accept_perms(NodeVec *state, perms_t &perms, bool filedfa)
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{
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int error = 0;
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uint32_t exact_match_allow = 0;
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uint32_t exact_match_prompt = 0;
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uint32_t exact_audit = 0;
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perms.clear();
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@ -1405,6 +1409,9 @@ int accept_perms(NodeVec *state, perms_t &perms, bool filedfa)
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} else if (match->is_type(NODE_TYPE_DENYMATCHFLAG)) {
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perms.deny |= match->flag;
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perms.quiet |= match->audit;
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} else if (dynamic_cast<PromptMatchFlag *>(match)) {
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perms.prompt |= match->flag;
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perms.audit |= match->audit;
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} else {
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if (filedfa && !is_merged_x_consistent(perms.allow, match->flag))
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error = 1;
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@ -1415,9 +1422,11 @@ int accept_perms(NodeVec *state, perms_t &perms, bool filedfa)
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if (filedfa) {
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perms.allow |= exact_match_allow & ~(ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE);
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perms.prompt |= exact_match_prompt & ~(ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE);
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perms.audit |= exact_audit & ~(ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE);
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} else {
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perms.allow |= exact_match_allow;
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perms.prompt |= exact_match_prompt;
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perms.audit |= exact_audit;
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}
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if (exact_match_allow & AA_USER_EXEC) {
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@ -1438,6 +1447,8 @@ int accept_perms(NodeVec *state, perms_t &perms, bool filedfa)
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perms.allow &= ~perms.deny;
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perms.quiet &= perms.deny;
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perms.prompt &= ~perms.deny;
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perms.prompt &= ~perms.allow;
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if (error)
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fprintf(stderr, "profile has merged rule with conflicting x modifiers\n");
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@ -51,16 +51,20 @@ class perms_t {
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public:
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perms_t(void): allow(0), deny(0), audit(0), quiet(0), exact(0) { };
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bool is_accept(void) { return (allow | audit | quiet); }
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bool is_accept(void) { return (allow | prompt | audit | quiet); }
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void dump_header(ostream &os)
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{
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os << "(allow/deny/prompt/audit/quiet)";
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}
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void dump(ostream &os)
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{
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os << " (0x " << hex
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<< allow << "/" << deny << "/" << audit << "/" << quiet
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<< allow << "/" << deny << "/" << "/" << prompt << "/" << audit << "/" << quiet
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<< ')' << dec;
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}
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void clear(void) { allow = deny = audit = quiet = 0; }
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void clear(void) { allow = deny = prompt = audit = quiet = 0; }
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void add(perms_t &rhs, bool filedfa)
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{
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deny |= rhs.deny;
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@ -97,6 +101,7 @@ public:
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allow = (allow | (rhs.allow & ~ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE));
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else
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allow |= rhs.allow;
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prompt |= rhs.prompt;
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audit |= rhs.audit;
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quiet = (quiet | rhs.quiet);
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@ -114,6 +119,7 @@ public:
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{
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if (deny) {
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allow &= ~deny;
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prompt &= ~deny;
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quiet &= deny;
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deny = 0;
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return !is_accept();
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@ -127,12 +133,14 @@ public:
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return allow < rhs.allow;
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if (deny < rhs.deny)
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return deny < rhs.deny;
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if (prompt < rhs.prompt)
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return prompt < rhs.prompt;
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if (audit < rhs.audit)
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return audit < rhs.audit;
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return quiet < rhs.quiet;
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}
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uint32_t allow, deny, audit, quiet, exact;
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uint32_t allow, deny, prompt, audit, quiet, exact;
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};
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int accept_perms(NodeVec *state, perms_t &perms, bool filedfa);
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@ -250,10 +258,11 @@ public:
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void flatten_relative(State *, int upper_bound);
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int apply_and_clear_deny(void) { return perms.apply_and_clear_deny(); }
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void map_perms_to_accept(uint32_t &accept1, uint32_t &accept2)
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void map_perms_to_accept(uint32_t &accept1, uint32_t &accept2, uint32_t &accept3)
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{
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accept1 = perms.allow;
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accept2 = PACK_AUDIT_CTL(perms.audit, perms.quiet & perms.deny);
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accept3 = perms.prompt;
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}
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int label;
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@ -64,23 +64,23 @@ static uint32_t dfa_map_xindex(uint16_t mask)
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/*
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* map old dfa inline permissions to new format
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*/
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#define dfa_user_allow(accept1, accept2) (((accept1) & 0x7f) | \
|
||||
#define dfa_user_allow(accept1) (((accept1) & 0x7f) | \
|
||||
((accept1) & 0x80000000))
|
||||
#define dfa_user_xbits(accept1, accept2) (((accept1) >> 7) & 0x7f)
|
||||
#define dfa_user_xbits(accept1) (((accept1) >> 7) & 0x7f)
|
||||
#define dfa_user_audit(accept1, accept2) ((accept2) & 0x7f)
|
||||
#define dfa_user_quiet(accept1, accept2) (((accept2) >> 7) & 0x7f)
|
||||
#define dfa_user_xindex(accept1, accept2) \
|
||||
#define dfa_user_xindex(accept1) \
|
||||
(dfa_map_xindex(accept1 & 0x3fff))
|
||||
|
||||
#define dfa_other_allow(accept1, accept2) ((((accept1) >> 14) & \
|
||||
#define dfa_other_allow(accept1) ((((accept1) >> 14) & \
|
||||
0x7f) | \
|
||||
((accept1) & 0x80000000))
|
||||
#define dfa_other_xbits(accept1, accept2) \
|
||||
#define dfa_other_xbits(accept1) \
|
||||
((((accept1) >> 7) >> 14) & 0x7f)
|
||||
#define dfa_other_audit(accept1, accept2) (((accept2) >> 14) & 0x7f)
|
||||
#define dfa_other_quiet(accept1, accept2) \
|
||||
((((accept2) >> 7) >> 14) & 0x7f)
|
||||
#define dfa_other_xindex(accept1, accept2) \
|
||||
#define dfa_other_xindex(accept1) \
|
||||
dfa_map_xindex((accept1 >> 14) & 0x3fff)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
|
|
@ -122,39 +122,33 @@ static void compute_fperms_allow(struct aa_perms *perms, uint32_t accept1)
|
|||
perms->allow |= AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
struct aa_perms compute_fperms_user(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2)
|
||||
struct aa_perms compute_fperms_user(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2,
|
||||
uint32_t accept3)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct aa_perms perms = { };
|
||||
|
||||
perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(accept1, accept2));
|
||||
perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(accept1));
|
||||
perms.prompt = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(accept3));
|
||||
perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(accept1, accept2));
|
||||
perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(accept1, accept2));
|
||||
perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(accept1, accept2);
|
||||
perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(accept1);
|
||||
|
||||
compute_fperms_allow(&perms, accept1);
|
||||
// prompt being carried as audit need to change
|
||||
perms.allow &= ~perms.prompt;
|
||||
if (perms.allow & perms.prompt) {
|
||||
//std::cerr << "user allow & prompt\n";
|
||||
}
|
||||
return perms;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
struct aa_perms compute_fperms_other(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2)
|
||||
struct aa_perms compute_fperms_other(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2,
|
||||
uint32_t accept3)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct aa_perms perms = { };
|
||||
|
||||
perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_other_allow(accept1, accept2));
|
||||
perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_other_allow(accept1));
|
||||
perms.prompt = map_old_perms(dfa_other_allow(accept3));
|
||||
perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_other_audit(accept1, accept2));
|
||||
perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(accept1, accept2));
|
||||
perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(accept1, accept2);
|
||||
perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(accept1);
|
||||
|
||||
compute_fperms_allow(&perms, accept1);
|
||||
// prompt being carried as audit need to change
|
||||
perms.allow &= ~perms.prompt;
|
||||
if (perms.allow & perms.prompt) {
|
||||
std::cerr << "other allow & prompt\n";
|
||||
}
|
||||
return perms;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -171,13 +165,15 @@ static uint32_t map_xbits(uint32_t x)
|
|||
((x & 0x7e) << 9);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
struct aa_perms compute_perms_entry(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2)
|
||||
struct aa_perms compute_perms_entry(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2,
|
||||
uint32_t accept3)
|
||||
// don't need to worry about version internally within the parser
|
||||
// uint32_t version)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct aa_perms perms = { };
|
||||
|
||||
perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(accept1, accept2);
|
||||
perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(accept1);
|
||||
perms.prompt = dfa_user_allow(accept3);
|
||||
perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(accept1, accept2);
|
||||
perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(accept1, accept2);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -192,7 +188,7 @@ struct aa_perms compute_perms_entry(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2)
|
|||
* Unfortunately there is no way to force auditing on the
|
||||
* perms represented by the xbits
|
||||
*/
|
||||
perms.allow |= map_other(dfa_other_allow(accept1, accept2));
|
||||
perms.allow |= map_other(dfa_other_allow(accept1));
|
||||
// v9 encoding never rolled out. AA_MAY_LOCK needed to fix
|
||||
// non fs unix locking see kernel commit
|
||||
// 1cf26c3d2c4c apparmor: fix apparmor mediating locking non-fs unix sockets
|
||||
|
|
@ -205,6 +201,7 @@ struct aa_perms compute_perms_entry(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2)
|
|||
* for v5-v9 perm mapping in the policydb, the other set is used
|
||||
* to extend the general perm set
|
||||
*/
|
||||
perms.prompt |= map_other(dfa_other_allow(accept3));
|
||||
perms.audit |= map_other(dfa_other_audit(accept1, accept2));
|
||||
perms.quiet |= map_other(dfa_other_quiet(accept1, accept2));
|
||||
//if (VERSION_GT(version, v8))
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -18,8 +18,8 @@
|
|||
#ifndef __AA_POLICY_COMPAT_H
|
||||
#define __AA_POLICY_COMPAT_H
|
||||
|
||||
struct aa_perms compute_fperms_user(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2);
|
||||
struct aa_perms compute_fperms_other(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2);
|
||||
struct aa_perms compute_perms_entry(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2);
|
||||
struct aa_perms compute_fperms_user(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2, uint32_t accept3);
|
||||
struct aa_perms compute_fperms_other(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2, uint32_t accept3);
|
||||
struct aa_perms compute_perms_entry(uint32_t accept1, uint32_t accept2, uint32_t accept3);
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* __AA_POLICY_COMPAT_H */
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ int mnt_rule::gen_policy_remount(Profile &prof, int &count,
|
|||
* if a data match is required this only has AA_MATCH_CONT perms
|
||||
* else it has full perms
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, tmpperms, tmpaudit, 4,
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, tmpperms, tmpaudit, 4,
|
||||
vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
count++;
|
||||
|
|
@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ int mnt_rule::gen_policy_remount(Profile &prof, int &count,
|
|||
if (!build_mnt_opts(optsbuf, opts))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
vec[4] = optsbuf.c_str();
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, perms,
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, perms,
|
||||
(audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0),
|
||||
5, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
|
|
@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ int mnt_rule::gen_policy_bind_mount(Profile &prof, int &count,
|
|||
opt_flags & MS_BIND_FLAGS))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
vec[3] = flagsbuf;
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, perms, audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, perms, audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
|
||||
4, vec,
|
||||
parseopts, false))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
|
|
@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ int mnt_rule::gen_policy_change_mount_type(Profile &prof, int &count,
|
|||
opt_flags & MS_MAKE_FLAGS))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
vec[3] = flagsbuf;
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, perms, audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, perms, audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
|
||||
4, vec,
|
||||
parseopts, false))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
|
|
@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ int mnt_rule::gen_policy_move_mount(Profile &prof, int &count,
|
|||
opt_flags & MS_MOVE_FLAGS))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
vec[3] = flagsbuf;
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, perms, audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, perms, audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
|
||||
4, vec,
|
||||
parseopts, false))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
|
|
@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@ int mnt_rule::gen_policy_new_mount(Profile &prof, int &count,
|
|||
tmpaudit = audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* rule for match without required data || data MATCH_CONT */
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, tmpperms, tmpaudit, 4,
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, tmpperms, tmpaudit, 4,
|
||||
vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
count++;
|
||||
|
|
@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ int mnt_rule::gen_policy_new_mount(Profile &prof, int &count,
|
|||
if (!build_mnt_opts(optsbuf, opts))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
vec[4] = optsbuf.c_str();
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, perms,
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, perms,
|
||||
audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
|
||||
5, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
|
|
@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@ int mnt_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
|
|||
if (!convert_entry(mntbuf, mnt_point))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
vec[0] = mntbuf.c_str();
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, perms,
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, perms,
|
||||
(audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0), 1, vec,
|
||||
parseopts, false))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
|
|
@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ int mnt_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
|
|||
if (!clear_and_convert_entry(devbuf, device))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
vec[1] = devbuf.c_str();
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, perms,
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, perms,
|
||||
(audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0), 2, vec,
|
||||
parseopts, false))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -231,10 +231,10 @@ int mqueue_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
|
|||
/* store perms at name match so label doesn't need
|
||||
* to be checked
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!label && !prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, map_mqueue_perms(perms), audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_mqueue_perms(perms) : 0, 1, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
if (!label && !prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, map_mqueue_perms(perms), audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_mqueue_perms(perms) : 0, 1, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
/* also provide label match with perm */
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, map_mqueue_perms(perms), audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_mqueue_perms(perms) : 0, size, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, map_mqueue_perms(perms), audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_mqueue_perms(perms) : 0, size, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -266,10 +266,10 @@ int mqueue_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (perms & AA_VALID_SYSV_MQ_PERMS) {
|
||||
if (!label && !prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, map_mqueue_perms(perms), audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_mqueue_perms(perms) : 0, 1, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
if (!label && !prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, map_mqueue_perms(perms), audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_mqueue_perms(perms) : 0, 1, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
/* also provide label match with perm */
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode == RULE_DENY, map_mqueue_perms(perms), audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_mqueue_perms(perms) : 0, size, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule_vec(rule_mode, map_mqueue_perms(perms), audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_mqueue_perms(perms) : 0, size, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ bool network_rule::gen_ip_conds(Profile &prof, std::list<std::ostringstream> &st
|
|||
|
||||
buf = oss.str();
|
||||
/* AA_CONT_MATCH mapping (cond_perms) only applies to perms, not audit */
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY, cond_perms,
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode, cond_perms,
|
||||
dedup_perms_rule_t::audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_perms(perms) : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
|
@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ bool network_rule::gen_ip_conds(Profile &prof, std::list<std::ostringstream> &st
|
|||
oss << "\\x00"; /* null transition */
|
||||
|
||||
buf = oss.str();
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY, cond_perms,
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode, cond_perms,
|
||||
dedup_perms_rule_t::audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_perms(perms) : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
|
@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ bool network_rule::gen_net_rule(Profile &prof, u16 family, unsigned int type_mas
|
|||
|
||||
if (!features_supports_inet || (family != AF_INET && family != AF_INET6)) {
|
||||
buf = buffer.str();
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY, map_perms(perms),
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode, map_perms(perms),
|
||||
dedup_perms_rule_t::audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_perms(perms) : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
|
@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ bool network_rule::gen_net_rule(Profile &prof, u16 family, unsigned int type_mas
|
|||
buf = buffer.str();
|
||||
/* create perms need to be generated excluding the rest of the perms */
|
||||
if (perms & AA_NET_CREATE) {
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY, map_perms(perms & AA_NET_CREATE) | (AA_CONT_MATCH << 1),
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode, map_perms(perms & AA_NET_CREATE) | (AA_CONT_MATCH << 1),
|
||||
dedup_perms_rule_t::audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_perms(perms & AA_NET_CREATE) : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
|
@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ bool network_rule::gen_net_rule(Profile &prof, u16 family, unsigned int type_mas
|
|||
/* length of queue allowed - not used for now */
|
||||
listen_buffer << "..";
|
||||
buf = listen_buffer.str();
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY, map_perms(perms),
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode, map_perms(perms),
|
||||
dedup_perms_rule_t::audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_perms(perms) : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
|
@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ bool network_rule::gen_net_rule(Profile &prof, u16 family, unsigned int type_mas
|
|||
/* socket mapping - not used for now */
|
||||
opt_buffer << "..";
|
||||
buf = opt_buffer.str();
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY, map_perms(perms),
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode, map_perms(perms),
|
||||
dedup_perms_rule_t::audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? map_perms(perms) : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -507,7 +507,8 @@ static int process_profile_name_xmatch(Profile *prof)
|
|||
aare_rules *rules = new aare_rules();
|
||||
if (!rules)
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
if (!rules->add_rule(tbuf.c_str(), 0, AA_MAY_EXEC, 0, parseopts)) {
|
||||
if (!rules->add_rule(tbuf.c_str(), RULE_ALLOW,
|
||||
AA_MAY_EXEC, 0, parseopts)) {
|
||||
delete rules;
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -520,7 +521,9 @@ static int process_profile_name_xmatch(Profile *prof)
|
|||
ptype = convert_aaregex_to_pcre(alt->name, 0,
|
||||
glob_default,
|
||||
tbuf, &len);
|
||||
if (!rules->add_rule(tbuf.c_str(), 0, AA_MAY_EXEC, 0, parseopts)) {
|
||||
if (!rules->add_rule(tbuf.c_str(),
|
||||
RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_EXEC,
|
||||
0, parseopts)) {
|
||||
delete rules;
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -642,14 +645,14 @@ static int process_dfa_entry(aare_rules *dfarules, struct cod_entry *entry)
|
|||
if (entry->rule_mode == RULE_DENY) {
|
||||
if ((entry->perms & ~AA_LINK_BITS) &&
|
||||
!is_change_profile_perms(entry->perms) &&
|
||||
!dfarules->add_rule(tbuf.c_str(), entry->rule_mode == RULE_DENY,
|
||||
!dfarules->add_rule(tbuf.c_str(), entry->rule_mode,
|
||||
entry->perms & ~(AA_LINK_BITS | AA_CHANGE_PROFILE),
|
||||
entry->audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? entry->perms & ~(AA_LINK_BITS | AA_CHANGE_PROFILE) : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
} else if (!is_change_profile_perms(entry->perms)) {
|
||||
if (!dfarules->add_rule(tbuf.c_str(),
|
||||
entry->rule_mode == RULE_DENY, entry->perms,
|
||||
entry->rule_mode, entry->perms,
|
||||
entry->audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? entry->perms : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
|
|
@ -674,7 +677,7 @@ static int process_dfa_entry(aare_rules *dfarules, struct cod_entry *entry)
|
|||
perms |= LINK_TO_LINK_SUBSET(perms);
|
||||
vec[1] = "/[^/].*";
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!dfarules->add_rule_vec(entry->rule_mode == RULE_DENY, perms, entry->audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms & AA_LINK_BITS : 0, 2, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
if (!dfarules->add_rule_vec(entry->rule_mode, perms, entry->audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms & AA_LINK_BITS : 0, 2, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (is_change_profile_perms(entry->perms)) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -725,13 +728,13 @@ static int process_dfa_entry(aare_rules *dfarules, struct cod_entry *entry)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* regular change_profile rule */
|
||||
if (!dfarules->add_rule_vec(entry->rule_mode == RULE_DENY,
|
||||
if (!dfarules->add_rule_vec(entry->rule_mode,
|
||||
AA_CHANGE_PROFILE | onexec_perms,
|
||||
0, index - 1, &vec[1], parseopts, false))
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
|
||||
/* onexec rules - both rules are needed for onexec */
|
||||
if (!dfarules->add_rule_vec(entry->rule_mode == RULE_DENY, onexec_perms,
|
||||
if (!dfarules->add_rule_vec(entry->rule_mode, onexec_perms,
|
||||
0, 1, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -740,7 +743,7 @@ static int process_dfa_entry(aare_rules *dfarules, struct cod_entry *entry)
|
|||
* unsafe exec transitions
|
||||
*/
|
||||
onexec_perms |= (entry->perms & (AA_EXEC_BITS | ALL_AA_EXEC_UNSAFE));
|
||||
if (!dfarules->add_rule_vec(entry->rule_mode == RULE_DENY, onexec_perms,
|
||||
if (!dfarules->add_rule_vec(entry->rule_mode, onexec_perms,
|
||||
0, index, vec, parseopts, false))
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -980,6 +983,80 @@ int post_process_policydb_ents(Profile *prof)
|
|||
return TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
static bool gen_net_rule(Profile *prof, u16 family, unsigned int type_mask,
|
||||
bool audit, rule_mode_t rmode) {
|
||||
std::ostringstream buffer;
|
||||
std::string buf;
|
||||
|
||||
buffer << "\\x" << std::setfill('0') << std::setw(2) << std::hex << AA_CLASS_NETV8;
|
||||
buffer << "\\x" << std::setfill('0') << std::setw(2) << std::hex << ((family & 0xff00) >> 8);
|
||||
buffer << "\\x" << std::setfill('0') << std::setw(2) << std::hex << (family & 0xff);
|
||||
if (type_mask > 0xffff) {
|
||||
buffer << "..";
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
buffer << "\\x" << std::setfill('0') << std::setw(2) << std::hex << ((type_mask & 0xff00) >> 8);
|
||||
buffer << "\\x" << std::setfill('0') << std::setw(2) << std::hex << (type_mask & 0xff);
|
||||
}
|
||||
buf = buffer.str();
|
||||
if (!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rmode, map_perms(AA_VALID_NET_PERMS),
|
||||
audit ? map_perms(AA_VALID_NET_PERMS) : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static bool gen_af_rules(Profile *prof, u16 family, unsigned int type_mask,
|
||||
unsigned int audit_mask, rule_mode_t rmode)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (type_mask > 0xffff && audit_mask > 0xffff) {
|
||||
/* instead of generating multiple rules wild card type */
|
||||
return gen_net_rule(prof, family, type_mask, audit_mask, rmode);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
int t;
|
||||
/* generate rules for types that are set */
|
||||
for (t = 0; t < 16; t++) {
|
||||
if (type_mask & (1 << t)) {
|
||||
if (!gen_net_rule(prof, family, t,
|
||||
audit_mask & (1 << t),
|
||||
rmode))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool post_process_policydb_net(Profile *prof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u16 af;
|
||||
|
||||
/* no network rules defined so we don't have generate them */
|
||||
if (!prof->net.allow)
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
|
||||
/* generate rules if the af has something set */
|
||||
for (af = AF_UNSPEC; af < get_af_max(); af++) {
|
||||
if (prof->net.allow[af] ||
|
||||
prof->net.deny[af] ||
|
||||
prof->net.audit[af] ||
|
||||
prof->net.quiet[af]) {
|
||||
if (!gen_af_rules(prof, af, prof->net.allow[af],
|
||||
prof->net.audit[af],
|
||||
{ RULE_ALLOW}))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
if (!gen_af_rules(prof, af, prof->net.deny[af],
|
||||
prof->net.quiet[af],
|
||||
{ RULE_DENY}))
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define MAKE_STR(X) #X
|
||||
#define CLASS_STR(X) "\\d" MAKE_STR(X)
|
||||
#define MAKE_SUB_STR(X) "\\000" MAKE_STR(X)
|
||||
|
|
@ -1013,9 +1090,8 @@ int process_profile_policydb(Profile *prof)
|
|||
/* insert entries to show indicate what compiler/policy expects
|
||||
* to be supported
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
if (features_supports_userns &&
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_ns, 0, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_ns, RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
/* don't add mediated classes to unconfined profiles */
|
||||
|
|
@ -1023,35 +1099,35 @@ int process_profile_policydb(Profile *prof)
|
|||
prof->flags.mode != MODE_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
|
||||
/* note: this activates fs based unix domain sockets mediation on connect */
|
||||
if (kernel_abi_version > 5 &&
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_file, 0, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_file, RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
if (features_supports_mount &&
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_mount, 0, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_mount, RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
if (features_supports_dbus &&
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_dbus, 0, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_dbus, RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
if (features_supports_signal &&
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_signal, 0, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_signal, RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
if (features_supports_ptrace &&
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_ptrace, 0, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_ptrace, RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
if (features_supports_networkv8 &&
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_netv8, 0, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_netv8, RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
if (features_supports_unix &&
|
||||
(!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_extended_net, 0, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts) ||
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_net_unix, 0, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts)))
|
||||
(!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_extended_net, RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts) ||
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_net_unix, RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts)))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
if (features_supports_posix_mqueue &&
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_posix_mqueue, 0, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_posix_mqueue, RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
if (features_supports_sysv_mqueue &&
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_sysv_mqueue, 0, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_sysv_mqueue, RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
if (features_supports_io_uring &&
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_io_uring, 0, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_io_uring, RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1060,11 +1136,11 @@ int process_profile_policydb(Profile *prof)
|
|||
// This requires file rule processing happen first
|
||||
if (!prof->dfa.rules->rule_count) {
|
||||
// add null dfa
|
||||
if (!prof->dfa.rules->add_rule(deny_file, true, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
if (!prof->dfa.rules->add_rule(deny_file, RULE_DENY, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!prof->policy.rules->rule_count) {
|
||||
if (!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_file, true, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
if (!prof->policy.rules->add_rule(mediates_file, RULE_DENY, AA_MAY_READ, 0, parseopts))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
int xmatch_len = 0;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -133,8 +133,9 @@ int ptrace_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
|
|||
|
||||
buf = buffer.str();
|
||||
if (perms & AA_VALID_PTRACE_PERMS) {
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY, perms, audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode, perms,
|
||||
audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -316,8 +316,9 @@ int signal_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
|
|||
|
||||
buf = buffer.str();
|
||||
if (perms & (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE)) {
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY, perms, audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode,
|
||||
perms, audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -95,9 +95,9 @@ int userns_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
|
|||
buffer << "\\x" << std::setfill('0') << std::setw(2) << std::hex << AA_CLASS_NS;
|
||||
buf = buffer.str();
|
||||
if (perms & AA_VALID_USERNS_PERMS) {
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode == RULE_DENY, perms,
|
||||
audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), rule_mode, perms,
|
||||
audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
|
||||
parseopts))
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue