address the capabilities half of https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=165170 -- remaining in this bug report is variables descriptions

This commit is contained in:
Seth Arnold 2006-04-24 21:59:20 +00:00
parent 2a2010c839
commit 8fc3074343

View file

@ -54,10 +54,13 @@ B<COMMENT> = '#' I<TEXT>
B<TEXT> = any characters
B<PROFILE> = [ I<COMMENT> ... ] I<PROGRAM> [ I<flags=(complain)> ]'{' [ ( I<RESOURCE RULE> | I<COMMENT> | I<INCLUDE> | I<SUBPROFILE> ) ... ] '}'
B<PROFILE> = [ I<COMMENT> ... ] I<PROGRAM> [ I<flags=(complain)> ]'{' [ ( I<RESOURCE RULE> | I<COMMENT> | I<INCLUDE> | I<SUBPROFILE> | 'capability ' I<CAPABILITY> ) ... ] '}'
B<SUBPROFILE> = [ I<COMMENT> ... ] I<PROGRAMHAT> '{' [ ( I<FILE RULE> | I<COMMENT> | I<INCLUDE> ) ... ] '}'
B<CAPABILITY> = (lowercase capability name without 'CAP_' prefix; see
capabilities(7))
B<PROGRAM> = (non-whitespace characters except for B<^>, must start with '/')
B<PROGRAMHAT> = '^' (non-whitespace characters; see change_hat(2) for a description of how this "hat" is used.)
@ -172,6 +175,19 @@ Comments start with # and may begin at any place within a line. The
comment ends when the line ends. This is the same comment style as
shell scripts.
=head2 Capabilities
The only capabilities a confined process may use may be enumerated; for
the complete list, please refer to capabilities(7). Note that granting
some capabilities renders AppArmor confinement for that domain advisory;
while open(2), read(2), write(2), etc., will still return error when
access is not granted, some capabilities allow loading kernel modules,
arbitrary access to IPC, ability to bypass discretionary access controls,
and other operations that are typically reserved for the root user.
The only operations that cannot be controlled in this manner are mount(2)
and umount(2), which are always denied to confined processes.
=head2 Globbing
File resources may be specified with a globbing syntax similar to that