Add kernel patches for 3.5 and 3.6 kernels

2025-03-04 08:24:42 +01:00 · 2012-11-20 17:00:59 -08:00 · 2012-11-20 17:00:59 -08:00 · b5c6e11aca
commit b5c6e11aca
parent fd6a33f89e
12 changed files with 4102 additions and 0 deletions
--- a/kernel-patches/3.5/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-Add-profile-introspection-file.patch
+++ b/kernel-patches/3.5/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-Add-profile-introspection-file.patch
@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
 From 05bf1eb7276886a3eda0588a8e012b558b693e96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2010 02:32:02 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH 1/6] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: Add profile introspection file
 to interface
 Add the dynamic profiles file to the interace, to allow load policy
 introspection.
 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
 ---
 security/apparmor/Kconfig      |    9 ++
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c |  231 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 240 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
 index 9b9013b..51ebf96 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
 +++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -29,3 +29,12 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
 	  boot.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
 +
 +config SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
 +	bool "Enable AppArmor 2.4 compatability"
 +	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
 +	default y
 +	help
 +	  This option enables compatability with AppArmor 2.4.  It is
 +          recommended if compatability with older versions of AppArmor
 +          is desired.
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 index 16c15ec..42b7c9f 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -182,6 +182,234 @@ const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops = {
 	.release	= single_release,
 };
 +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
 +/**
 + * __next_namespace - find the next namespace to list
 + * @root: root namespace to stop search at (NOT NULL)
 + * @ns: current ns position (NOT NULL)
 + *
 + * Find the next namespace from @ns under @root and handle all locking needed
 + * while switching current namespace.
 + *
 + * Returns: next namespace or NULL if at last namespace under @root
 + * NOTE: will not unlock root->lock
 + */
 +static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
 +					     struct aa_namespace *ns)
 +{
 +	struct aa_namespace *parent;
 +
 +	/* is next namespace a child */
 +	if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) {
 +		struct aa_namespace *next;
 +		next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list);
 +		read_lock(&next->lock);
 +		return next;
 +	}
 +
 +	/* check if the next ns is a sibling, parent, gp, .. */
 +	parent = ns->parent;
 +	while (parent) {
 +		read_unlock(&ns->lock);
 +		list_for_each_entry_continue(ns, &parent->sub_ns, base.list) {
 +			read_lock(&ns->lock);
 +			return ns;
 +		}
 +		if (parent == root)
 +			return NULL;
 +		ns = parent;
 +		parent = parent->parent;
 +	}
 +
 +	return NULL;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * __first_profile - find the first profile in a namespace
 + * @root: namespace that is root of profiles being displayed (NOT NULL)
 + * @ns: namespace to start in   (NOT NULL)
 + *
 + * Returns: unrefcounted profile or NULL if no profile
 + */
 +static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
 +					  struct aa_namespace *ns)
 +{
 +	for ( ; ns; ns = __next_namespace(root, ns)) {
 +		if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles))
 +			return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles,
 +						struct aa_profile, base.list);
 +	}
 +	return NULL;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * __next_profile - step to the next profile in a profile tree
 + * @profile: current profile in tree (NOT NULL)
 + *
 + * Perform a depth first taversal on the profile tree in a namespace
 + *
 + * Returns: next profile or NULL if done
 + * Requires: profile->ns.lock to be held
 + */
 +static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *parent;
 +	struct aa_namespace *ns = p->ns;
 +
 +	/* is next profile a child */
 +	if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles))
 +		return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p),
 +					base.list);
 +
 +	/* is next profile a sibling, parent sibling, gp, subling, .. */
 +	parent = p->parent;
 +	while (parent) {
 +		list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &parent->base.profiles,
 +					     base.list)
 +				return p;
 +		p = parent;
 +		parent = parent->parent;
 +	}
 +
 +	/* is next another profile in the namespace */
 +	list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
 +		return p;
 +
 +	return NULL;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * next_profile - step to the next profile in where ever it may be
 + * @root: root namespace  (NOT NULL)
 + * @profile: current profile  (NOT NULL)
 + *
 + * Returns: next profile or NULL if there isn't one
 + */
 +static struct aa_profile *next_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
 +				       struct aa_profile *profile)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *next = __next_profile(profile);
 +	if (next)
 +		return next;
 +
 +	/* finished all profiles in namespace move to next namespace */
 +	return __first_profile(root, __next_namespace(root, profile->ns));
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * p_start - start a depth first traversal of profile tree
 + * @f: seq_file to fill
 + * @pos: current position
 + *
 + * Returns: first profile under current namespace or NULL if none found
 + *
 + * acquires first ns->lock
 + */
 +static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
 +	__acquires(root->lock)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
 +	struct aa_namespace *root = aa_current_profile()->ns;
 +	loff_t l = *pos;
 +	f->private = aa_get_namespace(root);
 +
 +
 +	/* find the first profile */
 +	read_lock(&root->lock);
 +	profile = __first_profile(root, root);
 +
 +	/* skip to position */
 +	for (; profile && l > 0; l--)
 +		profile = next_profile(root, profile);
 +
 +	return profile;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * p_next - read the next profile entry
 + * @f: seq_file to fill
 + * @p: profile previously returned
 + * @pos: current position
 + *
 + * Returns: next profile after @p or NULL if none
 + *
 + * may acquire/release locks in namespace tree as necessary
 + */
 +static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
 +	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
 +	(*pos)++;
 +
 +	return next_profile(root, profile);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
 + * @f: seq_file we are filling
 + * @p: the last profile writen
 + *
 + * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
 + */
 +static void p_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
 +	__releases(root->lock)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
 +	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private, *ns;
 +
 +	if (profile) {
 +		for (ns = profile->ns; ns && ns != root; ns = ns->parent)
 +			read_unlock(&ns->lock);
 +	}
 +	read_unlock(&root->lock);
 +	aa_put_namespace(root);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * seq_show_profile - show a profile entry
 + * @f: seq_file to file
 + * @p: current position (profile)    (NOT NULL)
 + *
 + * Returns: error on failure
 + */
 +static int seq_show_profile(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *)p;
 +	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
 +
 +	if (profile->ns != root)
 +		seq_printf(f, ":%s://", aa_ns_name(root, profile->ns));
 +	seq_printf(f, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname,
 +		   COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? "complain" : "enforce");
 +
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 +static const struct seq_operations aa_fs_profiles_op = {
 +	.start = p_start,
 +	.next = p_next,
 +	.stop = p_stop,
 +	.show = seq_show_profile,
 +};
 +
 +static int profiles_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 +{
 +	return seq_open(file, &aa_fs_profiles_op);
 +}
 +
 +static int profiles_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 +{
 +	return seq_release(inode, file);
 +}
 +
 +const struct file_operations aa_fs_profiles_fops = {
 +	.open = profiles_open,
 +	.read = seq_read,
 +	.llseek = seq_lseek,
 +	.release = profiles_release,
 +};
 +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24 */
 +
 /** Base file system setup **/
 static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_file[] = {
@@ -210,6 +438,9 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_apparmor[] = {
 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load),
 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace),
 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove),
 +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
 +	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0640, &aa_fs_profiles_fops),
 +#endif
 	AA_FS_DIR("features", aa_fs_entry_features),
 	{ }
 };
 -- 
 1.7.10.4
--- a/kernel-patches/3.5/0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch
+++ b/kernel-patches/3.5/0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch
@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
 From 4facdf9db37c12ff655c91270d9030e2ed805ca2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 15:03:36 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH 2/6] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
 Base support for network mediation.
 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 ---
 security/apparmor/.gitignore       |    2 +-
 security/apparmor/Makefile         |   42 +++++++++-
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c     |    1 +
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h  |    4 +
 security/apparmor/include/net.h    |   44 ++++++++++
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h |    3 +
 security/apparmor/lsm.c            |  112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/net.c            |  162 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/policy.c         |    1 +
 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c  |   46 ++++++++++
 10 files changed, 414 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
 index 4d995ae..d5b291e 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
 +++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #
 # Generated include files
 #
 -af_names.h
 +net_names.h
 capability_names.h
 rlim_names.h
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
 index 806bd19..19daa85 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
 +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
 -              resource.o sid.o file.o
 +              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
 -clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
 +clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
 # Build a lower case string table of capability names
@@ -20,6 +20,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
 	-e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
 	echo "};" >> $@
 +# Build a lower case string table of address family names
 +# Transform lines from
 +#    define AF_LOCAL	1	/* POSIX name for AF_UNIX	*/
 +#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
 +# to
 +#    [1] = "local",
 +#    [2] = "inet",
 +#
 +# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
 +# Transforms lines from
 +#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
 +# to
 +#    #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet"
 +quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
 +cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
 +	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
 +	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
 +	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
 +	echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
 +	sed -r -n 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
 +	 $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
 +
 +# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
 +# Transform lines from
 +#    SOCK_STREAM	= 1,
 +# to
 +#    [1] = "stream",
 +quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
 +cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
 +	sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
 +	-e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
 +	echo "};" >> $@
 # Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
 # Transforms lines from
@@ -56,6 +88,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
 	    tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
 $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
 +$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
 $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
 $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
 			    $(src)/Makefile
@@ -63,3 +96,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
 $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \
 		      $(src)/Makefile
 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
 +$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
 +		     $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
 +		     $(src)/Makefile
 +	$(call cmd,make-af)
 +	$(call cmd,make-sock)
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 index 42b7c9f..114fb23 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
 static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
 +	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
 	{ }
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 index 4b7e189..17734f9 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 			u32 denied;
 			uid_t ouid;
 		} fs;
 +		struct {
 +			int type, protocol;
 +			struct sock *sk;
 +		} net;
 	};
 };
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000..cb8a121
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
 +/*
 + * AppArmor security module
 + *
 + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
 + *
 + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
 + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
 + *
 + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 + * License.
 + */
 +
 +#ifndef __AA_NET_H
 +#define __AA_NET_H
 +
 +#include <net/sock.h>
 +
 +#include "apparmorfs.h"
 +
 +/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
 + * @allowed: basic network families permissions
 + * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
 + * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
 + */
 +struct aa_net {
 +	u16 allow[AF_MAX];
 +	u16 audit[AF_MAX];
 +	u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
 +};
 +
 +extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[];
 +
 +extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
 +		       int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
 +extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
 +
 +static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
 +{
 +	/* NOP */
 +}
 +
 +#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
 index bda4569..eb13a73 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include "capability.h"
 #include "domain.h"
 #include "file.h"
 +#include "net.h"
 #include "resource.h"
 extern const char *const profile_mode_names[];
@@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ struct aa_policydb {
  * @policy: general match rules governing policy
  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
 + * @net: network controls for the profile
  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
  *
  * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data.  Each profile
@@ -194,6 +196,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
 	struct aa_policydb policy;
 	struct aa_file_rules file;
 	struct aa_caps caps;
 +	struct aa_net net;
 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
 };
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 index 8ea39aa..f628734 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include "include/context.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
 +#include "include/net.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/procattr.h"
@@ -614,6 +615,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
 	return error;
 }
 +static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile;
 +	int error = 0;
 +
 +	if (kern)
 +		return 0;
 +
 +	profile = __aa_current_profile();
 +	if (!unconfined(profile))
 +		error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
 +				    NULL);
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
 +				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
 +				   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
 +				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
 +				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
 +				      int optname)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
 +				      int optname)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
 +}
 +
 static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.name =				"apparmor",
@@ -646,6 +745,19 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
 +	.socket_create =		apparmor_socket_create,
 +	.socket_bind =			apparmor_socket_bind,
 +	.socket_connect =		apparmor_socket_connect,
 +	.socket_listen =		apparmor_socket_listen,
 +	.socket_accept =		apparmor_socket_accept,
 +	.socket_sendmsg =		apparmor_socket_sendmsg,
 +	.socket_recvmsg =		apparmor_socket_recvmsg,
 +	.socket_getsockname =		apparmor_socket_getsockname,
 +	.socket_getpeername =		apparmor_socket_getpeername,
 +	.socket_getsockopt =		apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
 +	.socket_setsockopt =		apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
 +	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
 +
 	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
 	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
 	.cred_prepare =			apparmor_cred_prepare,
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000..003dd18
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
 +/*
 + * AppArmor security module
 + *
 + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
 + *
 + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
 + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
 + *
 + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 + * License.
 + */
 +
 +#include "include/apparmor.h"
 +#include "include/audit.h"
 +#include "include/context.h"
 +#include "include/net.h"
 +#include "include/policy.h"
 +
 +#include "net_names.h"
 +
 +struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = {
 +	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_FS_AF_MASK),
 +	{ }
 +};
 +
 +/* audit callback for net specific fields */
 +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 +{
 +	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 +
 +	audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
 +	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) {
 +		audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
 +	} else {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
 +	}
 +	audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
 +	if (sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]) {
 +		audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]);
 +	} else {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad->net.type);
 +	}
 +	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad->net.protocol);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * audit_net - audit network access
 + * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
 + * @op: operation being checked
 + * @family: network family
 + * @type:   network type
 + * @protocol: network protocol
 + * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
 + * @error: error code for failure else 0
 + *
 + * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
 + */
 +static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
 +		     int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
 +{
 +	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
 +	struct common_audit_data sa;
 +	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
 +	struct lsm_network_audit net = { };
 +	if (sk) {
 +		sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 +	} else {
 +		sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 +	}
 +	/* todo fill in socket addr info */
 +	sa.aad = &aad;
 +	sa.u.net = &net;
 +	sa.aad->op = op,
 +	sa.u.net->family = family;
 +	sa.u.net->sk = sk;
 +	sa.aad->net.type = type;
 +	sa.aad->net.protocol = protocol;
 +	sa.aad->error = error;
 +
 +	if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
 +		u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net->family];
 +		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
 +			   !(1 << sa.aad->net.type & audit_mask)))
 +			return 0;
 +		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
 +	} else {
 +		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
 +		u16 kill_mask = 0;
 +		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
 +
 +		if (denied & kill_mask)
 +			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
 +
 +		if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
 +		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
 +		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
 +			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
 +	}
 +
 +	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
 + * @op: operation being checked
 + * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
 + * @family: network family
 + * @type:   network type
 + * @protocol: network protocol
 + *
 + * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
 + */
 +int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
 +		int protocol, struct sock *sk)
 +{
 +	u16 family_mask;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
 +		return -EINVAL;
 +
 +	if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
 +		return -EINVAL;
 +
 +	/* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
 +	if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
 +		return 0;
 +
 +	family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
 +
 +	error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
 +
 +	return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
 + * @op: operation being checked
 + * @sk: sock being revalidated  (NOT NULL)
 + *
 + * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
 + */
 +int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile;
 +	int error = 0;
 +
 +	/* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
 +	 * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
 +	 */
 +	if (in_interrupt())
 +		return 0;
 +
 +	profile = __aa_current_profile();
 +	if (!unconfined(profile))
 +		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
 +				    sk->sk_protocol, sk);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
 index cf5fd22..27c8161 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
 +	aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
 	aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
 index 329b1fd..1b90dfa 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -193,6 +193,19 @@ fail:
 	return 0;
 }
 +static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
 +{
 +	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
 +		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
 +			return 0;
 +		if (data)
 +			*data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
 +		e->pos += sizeof(u16);
 +		return 1;
 +	}
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
 {
 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
@@ -471,6 +484,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
 	const char *name = NULL;
 +	size_t size = 0;
 	int i, error = -EPROTO;
 	kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
 	u32 tmp;
@@ -564,6 +578,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
 	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
 		goto fail;
 +	size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
 +	if (size) {
 +
 +		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
 +			/* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
 +			 * never request
 +			 */
 +			if (i >= AF_MAX) {
 +				u16 tmp;
 +				if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
 +				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
 +				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
 +					goto fail;
 +				continue;
 +			}
 +			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
 +				goto fail;
 +			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
 +				goto fail;
 +			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
 +				goto fail;
 +		}
 +		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
 +			goto fail;
 +	}
 +	/*
 +	 * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
 +	 * by IPC
 +	 */
 +	profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
 +	profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
 +
 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
 		/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
 		profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
 -- 
 1.7.10.4
--- a/kernel-patches/3.5/0003-apparmor-Fix-quieting-of-audit-messages-for-network-.patch
+++ b/kernel-patches/3.5/0003-apparmor-Fix-quieting-of-audit-messages-for-network-.patch
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
 From 4b25e62dc1e8d81d80f778e1e57b7c38ba4fd901 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:34:00 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH 3/6] apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network
 mediation
 If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by
 either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for
 denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs.
 1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly
   tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that
   should have resulted in the application being killed did not.
 2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied.
   This would result in network rejections always being logged even when
   they had been specifically marked as quieted.
 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 ---
 security/apparmor/net.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
 index 003dd18..6e6e5c9 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/net.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
 	} else {
 		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
 		u16 kill_mask = 0;
 -		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
 +		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type);
 		if (denied & kill_mask)
 			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
 -- 
 1.7.10.4
--- a/kernel-patches/3.5/0004-apparmor-Ensure-apparmor-does-not-mediate-kernel-bas.patch
+++ b/kernel-patches/3.5/0004-apparmor-Ensure-apparmor-does-not-mediate-kernel-bas.patch
@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
 From e2d745442133f625e715f713c0441f0f2a7ea6ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:34:01 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH 4/6] apparmor: Ensure apparmor does not mediate kernel based
 sockets
 Currently apparmor makes the assumption that kernel sockets are unmediated
 because mediation is only done against tasks that have a profile attached.
 Ensure we never get in a situation where a kernel socket is being mediated
 by tagging the sk_security field for kernel sockets.
 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 ---
 security/apparmor/include/net.h |    2 ++
 security/apparmor/lsm.c         |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/net.c         |    3 +++
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
 index cb8a121..bc8198b 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 #include "apparmorfs.h"
 +#define AA_SOCK_KERN 0xAA
 +
 /* struct aa_net - network confinement data
  * @allowed: basic network families permissions
  * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 index f628734..a172d01 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -630,6 +630,16 @@ static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 	return error;
 }
 +static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 +				       int type, int protocol, int kern)
 +{
 +	if (kern)
 +		/* tag kernel sockets so we don't mediate them later */
 +		sock->sk->sk_security = (void *) AA_SOCK_KERN;
 +
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
 				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
@@ -713,6 +723,12 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
 	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
 }
 +static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
 +				       struct sock *newsk)
 +{
 +	newsk->sk_security = sk->sk_security;
 +}
 +
 static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.name =				"apparmor",
@@ -746,6 +762,7 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
 	.socket_create =		apparmor_socket_create,
 +	.socket_post_create =		apparmor_socket_post_create,
 	.socket_bind =			apparmor_socket_bind,
 	.socket_connect =		apparmor_socket_connect,
 	.socket_listen =		apparmor_socket_listen,
@@ -757,6 +774,7 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.socket_getsockopt =		apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
 	.socket_setsockopt =		apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
 	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
 +	.sk_clone_security =		apparmor_sk_clone_security,
 	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
 	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
 index 6e6e5c9..baa4df1 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/net.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -153,6 +153,9 @@ int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
 	if (in_interrupt())
 		return 0;
 +	if (sk->sk_security == (void *) AA_SOCK_KERN)
 +		return 0;
 +
 	profile = __aa_current_profile();
 	if (!unconfined(profile))
 		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
 -- 
 1.7.10.4
--- a/kernel-patches/3.5/0005-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch
+++ b/kernel-patches/3.5/0005-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch
@ -0,0 +1,957 @@
 From 272431fc90fab50ea9593d969d3ab8d98f03627c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:58:05 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH 5/6] UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate
 mount
 Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
 rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
 The basic form of the rules are.
  [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
  [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
  [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
  [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
  remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
  where [conds] can be
    fstype=<expr>
    options=<expr>
 Example mount commands
  mount,		# allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
  mount fstype=procfs,  # allow mounting procfs anywhere
  mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar,  # readonly bind mount
  mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
  mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
  mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
  umount,
  umount /m*,
 See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
 ---
 security/apparmor/Makefile           |    2 +-
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c       |   13 +
 security/apparmor/audit.c            |    4 +
 security/apparmor/domain.c           |    2 +-
 security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h |    3 +-
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h    |   11 +
 security/apparmor/include/domain.h   |    2 +
 security/apparmor/include/mount.h    |   54 +++
 security/apparmor/lsm.c              |   59 ++++
 security/apparmor/mount.c            |  620 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 10 files changed, 767 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/mount.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/mount.c
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
 index 19daa85..63e0a4c 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
 +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
 -              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
 +              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o mount.o
 clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 index 114fb23..ee77ec9 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -426,10 +426,23 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
 	{ }
 };
 +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = {
 +	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"),
 +	{ }
 +};
 +
 +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = {
 +	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile",           1),
 +	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root",        1),
 +	{ }
 +};
 +
 static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
 	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
 +	AA_FS_DIR("mount",                      aa_fs_entry_mount),
 +	AA_FS_DIR("namespaces",                 aa_fs_entry_namespaces),
 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
 	{ }
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
 index 3ae28db..e267963 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ const char *const op_table[] = {
 	"file_mmap",
 	"file_mprotect",
 +	"pivotroot",
 +	"mount",
 +	"umount",
 +
 	"create",
 	"post_create",
 	"bind",
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
 index b81ea10..afa8671 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
  *
  * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
  */
 -static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
 +struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
 	struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
 index 40aedd9..e243d96 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@
 #define AA_CLASS_NET		4
 #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
 #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
 +#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT		7
 -#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
 +#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_MOUNT
 /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
 extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 index 17734f9..66a738c 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ enum aa_ops {
 	OP_FMMAP,
 	OP_FMPROT,
 +	OP_PIVOTROOT,
 +	OP_MOUNT,
 +	OP_UMOUNT,
 +
 	OP_CREATE,
 	OP_POST_CREATE,
 	OP_BIND,
@@ -122,6 +126,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 			unsigned long max;
 		} rlim;
 		struct {
 +			const char *src_name;
 +			const char *type;
 +			const char *trans;
 +			const char *data;
 +			unsigned long flags;
 +		} mnt;
 +		struct {
 			const char *target;
 			u32 request;
 			u32 denied;
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
 index de04464..a3f70c5 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain {
 	char **table;
 };
 +struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex);
 +
 int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000..bc17a53
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
 +/*
 + * AppArmor security module
 + *
 + * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
 + *
 + * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd.
 + *
 + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 + * License.
 + */
 +
 +#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
 +#define __AA_MOUNT_H
 +
 +#include <linux/fs.h>
 +#include <linux/path.h>
 +
 +#include "domain.h"
 +#include "policy.h"
 +
 +/* mount perms */
 +#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT	0x01
 +#define AA_MAY_MOUNT		0x02
 +#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT		0x04
 +#define AA_AUDIT_DATA		0x40
 +#define AA_CONT_MATCH		0x40
 +
 +#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
 +
 +int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +	       unsigned long flags, void *data);
 +
 +int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +		  const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
 +
 +
 +int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +			 unsigned long flags);
 +
 +int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +		  const char *old_name);
 +
 +int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name,
 +		 struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
 +		 void *data);
 +
 +int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
 +
 +int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
 +		  struct path *new_path);
 +
 +#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 index a172d01..5da8af9 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/procattr.h"
 +#include "include/mount.h"
 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
 int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
@@ -504,6 +505,60 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 			   !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
 }
 +static int apparmor_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type,
 +			     unsigned long flags, void *data)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile;
 +	int error = 0;
 +
 +	/* Discard magic */
 +	if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
 +		flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
 +
 +	flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
 +
 +	profile = __aa_current_profile();
 +	if (!unconfined(profile)) {
 +		if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
 +			error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data);
 +		else if (flags & MS_BIND)
 +			error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags);
 +		else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
 +				  MS_UNBINDABLE))
 +			error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags);
 +		else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
 +			error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name);
 +		else
 +			error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type,
 +					     flags, data);
 +	}
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile;
 +	int error = 0;
 +
 +	profile = __aa_current_profile();
 +	if (!unconfined(profile))
 +		error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile;
 +	int error = 0;
 +
 +	profile = __aa_current_profile();
 +	if (!unconfined(profile))
 +		error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 				char **value)
 {
@@ -737,6 +792,10 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.capget =			apparmor_capget,
 	.capable =			apparmor_capable,
 +	.sb_mount =			apparmor_sb_mount,
 +	.sb_umount =			apparmor_sb_umount,
 +	.sb_pivotroot =			apparmor_sb_pivotroot,
 +
 	.path_link =			apparmor_path_link,
 	.path_unlink =			apparmor_path_unlink,
 	.path_symlink =			apparmor_path_symlink,
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000..478aa4d
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
 +/*
 + * AppArmor security module
 + *
 + * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
 + *
 + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
 + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
 + *
 + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 + * License.
 + */
 +
 +#include <linux/fs.h>
 +#include <linux/mount.h>
 +#include <linux/namei.h>
 +
 +#include "include/apparmor.h"
 +#include "include/audit.h"
 +#include "include/context.h"
 +#include "include/domain.h"
 +#include "include/file.h"
 +#include "include/match.h"
 +#include "include/mount.h"
 +#include "include/path.h"
 +#include "include/policy.h"
 +
 +
 +static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
 +{
 +	if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
 +	else
 +		audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
 +	if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
 +	if (flags & MS_NODEV)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
 +	if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
 +	if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
 +	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
 +	if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
 +	if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
 +	if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
 +	if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
 +	if (flags & MS_BIND)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
 +	if (flags & MS_MOVE)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
 +	if (flags & MS_SILENT)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
 +	if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
 +	if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
 +				 ", unbindable");
 +	if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
 +				 ", private");
 +	if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
 +				 ", slave");
 +	if (flags & MS_SHARED)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
 +				 ", shared");
 +	if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
 +	if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
 +	if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
 +	if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
 + * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
 + * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
 + */
 +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 +{
 +	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 +
 +	if (sa->aad->mnt.type) {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
 +		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.type);
 +	}
 +	if (sa->aad->mnt.src_name) {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
 +		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.src_name);
 +	}
 +	if (sa->aad->mnt.trans) {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
 +		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.trans);
 +	}
 +	if (sa->aad->mnt.flags || sa->aad->op == OP_MOUNT) {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
 +		audit_mnt_flags(ab, sa->aad->mnt.flags);
 +		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
 +	}
 +	if (sa->aad->mnt.data) {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
 +		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.data);
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
 + * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
 + * @gfp: allocation flags
 + * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
 + * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
 + * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
 + * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
 + * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
 + * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags
 + * @data: filesystem mount flags
 + * @request: permissions requested
 + * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
 + * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
 + * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
 + *
 + * Returns: %0 or error on failure
 + */
 +static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, int op,
 +		       const char *name, const char *src_name,
 +		       const char *type, const char *trans,
 +		       unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
 +		       struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
 +{
 +	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
 +	struct common_audit_data sa = { };
 +	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
 +
 +	if (likely(!error)) {
 +		u32 mask = perms->audit;
 +
 +		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
 +			mask = 0xffff;
 +
 +		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
 +		request &= mask;
 +
 +		if (likely(!request))
 +			return 0;
 +		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
 +	} else {
 +		/* only report permissions that were denied */
 +		request = request & ~perms->allow;
 +
 +		if (request & perms->kill)
 +			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
 +
 +		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
 +		if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
 +		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
 +		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
 +			request &= ~perms->quiet;
 +
 +		if (!request)
 +			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ?
 +				complain_error(error) : error;
 +	}
 +
 +	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 +	sa.aad = &aad;
 +	sa.aad->op = op;
 +	sa.aad->name = name;
 +	sa.aad->mnt.src_name = src_name;
 +	sa.aad->mnt.type = type;
 +	sa.aad->mnt.trans = trans;
 +	sa.aad->mnt.flags = flags;
 +	if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
 +		sa.aad->mnt.data = data;
 +	sa.aad->info = info;
 +	sa.aad->error = error;
 +
 +	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, gfp, &sa, audit_cb);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
 + * @dfa: dfa to match against
 + * @state: state to start in
 + * @flags: mount flags to match against
 + *
 + * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
 + * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
 + * on the flags.
 + *
 + * Returns: next state after flags match
 + */
 +static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
 +				    unsigned long flags)
 +{
 +	unsigned int i;
 +
 +	for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
 +		if ((1 << i) & flags)
 +			state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
 +	}
 +
 +	return state;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state
 + * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL)
 + * @state: state match finished in
 + *
 + * Returns: mount permissions
 + */
 +static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
 +					   unsigned int state)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms;
 +
 +	perms.kill = 0;
 +	perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
 +	perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
 +	perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
 +	perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
 +
 +	return perms;
 +}
 +
 +static const char const *mnt_info_table[] = {
 +	"match succeeded",
 +	"failed mntpnt match",
 +	"failed srcname match",
 +	"failed type match",
 +	"failed flags match",
 +	"failed data match"
 +};
 +
 +/*
 + * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
 + * index into the mnt_info_table above
 + */
 +static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 +			const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
 +			const char *type, unsigned long flags,
 +			void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms)
 +{
 +	unsigned int state;
 +
 +	state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt);
 +	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
 +	if (!state)
 +		return 1;
 +
 +	if (devname)
 +		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname);
 +	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
 +	if (!state)
 +		return 2;
 +
 +	if (type)
 +		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type);
 +	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
 +	if (!state)
 +		return 3;
 +
 +	state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags);
 +	if (!state)
 +		return 4;
 +	*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
 +	if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
 +		return 0;
 +
 +	/* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
 +	if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) {
 +		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
 +		if (!state)
 +			return 4;
 +
 +		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data);
 +		if (!state)
 +			return 5;
 +		*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
 +		if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
 +			return 0;
 +	}
 +
 +	/* failed at end of flags match */
 +	return 4;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
 + * @profile: the confining profile
 + * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
 + * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
 + * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
 + * @flags: mount flags to match
 + * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
 + * @binary: whether @data is binary
 + * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match
 + * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging
 + *
 + * Returns: 0 on success else error
 + */
 +static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt,
 +		     const char *devname, const char *type,
 +		     unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
 +		     struct file_perms *perms, const char **info)
 +{
 +	int pos;
 +
 +	if (!profile->policy.dfa)
 +		return -EACCES;
 +
 +	pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa,
 +			   profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
 +			   mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms);
 +	if (pos) {
 +		*info = mnt_info_table[pos];
 +		return -EACCES;
 +	}
 +
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 +static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path)
 +{
 +	return profile->path_flags |
 +		S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0;
 +}
 +
 +int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +	       unsigned long flags, void *data)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	const char *name, *info = NULL;
 +	char *buffer = NULL;
 +	int binary, error;
 +
 +	binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
 +			     &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary,
 +			  &perms, &info);
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
 +			    NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
 +			    error);
 +	kfree(buffer);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +		  const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
 +	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
 +	struct path old_path;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
 +		return -EINVAL;
 +
 +	flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
 +			     &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
 +			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
 +	path_put(&old_path);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0,
 +			  &perms, &info);
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
 +			    NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
 +			    info, error);
 +	kfree(buffer);
 +	kfree(old_buffer);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +			 unsigned long flags)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	char *buffer = NULL;
 +	const char *name, *info = NULL;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	/* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
 +	flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
 +		  MS_UNBINDABLE);
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
 +			     &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms,
 +			  &info);
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
 +			    NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
 +			    error);
 +	kfree(buffer);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +		  const char *orig_name)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
 +	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
 +	struct path old_path;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
 +		return -EINVAL;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
 +			     &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
 +			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
 +	path_put(&old_path);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0,
 +			  &perms, &info);
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
 +			    NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
 +			    info, error);
 +	kfree(buffer);
 +	kfree(old_buffer);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name,
 +		 struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
 +		 void *data)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
 +	const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
 +	int binary = 1;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	dev_name = orig_dev_name;
 +	if (type) {
 +		int requires_dev;
 +		struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type);
 +		if (!fstype)
 +			return -ENODEV;
 +
 +		binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
 +		requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
 +		put_filesystem(fstype);
 +
 +		if (requires_dev) {
 +			struct path dev_path;
 +
 +			if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) {
 +				error = -ENOENT;
 +				goto out;
 +			}
 +
 +			error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path);
 +			if (error)
 +				goto audit;
 +
 +			error = aa_path_name(&dev_path,
 +					     path_flags(profile, &dev_path),
 +					     &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info);
 +			path_put(&dev_path);
 +			if (error)
 +				goto audit;
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
 +			     &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary,
 +			  &perms, &info);
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name,  dev_name,
 +			    type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
 +			    error);
 +	kfree(buffer);
 +	kfree(dev_buffer);
 +
 +out:
 +	return error;
 +
 +}
 +
 +int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	char *buffer = NULL;
 +	const char *name, *info = NULL;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
 +	error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name,
 +			     &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) {
 +		unsigned int state;
 +		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
 +				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
 +				     name);
 +		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
 +	}
 +
 +	if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
 +		error = -EACCES;
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
 +			    NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
 +	kfree(buffer);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
 +		  struct path *new_path)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	struct aa_profile *target = NULL;
 +	char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL;
 +	const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
 +			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
 +			     &new_buffer, &new_name, &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	if (profile->policy.dfa) {
 +		unsigned int state;
 +		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
 +				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
 +				     new_name);
 +		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
 +		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
 +		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
 +	}
 +
 +	if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) {
 +		if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) {
 +			target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex);
 +			if (!target)
 +				error = -ENOENT;
 +			else
 +				error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
 +		}
 +	} else
 +		error = -EACCES;
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
 +			    old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL,
 +			    0, NULL,  AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error);
 +	aa_put_profile(target);
 +	kfree(old_buffer);
 +	kfree(new_buffer);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 -- 
 1.7.10.4
--- a/kernel-patches/3.5/0006-apparmor-fix-IRQ-stack-overflow-during-free_profile.patch
+++ b/kernel-patches/3.5/0006-apparmor-fix-IRQ-stack-overflow-during-free_profile.patch
@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
 From f58c91bc1871d604f88d0056099dc34f8ce3ae21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2012 06:27:32 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH 6/6] apparmor: fix IRQ stack overflow during free_profile
 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1056078
 Profile replacement can cause long chains of profiles to build up when
 the profile being replaced is pinned. When the pinned profile is finally
 freed, it puts the reference to its replacement, which may in turn nest
 another call to free_profile on the stack. Because this may happen for
 each profile in the replacedby chain this can result in a recusion that
 causes the stack to overflow.
 Break this nesting by directly walking the chain of replacedby profiles
 (ie. use iteration instead of recursion to free the list). This results
 in at most 2 levels of free_profile being called, while freeing a
 replacedby chain.
 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
 ---
 security/apparmor/policy.c |   24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
 index 27c8161..56e5304 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -724,6 +724,8 @@ fail:
  */
 static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
 +	struct aa_profile *p;
 +
 	AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile);
 	if (!profile)
@@ -752,7 +754,27 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
 -	aa_put_profile(profile->replacedby);
 +	/* put the profile reference for replacedby, but not via
 +	 * put_profile(kref_put).
 +	 * replacedby can form a long chain that can result in cascading
 +	 * frees that blows the stack because kref_put makes a nested fn
 +	 * call (it looks like recursion, with free_profile calling
 +	 * free_profile) for each profile in the chain lp#1056078.
 +	 */
 +	for (p = profile->replacedby; p; ) {
 +		if (atomic_dec_and_test(&p->base.count.refcount)) {
 +			/* no more refs on p, grab its replacedby */
 +			struct aa_profile *next = p->replacedby;
 +			/* break the chain */
 +			p->replacedby = NULL;
 +			/* now free p, chain is broken */
 +			free_profile(p);
 +
 +			/* follow up with next profile in the chain */
 +			p = next;
 +		} else
 +			break;
 +	}
 	kzfree(profile);
 }
 -- 
 1.7.10.4
--- a/kernel-patches/3.6/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-Add-profile-introspection-file.patch
+++ b/kernel-patches/3.6/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-Add-profile-introspection-file.patch
@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
 From 259cf7251194d81a4a3c4e6d76c2cf9e38d5647d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2010 02:32:02 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH 1/6] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: Add profile introspection file
 to interface
 Add the dynamic profiles file to the interace, to allow load policy
 introspection.
 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
 ---
 security/apparmor/Kconfig      |    9 ++
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c |  231 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 240 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
 index 9b9013b..51ebf96 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
 +++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -29,3 +29,12 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
 	  boot.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
 +
 +config SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
 +	bool "Enable AppArmor 2.4 compatability"
 +	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
 +	default y
 +	help
 +	  This option enables compatability with AppArmor 2.4.  It is
 +          recommended if compatability with older versions of AppArmor
 +          is desired.
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 index 16c15ec..42b7c9f 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -182,6 +182,234 @@ const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops = {
 	.release	= single_release,
 };
 +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
 +/**
 + * __next_namespace - find the next namespace to list
 + * @root: root namespace to stop search at (NOT NULL)
 + * @ns: current ns position (NOT NULL)
 + *
 + * Find the next namespace from @ns under @root and handle all locking needed
 + * while switching current namespace.
 + *
 + * Returns: next namespace or NULL if at last namespace under @root
 + * NOTE: will not unlock root->lock
 + */
 +static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
 +					     struct aa_namespace *ns)
 +{
 +	struct aa_namespace *parent;
 +
 +	/* is next namespace a child */
 +	if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) {
 +		struct aa_namespace *next;
 +		next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list);
 +		read_lock(&next->lock);
 +		return next;
 +	}
 +
 +	/* check if the next ns is a sibling, parent, gp, .. */
 +	parent = ns->parent;
 +	while (parent) {
 +		read_unlock(&ns->lock);
 +		list_for_each_entry_continue(ns, &parent->sub_ns, base.list) {
 +			read_lock(&ns->lock);
 +			return ns;
 +		}
 +		if (parent == root)
 +			return NULL;
 +		ns = parent;
 +		parent = parent->parent;
 +	}
 +
 +	return NULL;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * __first_profile - find the first profile in a namespace
 + * @root: namespace that is root of profiles being displayed (NOT NULL)
 + * @ns: namespace to start in   (NOT NULL)
 + *
 + * Returns: unrefcounted profile or NULL if no profile
 + */
 +static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
 +					  struct aa_namespace *ns)
 +{
 +	for ( ; ns; ns = __next_namespace(root, ns)) {
 +		if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles))
 +			return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles,
 +						struct aa_profile, base.list);
 +	}
 +	return NULL;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * __next_profile - step to the next profile in a profile tree
 + * @profile: current profile in tree (NOT NULL)
 + *
 + * Perform a depth first taversal on the profile tree in a namespace
 + *
 + * Returns: next profile or NULL if done
 + * Requires: profile->ns.lock to be held
 + */
 +static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *parent;
 +	struct aa_namespace *ns = p->ns;
 +
 +	/* is next profile a child */
 +	if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles))
 +		return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p),
 +					base.list);
 +
 +	/* is next profile a sibling, parent sibling, gp, subling, .. */
 +	parent = p->parent;
 +	while (parent) {
 +		list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &parent->base.profiles,
 +					     base.list)
 +				return p;
 +		p = parent;
 +		parent = parent->parent;
 +	}
 +
 +	/* is next another profile in the namespace */
 +	list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
 +		return p;
 +
 +	return NULL;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * next_profile - step to the next profile in where ever it may be
 + * @root: root namespace  (NOT NULL)
 + * @profile: current profile  (NOT NULL)
 + *
 + * Returns: next profile or NULL if there isn't one
 + */
 +static struct aa_profile *next_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
 +				       struct aa_profile *profile)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *next = __next_profile(profile);
 +	if (next)
 +		return next;
 +
 +	/* finished all profiles in namespace move to next namespace */
 +	return __first_profile(root, __next_namespace(root, profile->ns));
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * p_start - start a depth first traversal of profile tree
 + * @f: seq_file to fill
 + * @pos: current position
 + *
 + * Returns: first profile under current namespace or NULL if none found
 + *
 + * acquires first ns->lock
 + */
 +static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
 +	__acquires(root->lock)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
 +	struct aa_namespace *root = aa_current_profile()->ns;
 +	loff_t l = *pos;
 +	f->private = aa_get_namespace(root);
 +
 +
 +	/* find the first profile */
 +	read_lock(&root->lock);
 +	profile = __first_profile(root, root);
 +
 +	/* skip to position */
 +	for (; profile && l > 0; l--)
 +		profile = next_profile(root, profile);
 +
 +	return profile;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * p_next - read the next profile entry
 + * @f: seq_file to fill
 + * @p: profile previously returned
 + * @pos: current position
 + *
 + * Returns: next profile after @p or NULL if none
 + *
 + * may acquire/release locks in namespace tree as necessary
 + */
 +static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
 +	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
 +	(*pos)++;
 +
 +	return next_profile(root, profile);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
 + * @f: seq_file we are filling
 + * @p: the last profile writen
 + *
 + * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
 + */
 +static void p_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
 +	__releases(root->lock)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
 +	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private, *ns;
 +
 +	if (profile) {
 +		for (ns = profile->ns; ns && ns != root; ns = ns->parent)
 +			read_unlock(&ns->lock);
 +	}
 +	read_unlock(&root->lock);
 +	aa_put_namespace(root);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * seq_show_profile - show a profile entry
 + * @f: seq_file to file
 + * @p: current position (profile)    (NOT NULL)
 + *
 + * Returns: error on failure
 + */
 +static int seq_show_profile(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *)p;
 +	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
 +
 +	if (profile->ns != root)
 +		seq_printf(f, ":%s://", aa_ns_name(root, profile->ns));
 +	seq_printf(f, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname,
 +		   COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? "complain" : "enforce");
 +
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 +static const struct seq_operations aa_fs_profiles_op = {
 +	.start = p_start,
 +	.next = p_next,
 +	.stop = p_stop,
 +	.show = seq_show_profile,
 +};
 +
 +static int profiles_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 +{
 +	return seq_open(file, &aa_fs_profiles_op);
 +}
 +
 +static int profiles_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 +{
 +	return seq_release(inode, file);
 +}
 +
 +const struct file_operations aa_fs_profiles_fops = {
 +	.open = profiles_open,
 +	.read = seq_read,
 +	.llseek = seq_lseek,
 +	.release = profiles_release,
 +};
 +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24 */
 +
 /** Base file system setup **/
 static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_file[] = {
@@ -210,6 +438,9 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_apparmor[] = {
 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load),
 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace),
 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove),
 +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
 +	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0640, &aa_fs_profiles_fops),
 +#endif
 	AA_FS_DIR("features", aa_fs_entry_features),
 	{ }
 };
 -- 
 1.7.10.4
--- a/kernel-patches/3.6/0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch
+++ b/kernel-patches/3.6/0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch
@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
 From 0317e6ba6aa4adc71f645b7da5318f4caa69267e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 15:03:36 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH 2/6] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
 Base support for network mediation.
 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 ---
 security/apparmor/.gitignore       |    2 +-
 security/apparmor/Makefile         |   42 +++++++++-
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c     |    1 +
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h  |    4 +
 security/apparmor/include/net.h    |   44 ++++++++++
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h |    3 +
 security/apparmor/lsm.c            |  112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/net.c            |  162 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/policy.c         |    1 +
 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c  |   46 ++++++++++
 10 files changed, 414 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
 index 4d995ae..d5b291e 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
 +++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #
 # Generated include files
 #
 -af_names.h
 +net_names.h
 capability_names.h
 rlim_names.h
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
 index 806bd19..19daa85 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
 +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
 -              resource.o sid.o file.o
 +              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
 -clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
 +clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
 # Build a lower case string table of capability names
@@ -20,6 +20,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
 	-e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
 	echo "};" >> $@
 +# Build a lower case string table of address family names
 +# Transform lines from
 +#    define AF_LOCAL	1	/* POSIX name for AF_UNIX	*/
 +#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
 +# to
 +#    [1] = "local",
 +#    [2] = "inet",
 +#
 +# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
 +# Transforms lines from
 +#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
 +# to
 +#    #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet"
 +quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
 +cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
 +	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
 +	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
 +	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
 +	echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
 +	sed -r -n 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
 +	 $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
 +
 +# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
 +# Transform lines from
 +#    SOCK_STREAM	= 1,
 +# to
 +#    [1] = "stream",
 +quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
 +cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
 +	sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
 +	-e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
 +	echo "};" >> $@
 # Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
 # Transforms lines from
@@ -56,6 +88,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
 	    tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
 $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
 +$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
 $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
 $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
 			    $(src)/Makefile
@@ -63,3 +96,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
 $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \
 		      $(src)/Makefile
 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
 +$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
 +		     $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
 +		     $(src)/Makefile
 +	$(call cmd,make-af)
 +	$(call cmd,make-sock)
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 index 42b7c9f..114fb23 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
 static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
 +	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
 	{ }
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 index 4b7e189..17734f9 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 			u32 denied;
 			uid_t ouid;
 		} fs;
 +		struct {
 +			int type, protocol;
 +			struct sock *sk;
 +		} net;
 	};
 };
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000..cb8a121
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
 +/*
 + * AppArmor security module
 + *
 + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
 + *
 + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
 + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
 + *
 + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 + * License.
 + */
 +
 +#ifndef __AA_NET_H
 +#define __AA_NET_H
 +
 +#include <net/sock.h>
 +
 +#include "apparmorfs.h"
 +
 +/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
 + * @allowed: basic network families permissions
 + * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
 + * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
 + */
 +struct aa_net {
 +	u16 allow[AF_MAX];
 +	u16 audit[AF_MAX];
 +	u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
 +};
 +
 +extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[];
 +
 +extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
 +		       int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
 +extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
 +
 +static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
 +{
 +	/* NOP */
 +}
 +
 +#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
 index bda4569..eb13a73 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include "capability.h"
 #include "domain.h"
 #include "file.h"
 +#include "net.h"
 #include "resource.h"
 extern const char *const profile_mode_names[];
@@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ struct aa_policydb {
  * @policy: general match rules governing policy
  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
 + * @net: network controls for the profile
  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
  *
  * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data.  Each profile
@@ -194,6 +196,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
 	struct aa_policydb policy;
 	struct aa_file_rules file;
 	struct aa_caps caps;
 +	struct aa_net net;
 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
 };
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 index 8ea39aa..f628734 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include "include/context.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
 +#include "include/net.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/procattr.h"
@@ -614,6 +615,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
 	return error;
 }
 +static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile;
 +	int error = 0;
 +
 +	if (kern)
 +		return 0;
 +
 +	profile = __aa_current_profile();
 +	if (!unconfined(profile))
 +		error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
 +				    NULL);
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
 +				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
 +				   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
 +				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
 +				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
 +				      int optname)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
 +				      int optname)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
 +{
 +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 +
 +	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
 +}
 +
 static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.name =				"apparmor",
@@ -646,6 +745,19 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
 +	.socket_create =		apparmor_socket_create,
 +	.socket_bind =			apparmor_socket_bind,
 +	.socket_connect =		apparmor_socket_connect,
 +	.socket_listen =		apparmor_socket_listen,
 +	.socket_accept =		apparmor_socket_accept,
 +	.socket_sendmsg =		apparmor_socket_sendmsg,
 +	.socket_recvmsg =		apparmor_socket_recvmsg,
 +	.socket_getsockname =		apparmor_socket_getsockname,
 +	.socket_getpeername =		apparmor_socket_getpeername,
 +	.socket_getsockopt =		apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
 +	.socket_setsockopt =		apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
 +	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
 +
 	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
 	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
 	.cred_prepare =			apparmor_cred_prepare,
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000..003dd18
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
 +/*
 + * AppArmor security module
 + *
 + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
 + *
 + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
 + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
 + *
 + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 + * License.
 + */
 +
 +#include "include/apparmor.h"
 +#include "include/audit.h"
 +#include "include/context.h"
 +#include "include/net.h"
 +#include "include/policy.h"
 +
 +#include "net_names.h"
 +
 +struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = {
 +	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_FS_AF_MASK),
 +	{ }
 +};
 +
 +/* audit callback for net specific fields */
 +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 +{
 +	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 +
 +	audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
 +	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) {
 +		audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
 +	} else {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
 +	}
 +	audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
 +	if (sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]) {
 +		audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]);
 +	} else {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad->net.type);
 +	}
 +	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad->net.protocol);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * audit_net - audit network access
 + * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
 + * @op: operation being checked
 + * @family: network family
 + * @type:   network type
 + * @protocol: network protocol
 + * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
 + * @error: error code for failure else 0
 + *
 + * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
 + */
 +static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
 +		     int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
 +{
 +	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
 +	struct common_audit_data sa;
 +	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
 +	struct lsm_network_audit net = { };
 +	if (sk) {
 +		sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 +	} else {
 +		sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 +	}
 +	/* todo fill in socket addr info */
 +	sa.aad = &aad;
 +	sa.u.net = &net;
 +	sa.aad->op = op,
 +	sa.u.net->family = family;
 +	sa.u.net->sk = sk;
 +	sa.aad->net.type = type;
 +	sa.aad->net.protocol = protocol;
 +	sa.aad->error = error;
 +
 +	if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
 +		u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net->family];
 +		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
 +			   !(1 << sa.aad->net.type & audit_mask)))
 +			return 0;
 +		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
 +	} else {
 +		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
 +		u16 kill_mask = 0;
 +		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
 +
 +		if (denied & kill_mask)
 +			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
 +
 +		if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
 +		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
 +		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
 +			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
 +	}
 +
 +	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
 + * @op: operation being checked
 + * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
 + * @family: network family
 + * @type:   network type
 + * @protocol: network protocol
 + *
 + * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
 + */
 +int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
 +		int protocol, struct sock *sk)
 +{
 +	u16 family_mask;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
 +		return -EINVAL;
 +
 +	if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
 +		return -EINVAL;
 +
 +	/* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
 +	if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
 +		return 0;
 +
 +	family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
 +
 +	error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
 +
 +	return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
 + * @op: operation being checked
 + * @sk: sock being revalidated  (NOT NULL)
 + *
 + * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
 + */
 +int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile;
 +	int error = 0;
 +
 +	/* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
 +	 * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
 +	 */
 +	if (in_interrupt())
 +		return 0;
 +
 +	profile = __aa_current_profile();
 +	if (!unconfined(profile))
 +		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
 +				    sk->sk_protocol, sk);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
 index cf5fd22..27c8161 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
 +	aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
 	aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
 index 329b1fd..1b90dfa 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -193,6 +193,19 @@ fail:
 	return 0;
 }
 +static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
 +{
 +	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
 +		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
 +			return 0;
 +		if (data)
 +			*data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
 +		e->pos += sizeof(u16);
 +		return 1;
 +	}
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
 {
 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
@@ -471,6 +484,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
 	const char *name = NULL;
 +	size_t size = 0;
 	int i, error = -EPROTO;
 	kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
 	u32 tmp;
@@ -564,6 +578,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
 	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
 		goto fail;
 +	size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
 +	if (size) {
 +
 +		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
 +			/* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
 +			 * never request
 +			 */
 +			if (i >= AF_MAX) {
 +				u16 tmp;
 +				if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
 +				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
 +				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
 +					goto fail;
 +				continue;
 +			}
 +			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
 +				goto fail;
 +			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
 +				goto fail;
 +			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
 +				goto fail;
 +		}
 +		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
 +			goto fail;
 +	}
 +	/*
 +	 * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
 +	 * by IPC
 +	 */
 +	profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
 +	profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
 +
 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
 		/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
 		profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
 -- 
 1.7.10.4
--- a/kernel-patches/3.6/0003-apparmor-Fix-quieting-of-audit-messages-for-network-.patch
+++ b/kernel-patches/3.6/0003-apparmor-Fix-quieting-of-audit-messages-for-network-.patch
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
 From b1cb9d1b4f0d585c271c584da954d9eb2e347b40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:34:00 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH 3/6] apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network
 mediation
 If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by
 either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for
 denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs.
 1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly
   tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that
   should have resulted in the application being killed did not.
 2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied.
   This would result in network rejections always being logged even when
   they had been specifically marked as quieted.
 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 ---
 security/apparmor/net.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
 index 003dd18..6e6e5c9 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/net.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
 	} else {
 		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
 		u16 kill_mask = 0;
 -		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
 +		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type);
 		if (denied & kill_mask)
 			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
 -- 
 1.7.10.4
--- a/kernel-patches/3.6/0004-apparmor-Ensure-apparmor-does-not-mediate-kernel-bas.patch
+++ b/kernel-patches/3.6/0004-apparmor-Ensure-apparmor-does-not-mediate-kernel-bas.patch
@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
 From f284c9554341aded2d599e9355574cac36c2dd23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:34:01 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH 4/6] apparmor: Ensure apparmor does not mediate kernel based
 sockets
 Currently apparmor makes the assumption that kernel sockets are unmediated
 because mediation is only done against tasks that have a profile attached.
 Ensure we never get in a situation where a kernel socket is being mediated
 by tagging the sk_security field for kernel sockets.
 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 ---
 security/apparmor/include/net.h |    2 ++
 security/apparmor/lsm.c         |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/net.c         |    3 +++
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
 index cb8a121..bc8198b 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 #include "apparmorfs.h"
 +#define AA_SOCK_KERN 0xAA
 +
 /* struct aa_net - network confinement data
  * @allowed: basic network families permissions
  * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 index f628734..a172d01 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -630,6 +630,16 @@ static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 	return error;
 }
 +static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 +				       int type, int protocol, int kern)
 +{
 +	if (kern)
 +		/* tag kernel sockets so we don't mediate them later */
 +		sock->sk->sk_security = (void *) AA_SOCK_KERN;
 +
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
 				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
@@ -713,6 +723,12 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
 	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
 }
 +static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
 +				       struct sock *newsk)
 +{
 +	newsk->sk_security = sk->sk_security;
 +}
 +
 static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.name =				"apparmor",
@@ -746,6 +762,7 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
 	.socket_create =		apparmor_socket_create,
 +	.socket_post_create =		apparmor_socket_post_create,
 	.socket_bind =			apparmor_socket_bind,
 	.socket_connect =		apparmor_socket_connect,
 	.socket_listen =		apparmor_socket_listen,
@@ -757,6 +774,7 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.socket_getsockopt =		apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
 	.socket_setsockopt =		apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
 	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
 +	.sk_clone_security =		apparmor_sk_clone_security,
 	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
 	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
 index 6e6e5c9..baa4df1 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/net.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -153,6 +153,9 @@ int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
 	if (in_interrupt())
 		return 0;
 +	if (sk->sk_security == (void *) AA_SOCK_KERN)
 +		return 0;
 +
 	profile = __aa_current_profile();
 	if (!unconfined(profile))
 		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
 -- 
 1.7.10.4
--- a/kernel-patches/3.6/0005-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch
+++ b/kernel-patches/3.6/0005-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch
@ -0,0 +1,957 @@
 From f5e962d77f98deab3461404567abd4759f5445a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:58:05 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH 5/6] UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate
 mount
 Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
 rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
 The basic form of the rules are.
  [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
  [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
  [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
  [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
  remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
  where [conds] can be
    fstype=<expr>
    options=<expr>
 Example mount commands
  mount,		# allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
  mount fstype=procfs,  # allow mounting procfs anywhere
  mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar,  # readonly bind mount
  mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
  mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
  mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
  umount,
  umount /m*,
 See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
 ---
 security/apparmor/Makefile           |    2 +-
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c       |   13 +
 security/apparmor/audit.c            |    4 +
 security/apparmor/domain.c           |    2 +-
 security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h |    3 +-
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h    |   11 +
 security/apparmor/include/domain.h   |    2 +
 security/apparmor/include/mount.h    |   54 +++
 security/apparmor/lsm.c              |   59 ++++
 security/apparmor/mount.c            |  620 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 10 files changed, 767 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/mount.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/mount.c
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
 index 19daa85..63e0a4c 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
 +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
 -              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
 +              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o mount.o
 clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 index 114fb23..ee77ec9 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -426,10 +426,23 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
 	{ }
 };
 +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = {
 +	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"),
 +	{ }
 +};
 +
 +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = {
 +	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile",           1),
 +	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root",        1),
 +	{ }
 +};
 +
 static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
 	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
 +	AA_FS_DIR("mount",                      aa_fs_entry_mount),
 +	AA_FS_DIR("namespaces",                 aa_fs_entry_namespaces),
 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
 	{ }
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
 index 3ae28db..e267963 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ const char *const op_table[] = {
 	"file_mmap",
 	"file_mprotect",
 +	"pivotroot",
 +	"mount",
 +	"umount",
 +
 	"create",
 	"post_create",
 	"bind",
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
 index b81ea10..afa8671 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
  *
  * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
  */
 -static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
 +struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
 	struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
 index 40aedd9..e243d96 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@
 #define AA_CLASS_NET		4
 #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
 #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
 +#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT		7
 -#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
 +#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_MOUNT
 /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
 extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 index 17734f9..66a738c 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ enum aa_ops {
 	OP_FMMAP,
 	OP_FMPROT,
 +	OP_PIVOTROOT,
 +	OP_MOUNT,
 +	OP_UMOUNT,
 +
 	OP_CREATE,
 	OP_POST_CREATE,
 	OP_BIND,
@@ -122,6 +126,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 			unsigned long max;
 		} rlim;
 		struct {
 +			const char *src_name;
 +			const char *type;
 +			const char *trans;
 +			const char *data;
 +			unsigned long flags;
 +		} mnt;
 +		struct {
 			const char *target;
 			u32 request;
 			u32 denied;
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
 index de04464..a3f70c5 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain {
 	char **table;
 };
 +struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex);
 +
 int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000..bc17a53
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
 +/*
 + * AppArmor security module
 + *
 + * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
 + *
 + * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd.
 + *
 + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 + * License.
 + */
 +
 +#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
 +#define __AA_MOUNT_H
 +
 +#include <linux/fs.h>
 +#include <linux/path.h>
 +
 +#include "domain.h"
 +#include "policy.h"
 +
 +/* mount perms */
 +#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT	0x01
 +#define AA_MAY_MOUNT		0x02
 +#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT		0x04
 +#define AA_AUDIT_DATA		0x40
 +#define AA_CONT_MATCH		0x40
 +
 +#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
 +
 +int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +	       unsigned long flags, void *data);
 +
 +int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +		  const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
 +
 +
 +int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +			 unsigned long flags);
 +
 +int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +		  const char *old_name);
 +
 +int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name,
 +		 struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
 +		 void *data);
 +
 +int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
 +
 +int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
 +		  struct path *new_path);
 +
 +#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 index a172d01..5da8af9 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/procattr.h"
 +#include "include/mount.h"
 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
 int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
@@ -504,6 +505,60 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 			   !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
 }
 +static int apparmor_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type,
 +			     unsigned long flags, void *data)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile;
 +	int error = 0;
 +
 +	/* Discard magic */
 +	if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
 +		flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
 +
 +	flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
 +
 +	profile = __aa_current_profile();
 +	if (!unconfined(profile)) {
 +		if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
 +			error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data);
 +		else if (flags & MS_BIND)
 +			error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags);
 +		else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
 +				  MS_UNBINDABLE))
 +			error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags);
 +		else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
 +			error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name);
 +		else
 +			error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type,
 +					     flags, data);
 +	}
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile;
 +	int error = 0;
 +
 +	profile = __aa_current_profile();
 +	if (!unconfined(profile))
 +		error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
 +{
 +	struct aa_profile *profile;
 +	int error = 0;
 +
 +	profile = __aa_current_profile();
 +	if (!unconfined(profile))
 +		error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 				char **value)
 {
@@ -737,6 +792,10 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.capget =			apparmor_capget,
 	.capable =			apparmor_capable,
 +	.sb_mount =			apparmor_sb_mount,
 +	.sb_umount =			apparmor_sb_umount,
 +	.sb_pivotroot =			apparmor_sb_pivotroot,
 +
 	.path_link =			apparmor_path_link,
 	.path_unlink =			apparmor_path_unlink,
 	.path_symlink =			apparmor_path_symlink,
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000..478aa4d
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
 +/*
 + * AppArmor security module
 + *
 + * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
 + *
 + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
 + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
 + *
 + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 + * License.
 + */
 +
 +#include <linux/fs.h>
 +#include <linux/mount.h>
 +#include <linux/namei.h>
 +
 +#include "include/apparmor.h"
 +#include "include/audit.h"
 +#include "include/context.h"
 +#include "include/domain.h"
 +#include "include/file.h"
 +#include "include/match.h"
 +#include "include/mount.h"
 +#include "include/path.h"
 +#include "include/policy.h"
 +
 +
 +static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
 +{
 +	if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
 +	else
 +		audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
 +	if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
 +	if (flags & MS_NODEV)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
 +	if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
 +	if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
 +	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
 +	if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
 +	if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
 +	if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
 +	if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
 +	if (flags & MS_BIND)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
 +	if (flags & MS_MOVE)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
 +	if (flags & MS_SILENT)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
 +	if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
 +	if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
 +				 ", unbindable");
 +	if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
 +				 ", private");
 +	if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
 +				 ", slave");
 +	if (flags & MS_SHARED)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
 +				 ", shared");
 +	if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
 +	if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
 +	if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
 +	if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
 +		audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
 + * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
 + * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
 + */
 +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 +{
 +	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 +
 +	if (sa->aad->mnt.type) {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
 +		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.type);
 +	}
 +	if (sa->aad->mnt.src_name) {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
 +		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.src_name);
 +	}
 +	if (sa->aad->mnt.trans) {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
 +		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.trans);
 +	}
 +	if (sa->aad->mnt.flags || sa->aad->op == OP_MOUNT) {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
 +		audit_mnt_flags(ab, sa->aad->mnt.flags);
 +		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
 +	}
 +	if (sa->aad->mnt.data) {
 +		audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
 +		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.data);
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
 + * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
 + * @gfp: allocation flags
 + * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
 + * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
 + * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
 + * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
 + * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
 + * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags
 + * @data: filesystem mount flags
 + * @request: permissions requested
 + * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
 + * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
 + * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
 + *
 + * Returns: %0 or error on failure
 + */
 +static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, int op,
 +		       const char *name, const char *src_name,
 +		       const char *type, const char *trans,
 +		       unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
 +		       struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
 +{
 +	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
 +	struct common_audit_data sa = { };
 +	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
 +
 +	if (likely(!error)) {
 +		u32 mask = perms->audit;
 +
 +		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
 +			mask = 0xffff;
 +
 +		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
 +		request &= mask;
 +
 +		if (likely(!request))
 +			return 0;
 +		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
 +	} else {
 +		/* only report permissions that were denied */
 +		request = request & ~perms->allow;
 +
 +		if (request & perms->kill)
 +			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
 +
 +		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
 +		if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
 +		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
 +		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
 +			request &= ~perms->quiet;
 +
 +		if (!request)
 +			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ?
 +				complain_error(error) : error;
 +	}
 +
 +	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 +	sa.aad = &aad;
 +	sa.aad->op = op;
 +	sa.aad->name = name;
 +	sa.aad->mnt.src_name = src_name;
 +	sa.aad->mnt.type = type;
 +	sa.aad->mnt.trans = trans;
 +	sa.aad->mnt.flags = flags;
 +	if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
 +		sa.aad->mnt.data = data;
 +	sa.aad->info = info;
 +	sa.aad->error = error;
 +
 +	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, gfp, &sa, audit_cb);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
 + * @dfa: dfa to match against
 + * @state: state to start in
 + * @flags: mount flags to match against
 + *
 + * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
 + * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
 + * on the flags.
 + *
 + * Returns: next state after flags match
 + */
 +static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
 +				    unsigned long flags)
 +{
 +	unsigned int i;
 +
 +	for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
 +		if ((1 << i) & flags)
 +			state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
 +	}
 +
 +	return state;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state
 + * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL)
 + * @state: state match finished in
 + *
 + * Returns: mount permissions
 + */
 +static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
 +					   unsigned int state)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms;
 +
 +	perms.kill = 0;
 +	perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
 +	perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
 +	perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
 +	perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
 +
 +	return perms;
 +}
 +
 +static const char const *mnt_info_table[] = {
 +	"match succeeded",
 +	"failed mntpnt match",
 +	"failed srcname match",
 +	"failed type match",
 +	"failed flags match",
 +	"failed data match"
 +};
 +
 +/*
 + * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
 + * index into the mnt_info_table above
 + */
 +static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 +			const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
 +			const char *type, unsigned long flags,
 +			void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms)
 +{
 +	unsigned int state;
 +
 +	state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt);
 +	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
 +	if (!state)
 +		return 1;
 +
 +	if (devname)
 +		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname);
 +	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
 +	if (!state)
 +		return 2;
 +
 +	if (type)
 +		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type);
 +	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
 +	if (!state)
 +		return 3;
 +
 +	state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags);
 +	if (!state)
 +		return 4;
 +	*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
 +	if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
 +		return 0;
 +
 +	/* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
 +	if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) {
 +		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
 +		if (!state)
 +			return 4;
 +
 +		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data);
 +		if (!state)
 +			return 5;
 +		*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
 +		if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
 +			return 0;
 +	}
 +
 +	/* failed at end of flags match */
 +	return 4;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
 + * @profile: the confining profile
 + * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
 + * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
 + * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
 + * @flags: mount flags to match
 + * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
 + * @binary: whether @data is binary
 + * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match
 + * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging
 + *
 + * Returns: 0 on success else error
 + */
 +static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt,
 +		     const char *devname, const char *type,
 +		     unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
 +		     struct file_perms *perms, const char **info)
 +{
 +	int pos;
 +
 +	if (!profile->policy.dfa)
 +		return -EACCES;
 +
 +	pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa,
 +			   profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
 +			   mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms);
 +	if (pos) {
 +		*info = mnt_info_table[pos];
 +		return -EACCES;
 +	}
 +
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 +static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path)
 +{
 +	return profile->path_flags |
 +		S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0;
 +}
 +
 +int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +	       unsigned long flags, void *data)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	const char *name, *info = NULL;
 +	char *buffer = NULL;
 +	int binary, error;
 +
 +	binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
 +			     &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary,
 +			  &perms, &info);
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
 +			    NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
 +			    error);
 +	kfree(buffer);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +		  const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
 +	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
 +	struct path old_path;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
 +		return -EINVAL;
 +
 +	flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
 +			     &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
 +			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
 +	path_put(&old_path);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0,
 +			  &perms, &info);
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
 +			    NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
 +			    info, error);
 +	kfree(buffer);
 +	kfree(old_buffer);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +			 unsigned long flags)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	char *buffer = NULL;
 +	const char *name, *info = NULL;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	/* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
 +	flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
 +		  MS_UNBINDABLE);
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
 +			     &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms,
 +			  &info);
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
 +			    NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
 +			    error);
 +	kfree(buffer);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 +		  const char *orig_name)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
 +	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
 +	struct path old_path;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
 +		return -EINVAL;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
 +			     &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
 +			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
 +	path_put(&old_path);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0,
 +			  &perms, &info);
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
 +			    NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
 +			    info, error);
 +	kfree(buffer);
 +	kfree(old_buffer);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name,
 +		 struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
 +		 void *data)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
 +	const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
 +	int binary = 1;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	dev_name = orig_dev_name;
 +	if (type) {
 +		int requires_dev;
 +		struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type);
 +		if (!fstype)
 +			return -ENODEV;
 +
 +		binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
 +		requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
 +		put_filesystem(fstype);
 +
 +		if (requires_dev) {
 +			struct path dev_path;
 +
 +			if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) {
 +				error = -ENOENT;
 +				goto out;
 +			}
 +
 +			error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path);
 +			if (error)
 +				goto audit;
 +
 +			error = aa_path_name(&dev_path,
 +					     path_flags(profile, &dev_path),
 +					     &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info);
 +			path_put(&dev_path);
 +			if (error)
 +				goto audit;
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
 +			     &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary,
 +			  &perms, &info);
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name,  dev_name,
 +			    type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
 +			    error);
 +	kfree(buffer);
 +	kfree(dev_buffer);
 +
 +out:
 +	return error;
 +
 +}
 +
 +int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	char *buffer = NULL;
 +	const char *name, *info = NULL;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
 +	error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name,
 +			     &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) {
 +		unsigned int state;
 +		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
 +				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
 +				     name);
 +		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
 +	}
 +
 +	if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
 +		error = -EACCES;
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
 +			    NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
 +	kfree(buffer);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 +
 +int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
 +		  struct path *new_path)
 +{
 +	struct file_perms perms = { };
 +	struct aa_profile *target = NULL;
 +	char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL;
 +	const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
 +	int error;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
 +			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
 +			     &new_buffer, &new_name, &info);
 +	if (error)
 +		goto audit;
 +
 +	if (profile->policy.dfa) {
 +		unsigned int state;
 +		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
 +				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
 +				     new_name);
 +		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
 +		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
 +		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
 +	}
 +
 +	if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) {
 +		if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) {
 +			target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex);
 +			if (!target)
 +				error = -ENOENT;
 +			else
 +				error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
 +		}
 +	} else
 +		error = -EACCES;
 +
 +audit:
 +	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
 +			    old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL,
 +			    0, NULL,  AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error);
 +	aa_put_profile(target);
 +	kfree(old_buffer);
 +	kfree(new_buffer);
 +
 +	return error;
 +}
 -- 
 1.7.10.4
--- a/kernel-patches/3.6/0006-apparmor-fix-IRQ-stack-overflow-during-free_profile.patch
+++ b/kernel-patches/3.6/0006-apparmor-fix-IRQ-stack-overflow-during-free_profile.patch
@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
 From 663d5bbe6197bf990721c37ec877ea8ba5840202 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2012 06:27:32 -0700
 Subject: [PATCH 6/6] apparmor: fix IRQ stack overflow during free_profile
 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1056078
 Profile replacement can cause long chains of profiles to build up when
 the profile being replaced is pinned. When the pinned profile is finally
 freed, it puts the reference to its replacement, which may in turn nest
 another call to free_profile on the stack. Because this may happen for
 each profile in the replacedby chain this can result in a recusion that
 causes the stack to overflow.
 Break this nesting by directly walking the chain of replacedby profiles
 (ie. use iteration instead of recursion to free the list). This results
 in at most 2 levels of free_profile being called, while freeing a
 replacedby chain.
 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
 ---
 security/apparmor/policy.c |   24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
 index 27c8161..56e5304 100644
 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
 +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -724,6 +724,8 @@ fail:
  */
 static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
 +	struct aa_profile *p;
 +
 	AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile);
 	if (!profile)
@@ -752,7 +754,27 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
 -	aa_put_profile(profile->replacedby);
 +	/* put the profile reference for replacedby, but not via
 +	 * put_profile(kref_put).
 +	 * replacedby can form a long chain that can result in cascading
 +	 * frees that blows the stack because kref_put makes a nested fn
 +	 * call (it looks like recursion, with free_profile calling
 +	 * free_profile) for each profile in the chain lp#1056078.
 +	 */
 +	for (p = profile->replacedby; p; ) {
 +		if (atomic_dec_and_test(&p->base.count.refcount)) {
 +			/* no more refs on p, grab its replacedby */
 +			struct aa_profile *next = p->replacedby;
 +			/* break the chain */
 +			p->replacedby = NULL;
 +			/* now free p, chain is broken */
 +			free_profile(p);
 +
 +			/* follow up with next profile in the chain */
 +			p = next;
 +		} else
 +			break;
 +	}
 	kzfree(profile);
 }
 -- 
 1.7.10.4