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add more descriptions of abstractions, remove netdomain comments, remove comment about 'ix' being infrequently used, add short comment about tunables and variables, and an erroneous symlink reference
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1 changed files with 72 additions and 125 deletions
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@ -72,27 +72,6 @@ B<FILEGLOB> = (non-whitespace characters, must start with '/', B<?*[]{}^> have s
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B<ACCESS> = ( 'r' | 'w' | 'l' | 'ix' | 'ux' | 'px' ) I<ACCESS> (not all combinations are allowed; see below.)
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=begin comment
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XXX COMMENTED OUT UNTIL APPARMOR SUPPORTS NETDOMAIN
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B<NETWORK RULE> = ( 'tcp_connect' | 'tcp_accept' | 'udp_send' | 'udp_receive' ) [ ( 'to' I<IP> | 'from' I<IP> ) ] [ 'via' I<IFACE> ] (Obviously, at most one 'to' and at most one 'from' is allowed per line.)
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=
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=B<IP> = I<NUM> '.' I<NUM> '.' I<NUM> '.' I<NUM> [ '/' I<NETMASK> ] [ ':' ( I<PORT> | I<PORTRANGE> ) ]
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B<NUM> = [0-9]+
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B<NETMASK> = I<NUM> [ I<NUM> ... ] (CIDR notation)
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B<PORT> = I<NUM> [ I<NUM> ... ] (0-65535, inclusive)
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B<PORTRANGE> = I<PORT> '-' I<PORT> (low port, high port, inclusive)
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B<IFACE> = [a-z0-9]+ (name of interface; e.g., 'eth0')
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=end comment
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=back
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All resources and programs need a full path. There may be any number
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@ -168,8 +147,7 @@ Discrete Profile execute entries.
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This mode is useful when a confined program needs to call another
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confined program without gaining the permissions of the target's
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profile, or losing the permissions of the current profile. This mode is
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infrequently used.
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profile, or losing the permissions of the current profile.
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=item B<Discrete Profile execute mode>
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@ -180,8 +158,8 @@ Inherit and Unconstrained execute entries.
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=item B<Link mode>
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Allows the program to be able to create a link with this name
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(including symlinks). When a link is created, the file that is being
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Allows the program to be able to create a link with this name.
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When a link is created, the file that is being
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linked to B<MUST> have the same access permissions as the link being
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created (with the exception that the destination does not have to have
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link access.)
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@ -227,77 +205,6 @@ will expand to one rule to match ab, one rule to match cd
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=back
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=begin comment
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=head2 Network Rules
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AppArmor also performs mandatory per-process mediation of network
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use, similar to tcp_wrappers (hosts_access(5)). Network access control
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is handled a little differently than file system access control ---
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a process only has network use mediated by AppArmor if there are any
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network rules in the program's profile.
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All network rules accept specifications for a "from" address, a "to"
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address, and an interface to use. Leaving a "from" or "to" address
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unspecified is the same as using "0.0.0.0" --- a wildcard equivalent to
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INADDR_ANY. Leaving the ports unspecified for a "from" or "to" address
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is equivalent to using the range 0-65535.
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=over 4
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=item B<tcp_accept>
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is required if a program must be able to use accept(2) to
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accept an incoming TCP session setup handshake. An incoming connection
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that does not match any of the loaded rules is rejected; if no accept
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rule is loaded, the accept(2) system call is quickly rejected with
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-EACCES. If the process is allowed to perform an accept(2), rejected
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connections do NOT cause an error out of the system call --- the
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connection is simply dropped with an RST.
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=item B<tcp_connect>
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is required if a program must be able to use connect(2) to
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initiate an outgoing TCP session setup handshake. An outgoing connection
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that does not match any of the loaded rules is rejected with -EACCES.
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(It is a known issue that I<tcp_connect> does not mediate TCP session
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setup when only a "via iface" is specified; read(2) and write(2)
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mediation will still occur, so explicit data transfer is impossible.)
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=item B<udp_send>
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is required if a program must be able to use send(2), sendto(2),
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sendmsg(2), or write(2) to communicate using a UDP socket. No outgoing
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packet is sent, and -EACCES is returned to the process.
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(It is a known issue that I<udp_send> does not mediate outgoing UDP
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packets when only a "via iface" rule is specified. If the socket is
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connected, read(2) and write(2) mediation will still occur; however,
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explicit data transfer is possible.)
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=item B<udp_receive>
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is required if a program must be able to use recv(2), recvfrom(2),
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recvmsg(2), or read(2) to communicate using a UDP socket. The incoming
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packet is thrown away and no notice is sent to the communicating peer;
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if no receive rule is loaded, the system calls are quickly rejected with
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-EACCES. If the process is allowed to receive, rejected packets do NOT
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cause an error out of the system call --- the packet is simply dropped.
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=back
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Of special note is programs spawned by inetd(8), xinetd(8), tcpserver,
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or similar programs; as the inetd will perform an accept(2) on behalf of
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a configured service, the profile for inetd must include a I<tcp_accept>
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rule that allows connections to the service. In addition, if the program
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spawned by the inetd uses a different profile than the inetd (strongly
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recommended), then the spawned program's profile must also include a
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I<tcp_accept> or I<tcp_connect> rule, so that the short-circuit tests
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may be satisfied.
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=end comment
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=head2 #include mechanism
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AppArmor provides an easy abstraction mechanism to group common file
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@ -321,40 +228,80 @@ descriptions of how some of the abstractions are used.
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=over 4
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=item F<abstractions/audio>
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Includes accesses to device files used for audio applications.
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=item F<abstractions/authentication>
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Includes access to files and services typically necessary for services
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that perform user authentication.
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=item F<abstractions/base>
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includes files that should be readable and writable in all profiles.
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Includes files that should be readable and writable in all profiles.
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=begin comment
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=item F<abstractions/bash>
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Note: this profile set is required by programs compiled with the
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Immunix security toolchain - including StackGuard and FormatGuard.
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(Should you need to write a profile that does not include network
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rules, you may I<#include E<lt>program-chunks/base-filesE<gt>>,
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which is only the file portions of the F<abstractions/base>
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abstraction.)
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=end comment
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=item F<abstractions/nameservice>
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includes file rules to allow DNS, LDAP, NIS, SMB, user and group password
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databases, services, and protocols lookups.
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Includes many files used by bash; useful for interactive shells and
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programs that call system(3).
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=item F<abstractions/consoles>
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includes read and write access to the device files controlling the
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Includes read and write access to the device files controlling the
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virtual console, sshd(8), xterm(1), etc. This abstraction is needed for
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many programs that interact with users.
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=item F<abstractions/wutmp>
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=item F<abstractions/fonts>
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includes write access to files used to maintain wtmp(5) and utmp(5)
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databases, used with the w(1) and associated commands.
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Includes access to fonts and the font libraries.
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=item F<abstractions/gnome>
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Includes read and write access to GNOME configuration files, as well as
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read access to GNOME libraries.
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=item F<abstractions/kde>
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Includes read and write access to KDE configuration files, as well as
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read access to KDE libraries.
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=item F<abstractions/kerberosclient>
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includes file access rules needed for common kerberos clients.
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Includes file access rules needed for common kerberos clients.
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=item F<abstractions/nameservice>
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Includes file rules to allow DNS, LDAP, NIS, SMB, user and group password
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databases, services, and protocols lookups.
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=item F<abstractions/perl>
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Includes read access to perl modules.
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=item F<abstractions/user-download>
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=item F<abstractions/user-mail>
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=item F<abstractions/user-manpages>
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=item F<abstractions/user-tmp>
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=item F<abstractions/user-write>
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Some profiles for typical "user" programs will use these include files
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to describe rights that users have in the system.
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=item F<abstractions/wutmp>
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Includes write access to files used to maintain wtmp(5) and utmp(5)
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databases, used with the w(1) and associated commands.
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=item F<abstractions/X>
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Includes read access to libraries, configuration files, X authentication
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files, and the X socket.
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=back
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@ -362,15 +309,15 @@ The abstractions stored in F</etc/apparmor.d/program-chunks/> are
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intended for use by specific program suites, and are not generally
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useful.
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=begin comment
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most networking rules have been
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placed in these files to facilitate better constraints. (The AppArmor
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network policies allow communication with all IP addresses, and restrict
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access to specific ports only. A system administrator may wish to allow
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certain services to communicate only with specific subnets.)
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=end comment
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Some of the abstractions rely on variables that are set in files in the
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F</etc/apparmor.d/tunables/> directory. These variables are currently
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B<@{HOME}> and B<@{HOMEDIR}>. Variables cannot be set in profile scope;
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they can only be set before the profile. Therefore, any profiles that
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use abstractions should either B<#include E<lt>tunables/globalE<gt>> or
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otherwise ensure that B<@{HOME}> and B<@{HOMEDIR}> are set before
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starting the profile definition. The autodep(8) and genprof(8) utilities
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will automatically emit B<#include E<lt>tunables/globalE<gt>> in
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generated profiles.
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=head1 EXAMPLE
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