remove for-mainline dir from kernel patches

kernel-patches/for-mainline/__d_path-keep-connected.diff

@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-From: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-Subject: Fix __d_path to allow for old and new behavior bnc#380763
-
-Fix __d_path so that it can be told whether or not to connect
-disconnect path to the root.  This is easier and more efficient
-than trying to reconnect these paths for d_path and get_cwd
-after the fact.
-
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/dcache.c            |   57 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
- fs/namespace.c         |    2 -
- include/linux/dcache.h |    2 -
- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/dcache.c
-+++ b/fs/dcache.c
-@@ -1772,6 +1772,7 @@ shouldnt_be_hashed:
-  * @buffer: buffer to return value in
-  * @buflen: buffer length
-  * @fail_deleted: what to return for deleted files
-+ * @disconnect: don't return a path starting with / when disconnected
-  *
-  * Convert a dentry into an ASCII path name. If the entry has been deleted,
-  * then if @fail_deleted is true, ERR_PTR(-ENOENT) is returned. Otherwise,
-@@ -1784,9 +1785,10 @@ shouldnt_be_hashed:
-  */
- char *__d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
- 	       struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt,
--	       char *buffer, int buflen, int fail_deleted)
-+	       char *buffer, int buflen, int fail_deleted, int disconnect)
- {
--	int namelen, is_slash, vfsmount_locked = 0;
-+	int namelen, vfsmount_locked = 0;
-+	const unsigned char *name;
- 
- 	if (buflen < 2)
- 		return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
-@@ -1847,27 +1849,26 @@ global_root:
- 	 * unconnected dentry, or the file is on a pseudo filesystem.
- 	 */
- 	namelen = dentry->d_name.len;
--	is_slash = (namelen == 1 && *dentry->d_name.name == '/');
--	if (is_slash || (dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_NOUSER)) {
--		/*
--		 * Make sure we won't return a pathname starting with '/'.
--		 *
--		 * Historically, we also glue together the root dentry and
--		 * remaining name for pseudo filesystems like pipefs, which
--		 * have the MS_NOUSER flag set. This results in pathnames
--		 * like "pipe:[439336]".
--		 */
--		if (*buffer == '/') {
--			buffer++;
--			buflen++;
--		}
--		if (is_slash)
--			goto out;
-+	name = dentry->d_name.name;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * If this is a root dentry, then overwrite the slash.  This
-+	 * will also DTRT with pseudo filesystems which have root
-+	 * dentries named "foo:".
-+	 */
-+	if (IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
-+		buffer++;
-+		buflen++;
-+	}
-+	if (disconnect && *name == '/') {
-+		/* Make sure we won't return a pathname starting with '/' */
-+		name++;
-+		namelen--;
- 	}
- 	if (buflen < namelen)
- 		goto Elong;
- 	buffer -= namelen;
--	memcpy(buffer, dentry->d_name.name, namelen);
-+	memcpy(buffer, name, namelen);
- 	goto out;
- 
- Elong:
-@@ -1875,18 +1876,6 @@ Elong:
- 	goto out;
- }
- 
--static char *__connect_d_path(char *path, char *buffer)
--{
--	if (!IS_ERR(path) && *path != '/') {
--		/* Pretend that disconnected paths are hanging off the root. */
--		if (path == buffer)
--			path = ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
--		else
--			*--path = '/';
--	}
--	return path;
--}
--
- /* write full pathname into buffer and return start of pathname */
- char *d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, char *buf,
- 	     int buflen)
-@@ -1909,8 +1898,7 @@ char *d_path(struct dentry *dentry, stru
- 	rootmnt = mntget(current->fs->rootmnt);
- 	root = dget(current->fs->root);
- 	read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
--	res = __d_path(dentry, vfsmnt, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen, 0);
--	res = __connect_d_path(res, buf);
-+	res = __d_path(dentry, vfsmnt, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen, 0, 0);
- 	dput(root);
- 	mntput(rootmnt);
- 	return res;
-@@ -1972,8 +1960,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getcwd(char __user *
- 	root = dget(current->fs->root);
- 	read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
- 
--	cwd = __d_path(pwd, pwdmnt, root, rootmnt, page, PAGE_SIZE, 1);
--	cwd = __connect_d_path(cwd, page);
-+	cwd = __d_path(pwd, pwdmnt, root, rootmnt, page, PAGE_SIZE, 1, 0);
- 	error = PTR_ERR(cwd);
- 	if (IS_ERR(cwd))
- 		goto out;
---- a/fs/namespace.c
-+++ b/fs/namespace.c
-@@ -1901,7 +1901,7 @@ char *d_namespace_path(struct dentry *de
- 	mntput(rootmnt);
- 	if (nsrootmnt)
- 		root = dget(nsrootmnt->mnt_root);
--	res = __d_path(dentry, vfsmnt, root, nsrootmnt, buf, buflen, 1);
-+	res = __d_path(dentry, vfsmnt, root, nsrootmnt, buf, buflen, 1, 1);
- 	dput(root);
- 	mntput(nsrootmnt);
- 	/* Prevent empty path for lazily unmounted filesystems. */
---- a/include/linux/dcache.h
-+++ b/include/linux/dcache.h
-@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ extern int d_validate(struct dentry *, s
- extern char *dynamic_dname(struct dentry *, char *, int, const char *, ...);
- 
- extern char *__d_path(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *,
--		      struct vfsmount *, char *, int, int);
-+		      struct vfsmount *, char *, int, int, int);
- extern char * d_path(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, char *, int);
-   
- /* Allocation counts.. */

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-audit-flags2.diff

@@ -1,745 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/apparmor.h         |   14 -
- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c       |    2 
- security/apparmor/inline.h           |   14 -
- security/apparmor/main.c             |  490 +++++++++++++++++++----------------
- security/apparmor/match.c            |    9 
- security/apparmor/module_interface.c |   10 
- 6 files changed, 309 insertions(+), 230 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-@@ -44,8 +44,7 @@
- 					 AA_EXEC_MOD_2 | AA_EXEC_MOD_3 | \
- 					 AA_EXEC_MOD_4)
- 
--#define AA_EXEC_TYPE			(MAY_EXEC | AA_EXEC_UNSAFE | \
--					 AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS)
-+#define AA_EXEC_TYPE			(AA_EXEC_UNSAFE | AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS)
- 
- #define AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED		AA_EXEC_MOD_0
- #define AA_EXEC_INHERIT			AA_EXEC_MOD_1
-@@ -85,6 +84,10 @@
- 					 AA_AUDIT_FIELD)
- 
- #define AA_VALID_PERM_MASK		(AA_FILE_PERMS | AA_SHARED_PERMS)
-+
-+/* audit bits for the second accept field */
-+#define AUDIT_FILE_MASK 0x1fc07f
-+#define AUDIT_QUIET_MASK(mask)		((mask >> 7) & AUDIT_FILE_MASK)
- #define AA_VALID_PERM2_MASK		0x0fffffff
- 
- #define AA_SECURE_EXEC_NEEDED		1
-@@ -179,6 +182,9 @@ struct aa_profile {
- 	int isstale;
- 
- 	kernel_cap_t capabilities;
-+	kernel_cap_t audit_caps;
-+	kernel_cap_t quiet_caps;
-+
- 	struct kref count;
- 	struct list_head task_contexts;
- 	spinlock_t lock;
-@@ -226,7 +232,7 @@ struct aa_audit {
- 	const char *name;
- 	const char *name2;
- 	const char *name3;
--	int request_mask, denied_mask;
-+	int request_mask, denied_mask, audit_mask;
- 	struct iattr *iattr;
- 	pid_t task, parent;
- 	int error_code;
-@@ -331,7 +337,7 @@ extern struct aa_dfa *aa_match_alloc(voi
- extern void aa_match_free(struct aa_dfa *dfa);
- extern int unpack_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, void *blob, size_t size);
- extern int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa);
--extern unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, const char *str);
-+extern unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, const char *str, int *);
- extern unsigned int aa_dfa_next_state(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
- 				      const char *str);
- extern unsigned int aa_match_state(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static struct file_operations apparmorfs
- static ssize_t aa_matching_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
- 			       size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
- {
--	const char *matching = "pattern=aadfa perms=rwxamlk/ user::other";
-+	const char *matching = "pattern=aadfa audit perms=rwxamlk/ user::other";
- 
- 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, matching,
- 				       strlen(matching));
---- a/security/apparmor/inline.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/inline.h
-@@ -232,9 +232,19 @@ static inline void unlock_both_profiles(
- 	}
- }
- 
--static inline unsigned int aa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, const char *pathname)
-+static inline unsigned int aa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, const char *pathname,
-+				    int *audit_mask)
- {
--	        return dfa ? aa_dfa_match(dfa, pathname) : 0;
-+	if (dfa)
-+		return aa_dfa_match(dfa, pathname, audit_mask);
-+	if (audit_mask)
-+		*audit_mask = 0;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static inline int dfa_audit_mask(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state)
-+{
-+	return 	ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state];
- }
- 
- #endif /* __INLINE_H__ */
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -36,204 +36,6 @@ static int aa_inode_mode(struct inode *i
- 	return AA_OTHER_SHIFT;
- }
- 
--/**
-- * aa_file_denied - check for @mask access on a file
-- * @profile: profile to check against
-- * @name: pathname of file
-- * @mask: permission mask requested for file
-- *
-- * Return %0 on success, or else the permissions in @mask that the
-- * profile denies.
-- */
--static int aa_file_denied(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
--			  int mask)
--{
--	return (mask & ~aa_match(profile->file_rules, name));
--}
--
--/**
-- * aa_link_denied - check for permission to link a file
-- * @profile: profile to check against
-- * @link: pathname of link being created
-- * @target: pathname of target to be linked to
-- * @target_mode: UGO shift for target inode
-- * @request_mask: the permissions subset valid only if link succeeds
-- * Return %0 on success, or else the permissions that the profile denies.
-- */
--static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *link,
--			  const char *target, int target_mode,
--			  int *request_mask)
--{
--	unsigned int state;
--	int l_mode, t_mode, denied_mask = 0;
--	int link_mask = AA_MAY_LINK << target_mode;
--
--	*request_mask = link_mask;
--
--	l_mode = aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, DFA_START, link, &state);
--	if (l_mode & link_mask) {
--		int mode;
--		/* test to see if target can be paired with link */
--		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file_rules, state);
--		mode = aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, state, target,
--				      NULL);
--
--		if (!(mode & link_mask))
--			denied_mask |= link_mask;
--		/* return if link subset test is not required */
--		if (!(mode & (AA_LINK_SUBSET_TEST << target_mode)))
--			return denied_mask;
--	}
--
--	/* Do link perm subset test
--	 * If a subset test is required a permission subset test of the
--	 * perms for the link are done against the user::other of the
--	 * target's 'r', 'w', 'x', 'a', 'k', and 'm' permissions.
--	 *
--	 * If the link has 'x', an exact match of all the execute flags
--	 * must match.
-- 	 */
--	denied_mask |= ~l_mode & link_mask;
--
--	t_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, target);
--
--	/* For actual subset test ignore valid-profile-transition flags,
--	 * and link bits
--	 */
--	l_mode &= AA_FILE_PERMS & ~AA_LINK_BITS;
--	t_mode &= AA_FILE_PERMS & ~AA_LINK_BITS;
--
--	*request_mask = l_mode | link_mask;
--
--	if (l_mode) {
--		denied_mask |= l_mode & ~t_mode;
--		if ((l_mode & AA_EXEC_BITS) &&
--		    (l_mode & ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE) !=
--		    (t_mode & ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE))
--			denied_mask = (denied_mask & ~ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE) |
--				      (l_mode & ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE);
--	}
--
--	return denied_mask;
--}
--
--/**
-- * aa_get_name - compute the pathname of a file
-- * @dentry: dentry of the file
-- * @mnt: vfsmount of the file
-- * @buffer: buffer that aa_get_name() allocated
-- * @check: AA_CHECK_DIR is set if the file is a directory
-- *
-- * Returns a pointer to the beginning of the pathname (which usually differs
-- * from the beginning of the buffer), or an error code.
-- *
-- * We need @check to indicate whether the file is a directory or not because
-- * the file may not yet exist, and so we cannot check the inode's file type.
-- */
--static char *aa_get_name(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--			 char **buffer, int check)
--{
--	char *name;
--	int is_dir, size = 256;
--
--	is_dir = (check & AA_CHECK_DIR) ? 1 : 0;
--
--	for (;;) {
--		char *buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
--		if (!buf)
--			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
--
--		name = d_namespace_path(dentry, mnt, buf, size - is_dir);
--		if (!IS_ERR(name)) {
--			if (name[0] != '/') {
--				/*
--				 * This dentry is not connected to the
--				 * namespace root -- reject access.
--				 */
--				kfree(buf);
--				return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
--			}
--			if (is_dir && name[1] != '\0') {
--				/*
--				 * Append "/" to the pathname. The root
--				 * directory is a special case; it already
--				 * ends in slash.
--				 */
--				buf[size - 2] = '/';
--				buf[size - 1] = '\0';
--			}
--
--			*buffer = buf;
--			return name;
--		}
--		if (PTR_ERR(name) != -ENAMETOOLONG)
--			return name;
--
--		kfree(buf);
--		size <<= 1;
--		if (size > apparmor_path_max)
--			return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
--	}
--}
--
--static inline void aa_put_name_buffer(char *buffer)
--{
--	kfree(buffer);
--}
--
--/**
-- * aa_perm_dentry - check if @profile allows @mask for a file
-- * @profile: profile to check against
-- * @dentry: dentry of the file
-- * @mnt: vfsmount o the file
-- * @sa: audit context
-- * @mask: requested profile permissions
-- * @check: kind of check to perform
-- *
-- * Returns 0 upon success, or else an error code.
-- *
-- * @check indicates the file type, and whether the file was accessed through
-- * an open file descriptor (AA_CHECK_FD) or not.
-- */
--static int aa_perm_dentry(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *dentry,
--			  struct vfsmount *mnt, struct aa_audit *sa, int check)
--{
--	int error;
--	char *buffer = NULL;
--
--	sa->name = aa_get_name(dentry, mnt, &buffer, check);
--	sa->request_mask <<= aa_inode_mode(dentry->d_inode);
--	if (IS_ERR(sa->name)) {
--		/*
--		 * deleted files are given a pass on permission checks when
--		 * accessed through a file descriptor.
--		 */
--		if (PTR_ERR(sa->name) == -ENOENT && (check & AA_CHECK_FD))
--			sa->denied_mask = 0;
--		else {
--			sa->denied_mask = sa->request_mask;
--			sa->error_code = PTR_ERR(sa->name);
--			if (sa->error_code == -ENOENT)
--				sa->info = "Failed name resolution - object not a valid entry";
--			else if (sa->error_code == -ENAMETOOLONG)
--				sa->info = "Failed name resolution - name too long";
--			else
--				sa->info = "Failed name resolution";
--		}
--		sa->name = NULL;
--	} else
--		sa->denied_mask = aa_file_denied(profile, sa->name,
--						 sa->request_mask);
--
--	if (!sa->denied_mask)
--		sa->error_code = 0;
--
--	error = aa_audit(profile, sa);
--	aa_put_name_buffer(buffer);
--
--	return error;
--}
--
- int alloc_default_namespace(void)
- {
- 	struct aa_namespace *ns;
-@@ -471,20 +273,259 @@ int aa_audit(struct aa_profile *profile,
- 	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED;
- 	struct audit_context *audit_cxt;
- 
--	if (likely(!sa->error_code)) {
--		if (likely(!PROFILE_AUDIT(profile)))
--			/* nothing to log */
--			return 0;
--		else
--			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
--	} else if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile)) {
-+	if (likely(!sa->error_code))
-+		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
-+	else if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile))
- 		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED;
--	}
- 
- 	audit_cxt = apparmor_logsyscall ? current->audit_context : NULL;
- 	return aa_audit_base(profile, sa, audit_cxt, type);
- }
- 
-+static int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa)
-+{
-+	if (likely(!sa->error_code)) {
-+		int mask = sa->audit_mask & AUDIT_FILE_MASK;
-+
-+		if (unlikely(PROFILE_AUDIT(profile)))
-+			mask |= AUDIT_FILE_MASK;
-+
-+		if (likely(!(sa->request_mask & mask)))
-+			return 0;
-+
-+		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
-+		sa->request_mask &= mask | ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE;
-+	} else {
-+		int mask = AUDIT_QUIET_MASK(sa->audit_mask);
-+
-+		if (!(sa->denied_mask & ~mask))
-+			return sa->error_code;
-+
-+		/* mask off perms whose denial is being silenced */
-+		sa->denied_mask &= (~mask) | ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE;
-+	}
-+
-+	return aa_audit(profile, sa);
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa,
-+			 int cap)
-+{
-+	if (likely(!sa->error_code)) {
-+		if (likely(!PROFILE_AUDIT(profile) &&
-+			   !cap_raised(profile->audit_caps, cap)))
-+			return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* quieting of capabilities is handled the caps_logged cache */
-+	return aa_audit(profile, sa);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_file_denied - check for @mask access on a file
-+ * @profile: profile to check against
-+ * @name: pathname of file
-+ * @mask: permission mask requested for file
-+ * @audit_mask: return audit mask for the match
-+ *
-+ * Return %0 on success, or else the permissions in @mask that the
-+ * profile denies.
-+ */
-+static int aa_file_denied(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
-+			  int mask, int *audit_mask)
-+{
-+	return (mask & ~aa_match(profile->file_rules, name, audit_mask));
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_link_denied - check for permission to link a file
-+ * @profile: profile to check against
-+ * @link: pathname of link being created
-+ * @target: pathname of target to be linked to
-+ * @target_mode: UGO shift for target inode
-+ * @request_mask: the permissions subset valid only if link succeeds
-+ * @audit_mask: return the audit_mask for the link permission
-+ * Return %0 on success, or else the permissions that the profile denies.
-+ */
-+static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *link,
-+			  const char *target, int target_mode,
-+			  int *request_mask, int *audit_mask)
-+{
-+	unsigned int state;
-+	int l_mode, t_mode, denied_mask = 0;
-+	int link_mask = AA_MAY_LINK << target_mode;
-+
-+	*request_mask = link_mask;
-+
-+	l_mode = aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, DFA_START, link, &state);
-+
-+	if (l_mode & link_mask) {
-+		int mode;
-+		/* test to see if target can be paired with link */
-+		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file_rules, state);
-+		mode = aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, state, target,
-+				      &state);
-+
-+		if (!(mode & link_mask))
-+			denied_mask |= link_mask;
-+
-+		*audit_mask = dfa_audit_mask(profile->file_rules, state);
-+
-+		/* return if link subset test is not required */
-+		if (!(mode & (AA_LINK_SUBSET_TEST << target_mode)))
-+			return denied_mask;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Do link perm subset test
-+	 * If a subset test is required a permission subset test of the
-+	 * perms for the link are done against the user::other of the
-+	 * target's 'r', 'w', 'x', 'a', 'k', and 'm' permissions.
-+	 *
-+	 * If the link has 'x', an exact match of all the execute flags
-+	 * must match.
-+ 	 */
-+	denied_mask |= ~l_mode & link_mask;
-+
-+	t_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, target, NULL);
-+
-+	/* For actual subset test ignore valid-profile-transition flags,
-+	 * and link bits
-+	 */
-+	l_mode &= AA_FILE_PERMS & ~AA_LINK_BITS;
-+	t_mode &= AA_FILE_PERMS & ~AA_LINK_BITS;
-+
-+	*request_mask = l_mode | link_mask;
-+
-+	if (l_mode) {
-+		denied_mask |= l_mode & ~t_mode;
-+		if ((l_mode & AA_EXEC_BITS) &&
-+		    (l_mode & ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE) !=
-+		    (t_mode & ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE))
-+			denied_mask = (denied_mask & ~ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE) |
-+				(l_mode & (ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE | AA_EXEC_BITS));
-+	}
-+
-+	return denied_mask;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_get_name - compute the pathname of a file
-+ * @dentry: dentry of the file
-+ * @mnt: vfsmount of the file
-+ * @buffer: buffer that aa_get_name() allocated
-+ * @check: AA_CHECK_DIR is set if the file is a directory
-+ *
-+ * Returns a pointer to the beginning of the pathname (which usually differs
-+ * from the beginning of the buffer), or an error code.
-+ *
-+ * We need @check to indicate whether the file is a directory or not because
-+ * the file may not yet exist, and so we cannot check the inode's file type.
-+ */
-+static char *aa_get_name(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			 char **buffer, int check)
-+{
-+	char *name;
-+	int is_dir, size = 256;
-+
-+	is_dir = (check & AA_CHECK_DIR) ? 1 : 0;
-+
-+	for (;;) {
-+		char *buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
-+		if (!buf)
-+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-+
-+		name = d_namespace_path(dentry, mnt, buf, size - is_dir);
-+		if (!IS_ERR(name)) {
-+			if (name[0] != '/') {
-+				/*
-+				 * This dentry is not connected to the
-+				 * namespace root -- reject access.
-+				 */
-+				kfree(buf);
-+				return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
-+			}
-+			if (is_dir && name[1] != '\0') {
-+				/*
-+				 * Append "/" to the pathname. The root
-+				 * directory is a special case; it already
-+				 * ends in slash.
-+				 */
-+				buf[size - 2] = '/';
-+				buf[size - 1] = '\0';
-+			}
-+
-+			*buffer = buf;
-+			return name;
-+		}
-+		if (PTR_ERR(name) != -ENAMETOOLONG)
-+			return name;
-+
-+		kfree(buf);
-+		size <<= 1;
-+		if (size > apparmor_path_max)
-+			return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+static inline void aa_put_name_buffer(char *buffer)
-+{
-+	kfree(buffer);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_perm_dentry - check if @profile allows @mask for a file
-+ * @profile: profile to check against
-+ * @dentry: dentry of the file
-+ * @mnt: vfsmount o the file
-+ * @sa: audit context
-+ * @mask: requested profile permissions
-+ * @check: kind of check to perform
-+ *
-+ * Returns 0 upon success, or else an error code.
-+ *
-+ * @check indicates the file type, and whether the file was accessed through
-+ * an open file descriptor (AA_CHECK_FD) or not.
-+ */
-+static int aa_perm_dentry(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			  struct vfsmount *mnt, struct aa_audit *sa, int check)
-+{
-+	int error;
-+	char *buffer = NULL;
-+
-+	sa->name = aa_get_name(dentry, mnt, &buffer, check);
-+	sa->request_mask <<= aa_inode_mode(dentry->d_inode);
-+	if (IS_ERR(sa->name)) {
-+		/*
-+		 * deleted files are given a pass on permission checks when
-+		 * accessed through a file descriptor.
-+		 */
-+		if (PTR_ERR(sa->name) == -ENOENT && (check & AA_CHECK_FD))
-+			sa->denied_mask = 0;
-+		else {
-+			sa->denied_mask = sa->request_mask;
-+			sa->error_code = PTR_ERR(sa->name);
-+			if (sa->error_code == -ENOENT)
-+				sa->info = "Failed name resolution - object not a valid entry";
-+			else if (sa->error_code == -ENAMETOOLONG)
-+				sa->info = "Failed name resolution - name too long";
-+			else
-+				sa->info = "Failed name resolution";
-+		}
-+		sa->name = NULL;
-+	} else
-+		sa->denied_mask = aa_file_denied(profile, sa->name,
-+						 sa->request_mask,
-+						 &sa->audit_mask);
-+
-+	if (!sa->denied_mask)
-+		sa->error_code = 0;
-+
-+	error = aa_audit_file(profile, sa);
-+	aa_put_name_buffer(buffer);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
- /**
-  * aa_attr - check if attribute change is allowed
-  * @profile: profile to check against
-@@ -621,10 +662,11 @@ int aa_perm_path(struct aa_profile *prof
- 	else
- 		sa.request_mask = mask << AA_OTHER_SHIFT;
- 
--	sa.denied_mask = aa_file_denied(profile, name, sa.request_mask) ;
-+	sa.denied_mask = aa_file_denied(profile, name, sa.request_mask,
-+					&sa.audit_mask) ;
- 	sa.error_code = sa.denied_mask ? -EACCES : 0;
- 
--	return aa_audit(profile, &sa);
-+	return aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
- }
- 
- /**
-@@ -660,7 +702,7 @@ int aa_capability(struct aa_task_context
- 	sa.name = capability_names[cap];
- 	sa.error_code = error;
- 
--	error = aa_audit(cxt->profile, &sa);
-+	error = aa_audit_caps(cxt->profile, &sa, cap);
- 
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -709,11 +751,12 @@ int aa_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
- 	if (sa.name && sa.name2) {
- 		sa.denied_mask = aa_link_denied(profile, sa.name, sa.name2,
- 						aa_inode_mode(target->d_inode),
--						&sa.request_mask);
-+						&sa.request_mask,
-+						&sa.audit_mask);
- 		sa.error_code = sa.denied_mask ? -EACCES : 0;
- 	}
- 
--	error = aa_audit(profile, &sa);
-+	error = aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
- 
- 	aa_put_name_buffer(buffer);
- 	aa_put_name_buffer(buffer2);
-@@ -802,8 +845,8 @@ aa_register_find(struct aa_profile *prof
- 			new_profile =
- 			    aa_dup_profile(profile->ns->null_complain_profile);
- 		} else {
--			aa_audit_reject(profile, sa);
--			return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);  /* was -EPERM */
-+			sa->error_code = -EACCES;
-+			return ERR_PTR(aa_audit_file(profile, sa));
- 		}
- 	} else {
- 		/* Only way we can get into this code is if task
-@@ -863,7 +906,8 @@ repeat:
- 		/* Confined task, determine what mode inherit, unconfined or
- 		 * mandatory to load new profile
- 		 */
--		exec_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, filename);
-+		exec_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, filename,
-+				     &sa.audit_mask);
- 
- 		if (exec_mode & sa.request_mask) {
- 			switch ((exec_mode >> shift) & AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS) {
-@@ -906,6 +950,9 @@ repeat:
- 				break;
- 			}
- 
-+		} else if (sa.request_mask & AUDIT_QUIET_MASK(sa.audit_mask)) {
-+			/* quiet failed exit */
-+			new_profile = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
- 		} else if (complain) {
- 			/* There was no entry in calling profile
- 			 * describing mode to execute image in.
-@@ -916,8 +963,8 @@ repeat:
- 			exec_mode |= AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << shift;
- 		} else {
- 			sa.denied_mask = sa.request_mask;
--			aa_audit_reject(profile, &sa);
--			new_profile = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-+			sa.error_code = -EACCES;
-+			new_profile = ERR_PTR(aa_audit_file(profile, &sa));
- 		}
- 	} else {
- 		/* Unconfined task, load profile if it exists */
-@@ -973,6 +1020,7 @@ repeat:
- 		sa.info = "set profile";
- 		aa_audit_hint(new_profile, &sa);
- 	}
-+
- cleanup:
- 	aa_put_name_buffer(buffer);
- 	if (IS_ERR(new_profile))
-@@ -1149,7 +1197,7 @@ repeat:
- 
- 	if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile) ||
- 	    (ns == profile->ns &&
--	     (aa_match(profile->file_rules, name) & AA_CHANGE_PROFILE)))
-+	     (aa_match(profile->file_rules, name, NULL) & AA_CHANGE_PROFILE)))
- 		error = do_change_profile(profile, ns, name, 0, 0, &sa);
- 	else {
- 		/* check for a rule with a namespace prepended */
-@@ -1356,9 +1404,11 @@ void aa_change_task_context(struct task_
- 		call_rcu(&old_cxt->rcu, free_aa_task_context_rcu_callback);
- 	}
- 	if (new_cxt) {
--		/* clear the caps_logged cache, so that new profile/hat has
--		 * chance to emit its own set of cap messages */
--		new_cxt->caps_logged = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
-+		/* set the caps_logged cache to the quiet_caps mask
-+		 * this has the effect of quieting caps that are not
-+		 * supposed to be logged
-+		 */
-+		new_cxt->caps_logged = profile->quiet_caps;
- 		new_cxt->cookie = cookie;
- 		new_cxt->task = task;
- 		new_cxt->profile = aa_dup_profile(profile);
---- a/security/apparmor/match.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
-@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
- #include <linux/errno.h>
- #include "apparmor.h"
- #include "match.h"
-+#include "inline.h"
- 
- static struct table_header *unpack_table(void *blob, size_t bsize)
- {
-@@ -295,13 +296,17 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(stru
-  * aa_dfa_match - find accept perm for @str in @dfa
-  * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against
-  * @str: the string to match against the dfa
-+ * @audit_mask: the audit_mask for the final state
-  *
-  * aa_dfa_match will match @str and return the accept perms for the
-  * final state.
-  */
--unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, const char *str)
-+unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, const char *str, int *audit_mask)
- {
--	return ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[aa_dfa_next_state(dfa, DFA_START, str)];
-+	int state = aa_dfa_next_state(dfa, DFA_START, str);
-+	if (audit_mask)
-+		*audit_mask = dfa_audit_mask(dfa, state);
-+	return ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state];
- }
- 
- /**
---- a/security/apparmor/module_interface.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/module_interface.c
-@@ -310,6 +310,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *aa_unpack_prof
- 
- 	if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->capabilities), NULL))
- 		goto fail;
-+	if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->audit_caps), NULL))
-+		goto fail;
-+	if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->quiet_caps), NULL))
-+		goto fail;
- 
- 	/* get file rules */
- 	profile->file_rules = aa_unpack_dfa(e);
-@@ -317,6 +321,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *aa_unpack_prof
- 		error = PTR_ERR(profile->file_rules);
- 		profile->file_rules = NULL;
- 		goto fail;
-+			if (!aa_is_u16(e, &profile->audit_network[i], NULL))
-+				goto fail;
-+			if (!aa_is_u16(e, &profile->quiet_network[i], NULL))
-+				goto fail;
- 	}
- 
- 	if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
-@@ -360,7 +368,7 @@ static int aa_verify_header(struct aa_ex
- 	}
- 
- 	/* check that the interface version is currently supported */
--	if (e->version != 3) {
-+	if (e->version != 4) {
- 		struct aa_audit sa;
- 		memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- 		sa.operation = operation;

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-audit.diff

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Export audit subsystem for use by modules
-
-Update kenel audit range comments to show AppArmor's registered range of
-1500-1599.  This range used to be reserved for LSPP but LSPP uses the
-SE Linux range and the range was given to AppArmor.
-Adds necessary export symbols for audit subsystem routines.
-Changes audit_log_vformat to be externally visible (analagous to vprintf)
-Patch is not in mainline -- pending AppArmor code submission to lkml
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- include/linux/audit.h |   12 +++++++++++-
- kernel/audit.c        |    6 ++++--
- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
---- a/include/linux/audit.h
-+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
-@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
-  * 1200 - 1299 messages internal to the audit daemon
-  * 1300 - 1399 audit event messages
-  * 1400 - 1499 SE Linux use
-- * 1500 - 1599 kernel LSPP events
-+ * 1500 - 1599 AppArmor use
-  * 1600 - 1699 kernel crypto events
-  * 1700 - 1799 kernel anomaly records
-  * 1800 - 1999 future kernel use (maybe integrity labels and related events)
-@@ -116,6 +116,13 @@
- #define AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD	1414	/* Not used */
- #define AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_EVENT	1415	/* Audit an IPSec event */
- 
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT	1501	/* AppArmor audited grants */
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED	1502	/* Allowed Access for learning */
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED	1503
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_HINT	1504	/* Process Tracking information */
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS	1505	/* Changes in config */
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR	1506	/* Internal AppArmor Errors */
-+
- #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG   1700
- #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG    1799
- #define AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS      1700 /* Device changed promiscuous mode */
-@@ -513,6 +520,9 @@ extern void		    audit_log(struct audit_
- 				      __attribute__((format(printf,4,5)));
- 
- extern struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type);
-+extern void		    audit_log_vformat(struct audit_buffer *ab,
-+					      const char *fmt, va_list args)
-+			    __attribute__((format(printf,2,0)));
- extern void		    audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab,
- 					     const char *fmt, ...)
- 			    __attribute__((format(printf,2,3)));
---- a/kernel/audit.c
-+++ b/kernel/audit.c
-@@ -1215,8 +1215,7 @@ static inline int audit_expand(struct au
-  * will be called a second time.  Currently, we assume that a printk
-  * can't format message larger than 1024 bytes, so we don't either.
-  */
--static void audit_log_vformat(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt,
--			      va_list args)
-+void audit_log_vformat(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, va_list args)
- {
- 	int len, avail;
- 	struct sk_buff *skb;
-@@ -1471,3 +1470,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_start);
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_end);
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_format);
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log);
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(audit_log_vformat);
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(audit_log_untrustedstring);
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(audit_log_d_path);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-bootdisable.diff

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/Kconfig |   17 +++++++++++++++++
- security/apparmor/lsm.c   |   16 ++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
-+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
-@@ -7,4 +7,21 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR
- 	  Required userspace tools (if they are not included in your
- 	  distribution) and further information may be found at
- 	  <http://forge.novell.com/modules/xfmod/project/?apparmor>
-+
- 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-+
-+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
-+	int "AppArmor boot parameter default value"
-+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
-+	range 0 1
-+	default 1
-+	help
-+	  This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
-+	  'apparmor', which allows AppArmor to be enabled or disabled
-+          at boot.  If this option is set to 0 (zero), the AppArmor
-+	  kernel parameter will default to 0, disabling AppArmor at
-+	  bootup.  If this option is set to 1 (one), the AppArmor
-+	  kernel parameter will default to 1, enabling AppArmor at
-+	  bootup.
-+
-+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,17 @@
- #include "apparmor.h"
- #include "inline.h"
- 
-+/* Boot time disable flag */
-+int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
-+
-+static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
-+{
-+	apparmor_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
-+
-+
- static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
- static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
- #define param_check_aabool(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
-@@ -882,6 +893,11 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
- {
- 	int error;
- 
-+	if (!apparmor_enabled) {
-+		info_message("AppArmor disabled by boottime parameter\n");
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((error = create_apparmorfs())) {
- 		AA_ERROR("Unable to activate AppArmor filesystem\n");
- 		goto createfs_out;

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-builtin-only.diff

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/Kconfig |    2 +-
- security/apparmor/lsm.c   |   26 --------------------------
- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 27 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
-+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
-@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- config SECURITY_APPARMOR
--	tristate "AppArmor support"
-+	bool "AppArmor support"
- 	depends on SECURITY
- 	select AUDIT
- 	help
---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -931,33 +931,7 @@ createfs_out:
- 
- }
- 
--static void __exit apparmor_exit(void)
--{
--	/* Remove and release all the profiles on the profile list. */
--	mutex_lock(&aa_interface_lock);
--	aa_profile_ns_list_release();
--
--	/* FIXME: cleanup profiles references on files */
--	free_default_namespace();
--
--	/*
--	 * Delay for an rcu cycle to make sure that all active task
--	 * context readers have finished, and all profiles have been
--	 * freed by their rcu callbacks.
--	 */
--	synchronize_rcu();
--
--	destroy_apparmorfs();
--	mutex_unlock(&aa_interface_lock);
--
--	if (unregister_security(&apparmor_ops))
--		info_message("Unable to properly unregister AppArmor");
--
--	info_message("AppArmor protection removed");
--}
--
- module_init(apparmor_init);
--module_exit(apparmor_exit);
- 
- MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AppArmor process confinement");
- MODULE_AUTHOR("Novell/Immunix, http://bugs.opensuse.org");

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-create-append.diff

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/lsm.c |    3 +--
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -366,8 +366,7 @@ static inline int aa_mask_permissions(in
- static int apparmor_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 				 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask)
- {
--	/* FIXME: may move to MAY_APPEND later */
--	return aa_permission("inode_create", dir, dentry, mnt, MAY_WRITE, 0);
-+	return aa_permission("inode_create", dir, dentry, mnt, MAY_APPEND, 0);
- }
- 
- static int apparmor_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry,

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-failed-name-error.diff

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/main.c |   39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -216,6 +216,12 @@ static int aa_perm_dentry(struct aa_prof
- 		else {
- 			sa->denied_mask = sa->request_mask;
- 			sa->error_code = PTR_ERR(sa->name);
-+			if (sa->error_code == -ENOENT)
-+				sa->info = "Failed name resolution - object not a valid entry";
-+			else if (sa->error_code == -ENAMETOOLONG)
-+				sa->info = "Failed name resolution - name too long";
-+			else
-+				sa->info = "Failed name resolution";
- 		}
- 		sa->name = NULL;
- 	} else
-@@ -371,8 +377,11 @@ static int aa_audit_base(struct aa_profi
- 	if (sa->operation)
- 		audit_log_format(ab, "operation=\"%s\"", sa->operation);
- 
--	if (sa->info)
-+	if (sa->info) {
- 		audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", sa->info);
-+		if (sa->error_code)
-+			audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->error_code);
-+	}
- 
- 	if (sa->request_mask)
- 		aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "requested_mask", sa->request_mask);
-@@ -918,23 +927,29 @@ int aa_register(struct linux_binprm *bpr
- 
- 	AA_DEBUG("%s\n", __FUNCTION__);
- 
--	filename = aa_get_name(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, &buffer, 0);
--	if (IS_ERR(filename)) {
--		AA_ERROR("%s: Failed to get filename", __FUNCTION__);
--		return -ENOENT;
--	}
-+	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
- 
- 	shift = aa_inode_mode(filp->f_dentry->d_inode);
--	exec_mode = AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << shift;
--
- 	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- 	sa.operation = "exec";
- 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
--	sa.name = filename;
- 	sa.request_mask = MAY_EXEC << shift;
- 
-+	filename = aa_get_name(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, &buffer, 0);
-+	if (IS_ERR(filename)) {
-+		if (profile) {
-+			sa.info = "Failed name resolution - exec failed";
-+			sa.error_code = PTR_ERR(filename);
-+			aa_audit_reject(profile, &sa);
-+			return sa.error_code;
-+		} else
-+			return 0;
-+	}
-+	sa.name = filename;
-+
-+	exec_mode = AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << shift;
-+
- repeat:
--	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
- 	if (profile) {
- 		complain = PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile);
- 
-@@ -1011,8 +1026,10 @@ repeat:
- 	if (IS_ERR(old_profile)) {
- 		aa_put_profile(new_profile);
- 		aa_put_profile(profile);
--		if (PTR_ERR(old_profile) == -ESTALE)
-+		if (PTR_ERR(old_profile) == -ESTALE) {
-+			profile = aa_get_profile(current);
- 			goto repeat;
-+		}
- 		if (PTR_ERR(old_profile) == -EPERM) {
- 			sa.denied_mask = sa.request_mask;
- 			sa.info = "unable to set profile due to ptrace";

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-features.diff

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c |   20 ++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-@@ -99,6 +99,22 @@ static struct file_operations apparmorfs
- 	.read = 	aa_matching_read,
- };
- 
-+/* apparmor/features */
-+static ssize_t aa_features_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
-+				size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
-+{
-+	const char *features = "file=3.0 capability=1.0 network=1.0 "
-+			       "change_hat=1.3 change_profile=1.0 "
-+			       "aanamespaces=1.0";
-+
-+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, features,
-+				       strlen(features));
-+}
-+
-+static struct file_operations apparmorfs_features_fops = {
-+	.read = 	aa_features_read,
-+};
-+
- /* apparmor/.load */
- static ssize_t aa_profile_load(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
- 			       size_t size, loff_t *pos)
-@@ -204,6 +220,7 @@ void destroy_apparmorfs(void)
- 		aafs_remove(".replace");
- 		aafs_remove(".load");
- 		aafs_remove("matching");
-+		aafs_remove("features");
- 		aafs_remove("profiles");
- 		securityfs_remove(apparmor_dentry);
- 		apparmor_dentry = NULL;
-@@ -232,6 +249,9 @@ int create_apparmorfs(void)
- 	error = aafs_create("matching", 0444, &apparmorfs_matching_fops);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto error;
-+	error = aafs_create("features", 0444, &apparmorfs_features_fops);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto error;
- 	error = aafs_create(".load", 0640, &apparmorfs_profile_load);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto error;

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-fix-lock-letter.diff

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c |    2 +-
- security/apparmor/main.c       |    4 ++--
- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static struct file_operations apparmorfs
- static ssize_t aa_matching_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
- 			       size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
- {
--	const char *matching = "pattern=aadfa perms=rwxamlz user:other";
-+	const char *matching = "pattern=aadfa perms=rwxamlk/ user::other";
- 
- 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, matching,
- 				       strlen(matching));
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_prof
- 	/* Link always requires 'l' on the link for both parts of the pair.
- 	 * If a subset test is required a permission subset test of the
- 	 * perms for the link are done against the user:group:other of the
--	 * target's 'r', 'w', 'x', 'a', 'z', and 'm' permissions.
-+	 * target's 'r', 'w', 'x', 'a', 'k', and 'm' permissions.
- 	 *
- 	 * If the link has 'x', an exact match of all the execute flags
- 	 * ('i', 'u', 'p').  safe exec is treated as a subset of unsafe exec
-@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static int aa_audit_base(struct aa_profi
- 		audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", sa->info);
- 
- 	if (sa->request_mask)
--		aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "request_mask", sa->request_mask);
-+		aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "requested_mask", sa->request_mask);
- 
- 	if (sa->denied_mask)
- 		aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "denied_mask", sa->denied_mask);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-fix-sysctl-refcount.diff

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/lsm.c |    1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ static int apparmor_sysctl(struct ctl_ta
- 	}
- 
- out:
-+	aa_put_profile(profile);
- 	return error;
- }
- 

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-intree.diff

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-Subject: Add AppArmor LSM to security/Makefile
-
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-
----
- security/Kconfig  |    1 +
- security/Makefile |    1 +
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
---- a/security/Kconfig
-+++ b/security/Kconfig
-@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
- 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
- 
- source security/selinux/Kconfig
-+source security/apparmor/Kconfig
- 
- endmenu
- 
---- a/security/Makefile
-+++ b/security/Makefile
-@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@ endif
- obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o dummy.o inode.o
- # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
- obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
-+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)		+= commoncap.o apparmor/
- obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES)	+= commoncap.o capability.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= commoncap.o root_plug.o

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-link-pairs.diff

@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
-Change link to use pairs to provide tighter control of how links
-can be made.   The permission subset test is controled by an
-extra flag of the link perm, this allows for compatibility with
-old style links which have a broad pair, but also allows for
-pairs to not require the subset test when needed.
-
-The pairs are stored as two matches in the dfa seperated by the
-null transition.  Both matches must be made and have the link
-perm set.  If the second match has the AA_LINK_SUBSET_TEST perm
-set, then the subset test is done.
-
-
-The link keyword can be used or just the link mask
-User side these pairs are expressed as follows
-link [link_mask] linkname -> [subset_mask] targetname,
-[link_mask] linkname -> [subset_mask] targetname,
-
-link /linkname -> /targetname,   #link to targetname, link is perm subset
-
-if user:group:other link specification is desired then a user:group:other
-mask containing only the link perm in the appropriate positions can be
-specified
-eg.
-link l:: /linkname -> /targetname,   # links to targetname if owned by
-or
-l:: /linkname -> /targetname,
-
-Both the linkname and the target support full AppArmor globbing.
-link l:: /** -> /**,      # allow any link to target owned by user
-
-to override the default subset test
-l:: /linkname -> px /targetname,
-
-
-Traditional AA style links are still supported and are mapped by the
-parser into the newer link pair for the kernel, with the LINK_SUBSET_TEST
-bits set.
-  /linkname rwl,
-is mapped to
-  link /linkname -> /**,
-  /linkname rw,
-
----
- security/apparmor/apparmor.h |    4 +++
- security/apparmor/main.c     |   45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- 					 AA_MAY_LOCK | AA_EXEC_MMAP | \
- 					 AA_EXEC_UNSAFE | AA_EXEC_MOD_0 | \
- 					 AA_EXEC_MOD_1)
-+#define AA_LINK_SUBSET_TEST		0x0020
- 
- #define AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED		0
- #define AA_EXEC_INHERIT			AA_EXEC_MOD_0
-@@ -59,6 +60,9 @@
- #define AA_USER_EXEC_MODS		(AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS << AA_USER_SHIFT)
- #define AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS		(AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS << AA_OTHER_SHIFT)
- 
-+#define AA_USER_EXEC_UNSAFE		(AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << AA_USER_SHIFT)
-+#define AA_OTHER_EXEC_UNSAFE		(AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << AA_OTHER_SHIFT)
-+
- #define AA_EXEC_BITS			(AA_USER_EXEC | AA_OTHER_EXEC)
- 
- #define AA_ALL_EXEC_MODS		(AA_USER_EXEC_MODS | \
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -67,10 +67,27 @@ static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_prof
- 			  const char *target, int target_mode,
- 			  int *request_mask)
- {
--	int l_mode, t_mode, denied_mask;
-+	unsigned int state;
-+	int l_mode, t_mode, denied_mask = 0;
- 	int link_mask = AA_MAY_LINK << target_mode;
- 
--	l_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, link);
-+	*request_mask = link_mask;
-+
-+	l_mode = aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, DFA_START, link, &state);
-+	if (l_mode & link_mask) {
-+		int mode;
-+		/* test to see if target can be paired with link */
-+		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file_rules, state);
-+		mode = aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, state, target,
-+				      NULL);
-+
-+		if (!(mode & link_mask))
-+			denied_mask |= link_mask;
-+		if (!(mode & (AA_LINK_SUBSET_TEST << target_mode)))
-+			return denied_mask;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* do link perm subset test */
- 	t_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, target);
- 
- 	/* Ignore valid-profile-transition flags. */
-@@ -79,23 +96,30 @@ static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_prof
- 
- 	*request_mask = l_mode | link_mask;
- 
--	/* Link always requires 'l' on the link, a subset for user:other
--	 * of the target's 'r', 'w', 'x', 'a', 'z', and 'm' permissions on
--	 * the link, and if the link has 'x', an exact match of all the
--	 * execute flags ('i', 'u', 'U', 'p', 'P').
-+	/* Link always requires 'l' on the link for both parts of the pair.
-+	 * If a subset test is required a permission subset test of the
-+	 * perms for the link are done against the user:group:other of the
-+	 * target's 'r', 'w', 'x', 'a', 'z', and 'm' permissions.
-+	 *
-+	 * If the link has 'x', an exact match of all the execute flags
-+	 * ('i', 'u', 'p').  safe exec is treated as a subset of unsafe exec
-  	 */
- #define SUBSET_PERMS (AA_FILE_PERMS & ~AA_LINK_BITS)
--	denied_mask = ~l_mode & link_mask;
-+	denied_mask |= ~l_mode & link_mask;
- 	if (l_mode & SUBSET_PERMS) {
- 		denied_mask |= (l_mode & SUBSET_PERMS) & ~t_mode;
- 		if (denied_mask & AA_EXEC_BITS)
- 			denied_mask |= l_mode & AA_ALL_EXEC_MODS;
- 		else if (l_mode & AA_EXEC_BITS) {
-+			if (!(l_mode & AA_USER_EXEC_UNSAFE))
-+				l_mode |= t_mode & AA_USER_EXEC_UNSAFE;
- 			if (l_mode & AA_USER_EXEC &&
- 			    (l_mode & AA_USER_EXEC_MODS) !=
- 			    (t_mode & AA_USER_EXEC_MODS))
- 				denied_mask |= AA_USER_EXEC |
- 					(l_mode & AA_USER_EXEC_MODS);
-+			if (!(l_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_UNSAFE))
-+				l_mode |= t_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_UNSAFE;
- 			if (l_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC &&
- 			    (l_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS) !=
- 			    (t_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS))
-@@ -703,15 +727,15 @@ int aa_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
- 	    struct dentry *link, struct vfsmount *link_mnt,
- 	    struct dentry *target, struct vfsmount *target_mnt)
- {
--	int error, check = 0;
-+	int error;
- 	struct aa_audit sa;
- 	char *buffer = NULL, *buffer2 = NULL;
- 
- 	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- 	sa.operation = "inode_link";
- 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
--	sa.name = aa_get_name(link, link_mnt, &buffer, check);
--	sa.name2 = aa_get_name(target, target_mnt, &buffer2, check);
-+	sa.name = aa_get_name(link, link_mnt, &buffer, 0);
-+	sa.name2 = aa_get_name(target, target_mnt, &buffer2, 0);
- 
- 	if (IS_ERR(sa.name)) {
- 		sa.error_code = PTR_ERR(sa.name);
-@@ -723,7 +747,6 @@ int aa_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
- 	}
- 
- 	if (sa.name && sa.name2) {
--		sa.request_mask = AA_MAY_LINK;
- 		sa.denied_mask = aa_link_denied(profile, sa.name, sa.name2,
- 						aa_inode_mode(target->d_inode),
- 						&sa.request_mask);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-lsm.diff

@@ -1,904 +0,0 @@
-From: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-Subject: AppArmor: Module and LSM hooks
-
-Module parameters, LSM hooks, initialization and teardown.
-
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-
----
- security/apparmor/lsm.c |  889 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 889 insertions(+)
-
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,889 @@
-+/*
-+ *	Copyright (C) 1998-2007 Novell/SUSE
-+ *
-+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ *	modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ *	published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ *	License.
-+ *
-+ *	AppArmor LSM interface
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/security.h>
-+#include <linux/module.h>
-+#include <linux/mm.h>
-+#include <linux/mman.h>
-+#include <linux/mount.h>
-+#include <linux/namei.h>
-+#include <linux/ctype.h>
-+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
-+#include <linux/audit.h>
-+
-+#include "apparmor.h"
-+#include "inline.h"
-+
-+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
-+int apparmor_initialized = 0;
-+
-+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+#define param_check_aabool(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
-+
-+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+#define param_check_aauint(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
-+
-+/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
-+ * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
-+ *
-+ * Complain mode -- in complain mode access failures result in auditing only
-+ * and task is allowed access.  audit events are processed by userspace to
-+ * generate policy.  Default is 'enforce' (0).
-+ * Value is also togglable per profile and referenced when global value is
-+ * enforce.
-+ */
-+int apparmor_complain = 0;
-+module_param_named(complain, apparmor_complain, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
-+MODULE_PARM_DESC(apparmor_complain, "Toggle AppArmor complain mode");
-+
-+/* Debug mode */
-+int apparmor_debug = 0;
-+module_param_named(debug, apparmor_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
-+MODULE_PARM_DESC(apparmor_debug, "Toggle AppArmor debug mode");
-+
-+/* Audit mode */
-+int apparmor_audit = 0;
-+module_param_named(audit, apparmor_audit, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
-+MODULE_PARM_DESC(apparmor_audit, "Toggle AppArmor audit mode");
-+
-+/* Syscall logging mode */
-+int apparmor_logsyscall = 0;
-+module_param_named(logsyscall, apparmor_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
-+MODULE_PARM_DESC(apparmor_logsyscall, "Toggle AppArmor logsyscall mode");
-+
-+/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
-+unsigned int apparmor_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
-+module_param_named(path_max, apparmor_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
-+MODULE_PARM_DESC(apparmor_path_max, "Maximum pathname length allowed");
-+
-+/* Boot time disable flag */
-+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DISABLE
-+#define AA_ENABLED_PERMS 0600
-+#else
-+#define AA_ENABLED_PERMS 0400
-+#endif
-+static int param_set_aa_enabled(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+unsigned int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
-+module_param_call(enabled, param_set_aa_enabled, param_get_aauint,
-+		  &apparmor_enabled, AA_ENABLED_PERMS);
-+MODULE_PARM_DESC(apparmor_enabled, "Enable/Disable Apparmor on boot");
-+
-+static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
-+{
-+	apparmor_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
-+
-+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+	if (aa_task_context(current))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+	return param_set_bool(val, kp);
-+}
-+
-+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+	if (aa_task_context(current))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+	return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
-+}
-+
-+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+	if (aa_task_context(current))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+	return param_set_uint(val, kp);
-+}
-+
-+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+	if (aa_task_context(current))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+	return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
-+}
-+
-+/* allow run time disabling of apparmor */
-+static int param_set_aa_enabled(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+	char *endp;
-+	unsigned long l;
-+
-+	if (!apparmor_initialized) {
-+		apparmor_enabled = 0;
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (aa_task_context(current))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
-+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	if (!val)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	l = simple_strtoul(val, &endp, 0);
-+	if (endp == val || l != 0)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	apparmor_enabled = 0;
-+	apparmor_disable();
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_reject_syscall(struct task_struct *task, gfp_t flags,
-+			     const char *name)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile = aa_get_profile(task);
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	if (profile) {
-+		error = aa_audit_syscallreject(profile, flags, name);
-+		aa_put_profile(profile);
-+	}
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent,
-+			   struct task_struct *child)
-+{
-+	struct aa_task_context *cxt;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * parent can ptrace child when
-+	 * - parent is unconfined
-+	 * - parent & child are in the same namespace &&
-+	 *   - parent is in complain mode
-+	 *   - parent and child are confined by the same profile
-+	 *   - parent profile has CAP_SYS_PTRACE
-+	 */
-+
-+	rcu_read_lock();
-+	cxt = aa_task_context(parent);
-+	if (cxt) {
-+		if (parent->nsproxy != child->nsproxy) {
-+			struct aa_audit sa;
-+			memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+			sa.operation = "ptrace";
-+			sa.gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC;
-+			sa.parent = parent->pid;
-+			sa.task = child->pid;
-+			sa.info = "different namespaces";
-+			aa_audit_reject(cxt->profile, &sa);
-+			error = -EPERM;
-+		} else {
-+			struct aa_task_context *child_cxt =
-+				aa_task_context(child);
-+
-+			error = aa_may_ptrace(cxt, child_cxt ?
-+						   child_cxt->profile : NULL);
-+			if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(cxt->profile)) {
-+				struct aa_audit sa;
-+				memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+				sa.operation = "ptrace";
-+				sa.gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC;
-+				sa.parent = parent->pid;
-+				sa.task = child->pid;
-+				aa_audit_hint(cxt->profile, &sa);
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+	rcu_read_unlock();
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, int cap)
-+{
-+	int error;
-+	struct aa_task_context *cxt;
-+
-+	/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
-+	error = cap_capable(task, cap);
-+
-+	rcu_read_lock();
-+	cxt = aa_task_context(task);
-+	if (cxt && (!error || cap_raised(cxt->profile->set_caps, cap)))
-+		error = aa_capability(cxt, cap);
-+	rcu_read_unlock();
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	if (profile) {
-+		char *buffer, *name;
-+		int mask;
-+
-+		mask = 0;
-+		if (op & 4)
-+			mask |= MAY_READ;
-+		if (op & 2)
-+			mask |= MAY_WRITE;
-+
-+		error = -ENOMEM;
-+		buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-+		if (!buffer)
-+			goto out;
-+		name = sysctl_pathname(table, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
-+		if (name && name - buffer >= 5) {
-+			name -= 5;
-+			memcpy(name, "/proc", 5);
-+			error = aa_perm_path(profile, "sysctl", name, mask, 0);
-+		}
-+		free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
-+	}
-+
-+out:
-+	aa_put_profile(profile);
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-+{
-+	/* handle capability bits with setuid, etc */
-+	cap_bprm_set_security(bprm);
-+	/* already set based on script name */
-+	if (bprm->sh_bang)
-+		return 0;
-+	return aa_register(bprm);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-+{
-+	int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
-+
-+	if (!ret && (unsigned long)bprm->security & AA_SECURE_EXEC_NEEDED) {
-+		AA_DEBUG("%s: secureexec required for %s\n",
-+			 __FUNCTION__, bprm->filename);
-+		ret = 1;
-+	}
-+
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct nameidata *nd, char *type,
-+			      unsigned long flags, void *data)
-+{
-+	return aa_reject_syscall(current, GFP_KERNEL, "mount");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
-+{
-+	return aa_reject_syscall(current, GFP_KERNEL, "umount");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+				struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	if (!mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir))
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+
-+	if (profile)
-+		error = aa_perm_dir(profile, "inode_mkdir", dentry, mnt,
-+				    MAY_WRITE);
-+
-+	aa_put_profile(profile);
-+
-+out:
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+				struct vfsmount *mnt)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	if (!mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir))
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+
-+	if (profile)
-+		error = aa_perm_dir(profile, "inode_rmdir", dentry, mnt,
-+				    MAY_WRITE);
-+
-+	aa_put_profile(profile);
-+
-+out:
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_permission(const char *operation, struct inode *inode,
-+			 struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			 int mask, int check)
-+{
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	if (mnt && mediated_filesystem(inode)) {
-+		struct aa_profile *profile;
-+
-+		profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+		if (profile)
-+			error = aa_perm(profile, operation, dentry, mnt, mask,
-+					check);
-+		aa_put_profile(profile);
-+	}
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static inline int aa_mask_permissions(int mask)
-+{
-+	if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
-+		mask &= (MAY_READ | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC);
-+	else
-+		mask &= (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
-+	return mask;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+				 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask)
-+{
-+	return aa_permission("inode_create", dir, dentry, mnt, MAY_APPEND, 0);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry,
-+			       struct vfsmount *old_mnt, struct inode *dir,
-+			       struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+			       struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
-+{
-+	int error = 0;
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+
-+	if (!old_mnt || !new_mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir))
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+
-+	if (profile)
-+		error = aa_link(profile, new_dentry, new_mnt,
-+				old_dentry, old_mnt);
-+
-+	aa_put_profile(profile);
-+
-+out:
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+				 struct vfsmount *mnt)
-+{
-+	int check = 0;
-+
-+	if (S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
-+		check |= AA_CHECK_DIR;
-+	return aa_permission("inode_unlink", dir, dentry, mnt, MAY_WRITE,
-+			     check);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+				  struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *old_name)
-+{
-+	return aa_permission("inode_symlink", dir, dentry, mnt, MAY_WRITE, 0);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+				struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev)
-+{
-+	return aa_permission("inode_mknod", dir, dentry, mnt, MAY_WRITE, 0);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
-+				 struct dentry *old_dentry,
-+				 struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
-+				 struct inode *new_dir,
-+				 struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+				 struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	if ((!old_mnt && !new_mnt) || !mediated_filesystem(old_dir))
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+
-+	if (profile) {
-+		struct inode *inode = old_dentry->d_inode;
-+		int check = 0;
-+
-+		if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
-+			check |= AA_CHECK_DIR;
-+		if (old_mnt)
-+			error = aa_perm(profile, "inode_rename", old_dentry,
-+					old_mnt, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, check);
-+
-+		if (!error && new_mnt) {
-+			error = aa_perm(profile, "inode_rename", new_dentry,
-+					new_mnt, MAY_WRITE, check);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	aa_put_profile(profile);
-+
-+out:
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
-+				     struct nameidata *nd)
-+{
-+	int check = 0;
-+
-+	if (!nd || nd->flags & (LOOKUP_PARENT | LOOKUP_CONTINUE))
-+		return 0;
-+	mask = aa_mask_permissions(mask);
-+	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
-+		check |= AA_CHECK_DIR;
-+		/* allow traverse accesses to directories */
-+		mask &= ~MAY_EXEC;
-+	}
-+	return aa_permission("inode_permission", inode, nd->dentry, nd->mnt,
-+			     mask, check);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				  struct iattr *iattr)
-+{
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	if (!mnt)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	if (mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode)) {
-+		struct aa_profile *profile;
-+
-+		profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+		/*
-+		 * Mediate any attempt to change attributes of a file
-+		 * (chmod, chown, chgrp, etc)
-+		 */
-+		if (profile)
-+			error = aa_attr(profile, dentry, mnt, iattr);
-+
-+		aa_put_profile(profile);
-+	}
-+
-+out:
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_xattr_permission(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			       const char *operation, int mask,
-+			       struct file *file)
-+{
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	if (mnt && mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode)) {
-+		struct aa_profile *profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+		int check = file ? AA_CHECK_FD : 0;
-+
-+		if (profile)
-+			error = aa_perm_xattr(profile, operation, dentry, mnt,
-+					      mask, check);
-+		aa_put_profile(profile);
-+	}
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				   char *name, void *value, size_t size,
-+				   int flags, struct file *file)
-+{
-+	return aa_xattr_permission(dentry, mnt, "xattr set", MAY_WRITE, file);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				   char *name, struct file *file)
-+{
-+	return aa_xattr_permission(dentry, mnt, "xattr get", MAY_READ, file);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				    struct file *file)
-+{
-+	return aa_xattr_permission(dentry, mnt, "xattr list", MAY_READ, file);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-+				      struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name,
-+				      struct file *file)
-+{
-+	return aa_xattr_permission(dentry, mnt, "xattr remove", MAY_WRITE,
-+				   file);
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_file_permission(const char *op, struct file *file, int mask)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	struct aa_profile *file_profile = (struct aa_profile*)file->f_security;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	if (!file_profile)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * If this file was opened under a different profile, we
-+	 * revalidate the access against the current profile.
-+	 */
-+	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+	if (profile && (file_profile != profile || mask & AA_MAY_LOCK)) {
-+		struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
-+		struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
-+		struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-+		int check = AA_CHECK_FD;
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * FIXME: We should remember which profiles we revalidated
-+		 *	  against.
-+		 */
-+		if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
-+			check |= AA_CHECK_DIR;
-+		error = aa_permission(op, inode, dentry, mnt, mask, check);
-+	}
-+	aa_put_profile(profile);
-+
-+out:
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
-+{
-+	return aa_file_permission("file_permission", file,
-+				  aa_mask_permissions(mask));
-+}
-+
-+static inline int apparmor_file_lock (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
-+{
-+	int mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
-+	if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
-+		mask |= MAY_WRITE;
-+	return aa_file_permission("file_lock", file, mask);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+
-+	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+	if (profile)
-+		file->f_security = profile;
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *file_profile = (struct aa_profile*)file->f_security;
-+
-+	aa_put_profile(file_profile);
-+}
-+
-+static inline int aa_mmap(struct file *file, const char *operation,
-+			  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
-+{
-+	struct dentry *dentry;
-+	int mask = 0;
-+
-+	if (!file || !file->f_security)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if (prot & PROT_READ)
-+		mask |= MAY_READ;
-+	/* Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
-+	 * write back to the files */
-+	if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
-+		mask |= MAY_WRITE;
-+	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
-+		mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
-+
-+	dentry = file->f_dentry;
-+	return aa_permission(operation, dentry->d_inode, dentry,
-+			     file->f_vfsmnt, mask, AA_CHECK_FD);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-+			      unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-+			      unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
-+{
-+	if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) {
-+		struct aa_profile *profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+		if (profile)
-+			/* future control check here */
-+			return -EACCES;
-+		else
-+			return -EACCES;
-+		aa_put_profile(profile);
-+	}
-+
-+	return aa_mmap(file, "file_mmap", prot, flags);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
-+				  unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
-+{
-+	return aa_mmap(vma->vm_file, "file_mprotect", prot,
-+		       !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
-+{
-+	return aa_clone(task);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Called from IRQ context from RCU callback.
-+ */
-+static void apparmor_task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
-+{
-+	aa_release(task);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
-+				char **value)
-+{
-+	unsigned len;
-+	int error;
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+
-+	/* AppArmor only supports the "current" process attribute */
-+	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	/* must be task querying itself or admin */
-+	if (current != task && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
-+	profile = aa_get_profile(task);
-+	error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value, &len);
-+	aa_put_profile(profile);
-+	if (!error)
-+		error = len;
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
-+				void *value, size_t size)
-+{
-+	char *command, *args;
-+	int error;
-+
-+	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 || size == 0 || size >= PAGE_SIZE)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+	args = value;
-+	args[size] = '\0';
-+	args = strstrip(args);
-+	command = strsep(&args, " ");
-+	if (!args)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+	while (isspace(*args))
-+		args++;
-+	if (!*args)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
-+		if (current != task)
-+			return -EACCES;
-+		error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args);
-+	} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
-+		if (current != task)
-+			return -EACCES;
-+		error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args);
-+	} else if (strcmp(command, "setprofile") == 0) {
-+		struct aa_profile *profile;
-+
-+		/* Only an unconfined process with admin capabilities
-+		 * may change the profile of another task.
-+		 */
-+
-+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-+			return -EACCES;
-+
-+		profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+		if (profile) {
-+			struct aa_audit sa;
-+			memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+			sa.operation = "profile_set";
-+			sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+			sa.task = task->pid;
-+			sa.info = "from confined process";
-+			aa_audit_reject(profile, &sa);
-+			aa_put_profile(profile);
-+			return -EACCES;
-+		}
-+		error = aa_setprocattr_setprofile(task, args);
-+	} else {
-+		struct aa_audit sa;
-+		memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+		sa.operation = "setprocattr";
-+		sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+		sa.info = "invalid command";
-+		sa.name = command;
-+		sa.task = task->pid;
-+		aa_audit_reject(NULL, &sa);
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (!error)
-+		error = size;
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
-+	.ptrace =			apparmor_ptrace,
-+	.capget =			cap_capget,
-+	.capset_check =			cap_capset_check,
-+	.capset_set =			cap_capset_set,
-+	.sysctl =			apparmor_sysctl,
-+	.capable =			apparmor_capable,
-+	.syslog =			cap_syslog,
-+
-+	.netlink_send =			cap_netlink_send,
-+	.netlink_recv =			cap_netlink_recv,
-+
-+	.bprm_apply_creds =		cap_bprm_apply_creds,
-+	.bprm_set_security =		apparmor_bprm_set_security,
-+	.bprm_secureexec =		apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
-+
-+	.sb_mount =			apparmor_sb_mount,
-+	.sb_umount =			apparmor_umount,
-+
-+	.inode_mkdir =			apparmor_inode_mkdir,
-+	.inode_rmdir =			apparmor_inode_rmdir,
-+	.inode_create =			apparmor_inode_create,
-+	.inode_link =			apparmor_inode_link,
-+	.inode_unlink =			apparmor_inode_unlink,
-+	.inode_symlink =		apparmor_inode_symlink,
-+	.inode_mknod =			apparmor_inode_mknod,
-+	.inode_rename =			apparmor_inode_rename,
-+	.inode_permission =		apparmor_inode_permission,
-+	.inode_setattr =		apparmor_inode_setattr,
-+	.inode_setxattr =		apparmor_inode_setxattr,
-+	.inode_getxattr =		apparmor_inode_getxattr,
-+	.inode_listxattr =		apparmor_inode_listxattr,
-+	.inode_removexattr =		apparmor_inode_removexattr,
-+	.file_permission =		apparmor_file_permission,
-+	.file_alloc_security =		apparmor_file_alloc_security,
-+	.file_free_security =		apparmor_file_free_security,
-+	.file_mmap =			apparmor_file_mmap,
-+	.file_mprotect =		apparmor_file_mprotect,
-+	.file_lock =			apparmor_file_lock,
-+
-+	.task_alloc_security =		apparmor_task_alloc_security,
-+	.task_free_security =		apparmor_task_free_security,
-+	.task_post_setuid =		cap_task_post_setuid,
-+	.task_reparent_to_init =	cap_task_reparent_to_init,
-+
-+	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
-+	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
-+};
-+
-+void info_message(const char *str)
-+{
-+	struct aa_audit sa;
-+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+	sa.info = str;
-+	printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str);
-+	if (audit_enabled)
-+		aa_audit_message(NULL, &sa, AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS);
-+}
-+
-+static int __init apparmor_init(void)
-+{
-+	int error;
-+
-+	if (!apparmor_enabled) {
-+		info_message("AppArmor disabled by boottime parameter\n");
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((error = create_apparmorfs())) {
-+		AA_ERROR("Unable to activate AppArmor filesystem\n");
-+		goto createfs_out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((error = alloc_default_namespace())){
-+		AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
-+		goto alloc_out;
-+	}
-+
-+ 	if ((error = register_security(&apparmor_ops))) {
-+		AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
-+		goto register_security_out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
-+	apparmor_initialized = 1;
-+	if (apparmor_complain)
-+		info_message("AppArmor initialized: complainmode enabled");
-+	else
-+		info_message("AppArmor initialized");
-+
-+	return error;
-+
-+register_security_out:
-+	free_default_namespace();
-+
-+alloc_out:
-+ 	destroy_apparmorfs();
-+
-+createfs_out:
-+	return error;
-+
-+}
-+
-+security_initcall(apparmor_init);
-+
-+void apparmor_disable(void)
-+{
-+	/* Remove and release all the profiles on the profile list. */
-+	mutex_lock(&aa_interface_lock);
-+	aa_profile_ns_list_release();
-+
-+	/* FIXME: cleanup profiles references on files */
-+	free_default_namespace();
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Delay for an rcu cycle to make sure that all active task
-+	 * context readers have finished, and all profiles have been
-+	 * freed by their rcu callbacks.
-+	 */
-+	synchronize_rcu();
-+
-+	destroy_apparmorfs();
-+	mutex_unlock(&aa_interface_lock);
-+
-+	apparmor_initialized = 0;
-+
-+	info_message("AppArmor protection removed");
-+}
-+
-+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AppArmor process confinement");
-+MODULE_AUTHOR("Novell/Immunix, http://bugs.opensuse.org");
-+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-main-2.diff

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/main.c |   23 ++++++++++++++---------
- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -172,15 +172,18 @@ escape:
- static char *aa_get_name(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 			 char **buffer, int check)
- {
--	char *name;
-+	char *buf = NULL, *name;
- 	int is_dir, size = 256;
- 
- 	is_dir = (check & AA_CHECK_DIR) ? 1 : 0;
- 
- 	for (;;) {
--		char *buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
--		if (!buf)
--			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-+		char *b = krealloc(buf, size, GFP_KERNEL);
-+
-+		name = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-+		if (!b)
-+			break;
-+		buf = b;
- 
- 		name = d_namespace_path(dentry, mnt, buf, size - is_dir);
- 
-@@ -195,8 +198,8 @@ static char *aa_get_name(struct dentry *
- 				 * This dentry is not connected to the
- 				 * namespace root -- reject access.
- 				 */
--				kfree(buf);
--				return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
-+				name = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
-+				break;
- 			}
- 			if (is_dir && name[1] != '\0') {
- 				/*
-@@ -212,13 +215,15 @@ static char *aa_get_name(struct dentry *
- 			return name;
- 		}
- 		if (PTR_ERR(name) != -ENAMETOOLONG)
--			return name;
-+			break;
- 
--		kfree(buf);
- 		size <<= 1;
-+		name = ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
- 		if (size > apparmor_path_max)
--			return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
-+			break;
- 	}
-+	kfree(buf);
-+	return name;
- }
- 
- static inline void aa_put_name_buffer(char *buffer)

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-network.diff

@@ -1,408 +0,0 @@
-From: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-Subject: AppArmor: Simplified network controls for AppArmor
-
-Simple network control determining which network families a confined
-application has access to.
-
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- security/apparmor/Makefile           |    7 +
- security/apparmor/apparmor.h         |    9 ++
- security/apparmor/lsm.c              |  129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- security/apparmor/main.c             |  107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- security/apparmor/module_interface.c |   26 ++++++-
- 5 files changed, 271 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
-+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
-@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@ apparmor-y := main.o list.o procattr.o l
- quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN     $@
- cmd_make-caps = sed -n -e "/CAP_FS_MASK/d" -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+CAP_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\$$/[\\2]  = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z > $@
- 
--$(obj)/main.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
-+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
-+cmd_make-af = sed -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+AF_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/[\\2]  = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z > $@
-+
-+$(obj)/main.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h $(obj)/af_names.h
- $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h
- 	$(call cmd,make-caps)
-+$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h
-+	$(call cmd,make-af)
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
- #include <linux/fs.h>
- #include <linux/binfmts.h>
- #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
-+#include <linux/socket.h>
-+#include <net/sock.h>
- 
- /*
-  * We use MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, MAY_APPEND and the following flags
-@@ -208,6 +210,9 @@ struct aa_profile {
- 	struct list_head task_contexts;
- 	spinlock_t lock;
- 	unsigned long int_flags;
-+	u16 network_families[AF_MAX];
-+	u16 audit_network[AF_MAX];
-+	u16 quiet_network[AF_MAX];
- };
- 
- extern struct list_head profile_ns_list;
-@@ -254,6 +259,7 @@ struct aa_audit {
- 	int request_mask, denied_mask, audit_mask;
- 	struct iattr *iattr;
- 	pid_t task, parent;
-+	int family, type, protocol;
- 	int error_code;
- };
- 
-@@ -315,6 +321,9 @@ extern void aa_change_task_context(struc
- 				   struct aa_profile *previous_profile);
- extern int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_task_context *cxt,
- 			 struct aa_profile *tracee);
-+extern int aa_net_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, char *operation,
-+			int family, int type, int protocol);
-+extern int aa_revalidate_sk(struct sock *sk, char *operation);
- 
- /* lsm.c */
- extern int apparmor_initialized;
---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
- #include <linux/ctype.h>
- #include <linux/sysctl.h>
- #include <linux/audit.h>
-+#include <net/sock.h>
- 
- #include "apparmor.h"
- #include "inline.h"
-@@ -663,6 +664,117 @@ static void apparmor_task_free_security(
- 	aa_release(task);
- }
- 
-+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	if (kern)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+	if (profile)
-+		error = aa_net_perm(profile, "socket_create", family,
-+							type, protocol);
-+	aa_put_profile(profile);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
-+					int type, int protocol, int kern)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	if (kern)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_post_create");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
-+				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_bind");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
-+					struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_connect");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_listen");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_accept");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
-+					struct msghdr *msg, int size)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_sendmsg");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
-+				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_recvmsg");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_getsockname");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_getpeername");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
-+					int optname)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_getsockopt");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
-+					int optname)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_setsockopt");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_shutdown");
-+}
-+
- static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
- 				char **value)
- {
-@@ -763,9 +875,6 @@ struct security_operations apparmor_ops 
- 	.capable =			apparmor_capable,
- 	.syslog =			cap_syslog,
- 
--	.netlink_send =			cap_netlink_send,
--	.netlink_recv =			cap_netlink_recv,
--
- 	.bprm_apply_creds =		cap_bprm_apply_creds,
- 	.bprm_set_security =		apparmor_bprm_set_security,
- 	.bprm_secureexec =		apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
-@@ -801,6 +910,20 @@ struct security_operations apparmor_ops 
- 
- 	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
- 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
-+
-+	.socket_create =		apparmor_socket_create,
-+	.socket_post_create =		apparmor_socket_post_create,
-+	.socket_bind =			apparmor_socket_bind,
-+	.socket_connect =		apparmor_socket_connect,
-+	.socket_listen =		apparmor_socket_listen,
-+	.socket_accept =		apparmor_socket_accept,
-+	.socket_sendmsg =		apparmor_socket_sendmsg,
-+	.socket_recvmsg =		apparmor_socket_recvmsg,
-+	.socket_getsockname =		apparmor_socket_getsockname,
-+	.socket_getpeername =		apparmor_socket_getpeername,
-+	.socket_getsockopt =		apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
-+	.socket_setsockopt =		apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
-+	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
- };
- 
- void info_message(const char *str)
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
- #include <linux/audit.h>
- #include <linux/mount.h>
- #include <linux/ptrace.h>
-+#include <linux/socket.h>
-+#include <linux/net.h>
-+#include <net/sock.h>
- 
- #include "apparmor.h"
- 
-@@ -116,6 +119,24 @@ static void aa_audit_file_mask(struct au
- 	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"%s::%s\"", name, user, other);
- }
- 
-+static const char *address_families[] = {
-+#include "af_names.h"
-+};
-+
-+static const char *sock_types[] = {
-+	"unknown(0)",
-+	"stream",
-+	"dgram",
-+	"raw",
-+	"rdm",
-+	"seqpacket",
-+	"dccp",
-+	"unknown(7)",
-+	"unknown(8)",
-+	"unknown(9)",
-+	"packet",
-+};
-+
- /**
-  * aa_audit - Log an audit event to the audit subsystem
-  * @profile: profile to check against
-@@ -187,7 +208,25 @@ static int aa_audit_base(struct aa_profi
- 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->name2);
- 	}
- 
--	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d", current->pid);
-+	if (sa->family || sa->type) {
-+		if (address_families[sa->family])
-+			audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"",
-+					 address_families[sa->family]);
-+		else
-+			audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"",
-+					 sa->family);
-+
-+		if (sock_types[sa->type])
-+			audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"",
-+					 sock_types[sa->type]);
-+		else
-+			audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"unknown(%d)\"",
-+					 sa->type);
-+
-+		audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->protocol);
-+	}
-+
-+        audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d", current->pid);
- 
- 	if (profile) {
- 		audit_log_format(ab, " profile=");
-@@ -768,6 +807,72 @@ int aa_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
- 	return error;
- }
- 
-+int aa_net_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, char *operation,
-+		int family, int type, int protocol)
-+{
-+	struct aa_audit sa;
-+	int error = 0;
-+	u16 family_mask, audit_mask, quiet_mask;
-+
-+	if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	/* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
-+	if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	family_mask = profile->network_families[family];
-+	audit_mask = profile->audit_network[family];
-+	quiet_mask = profile->quiet_network[family];
-+
-+	error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
-+
-+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+	sa.operation = operation;
-+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+	sa.family = family;
-+	sa.type = type;
-+	sa.protocol = protocol;
-+	sa.error_code = error;
-+
-+	if (likely(!error)) {
-+		if (!PROFILE_AUDIT(profile) && !(family_mask & audit_mask))
-+			return 0;
-+	} else if (!((1 << type) & ~quiet_mask)) {
-+		return error;
-+	}
-+
-+	error = aa_audit(profile, &sa);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+int aa_revalidate_sk(struct sock *sk, char *operation)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	/* this is some debugging code to flush out the network hooks that
-+	   that are called in interrupt context */
-+	if (in_interrupt()) {
-+		printk("AppArmor Debug: Hook being called from interrupt context\n");
-+		dump_stack();
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+	if (profile)
-+		error = aa_net_perm(profile, operation,
-+				    sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
-+				    sk->sk_protocol);
-+	aa_put_profile(profile);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
- /*******************************
-  * Global task related functions
-  *******************************/
---- a/security/apparmor/module_interface.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/module_interface.c
-@@ -320,8 +320,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *aa_unpack_prof
- 					    struct aa_audit *sa)
- {
- 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
--
--	int error = -EPROTO;
-+	size_t size = 0;
-+	int i, error = -EPROTO;
- 
- 	profile = alloc_aa_profile();
- 	if (!profile)
-@@ -354,6 +354,28 @@ static struct aa_profile *aa_unpack_prof
- 	if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->set_caps), NULL))
- 		goto fail;
- 
-+	size = aa_is_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
-+	if (size) {
-+		if (size > AF_MAX)
-+			goto fail;
-+
-+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-+			if (!aa_is_u16(e, &profile->network_families[i], NULL))
-+				goto fail;
-+			if (!aa_is_u16(e, &profile->audit_network[i], NULL))
-+				goto fail;
-+			if (!aa_is_u16(e, &profile->quiet_network[i], NULL))
-+				goto fail;
-+		}
-+		if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
-+			goto fail;
-+		/* allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
-+		 * by IPC
-+		 */
-+	}
-+	profile->network_families[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
-+	profile->network_families[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
-+
- 	/* get file rules */
- 	profile->file_rules = aa_unpack_dfa(e);
- 	if (IS_ERR(profile->file_rules)) {

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-rlimits.diff

@@ -1,461 +0,0 @@
-From: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-Subject: AppArmor: per profile controls for system rlimits
-
-Provide contol of rlimits on a per profile basis.  Each profile provides
-a per limit contol and corresponding hard limit value, such that when a
-profile becomes attached to a task it sets the tasks limits to be <= to
-the profiles specified limits.  Note: the profile limit value will not
-raise a tasks limit if it is already less than the profile mandates.
-
-In addition to setting a tasks limits, the ability to set limits on
-a confined task are controlled.  AppArmor only controls the raising
-of a tasks limits Tasks with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE can have their hard limits
-raised up to the value specified by the profile.  AppArmor does not
-prevent a task for lowering its hard limits, nor does it provide
-additional control on soft limits.
-
-AppArmor only controls the limits specified in a profile so that
-any limit not specified is free to be modified subject to standard
-linux limitations.
-
----
- security/apparmor/apparmor.h         |   23 ++++++
- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c       |    2 
- security/apparmor/lsm.c              |   16 ++++
- security/apparmor/main.c             |  132 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
- security/apparmor/module_interface.c |   56 ++++++++++++++
- 5 files changed, 215 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
- #include <linux/fs.h>
- #include <linux/binfmts.h>
- #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
-+#include <linux/resource.h>
- #include <linux/socket.h>
- #include <net/sock.h>
- 
-@@ -136,6 +137,18 @@ extern unsigned int apparmor_path_max;
- 
- #define AA_ERROR(fmt, args...)	printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor: " fmt, ##args)
- 
-+/* struct aa_rlimit - rlimits settings for the profile
-+ * @mask: which hard limits to set
-+ * @limits: rlimit values that override task limits
-+ *
-+ * AppArmor rlimits are used to set confined task rlimits.  Only the
-+ * limits specified in @mask will be controlled by apparmor.
-+ */
-+struct aa_rlimit {
-+	unsigned int mask;
-+	struct rlimit limits[RLIM_NLIMITS];
-+};
-+
- struct aa_profile;
- 
- /* struct aa_namespace - namespace for a set of profiles
-@@ -170,6 +183,8 @@ struct aa_namespace {
-  * @audit_caps: caps that are to be audited
-  * @quiet_caps: caps that should not be audited
-  * @capabilities: capabilities granted by the process
-+ * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
-+ * @task_count: how many tasks the profile is attached to
-  * @count: reference count of the profile
-  * @task_contexts: list of tasks confined by profile
-  * @lock: lock for the task_contexts list
-@@ -206,6 +221,9 @@ struct aa_profile {
- 	kernel_cap_t audit_caps;
- 	kernel_cap_t quiet_caps;
- 
-+	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
-+	unsigned int task_count;
-+
- 	struct kref count;
- 	struct list_head task_contexts;
- 	spinlock_t lock;
-@@ -257,6 +275,7 @@ struct aa_audit {
- 	const char *name2;
- 	const char *name3;
- 	int request_mask, denied_mask, audit_mask;
-+	int rlimit;
- 	struct iattr *iattr;
- 	pid_t task, parent;
- 	int family, type, protocol;
-@@ -324,6 +343,10 @@ extern int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_task_
- extern int aa_net_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, char *operation,
- 			int family, int type, int protocol);
- extern int aa_revalidate_sk(struct sock *sk, char *operation);
-+extern int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
-+			     struct rlimit *new_rlim);
-+extern void aa_set_rlimits(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile);
-+
- 
- /* lsm.c */
- extern int apparmor_initialized;
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static ssize_t aa_features_read(struct f
- {
- 	const char *features = "file=3.0 capability=2.0 network=1.0 "
- 			       "change_hat=1.4 change_profile=1.0 "
--			       "aanamespaces=1.0";
-+			       "aanamespaces=1.0 rlimit=1.0";
- 
- 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, features,
- 				       strlen(features));
---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -866,6 +866,21 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct t
- 	return error;
- }
- 
-+static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource,
-+				   struct rlimit *new_rlim)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-+	if (profile) {
-+		error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim);
-+	}
-+	aa_put_profile(profile);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
- struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
- 	.ptrace =			apparmor_ptrace,
- 	.capget =			cap_capget,
-@@ -907,6 +922,7 @@ struct security_operations apparmor_ops 
- 	.task_free_security =		apparmor_task_free_security,
- 	.task_post_setuid =		cap_task_post_setuid,
- 	.task_reparent_to_init =	cap_task_reparent_to_init,
-+	.task_setrlimit =		apparmor_task_setrlimit,
- 
- 	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
- 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ static int aa_audit_base(struct aa_profi
- 	if (sa->request_mask)
- 		audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", current->fsuid);
- 
-+	if (sa->rlimit)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%d", sa->rlimit - 1);
-+
- 	if (sa->iattr) {
- 		struct iattr *iattr = sa->iattr;
- 
-@@ -872,6 +875,79 @@ int aa_revalidate_sk(struct sock *sk, ch
- 
- 	return error;
- }
-+/**
-+ * aa_task_setrlimit - test permission to set an rlimit
-+ * @profile - profile confining the task
-+ * @resource - the resource being set
-+ * @new_rlim - the new resource limit
-+ *
-+ * Control raising the processes hard limit.
-+ */
-+int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
-+		      struct rlimit *new_rlim)
-+{
-+	struct aa_audit sa;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+	sa.operation = "setrlimit";
-+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+	sa.rlimit = resource + 1;
-+
-+	if (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
-+	    new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max) {
-+		sa.error_code = -EACCES;
-+
-+		error = aa_audit(profile, &sa);
-+	}
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_rlimit_nproc(struct aa_profile *profile) {
-+	if (profile && (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << RLIMIT_NPROC)) &&
-+	    profile->task_count >= profile->rlimits.limits[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_max)
-+		return -EAGAIN;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+void aa_set_rlimits(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+	int i, mask;
-+
-+	if (!profile)
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (!profile->rlimits.mask)
-+		return;
-+
-+	task_lock(task->group_leader);
-+	mask = 1;
-+	for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++, mask <<= 1) {
-+		struct rlimit new_rlim, *old_rlim;
-+
-+		/* check to see if NPROC which is per profile and handled
-+		 * in clone/exec or whether this is a limit to be set
-+		 * can't set cpu limit either right now
-+		 */
-+		if (i == RLIMIT_NPROC || i == RLIMIT_CPU)
-+			continue;
-+
-+		old_rlim = task->signal->rlim + i;
-+		new_rlim = *old_rlim;
-+
-+		if (mask & profile->rlimits.mask &&
-+		    profile->rlimits.limits[i].rlim_max < new_rlim.rlim_max) {
-+			new_rlim.rlim_max = profile->rlimits.limits[i].rlim_max;
-+			/* soft limit should not exceed hard limit */
-+			if (new_rlim.rlim_cur > new_rlim.rlim_max)
-+				new_rlim.rlim_cur = new_rlim.rlim_max;
-+		}
-+
-+		*old_rlim = new_rlim;
-+	}
-+	task_unlock(task->group_leader);
-+}
- 
- /*******************************
-  * Global task related functions
-@@ -885,6 +961,7 @@ int aa_revalidate_sk(struct sock *sk, ch
-  */
- int aa_clone(struct task_struct *child)
- {
-+	struct aa_audit sa;
- 	struct aa_task_context *cxt, *child_cxt;
- 	struct aa_profile *profile;
- 
-@@ -894,6 +971,11 @@ int aa_clone(struct task_struct *child)
- 	if (!child_cxt)
- 		return -ENOMEM;
- 
-+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+	sa.operation = "clone";
-+	sa.task = child->pid;
-+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+
- repeat:
- 	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
- 	if (profile) {
-@@ -910,18 +992,22 @@ repeat:
- 			goto repeat;
- 		}
- 
-+		if (aa_rlimit_nproc(profile)) {
-+			sa.info = "rlimit nproc limit exceeded";
-+			unlock_profile(profile);
-+			aa_audit_reject(profile, &sa);
-+			aa_put_profile(profile);
-+			return -EAGAIN;
-+		}
-+
- 		/* No need to grab the child's task lock here. */
- 		aa_change_task_context(child, child_cxt, profile,
- 				       cxt->cookie, cxt->previous_profile);
-+
- 		unlock_profile(profile);
- 
- 		if (APPARMOR_COMPLAIN(child_cxt) &&
- 		    profile == profile->ns->null_complain_profile) {
--			struct aa_audit sa;
--			memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
--			sa.operation = "clone";
--			sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
--			sa.task = child->pid;
- 			aa_audit_hint(profile, &sa);
- 		}
- 		aa_put_profile(profile);
-@@ -1156,6 +1242,10 @@ repeat:
- 			sa.task = current->parent->pid;
- 			aa_audit_reject(profile, &sa);
- 		}
-+		if (PTR_ERR(old_profile) == -EAGAIN) {
-+			sa.info = "rlimit nproc limit exceeded";
-+			aa_audit_reject(profile, &sa);
-+		}
- 		new_profile = old_profile;
- 		goto cleanup;
- 	}
-@@ -1296,6 +1386,12 @@ static int do_change_profile(struct aa_p
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-+	if ((error = aa_rlimit_nproc(new_profile))) {
-+		sa->info = "rlimit nproc limit exceeded";
-+		aa_audit_reject(cxt->profile, sa);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (new_profile == ns->null_complain_profile)
- 		aa_audit_hint(cxt->profile, sa);
- 
-@@ -1482,17 +1578,18 @@ struct aa_profile *__aa_replace_profile(
- 
- 	cxt = lock_task_and_profiles(task, profile);
- 	if (unlikely(profile && profile->isstale)) {
--		task_unlock(task);
--		unlock_both_profiles(profile, cxt ? cxt->profile : NULL);
--		aa_free_task_context(new_cxt);
--		return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE);
-+		old_profile = ERR_PTR(-ESTALE);
-+		goto error;
- 	}
- 
- 	if ((current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && aa_may_ptrace(cxt, profile)) {
--		task_unlock(task);
--		unlock_both_profiles(profile, cxt ? cxt->profile : NULL);
--		aa_free_task_context(new_cxt);
--		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-+		old_profile = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (aa_rlimit_nproc(profile)) {
-+		old_profile = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
-+		goto error;
- 	}
- 
- 	if (cxt)
-@@ -1500,8 +1597,15 @@ struct aa_profile *__aa_replace_profile(
- 	aa_change_task_context(task, new_cxt, profile, 0, NULL);
- 
- 	task_unlock(task);
-+	aa_set_rlimits(task, profile);
- 	unlock_both_profiles(profile, old_profile);
- 	return old_profile;
-+
-+error:
-+	task_unlock(task);
-+	unlock_both_profiles(profile, cxt ? cxt->profile : NULL);
-+	aa_free_task_context(new_cxt);
-+	return old_profile;
- }
- 
- /**
-@@ -1566,6 +1670,7 @@ void aa_change_task_context(struct task_
- 
- 	if (old_cxt) {
- 		list_del_init(&old_cxt->list);
-+		old_cxt->profile->task_count--;
- 		call_rcu(&old_cxt->rcu, free_aa_task_context_rcu_callback);
- 	}
- 	if (new_cxt) {
-@@ -1577,6 +1682,7 @@ void aa_change_task_context(struct task_
- 		new_cxt->cookie = cookie;
- 		new_cxt->task = task;
- 		new_cxt->profile = aa_dup_profile(profile);
-+		profile->task_count++;
- 		new_cxt->previous_profile = aa_dup_profile(previous_profile);
- 		list_move(&new_cxt->list, &profile->task_contexts);
- 	}
---- a/security/apparmor/module_interface.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/module_interface.c
-@@ -177,6 +177,22 @@ fail:
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+static int aa_is_u64(struct aa_ext *e, u64 *data, const char *name)
-+{
-+	void *pos = e->pos;
-+	if (aa_is_nameX(e, AA_U64, name)) {
-+		if (!aa_inbounds(e, sizeof(u64)))
-+			goto fail;
-+		if (data)
-+			*data = le64_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u64 *)e->pos));
-+		e->pos += sizeof(u64);
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+fail:
-+	e->pos = pos;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- static size_t aa_is_array(struct aa_ext *e, const char *name)
- {
- 	void *pos = e->pos;
-@@ -311,6 +327,39 @@ fail:
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+int aa_unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+	void *pos = e->pos;
-+
-+	/* rlimits are optional */
-+	if (aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "rlimits")) {
-+		int i, size;
-+		u32 tmp = 0;
-+		if (!aa_is_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
-+			goto fail;
-+		profile->rlimits.mask = tmp;
-+
-+		size = aa_is_array(e, NULL);
-+		if (size != RLIM_NLIMITS)
-+			goto fail;
-+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-+			u64 tmp = 0;
-+			if (!aa_is_u64(e, &tmp, NULL))
-+				goto fail;
-+			profile->rlimits.limits[i].rlim_max = tmp;
-+		}
-+		if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
-+			goto fail;
-+		if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
-+			goto fail;
-+	}
-+	return 1;
-+
-+fail:
-+	e->pos = pos;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /**
-  * aa_unpack_profile - unpack a serialized profile
-  * @e: serialized data extent information
-@@ -354,6 +403,9 @@ static struct aa_profile *aa_unpack_prof
- 	if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->set_caps), NULL))
- 		goto fail;
- 
-+	if (!aa_unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
-+		goto fail;
-+
- 	size = aa_is_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
- 	if (size) {
- 		if (size > AF_MAX)
-@@ -613,6 +665,8 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profile(void *udata, 
- 		sa.operation = "profile_load";
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	/* do not fail replacement based off of profile's NPROC rlimit */
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Replacement needs to allocate a new aa_task_context for each
- 	 * task confined by old_profile.  To do this the profile locks
-@@ -633,6 +687,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profile(void *udata, 
- 			task_lock(task);
- 			task_replace(task, new_cxt, new_profile);
- 			task_unlock(task);
-+			aa_set_rlimits(task, new_profile);
- 			new_cxt = NULL;
- 		}
- 		unlock_both_profiles(old_profile, new_profile);
-@@ -655,6 +710,7 @@ out:
-  *
-  * remove a profile from the profile list and all aa_task_context references
-  * to said profile.
-+ * NOTE: removing confinement does not restore rlimits to preconfinemnet values
-  */
- ssize_t aa_remove_profile(char *name, size_t size)
- {

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-secondary-accept.diff

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/apparmor.h |    1 +
- security/apparmor/match.c    |    9 +++++++--
- security/apparmor/match.h    |    2 ++
- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@
- 					 AA_AUDIT_FIELD)
- 
- #define AA_VALID_PERM_MASK		(AA_FILE_PERMS | AA_SHARED_PERMS)
-+#define AA_VALID_PERM2_MASK		0x0fffffff
- 
- #define AA_SECURE_EXEC_NEEDED		1
- 
---- a/security/apparmor/match.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
-@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ int unpack_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, void 
- 
- 		switch(table->td_id) {
- 		case YYTD_ID_ACCEPT:
-+		case YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2:
- 		case YYTD_ID_BASE:
- 			dfa->tables[table->td_id - 1] = table;
- 			if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA32)
-@@ -134,7 +135,8 @@ int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
- 	int error = -EPROTO;
- 
- 	/* check that required tables exist */
--	if (!(dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT -1 ] &&
-+	if (!(dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT - 1] &&
-+	      dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 - 1] &&
- 	      dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF - 1] &&
- 	      dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE - 1] &&
- 	      dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT - 1] &&
-@@ -144,7 +146,8 @@ int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
- 	/* accept.size == default.size == base.size */
- 	state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE - 1]->td_lolen;
- 	if (!(state_count == dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF - 1]->td_lolen &&
--	      state_count == dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT - 1]->td_lolen))
-+	      state_count == dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT - 1]->td_lolen &&
-+	      state_count == dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 - 1]->td_lolen))
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	/* next.size == chk.size */
-@@ -177,6 +180,8 @@ int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
- 
- 		if (mode & ~AA_VALID_PERM_MASK)
- 			goto out;
-+		if (ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[i] & ~AA_VALID_PERM2_MASK)
-+			goto out;
- 
- 		/* if any exec modifier is set MAY_EXEC must be set */
- 		if ((mode & AA_USER_EXEC_TYPE) && !(mode & AA_USER_EXEC))
---- a/security/apparmor/match.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/match.h
-@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct table_set_header {
- #define YYTD_ID_DEF	4
- #define YYTD_ID_EC	5
- #define YYTD_ID_META	6
-+#define YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 7
- #define YYTD_ID_NXT	8
- 
- 
-@@ -60,6 +61,7 @@ struct table_header {
- #define CHECK_TABLE(DFA) ((u16 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK - 1]->td_data))
- #define EQUIV_TABLE(DFA) ((u8 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_EC - 1]->td_data))
- #define ACCEPT_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT - 1]->td_data))
-+#define ACCEPT_TABLE2(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 -1]->td_data))
- 
- struct aa_dfa {
- 	struct table_header *tables[YYTD_ID_NXT];

kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-security-goal.diff

@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
----
- Documentation/lsm/AppArmor-Security-Goal.txt |  134 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 134 insertions(+)
-
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Documentation/lsm/AppArmor-Security-Goal.txt
-@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
-+AppArmor Security Goal
-+Crispin Cowan, PhD
-+MercenaryLinux.com
-+
-+This document specifies the security goal that AppArmor is intended to
-+achieve, so that users can evaluate whether AppArmor will meet their
-+needs, and kernel developers can evaluate whether AppArmor is living up
-+to its claims. This document is *not* a general purpose explanation of
-+how AppArmor works, nor is it an explanation for why one might want to
-+use AppArmor rather than some other system.
-+
-+AppArmor is intended to limit system damage from attackers exploiting
-+vulnerabilities in applications that the system hosts. The threat is
-+that an attacker can cause a vulnerable application to do something
-+unexpected and undesirable. AppArmor addresses this threat by confining
-+the application to access only the resources it needs to access to
-+execute properly, effectively imposing "least privilege" execution on
-+the application.
-+
-+Applications interact with the rest of the system via resources
-+including files, interprocess communication, networking, capabilities,
-+and execution of other applications. The purpose of least privilege is
-+to bound the damage that a malicious user or code can do by removing
-+access to resources that the application does not need for its intended
-+function. This is true for all access control systems, including AppArmor.
-+
-+The "attacker" is someone trying to gain the privileges of a process for
-+themselves. For instance, a policy for a web server might grant read
-+only access to most web documents, preventing an attacker who can
-+corrupt the web server from defacing the web pages. A web server has
-+access to the web server's local file system, and a network attacker
-+trying to hack the web server does not have such file access. An e-mail
-+attacker attempting to infect the recipient of the e-mail does not have
-+access to the files that the victim user's mail client does. By limiting
-+the scope of access for an application, AppArmor can limit the damage an
-+attacker can do by exploiting vulnerabilities in applications.
-+
-+An "application" is one or more related processes performing a function,
-+e.g. the gang of processes that constitute an Apache web server, or a
-+Postfix mail server. AppArmor *only* confines processes that the
-+AppArmor policy says it should confine, and other processes are
-+permitted to do anything that DAC permits. This is sometimes known as a
-+targeted security policy.
-+
-+AppArmor does not provide a "default" policy that applies to all
-+processes. So to defend an entire host, you have to piece-wise confine
-+each process that is exposed to potential attack. For instance, to
-+defend a system against network attack, place AppArmor profiles around
-+every application that accesses the network. This limits the damage a
-+network attacker can do to the file system to only those files granted
-+by the profiles for the network-available applications. Similarly, to
-+defend a system against attack from the console, place AppArmor profiles
-+around every application that accessed the keyboard and mouse. The
-+system is "defended" in that the worst the attacker can do to corrupt
-+the system is limited to the transitive closure of what the confined
-+processes are allowed to access.
-+
-+AppArmor currently mediates access to files, ability to use POSIX.1e
-+Capabilities, and coarse-grained control on network access. This is
-+sufficient to prevent a confined process from *directly* corrupting the
-+file system. It is not sufficient to prevent a confined process from
-+*indirectly* corrupting the system by influencing some other process to
-+do the dirty deed. But to do so requires a complicit process that can be
-+manipulated through another channel such as IPC. A "complicit" process
-+is either a malicious process the attacker somehow got control of, or is
-+a process that is actively listening to IPC of some kind and can be
-+corrupted via IPC.
-+
-+The only IPC that AppArmor mediates is access to named sockets, FIFOs,
-+etc. that appear in the file system name space, a side effect of
-+AppArmor's file access mediation. Future versions of AppArmor will
-+mediate more resources, including finer grained network access controls,
-+and controls on various forms of IPC.
-+
-+AppArmor specifies the programs to be confined and the resources they
-+can access in a syntax similar to how users are accustomed to accessing
-+those resources. So file access controls are specified using absolute
-+paths with respect to the name space the process is in. POSIX.1e
-+capabilities are specified by name. Network access controls currently
-+are specified by simply naming the protocol that can be used e.g. tcp,
-+udp, and in the future will be more general, resembling firewall rules.
-+
-+Thus the AppArmor security goal should be considered piecewise from the
-+point of view of a single confined process: that process should only be
-+able to access the resources specified in its profile:
-+
-+    * can only access files that are reachable in its name space by path
-+      names matching its profile, and only with the permitted modes:
-+      read, append, write, memory map, execute, and link
-+    * can only use the POSIX.1e capabilities listed in the profile
-+    * can only perform the network operations listed in the profile
-+
-+Security issues that AppArmor explicitly does *not* address:
-+
-+    * Processes that are not confined by AppArmor are not restricted in
-+      any way by AppArmor. If an unconfined process is considered an
-+      unacceptable threat, then confine additional applications until
-+      adequate security is achieved.
-+    * A process that is not permitted to directly access a resource can
-+      influence some other process that does have access to the resource
-+      may do so, if the "influence" is a permitted action.
-+    * A confined process may only access a file if it has at least one
-+      of the files aliases specified in its profile.  If a file alias is
-+      not specified in the profile then it can not be accessed by that
-+      path.  The creation of aliases needs to be tightly controlled in
-+      confined applications, hard links creation should be limited to
-+      provide adequate security.
-+    * A confined process can operate on a file descriptor passed to it
-+      by an unconfined process, even if it manipulates a file not in the
-+      confined process's profile. To block this attack, confine the
-+      process that passed the file descriptor.
-+    * Process activities not currently mediated by AppArmor are
-+      permitted, e.g. confined processes can perform any IPC that DAC
-+      permits, other than signals as mediated by CAP_KILL.
-+    * Manipulating AppArmor policy requires being both root privileged
-+      and not being confined by AppArmor, thus there is explicitly no
-+      capability for non-privileged users to change AppArmor policy.
-+    * AppArmor confines processes if they are children of a confined
-+      process, or if the name of the exec'd child matches the name of an
-+      AppArmor profile. Another process could copy a program to a
-+      different path name and then execute it without confinement, but
-+      the other process would have to have permission to do so in the
-+      first place. To prevent this, confine the other process and
-+      additional applications until adequate security is achieved.
-+    * Mount and namespace manipulations can be used to arbitrarily
-+      change the pathnames that files appear at, and thus completely
-+      bypass AppArmor policy. To prevent this, processes confined by
-+      AppArmor are currently not permitted to call mount or manipulate
-+      name spaces at all. A future development may provide more granular
-+      controls on mount and namespace manipulations.
-+    * AppArmor does not slice bread, cure cancer, bring world peace, or
-+      provide perfect security. This list may be expanded :-)
-+
-+

kernel-patches/for-mainline/audit-log-type-in-syslog.diff

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/main.c |    4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -159,8 +159,10 @@ static int aa_audit_base(struct aa_profi
- 		return type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
- 	}
- 
-+	audit_log_format(ab, " type=%d", type);
-+
- 	if (sa->operation)
--		audit_log_format(ab, "operation=\"%s\"", sa->operation);
-+		audit_log_format(ab, " operation=\"%s\"", sa->operation);
- 
- 	if (sa->info) {
- 		audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", sa->info);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/audit-uid.diff

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/main.c |    3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ static int aa_audit_base(struct aa_profi
- 	if (sa->denied_mask)
- 		aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "denied_mask", sa->denied_mask);
- 
-+	if (sa->request_mask)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", current->fsuid);
-+
- 	if (sa->iattr) {
- 		struct iattr *iattr = sa->iattr;
- 

kernel-patches/for-mainline/cap-set.diff

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/apparmor.h         |   10 ++++++++++
- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c       |    4 ++--
- security/apparmor/lsm.c              |   15 ++++++---------
- security/apparmor/module_interface.c |    2 ++
- 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-@@ -158,8 +158,17 @@ struct aa_namespace {
-  * @file_rules: dfa containing the profiles file rules
-  * @flags: flags controlling profile behavior
-  * @isstale: flag indicating if profile is stale
-+ * @set_caps: capabilities that are being set
-+ * @capabilities: capabilities mask
-+ * @audit_caps: caps that are to be audited
-+ * @quiet_caps: caps that should not be audited
-  * @capabilities: capabilities granted by the process
-  * @count: reference count of the profile
-+ * @task_contexts: list of tasks confined by profile
-+ * @lock: lock for the task_contexts list
-+ * @network_families: basic network permissions
-+ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
-+ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
-  *
-  * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data.  Each profile
-  * has a name, and all nonstale profile are in a profile namespace.
-@@ -183,6 +192,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
- 	} flags;
- 	int isstale;
- 
-+	kernel_cap_t set_caps;
- 	kernel_cap_t capabilities;
- 	kernel_cap_t audit_caps;
- 	kernel_cap_t quiet_caps;
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-@@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ static struct file_operations apparmorfs
- static ssize_t aa_features_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
- 				size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
- {
--	const char *features = "file=3.0 capability=1.0 network=1.0 "
--			       "change_hat=1.3 change_profile=1.0 "
-+	const char *features = "file=3.0 capability=2.0 network=1.0 "
-+			       "change_hat=1.4 change_profile=1.0 "
- 			       "aanamespaces=1.0";
- 
- 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, features,
---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -210,19 +210,16 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace(struct task_s
- static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, int cap)
- {
- 	int error;
-+	struct aa_task_context *cxt;
- 
- 	/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
- 	error = cap_capable(task, cap);
- 
--	if (!error) {
--		struct aa_task_context *cxt;
--
--		rcu_read_lock();
--		cxt = aa_task_context(task);
--		if (cxt)
--			error = aa_capability(cxt, cap);
--		rcu_read_unlock();
--	}
-+	rcu_read_lock();
-+	cxt = aa_task_context(task);
-+	if (cxt && (!error || cap_raised(cxt->profile->set_caps, cap)))
-+		error = aa_capability(cxt, cap);
-+	rcu_read_unlock();
- 
- 	return error;
- }
---- a/security/apparmor/module_interface.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/module_interface.c
-@@ -316,6 +316,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *aa_unpack_prof
- 		goto fail;
- 	if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->quiet_caps), NULL))
- 		goto fail;
-+	if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->set_caps), NULL))
-+		goto fail;
- 
- 	size = aa_is_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
- 	if (size) {

kernel-patches/for-mainline/change-profile-kernel-v2.diff

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-This patch removes magic cookies from the aa_change_profile interface, making
-it a true one-way transition.
-
-It also fixes a refcounting bug with previous_profile by virtue of removing
-the broken code entirely.
-
-Signed-off-by: Kenny Graunke <kgraunke@novell.com>
-Signed-off-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@suse.de>
-
----
- security/apparmor/apparmor.h |    2 +-
- security/apparmor/main.c     |   21 +++++++--------------
- security/apparmor/procattr.c |    9 +--------
- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ extern int aa_clone(struct task_struct *
- extern int aa_register(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
- extern void aa_release(struct task_struct *task);
- extern int aa_change_hat(const char *id, u64 hat_magic);
--extern int aa_change_profile(const char *name, u64 cookie);
-+extern int aa_change_profile(const char *name);
- extern struct aa_profile *__aa_find_profile(const char *name,
- 					    struct list_head *list);
- extern struct aa_profile *__aa_replace_profile(struct task_struct *task,
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -1110,20 +1110,18 @@ out:
- }
- 
- /**
-- * aa_change_profile - change profile to/from previous stored profile
-+ * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
-  * @name: name of profile to change to
-- * @cookie: magic value to validate the profile change
-  *
-- * Change to new profile @name, and store the @cookie in the current task
-- * context.  If the new @name is %NULL and the @cookie matches that
-- * stored in the current task context, return to the previous profile.
-+ * Change to new profile @name.  Unlike with hats, there is no way
-+ * to change back.
-  *
-  * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
-  */
--int aa_change_profile(const char *name, u64 cookie)
-+int aa_change_profile(const char *name)
- {
- 	struct aa_task_context *cxt;
--	struct aa_profile *profile, *previous_profile;
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
- 	struct aa_audit sa;
- 	int error = 0;
- 
-@@ -1139,7 +1137,6 @@ repeat:
- 		return -EPERM;
- 	}
- 	profile = aa_dup_profile(cxt->profile);
--	previous_profile = aa_dup_profile(cxt->previous_profile);
- 	task_unlock(current);
- 
- 	if (name) {
-@@ -1150,13 +1147,9 @@ repeat:
- 			aa_put_profile(profile);
- 			return -EACCES;
- 		}
--		error = do_change_profile(profile, name, cookie, 0, &sa);
--	} else if (previous_profile)
--		error = do_change_profile(profile, previous_profile->name,
--					  cookie, 1, &sa);
--	/* else ignore restores when there is no saved profile */
-+		error = do_change_profile(profile, name, 0, 0, &sa);
-+	}
- 
--	aa_put_profile(previous_profile);
- 	aa_put_profile(profile);
- 	if (error == -ESTALE)
- 		goto repeat;
---- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
-@@ -87,14 +87,7 @@ int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args)
- 
- int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *args)
- {
--	char *name;
--	u64 cookie;
--
--	name = split_token_from_name("change_profile", args, &cookie);
--	if (IS_ERR(name))
--		return PTR_ERR(name);
--
--	return aa_change_profile(name, cookie);
-+	return aa_change_profile(args);
- }
- 
- int aa_setprocattr_setprofile(struct task_struct *task, char *args)

kernel-patches/for-mainline/d_namespace_path.diff

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Add d_namespace_path() to compute namespace relative pathnames
-
-In AppArmor, we are interested in pathnames relative to the namespace root.
-This is the same as d_path() except for the root where the search ends. Add
-a function for computing the namespace-relative path.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/dcache.c            |    6 +++---
- fs/namespace.c         |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- include/linux/dcache.h |    2 ++
- include/linux/mount.h  |    2 ++
- 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/dcache.c
-+++ b/fs/dcache.c
-@@ -1782,9 +1782,9 @@ shouldnt_be_hashed:
-  *
-  * Returns the buffer or an error code.
-  */
--static char *__d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
--		      struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt,
--		      char *buffer, int buflen, int fail_deleted)
-+char *__d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
-+	       struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt,
-+	       char *buffer, int buflen, int fail_deleted)
- {
- 	int namelen, is_slash, vfsmount_locked = 0;
- 
---- a/fs/namespace.c
-+++ b/fs/namespace.c
-@@ -1883,3 +1883,30 @@ void __put_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *
- 	release_mounts(&umount_list);
- 	kfree(ns);
- }
-+
-+char *d_namespace_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
-+		       char *buf, int buflen)
-+{
-+	struct vfsmount *rootmnt, *nsrootmnt = NULL;
-+	struct dentry *root = NULL;
-+	char *res;
-+
-+	read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
-+	rootmnt = mntget(current->fs->rootmnt);
-+	read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
-+	spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
-+	if (rootmnt->mnt_ns)
-+		nsrootmnt = mntget(rootmnt->mnt_ns->root);
-+	spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
-+	mntput(rootmnt);
-+	if (nsrootmnt)
-+		root = dget(nsrootmnt->mnt_root);
-+	res = __d_path(dentry, vfsmnt, root, nsrootmnt, buf, buflen, 1);
-+	dput(root);
-+	mntput(nsrootmnt);
-+	/* Prevent empty path for lazily unmounted filesystems. */
-+	if (!IS_ERR(res) && *res == '\0')
-+		*--res = '.';
-+	return res;
-+}
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL(d_namespace_path);
---- a/include/linux/dcache.h
-+++ b/include/linux/dcache.h
-@@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ extern int d_validate(struct dentry *, s
-  */
- extern char *dynamic_dname(struct dentry *, char *, int, const char *, ...);
- 
-+extern char *__d_path(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *,
-+		      struct vfsmount *, char *, int, int);
- extern char * d_path(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, char *, int);
-   
- /* Allocation counts.. */
---- a/include/linux/mount.h
-+++ b/include/linux/mount.h
-@@ -103,5 +103,7 @@ extern void shrink_submounts(struct vfsm
- extern spinlock_t vfsmount_lock;
- extern dev_t name_to_dev_t(char *name);
- 
-+extern char *d_namespace_path(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, char *, int);
-+
- #endif
- #endif /* _LINUX_MOUNT_H */

kernel-patches/for-mainline/do_path_lookup-nameidata.diff

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Switch to vfs_permission() in do_path_lookup()
-
-Switch from file_permission() to vfs_permission() in do_path_lookup():
-this avoids calling permission() with a NULL nameidata here.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c |   13 ++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -1147,25 +1147,24 @@ static int fastcall do_path_lookup(int d
- 		nd->dentry = dget(fs->pwd);
- 		read_unlock(&fs->lock);
- 	} else {
--		struct dentry *dentry;
--
- 		file = fget_light(dfd, &fput_needed);
- 		retval = -EBADF;
- 		if (!file)
- 			goto out_fail;
- 
--		dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
-+		nd->dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
-+		nd->mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
- 
- 		retval = -ENOTDIR;
--		if (!S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
-+		if (!S_ISDIR(nd->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
- 			goto fput_fail;
- 
--		retval = file_permission(file, MAY_EXEC);
-+		retval = vfs_permission(nd, MAY_EXEC);
- 		if (retval)
- 			goto fput_fail;
- 
--		nd->mnt = mntget(file->f_path.mnt);
--		nd->dentry = dget(dentry);
-+		mntget(nd->mnt);
-+		dget(nd->dentry);
- 
- 		fput_light(file, fput_needed);
- 	}

kernel-patches/for-mainline/ecryptfs-d_revalidate.diff

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@use.de>
-Subject: Check for NULL nameidata in ecryptfs_d_revalidate
-
-Some filesystems like nfsd and ecryptfs use lookup_one_len() on other
-filesystems. This causes d_revalidate() calls with nd == NULL through
-__lookup_hash() and cached_lookup(), so we need to check for NULL
-nameidata.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@use.de>
-Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
-Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
-
----
- fs/ecryptfs/dentry.c |   16 ++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/ecryptfs/dentry.c
-+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/dentry.c
-@@ -51,13 +51,17 @@ static int ecryptfs_d_revalidate(struct 
- 
- 	if (!lower_dentry->d_op || !lower_dentry->d_op->d_revalidate)
- 		goto out;
--	dentry_save = nd->dentry;
--	vfsmount_save = nd->mnt;
--	nd->dentry = lower_dentry;
--	nd->mnt = lower_mnt;
-+	if (nd) {
-+		dentry_save = nd->dentry;
-+		vfsmount_save = nd->mnt;
-+		nd->dentry = lower_dentry;
-+		nd->mnt = lower_mnt;
-+	}
- 	rc = lower_dentry->d_op->d_revalidate(lower_dentry, nd);
--	nd->dentry = dentry_save;
--	nd->mnt = vfsmount_save;
-+	if (nd) {
-+		nd->dentry = dentry_save;
-+		nd->mnt = vfsmount_save;
-+	}
- 	if (dentry->d_inode) {
- 		struct inode *lower_inode =
- 			ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(dentry->d_inode);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/expand-dfa.diff

@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
-Allow the dfa to return its state, which will allow for pair matches.
-
----
- security/apparmor/apparmor.h |    7 ++-
- security/apparmor/inline.h   |    2 
- security/apparmor/match.c    |   99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- security/apparmor/match.h    |    2 
- 4 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@
- 
- #define AA_SECURE_EXEC_NEEDED		1
- 
--
- /* Control parameters (0 or 1), settable thru module/boot flags or
-  * via /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/control */
- extern int apparmor_complain;
-@@ -260,5 +259,11 @@ extern void aa_match_free(struct aa_dfa 
- extern int unpack_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, void *blob, size_t size);
- extern int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa);
- extern unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, const char *str);
-+extern unsigned int aa_dfa_next_state(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-+				      const char *str);
-+extern unsigned int aa_match_state(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-+				   const char *str, unsigned int *final);
-+extern unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
-+					   unsigned int start);
- 
- #endif  /* __APPARMOR_H */
---- a/security/apparmor/inline.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/inline.h
-@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
- 
- #include <linux/sched.h>
- 
-+#include "match.h"
-+
- static inline int mediated_filesystem(struct inode *inode)
- {
- 	return !(inode->i_sb->s_flags & MS_NOUSER);
---- a/security/apparmor/match.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
-@@ -208,22 +208,26 @@ void aa_match_free(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
- }
- 
- /**
-- * aa_dfa_match - match @path against @dfa starting in @state
-- * @dfa: the dfa to match @path against
-- * @state: the state to start matching in
-- * @path: the path to match against the dfa
-+ * aa_dfa_next_state - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
-+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against
-+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
-+ * @str: the string to match against the dfa
-  *
-- * aa_dfa_match will match the full path length and return the state it
-- * finished matching in. The final state is used to look up the accepting
-- * label.
-+ * aa_dfa_next_state will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
-+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
-+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
-  */
--unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, const char *str)
-+unsigned int aa_dfa_next_state(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-+			       const char *str)
- {
- 	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
- 	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
- 	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
- 	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
--	unsigned int state = 1, pos;
-+	unsigned int state = start, pos;
-+
-+	if (state == 0)
-+		return 0;
- 
- 	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
- 	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC - 1]) {
-@@ -244,5 +248,80 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa 
- 				state = def[state];
- 		}
- 	}
--	return ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state];
-+	return state;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_dfa_null_transition - step to next state after null character
-+ * @dfa: the dfa to match against
-+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
-+ *
-+ * aa_dfa_null_transition transitions to the next state after a null
-+ * character which is not used in standard matching and is only
-+ * used to seperate pairs.
-+ */
-+unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start)
-+{
-+	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
-+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
-+	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
-+	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
-+	unsigned int state = start, pos;
-+
-+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
-+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC - 1]) {
-+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
-+		pos = base[state] + equiv[0];
-+		if (check[pos] == state)
-+			state = next[pos];
-+		else
-+			state = def[state];
-+	} else {
-+		pos = base[state] + 0;
-+		if (check[pos] == state)
-+			state = next[pos];
-+		else
-+			state = def[state];
-+	}
-+
-+	return state;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_dfa_match - find accept perm for @str in @dfa
-+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against
-+ * @str: the string to match against the dfa
-+ *
-+ * aa_dfa_match will match @str and return the accept perms for the
-+ * final state.
-+ */
-+unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, const char *str)
-+{
-+	return ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[aa_dfa_next_state(dfa, DFA_START, str)];
- }
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_match_state - find accept perm and state for @str in @dfa
-+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against
-+ * @start: the state to start the match from
-+ * @str: the string to match against the dfa
-+ * @final: the state that the match finished in
-+ *
-+ * aa_match_state will match @str and return the accept perms, and @final
-+ * state, the match occured in.
-+ */
-+unsigned int aa_match_state(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-+			    const char *str, unsigned int *final)
-+{
-+	unsigned int state;
-+	if (dfa) {
-+		state = aa_dfa_next_state(dfa, start, str);
-+		if (final)
-+			*final = state;
-+		return ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state];
-+	}
-+	if (final)
-+		*final = 0;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
---- a/security/apparmor/match.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/match.h
-@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
- #ifndef __MATCH_H
- #define __MATCH_H
- 
-+#define DFA_START			1
-+
- /**
-  * The format used for transition tables is based on the GNU flex table
-  * file format (--tables-file option; see Table File Format in the flex

kernel-patches/for-mainline/extend-x-mods.diff

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/apparmor.h |   43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-@@ -26,25 +26,33 @@
- #define AA_MAY_LINK			0x0010
- #define AA_MAY_LOCK			0x0020
- #define AA_EXEC_MMAP			0x0040
--#define AA_EXEC_UNSAFE			0x0080
--#define AA_EXEC_MOD_0			0x0100
--#define AA_EXEC_MOD_1			0x0200
-+#define AA_MAY_MOUNT			0x0080	/* no direct audit mapping */
-+#define AA_EXEC_UNSAFE			0x0100
-+#define AA_EXEC_MOD_0			0x0200
-+#define AA_EXEC_MOD_1			0x0400
-+#define AA_EXEC_MOD_2			0x0800
-+#define AA_EXEC_MOD_3			0x1000
-+#define AA_EXEC_MOD_4			0x2000
-+
- #define AA_BASE_PERMS			(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | \
- 					 MAY_APPEND | AA_MAY_LINK | \
- 					 AA_MAY_LOCK | AA_EXEC_MMAP | \
--					 AA_EXEC_UNSAFE | AA_EXEC_MOD_0 | \
--					 AA_EXEC_MOD_1)
--#define AA_LINK_SUBSET_TEST		0x0020
--
--#define AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED		0
--#define AA_EXEC_INHERIT			AA_EXEC_MOD_0
--#define AA_EXEC_PROFILE			AA_EXEC_MOD_1
--#define AA_EXEC_PIX			(AA_EXEC_MOD_0 | AA_EXEC_MOD_1)
--
--#define AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS		(AA_EXEC_MOD_0 | AA_EXEC_MOD_1)
-+					 AA_MAY_MOUNT | AA_EXEC_UNSAFE | \
-+					 AA_EXEC_MOD_0 | AA_EXEC_MOD_1 | \
-+					 AA_EXEC_MOD_2 | AA_EXEC_MOD_3 | \
-+					 AA_EXEC_MOD_4)
-+
-+#define AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED		AA_EXEC_MOD_0
-+#define AA_EXEC_INHERIT			AA_EXEC_MOD_1
-+#define AA_EXEC_PROFILE			(AA_EXEC_MOD_0 | AA_EXEC_MOD_1)
-+#define AA_EXEC_PIX			 AA_EXEC_MOD_2
-+
-+#define AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS		(AA_EXEC_MOD_0 | AA_EXEC_MOD_1 | \
-+					 AA_EXEC_MOD_2 | AA_EXEC_MOD_3 | \
-+					 AA_EXEC_MOD_4)
- 
- #define AA_USER_SHIFT			0
--#define AA_OTHER_SHIFT			10
-+#define AA_OTHER_SHIFT			14
- 
- #define AA_USER_PERMS			(AA_BASE_PERMS << AA_USER_SHIFT)
- #define AA_OTHER_PERMS			(AA_BASE_PERMS << AA_OTHER_SHIFT)
-@@ -68,11 +76,16 @@
- #define AA_ALL_EXEC_MODS		(AA_USER_EXEC_MODS | \
- 					 AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS)
- 
-+/* overloaded permissions for link pairs */
-+#define AA_LINK_SUBSET_TEST		0x0020
-+
- /* shared permissions that are not duplicated in user::other */
-+#define AA_AUDIT_FIELD			0x10000000
- #define AA_CHANGE_HAT			0x20000000
- #define AA_CHANGE_PROFILE		0x40000000
- 
--#define AA_SHARED_PERMS			(AA_CHANGE_HAT | AA_CHANGE_PROFILE)
-+#define AA_SHARED_PERMS			(AA_CHANGE_HAT | AA_CHANGE_PROFILE | \
-+					 AA_AUDIT_FIELD)
- 
- #define AA_VALID_PERM_MASK		(AA_FILE_PERMS | AA_SHARED_PERMS)
- 

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fgetattr.diff

@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
-
-Add a new file operation: f_op->fgetattr(), that is invoked by
-fstat().  Fall back to i_op->getattr() if it is not defined.
-
-We need this because fstat() semantics can in some cases be better
-implemented if the filesystem has the open file available.
-
-Let's take the following example: we have a network filesystem, with
-the server implemented as an unprivileged userspace process running on
-a UNIX system (this is basically what sshfs does).
-
-We want the filesystem to follow the familiar UNIX file semantics as
-closely as possible.  If for example we have this sequence of events,
-we still would like fstat to work correctly:
-
- 1) file X is opened on client
- 2) file X is renamed to Y on server
- 3) fstat() is performed on open file descriptor on client
-
-This is only possible if the filesystem server acutally uses fstat()
-on a file descriptor obtained when the file was opened.  Which means,
-the filesystem client needs a way to get this information from the
-VFS.
-
-Even if we assume, that the remote filesystem never changes, it is
-difficult to implement open-unlink-fstat semantics correctly in the
-client, without having this information.
-
-Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
----
-
----
- fs/fuse/file.c     |   13 +++++++++++++
- fs/stat.c          |   29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- include/linux/fs.h |    1 +
- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- a/fs/fuse/file.c
-+++ b/fs/fuse/file.c
-@@ -871,6 +871,17 @@ static int fuse_file_flock(struct file *
- 	return err;
- }
- 
-+static int fuse_file_fgetattr(struct file *file, struct kstat *stat)
-+{
-+	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
-+
-+	if (!fuse_allow_task(fc, current))
-+		return -EACCES;
-+
-+	return fuse_update_attributes(inode, stat, file, NULL);
-+}
-+
- static sector_t fuse_bmap(struct address_space *mapping, sector_t block)
- {
- 	struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
-@@ -920,6 +931,7 @@ static const struct file_operations fuse
- 	.fsync		= fuse_fsync,
- 	.lock		= fuse_file_lock,
- 	.flock		= fuse_file_flock,
-+	.fgetattr	= fuse_file_fgetattr,
- 	.splice_read	= generic_file_splice_read,
- };
- 
-@@ -933,6 +945,7 @@ static const struct file_operations fuse
- 	.fsync		= fuse_fsync,
- 	.lock		= fuse_file_lock,
- 	.flock		= fuse_file_flock,
-+	.fgetattr	= fuse_file_fgetattr,
- 	/* no mmap and splice_read */
- };
- 
---- a/fs/stat.c
-+++ b/fs/stat.c
-@@ -55,6 +55,33 @@ int vfs_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, st
- 
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_getattr);
- 
-+/*
-+ * Perform getattr on an open file
-+ *
-+ * Fall back to i_op->getattr (or generic_fillattr) if the filesystem
-+ * doesn't define an f_op->fgetattr operation.
-+ */
-+static int vfs_fgetattr(struct file *file, struct kstat *stat)
-+{
-+	struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
-+	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
-+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-+	int retval;
-+
-+	retval = security_inode_getattr(mnt, dentry);
-+	if (retval)
-+		return retval;
-+
-+	if (file->f_op && file->f_op->fgetattr) {
-+		return file->f_op->fgetattr(file, stat);
-+	} else if (inode->i_op->getattr) {
-+		return inode->i_op->getattr(mnt, dentry, stat);
-+	} else {
-+		generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+}
-+
- int vfs_stat_fd(int dfd, char __user *name, struct kstat *stat)
- {
- 	struct nameidata nd;
-@@ -101,7 +128,7 @@ int vfs_fstat(unsigned int fd, struct ks
- 	int error = -EBADF;
- 
- 	if (f) {
--		error = vfs_getattr(f->f_path.mnt, f->f_path.dentry, stat);
-+		error = vfs_fgetattr(f, stat);
- 		fput(f);
- 	}
- 	return error;
---- a/include/linux/fs.h
-+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
-@@ -1188,6 +1188,7 @@ struct file_operations {
- 	ssize_t (*splice_write)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct file *, loff_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
- 	ssize_t (*splice_read)(struct file *, loff_t *, struct pipe_inode_info *, size_t, unsigned int);
- 	int (*setlease)(struct file *, long, struct file_lock **);
-+	int (*fgetattr)(struct file *, struct kstat *);
- };
- 
- struct inode_operations {

kernel-patches/for-mainline/file-handle-ops.diff

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Enable LSM hooks to distinguish operations on file descriptors from operations on pathnames
-
-Struct iattr already contains ia_file since commit cc4e69de from 
-Miklos (which is related to commit befc649c). Use this to pass
-struct file down the setattr hooks. This allows LSMs to distinguish
-operations on file descriptors from operations on paths.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
-
----
- fs/nfsd/vfs.c |   12 +++++++-----
- fs/open.c     |    4 +++-
- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
-+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
-@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static ssize_t nfsd_getxattr(struct dent
- {
- 	ssize_t buflen;
- 
--	buflen = vfs_getxattr(dentry, mnt, key, NULL, 0);
-+	buflen = vfs_getxattr(dentry, mnt, key, NULL, 0, NULL);
- 	if (buflen <= 0)
- 		return buflen;
- 
-@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ static ssize_t nfsd_getxattr(struct dent
- 	if (!*buf)
- 		return -ENOMEM;
- 
--	return vfs_getxattr(dentry, mnt, key, *buf, buflen);
-+	return vfs_getxattr(dentry, mnt, key, *buf, buflen, NULL);
- }
- #endif
- 
-@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ set_nfsv4_acl_one(struct dentry *dentry,
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	error = vfs_setxattr(dentry, mnt, key, buf, len, 0);
-+	error = vfs_setxattr(dentry, mnt, key, buf, len, 0, NULL);
- out:
- 	kfree(buf);
- 	return error;
-@@ -2051,12 +2051,14 @@ nfsd_set_posix_acl(struct svc_fh *fhp, i
- 
- 	mnt = fhp->fh_export->ex_mnt;
- 	if (size)
--		error = vfs_setxattr(fhp->fh_dentry, mnt, name, value, size,0);
-+		error = vfs_setxattr(fhp->fh_dentry, mnt, name, value, size, 0,
-+				     NULL);
- 	else {
- 		if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)
- 			error = 0;
- 		else {
--			error = vfs_removexattr(fhp->fh_dentry, mnt, name);
-+			error = vfs_removexattr(fhp->fh_dentry, mnt, name,
-+						NULL);
- 			if (error == -ENODATA)
- 				error = 0;
- 		}
---- a/fs/open.c
-+++ b/fs/open.c
-@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchmod(unsigned int 
- 	if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
- 		mode = inode->i_mode;
- 	newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
--	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
-+	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME | ATTR_FILE;
- 	err = fnotify_change(dentry, file->f_path.mnt, &newattrs, file);
- 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
- 
-@@ -661,6 +661,8 @@ static int chown_common(struct dentry * 
- 	if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
- 		newattrs.ia_valid |=
- 			ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
-+	if (file)
-+		newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_FILE;
- 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
- 	error = fnotify_change(dentry, mnt, &newattrs, file);
- 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/file_permission-nameidata.diff

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Fix file_permission()
-
-We cannot easily switch from file_permission() to vfs_permission()
-everywhere, so fix file_permission() to not use a NULL nameidata
-for the remaining users.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c |    8 +++++++-
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -313,7 +313,13 @@ int vfs_permission(struct nameidata *nd,
-  */
- int file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
- {
--	return permission(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode, mask, NULL);
-+	struct nameidata nd;
-+
-+	nd.dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
-+	nd.mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
-+	nd.flags = LOOKUP_ACCESS;
-+
-+	return permission(nd.dentry->d_inode, mask, &nd);
- }
- 
- /*

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fix-change_profile-namespace.diff

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/main.c |    4 +---
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -1239,9 +1239,7 @@ repeat:
- 		return -ENOENT;
- 	}
- 
--	if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile) ||
--	    (ns == profile->ns &&
--	     (aa_match(profile->file_rules, name) & AA_CHANGE_PROFILE)))
-+	if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile))
- 		error = do_change_profile(profile, ns, name, 0, 0, &sa);
- 	else {
- 		/* check for a rule with a namespace prepended */

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fix-d_path.diff

@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Distinguish between connected and disconnected paths in d_path()
-
-Change d_path() so that it will never return a path starting with '/' if
-the path doesn't lead up to the chroot directory. Also ensure that the
-path returned never is the empty string: this would only occur with a lazily unmounted file system; return "." in that case instead.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/dcache.c    |   18 ++++--------------
- fs/namespace.c |    3 ---
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/dcache.c
-+++ b/fs/dcache.c
-@@ -1829,8 +1829,11 @@ global_root:
- 			buffer++;
- 			buflen++;
- 		}
--		if (is_slash)
-+		if (is_slash) {
-+			if (*buffer == '\0')
-+				*--buffer = '.';
- 			goto out;
-+		}
- 	}
- 	if (buflen < namelen)
- 		goto Elong;
-@@ -1843,18 +1846,6 @@ Elong:
- 	goto out;
- }
- 
--static char *__connect_d_path(char *path, char *buffer)
--{
--	if (!IS_ERR(path) && *path != '/') {
--		/* Pretend that disconnected paths are hanging off the root. */
--		if (path == buffer)
--			path = ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
--		else
--			*--path = '/';
--	}
--	return path;
--}
--
- /* write full pathname into buffer and return start of pathname */
- char *d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, char *buf,
- 	     int buflen)
-@@ -1868,7 +1859,6 @@ char *d_path(struct dentry *dentry, stru
- 	root = dget(current->fs->root);
- 	read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
- 	res = __d_path(dentry, vfsmnt, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen, 0);
--	res = __connect_d_path(res, buf);
- 	dput(root);
- 	mntput(rootmnt);
- 	return res;
---- a/fs/namespace.c
-+++ b/fs/namespace.c
-@@ -1917,9 +1917,6 @@ char *d_namespace_path(struct dentry *de
- 	res = __d_path(dentry, vfsmnt, root, nsrootmnt, buf, buflen, 1);
- 	dput(root);
- 	mntput(nsrootmnt);
--	/* Prevent empty path for lazily unmounted filesystems. */
--	if (!IS_ERR(res) && *res == '\0')
--		*--res = '.';
- 	return res;
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(d_namespace_path);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fix-dfa.diff

@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/match.c |   74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/match.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
-@@ -213,17 +213,23 @@ void aa_match_free(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
- }
- 
- /**
-- * aa_dfa_next_state - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
-+ * aa_dfa_next_state_len - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
-  * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against
-  * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
-- * @str: the string to match against the dfa
-+ * @str: the string of bytes to match against the dfa
-+ * @len: length of the string of bytes to match
-  *
-  * aa_dfa_next_state will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
-  * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
-  * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
-+ *
-+ * aa_dfa_next_state could be implement using this function by doing
-+ * return aa_dfa_next_state_len(dfa, start, str, strlen(str));
-+ * but that would require traversing the string twice and be slightly
-+ * slower.
-  */
--unsigned int aa_dfa_next_state(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
--			       const char *str)
-+unsigned int aa_dfa_next_state_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-+				   const char *str, int len)
- {
- 	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
- 	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
-@@ -237,7 +243,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_next_state(struct aa
- 	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
- 	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC - 1]) {
- 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
--		while (*str) {
-+		for (; len; len--) {
- 			pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8)*str++];
- 			if (check[pos] == state)
- 				state = next[pos];
-@@ -245,7 +251,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_next_state(struct aa
- 				state = def[state];
- 		}
- 	} else {
--		while (*str) {
-+		for (; len; len--) {
- 			pos = base[state] + (u8)*str++;
- 			if (check[pos] == state)
- 				state = next[pos];
-@@ -257,15 +263,17 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_next_state(struct aa
- }
- 
- /**
-- * aa_dfa_null_transition - step to next state after null character
-- * @dfa: the dfa to match against
-+ * aa_dfa_next_state - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
-+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against
-  * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
-+ * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa
-  *
-- * aa_dfa_null_transition transitions to the next state after a null
-- * character which is not used in standard matching and is only
-- * used to seperate pairs.
-+ * aa_dfa_next_state will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
-+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
-+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
-  */
--unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start)
-+unsigned int aa_dfa_next_state(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-+			       const char *str)
- {
- 	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
- 	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
-@@ -273,26 +281,46 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(stru
- 	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
- 	unsigned int state = start, pos;
- 
-+	if (state == 0)
-+		return 0;
-+
- 	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
- 	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC - 1]) {
- 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
--		pos = base[state] + equiv[0];
--		if (check[pos] == state)
--			state = next[pos];
--		else
--			state = def[state];
-+		while (*str) {
-+			pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8)*str++];
-+			if (check[pos] == state)
-+				state = next[pos];
-+			else
-+				state = def[state];
-+		}
- 	} else {
--		pos = base[state] + 0;
--		if (check[pos] == state)
--			state = next[pos];
--		else
--			state = def[state];
-+		while (*str) {
-+			pos = base[state] + (u8)*str++;
-+			if (check[pos] == state)
-+				state = next[pos];
-+			else
-+				state = def[state];
-+		}
- 	}
--
- 	return state;
- }
- 
- /**
-+ * aa_dfa_null_transition - step to next state after null character
-+ * @dfa: the dfa to match against
-+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
-+ *
-+ * aa_dfa_null_transition transitions to the next state after a null
-+ * character which is not used in standard matching and is only
-+ * used to seperate pairs.
-+ */
-+unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start)
-+{
-+	return aa_dfa_next_state_len(dfa, start, "", 1);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-  * aa_dfa_match - find accept perm for @str in @dfa
-  * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against
-  * @str: the string to match against the dfa

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fix-fuse.diff

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
----
- fs/fuse/dir.c    |    2 +-
- fs/fuse/file.c   |    2 +-
- fs/fuse/fuse_i.h |    3 +++
- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
-+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
-@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ static int fuse_setattr(struct dentry *e
- 	return fuse_do_setattr(entry, attr, NULL);
- }
- 
--static int fuse_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *entry,
-+int fuse_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *entry,
- 			struct kstat *stat)
- {
- 	struct inode *inode = entry->d_inode;
---- a/fs/fuse/file.c
-+++ b/fs/fuse/file.c
-@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ static int fuse_file_fgetattr(struct fil
- 	if (!fuse_allow_task(fc, current))
- 		return -EACCES;
- 
--	return fuse_update_attributes(inode, stat, file, NULL);
-+	return fuse_getattr(file->f_vfsmnt, file->f_dentry, stat);
- }
- 
- static sector_t fuse_bmap(struct address_space *mapping, sector_t block)
---- a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
-+++ b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
-@@ -597,3 +597,6 @@ int fuse_valid_type(int m);
- int fuse_allow_task(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct task_struct *task);
- 
- u64 fuse_lock_owner_id(struct fuse_conn *fc, fl_owner_t id);
-+
-+int fuse_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *entry,
-+		 struct kstat *stat);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fix-getcwd.diff

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Make getcwd() only return valid paths
-
-Make getcwd() fail with -ENOENT if the current working directory is
-disconnected: the process is not asking for some previous name of that
-directory but for the current name; returning a path meaningless in the
-context of that process makes no sense.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/dcache.c |    4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- a/fs/dcache.c
-+++ b/fs/dcache.c
-@@ -1910,10 +1910,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getcwd(char __user *
- 	read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
- 
- 	cwd = __d_path(pwd, pwdmnt, root, rootmnt, page, PAGE_SIZE, 1);
--	cwd = __connect_d_path(cwd, page);
- 	error = PTR_ERR(cwd);
- 	if (IS_ERR(cwd))
- 		goto out;
-+	error = -ENOENT;
-+	if (*cwd != '/')
-+		goto out;
- 
- 	error = -ERANGE;
- 	len = PAGE_SIZE + page - cwd;

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fix-link-subset.diff

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/main.c |   37 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_prof
- 			  int *request_mask)
- {
- 	unsigned int state;
--	int l_mode, t_mode, denied_mask = 0;
-+	int l_mode, t_mode, l_subset, denied_mask = 0;
- 	int link_mask = AA_MAY_LINK << target_mode;
- 
- 	*request_mask = link_mask;
-@@ -83,31 +83,35 @@ static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_prof
- 
- 		if (!(mode & link_mask))
- 			denied_mask |= link_mask;
-+		/* return if link subset test is not required */
- 		if (!(mode & (AA_LINK_SUBSET_TEST << target_mode)))
- 			return denied_mask;
- 	}
- 
--	/* do link perm subset test */
--	t_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, target);
--
--	/* Ignore valid-profile-transition flags. */
--	l_mode &= ~AA_SHARED_PERMS;
--	t_mode &= ~AA_SHARED_PERMS;
--
--	*request_mask = l_mode | link_mask;
--
--	/* Link always requires 'l' on the link for both parts of the pair.
-+	/* Do link perm subset test
- 	 * If a subset test is required a permission subset test of the
- 	 * perms for the link are done against the user:group:other of the
- 	 * target's 'r', 'w', 'x', 'a', 'k', and 'm' permissions.
- 	 *
- 	 * If the link has 'x', an exact match of all the execute flags
--	 * ('i', 'u', 'p').  safe exec is treated as a subset of unsafe exec
-+	 * must match.
-  	 */
--#define SUBSET_PERMS (AA_FILE_PERMS & ~AA_LINK_BITS)
- 	denied_mask |= ~l_mode & link_mask;
--	if (l_mode & SUBSET_PERMS) {
--		denied_mask |= (l_mode & SUBSET_PERMS) & ~t_mode;
-+
-+	t_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, target);
-+
-+
-+	/* For actual subset test ignore valid-profile-transition flags,
-+	 * and link bits
-+	 */
-+	l_mode &= ~(AA_SHARED_PERMS | AA_LINK_BITS);
-+	t_mode &= ~(AA_SHARED_PERMS | AA_LINK_BITS);
-+	l_subset = l_mode & AA_FILE_PERMS;
-+
-+	*request_mask = l_mode | link_mask;
-+
-+	if (l_subset) {
-+		denied_mask |= (l_subset) & ~t_mode;
- 		if (denied_mask & AA_EXEC_BITS)
- 			denied_mask |= l_mode & AA_ALL_EXEC_MODS;
- 		else if (l_mode & AA_EXEC_BITS) {
-@@ -126,9 +130,8 @@ static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_prof
- 				denied_mask |= AA_OTHER_EXEC |
- 					(l_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS);
- 		}
--	} else
-+	} else if (t_mode & AA_FILE_PERMS)
- 		denied_mask |= t_mode | link_mask;
--#undef SUBSET_PERMS
- 
- 	return denied_mask;
- }

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fix-name-errorpath.diff

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-fix bug where the error code and mask are not being set correctly
-when pathname lookup fails.
-
----
- security/apparmor/main.c |    6 ++++--
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -191,8 +191,10 @@ static int aa_perm_dentry(struct aa_prof
- 		 */
- 		if (PTR_ERR(sa->name) == -ENOENT && (check & AA_CHECK_FD))
- 			sa->denied_mask = 0;
--		else
--			sa->denied_mask = PTR_ERR(sa->name);
-+		else {
-+			sa->denied_mask = sa->requested_mask;
-+			sa->error_code = PTR_ERR(sa->name);
-+		}
- 		sa->name = NULL;
- 	} else
- 		sa->denied_mask = aa_file_denied(profile, sa->name,

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fix-named-transitions.diff

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/main.c             |    2 +-
- security/apparmor/module_interface.c |    1 +
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -1119,7 +1119,7 @@ aa_x_to_profile(struct aa_profile *profi
- 	default:
- 		/* all other indexes are named transitions */
- 		index = AA_EXEC_INDEX(xmode);
--		if (index - 4 > profile->exec_table_size) {
-+		if (index - 4 >= profile->exec_table_size) {
- 			sa->info = "invalid named transition - exec failed";
- 			sa->error_code = -EACCES;
- 			new_profile = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
---- a/security/apparmor/module_interface.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/module_interface.c
-@@ -319,6 +319,7 @@ static int aa_unpack_exec_table(struct a
- 			goto fail;
- 		if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
- 			goto fail;
-+		profile->exec_table_size = size;
- 	}
- 	return 1;
- 

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fix-net.diff

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/lsm.c |   18 ------------------
- 1 file changed, 18 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -717,22 +717,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(stru
- 	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_shutdown");
- }
- 
--static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
--			char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
--{
--	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
--
--	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_getpeersec_stream");
--}
--
--static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
--					struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
--{
--	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
--
--	return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_getpeersec_dgram");
--}
--
- static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
- 				char **value)
- {
-@@ -882,8 +866,6 @@ struct security_operations apparmor_ops 
- 	.socket_getsockopt =		apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
- 	.socket_setsockopt =		apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
- 	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
--	.socket_getpeersec_stream =	apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream,
--	.socket_getpeersec_dgram =	apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- };
- 
- static void info_message(const char *str)

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fix-profile-namespaces.diff

@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/list.c     |    2 +-
- security/apparmor/main.c     |   20 +++++++++++---------
- security/apparmor/procattr.c |   13 +++++++------
- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/list.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/list.c
-@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static int seq_show_profile(struct seq_f
- 	    seq_printf(f, "%s (%s)\n", profile->name,
- 		       PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile) ? "complain" : "enforce");
- 	else
--	    seq_printf(f, "%s:%s (%s)\n", profile->ns->name, profile->name,
-+	    seq_printf(f, ":%s:%s (%s)\n", profile->ns->name, profile->name,
- 		       PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile) ? "complain" : "enforce");
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -251,8 +251,10 @@ static int aa_audit_base(struct aa_profi
- 		audit_log_format(ab, " profile=");
- 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->name);
- 
--		audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
--		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->name);
-+		if (profile->ns != default_namespace) {
-+			audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
-+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->name);
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	audit_log_end(ab);
-@@ -1364,15 +1366,15 @@ repeat:
- 
- 	if (hat_name) {
- 		char *name, *profile_name;
--		/* Not Yet.  This perm check is currently done by searching
--		   for the hat profile.   When hat style profile names
--		   become more generic then this will be needed.
--		if (!(aa_match(profile->file_rules, hat_name) &
--		      AA_CHANGE_PROFILE)) {
--			error = -EACCES;
-+		if (!PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile) &&
-+		    !(aa_match(profile->file_rules, hat_name, NULL)
-+		      & AA_CHANGE_HAT)) {
-+			/* missing permission to change_hat is treated the
-+			 * same as a failed hat search */
-+			error = -ENOENT;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
--		*/
-+
- 		if (previous_profile)
- 			profile_name = previous_profile->name;
- 		else
---- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
-@@ -24,15 +24,16 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_profile *pr
- 		mode_len = strlen(mode_str);
- 		name_len = strlen(profile->name);
- 		if (profile->ns != default_namespace)
--			ns_len = strlen(profile->ns->name) + 1;
-+			ns_len = strlen(profile->ns->name) + 2;
- 		*len = mode_len + ns_len + name_len + 1;
- 		str = kmalloc(*len, GFP_ATOMIC);
- 		if (!str)
- 			return -ENOMEM;
- 
- 		if (ns_len) {
--			memcpy(str, profile->ns->name, ns_len - 1);
--			str += ns_len - 1;
-+			*str++ = ':';
-+			memcpy(str, profile->ns->name, ns_len - 2);
-+			str += ns_len - 2;
- 			*str++ = ':';
- 		}
- 		memcpy(str, profile->name, name_len);
-@@ -96,11 +97,11 @@ int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *a
- {
- 	char *name = args, *ns_name = NULL;
- 
--	if (name[0] != '/') {
--		char *split = strchr(name, ':');
-+	if (name[0] == ':') {
-+		char *split = strchr(&name[1], ':');
- 		if (split) {
- 			*split = 0;
--			ns_name = name;
-+			ns_name = &name[1];
- 			name = split + 1;
- 		}
- 	}

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fix-rcu-deref.diff

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-The old style of casting in the rcu_dereference fails to compile with
-the newer rcu_dereference macro.
-
----
- security/apparmor/inline.h |    2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/inline.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/inline.h
-@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ static inline int mediated_filesystem(st
- 
- static inline struct aa_task_context *aa_task_context(struct task_struct *task)
- {
--	return rcu_dereference((struct aa_task_context *)task->security);
-+	return (struct aa_task_context *) rcu_dereference(task->security);
- }
- 
- /**

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fix-user-audit.diff

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/main.c |    2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static void aa_audit_file_mask(struct au
- 	aa_audit_file_sub_mask(ab, other,
- 			       (mask & AA_OTHER_PERMS) >> AA_OTHER_SHIFT);
- 
--	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"%s::%s\"", name, user, other);
-+	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"%s:%s\"", name, user, other);
- }
- 
- static const char *address_families[] = {

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fix-vfs_rmdir.diff

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-Subject: Call lsm hook before unhashing dentry in vfs_rmdir()
-
-If we unhash the dentry before calling the security_inode_rmdir hook,
-we cannot compute the file's pathname in the hook anymore. AppArmor
-needs to know the filename in order to decide whether a file may be
-deleted, though.
-
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c |   13 +++++++------
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -2097,6 +2097,10 @@ int vfs_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct 
- 	if (!dir->i_op || !dir->i_op->rmdir)
- 		return -EPERM;
- 
-+	error = security_inode_rmdir(dir, dentry, mnt);
-+	if (error)
-+		return error;
-+
- 	DQUOT_INIT(dir);
- 
- 	mutex_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
-@@ -2104,12 +2108,9 @@ int vfs_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct 
- 	if (d_mountpoint(dentry))
- 		error = -EBUSY;
- 	else {
--		error = security_inode_rmdir(dir, dentry, mnt);
--		if (!error) {
--			error = dir->i_op->rmdir(dir, dentry);
--			if (!error)
--				dentry->d_inode->i_flags |= S_DEAD;
--		}
-+		error = dir->i_op->rmdir(dir, dentry);
-+		if (!error)
-+			dentry->d_inode->i_flags |= S_DEAD;
- 	}
- 	mutex_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
- 	if (!error) {

kernel-patches/for-mainline/foobar.diff

@@ -1,278 +0,0 @@
----
- security/Makefile        |    2 
- security/foobar/Makefile |    1 
- security/foobar/foobar.c |  257 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 260 insertions(+)
-
---- a/security/Makefile
-+++ b/security/Makefile
-@@ -16,3 +16,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o d
- obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES)	+= commoncap.o capability.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= commoncap.o root_plug.o
-+
-+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)		+= foobar
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/security/foobar/Makefile
-@@ -0,0 +1 @@
-+obj-m += foobar.o
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/security/foobar/foobar.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
-+#include <linux/security.h>
-+#include <linux/module.h>
-+#include <linux/namei.h>
-+
-+#define log_path(dentry, mnt, fmt...) \
-+	__log_path(__FUNCTION__, dentry, mnt, NULL, ##fmt)
-+
-+#define log_path_inode(inode, fmt...) \
-+	__log_path(__FUNCTION__, NULL, NULL, inode, ##fmt)
-+
-+static int show_traversals;
-+module_param(show_traversals, bool, 0644);
-+
-+static void __log_path(const char *op, struct dentry *dentry,
-+		       struct vfsmount *mnt, struct inode *inode,
-+		       char *fmt, ...)
-+{
-+	va_list ap;
-+	char *page = NULL, *name = "<?>";
-+
-+	page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-+	if (!page)
-+		name = "<ENOMEM>";
-+	else if (mnt) {
-+		name = d_path(dentry, mnt, page + 1, PAGE_SIZE - 2);
-+		if (IS_ERR(name)) {
-+			snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "<%ld>", PTR_ERR(name));
-+			name = page;
-+		} else {
-+			page[PAGE_SIZE - 2] = '"';
-+			page[PAGE_SIZE - 1] = '\0';
-+			*--name = '"';
-+		}
-+	} else if (dentry) {
-+		snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "<%s>", dentry->d_name.name);
-+		name = page;
-+	} else if (inode) {
-+		snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "<%s:%ld>",
-+			 inode->i_sb->s_type->name,
-+			 inode->i_ino);
-+		name = page;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (fmt) {
-+		char *buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-+
-+		if (buffer) {
-+			int n;
-+
-+			n = snprintf(buffer, PAGE_SIZE, KERN_INFO "%s(%s, ",
-+				     op, name);
-+			va_start(ap, fmt);
-+			n += vsnprintf(buffer + n, PAGE_SIZE - n, fmt, ap);
-+			va_end(ap);
-+			snprintf(buffer + n, PAGE_SIZE - n, ")\n");
-+			printk("%s", buffer);
-+
-+			free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
-+		} else
-+			printk("%s: Out of memory\n", __FUNCTION__);
-+	} else
-+		printk(KERN_INFO "%s(%s)\n", op, name);
-+
-+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-+                                 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask)
-+{
-+	log_path(dentry, mnt, NULL);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_rmdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			      struct vfsmount *mnt)
-+{
-+	log_path(dentry, mnt, NULL);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-+                               struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask)
-+{
-+	log_path(dentry, mnt, NULL);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, 
-+			     struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
-+			     struct inode *inode,
-+			     struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+			     struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
-+{
-+	log_path(old_dentry, old_mnt, "<old>");
-+	log_path(new_dentry, new_mnt, "<new>");
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+                             struct vfsmount *mnt)
-+{
-+	log_path(dentry, mnt, NULL);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_mknod(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			      struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev)
-+{
-+	log_path(dentry, mnt, NULL);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
-+			       struct dentry *old_dentry, 
-+			       struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
-+			       struct inode *new_inode,
-+			       struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+			       struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
-+{
-+	log_path(old_dentry, old_mnt, "<old>");
-+	log_path(new_dentry, new_mnt, "<new>");
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, 
-+				struct iattr *iattr)
-+{
-+	log_path(dentry, mnt, NULL);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, 
-+			         char *name, void *value, size_t size, 
-+				 int flags, struct file *file)
-+{
-+	log_path(dentry, mnt, NULL);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, 
-+				 struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name, struct file *file)
-+{
-+	log_path(dentry, mnt, NULL);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-+				  struct vfsmount *mnt, struct file *file)
-+{
-+	log_path(dentry, mnt, NULL);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, 
-+				    struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name, struct file *file)
-+{
-+	log_path(dentry, mnt, NULL);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir,
-+			        struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, 
-+				const char *old_name)
-+{
-+	log_path(dentry, mnt, NULL);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int foobar_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
-+                                      struct nameidata *nd)
-+{
-+	if (nd && (nd->flags & (LOOKUP_PARENT | LOOKUP_CONTINUE)) &&
-+	    !show_traversals)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if (nd) {
-+		char *parent = "", *sep="", *cont = "";
-+
-+		if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_PARENT)
-+			parent = "LOOKUP_PARENT";
-+		if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_CONTINUE)
-+			cont = "LOOKUP_CONTINUE";
-+		if ((nd->flags & (LOOKUP_PARENT | LOOKUP_CONTINUE)) ==
-+		    (LOOKUP_PARENT | LOOKUP_CONTINUE))
-+			sep = ", ";
-+		else if (!(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_PARENT | LOOKUP_CONTINUE)))
-+			sep = "0";
-+
-+		log_path(nd->dentry, nd->mnt, "%c%c%c%c, %s%s%s",
-+			 mask & MAY_READ ? 'r' : '-',
-+			 mask & MAY_WRITE ? 'w' : '-',
-+			 mask & MAY_EXEC ? 'x' : '-',
-+			 mask & MAY_APPEND ? 'a' : '-',
-+			 parent, sep, cont);
-+	} else {
-+		log_path_inode(inode, "%c%c%c%c, 0",
-+			 mask & MAY_READ ? 'r' : '-',
-+			 mask & MAY_WRITE ? 'w' : '-',
-+			 mask & MAY_EXEC ? 'x' : '-',
-+			 mask & MAY_APPEND ? 'a' : '-');
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+struct security_operations foobar_ops = {
-+	.inode_create =		foobar_inode_create,
-+	.inode_link =		foobar_inode_link,
-+	.inode_unlink =		foobar_inode_unlink,
-+	.inode_mkdir =		foobar_inode_mkdir,
-+	.inode_rmdir =		foobar_inode_rmdir,
-+	.inode_mknod =		foobar_inode_mknod,
-+	.inode_rename =		foobar_inode_rename,
-+	.inode_setattr =	foobar_inode_setattr,
-+	.inode_setxattr =	foobar_inode_setxattr,
-+	.inode_getxattr =	foobar_inode_getxattr,
-+        .inode_listxattr =      foobar_inode_listxattr,
-+        .inode_removexattr =    foobar_inode_removexattr,
-+        .inode_symlink =        foobar_inode_symlink,
-+	.inode_permission =	foobar_inode_permission,
-+};
-+
-+static int __init foobar_init(void)
-+{
-+	int error;
-+
-+	error = register_security(&foobar_ops);
-+	if (error)
-+		printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to load foobar lsm\n");
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static void __exit foobar_exit(void)
-+{
-+	if (unregister_security(&foobar_ops))
-+		printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to properly unregister foobar lsm\n");
-+}
-+
-+module_init(foobar_init);
-+module_exit(foobar_exit);
-+
-+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("lsm module logging to syslog");
-+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fsetattr-reintro-ATTR_FILE.diff

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
----
- fs/open.c          |    3 +++
- include/linux/fs.h |    1 +
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
---- a/fs/open.c
-+++ b/fs/open.c
-@@ -207,6 +207,9 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, s
- 	newattrs.ia_size = length;
- 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | time_attrs;
- 
-+	if (filp)
-+		newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_FILE;
-+
- 	/* Remove suid/sgid on truncate too */
- 	newattrs.ia_valid |= should_remove_suid(dentry);
- 
---- a/include/linux/fs.h
-+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
-@@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ typedef void (dio_iodone_t)(struct kiocb
- #define ATTR_ATTR_FLAG	1024
- #define ATTR_KILL_SUID	2048
- #define ATTR_KILL_SGID	4096
-+#define ATTR_FILE	8192
- #define ATTR_KILL_PRIV	16384
- #define ATTR_OPEN	32768	/* Truncating from open(O_TRUNC) */
- 

kernel-patches/for-mainline/fsetattr.diff

@@ -1,392 +0,0 @@
-Subject: VFS: new fsetattr() file operation
-
-From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
-
-Add a new file operation: f_op->fsetattr(), that is invoked by
-ftruncate, fchmod, fchown and utimensat.  Fall back to i_op->setattr()
-if it is not defined.
-
-For the reasons why we need this, see patch adding fgetattr().
-
-ftruncate() already passed the open file to the filesystem via the
-ia_file member of struct iattr.  However it is cleaner to have a
-separate file operation for this, so remove ia_file, ATTR_FILE and
-convert existing users: fuse and AFS.
-
-Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> ---
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de> ---
-
----
- fs/afs/dir.c       |    1 +
- fs/afs/file.c      |    1 +
- fs/afs/inode.c     |   19 +++++++++++++++----
- fs/afs/internal.h  |    1 +
- fs/attr.c          |   18 ++++++++++++++----
- fs/fuse/dir.c      |   20 +++++++++-----------
- fs/fuse/file.c     |    7 +++++++
- fs/fuse/fuse_i.h   |    4 ++++
- fs/open.c          |   20 ++++++++------------
- fs/utimes.c        |    2 +-
- include/linux/fs.h |   10 ++--------
- 11 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/afs/dir.c
-+++ b/fs/afs/dir.c
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ const struct file_operations afs_dir_fil
- 	.release	= afs_release,
- 	.readdir	= afs_readdir,
- 	.lock		= afs_lock,
-+	.fsetattr	= afs_fsetattr,
- };
- 
- const struct inode_operations afs_dir_inode_operations = {
---- a/fs/afs/file.c
-+++ b/fs/afs/file.c
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ const struct file_operations afs_file_op
- 	.fsync		= afs_fsync,
- 	.lock		= afs_lock,
- 	.flock		= afs_flock,
-+	.fsetattr	= afs_fsetattr,
- };
- 
- const struct inode_operations afs_file_inode_operations = {
---- a/fs/afs/inode.c
-+++ b/fs/afs/inode.c
-@@ -360,7 +360,8 @@ void afs_clear_inode(struct inode *inode
- /*
-  * set the attributes of an inode
-  */
--int afs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
-+static int afs_do_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr,
-+		   struct file *file)
- {
- 	struct afs_vnode *vnode = AFS_FS_I(dentry->d_inode);
- 	struct key *key;
-@@ -382,8 +383,8 @@ int afs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, s
- 		afs_writeback_all(vnode);
- 	}
- 
--	if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_FILE) {
--		key = attr->ia_file->private_data;
-+	if (file) {
-+		key = file->private_data;
- 	} else {
- 		key = afs_request_key(vnode->volume->cell);
- 		if (IS_ERR(key)) {
-@@ -393,10 +394,20 @@ int afs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, s
- 	}
- 
- 	ret = afs_vnode_setattr(vnode, key, attr);
--	if (!(attr->ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
-+	if (!file)
- 		key_put(key);
- 
- error:
- 	_leave(" = %d", ret);
- 	return ret;
- }
-+
-+int afs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
-+{
-+	return afs_do_setattr(dentry, attr, NULL);
-+}
-+
-+int afs_fsetattr(struct file *file, struct iattr *attr)
-+{
-+	return afs_do_setattr(file->f_path.dentry, attr, file);
-+}
---- a/fs/afs/internal.h
-+++ b/fs/afs/internal.h
-@@ -550,6 +550,7 @@ extern void afs_zap_data(struct afs_vnod
- extern int afs_validate(struct afs_vnode *, struct key *);
- extern int afs_getattr(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *, struct kstat *);
- extern int afs_setattr(struct dentry *, struct iattr *);
-+extern int afs_fsetattr(struct file *, struct iattr *);
- extern void afs_clear_inode(struct inode *);
- 
- /*
---- a/fs/attr.c
-+++ b/fs/attr.c
-@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ int inode_setattr(struct inode * inode, 
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_setattr);
- 
--int notify_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--		  struct iattr *attr)
-+int fnotify_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+		   struct iattr *attr, struct file *file)
- {
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	mode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
-@@ -160,8 +160,12 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry *dentry,
- 
- 	if (inode->i_op && inode->i_op->setattr) {
- 		error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, mnt, attr);
--		if (!error)
--			error = inode->i_op->setattr(dentry, attr);
-+		if (!error) {
-+			if (file && file->f_op && file->f_op->fsetattr)
-+				error = file->f_op->fsetattr(file, attr);
-+			else
-+				error = inode->i_op->setattr(dentry, attr);
-+		}
- 	} else {
- 		error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
- 		if (!error)
-@@ -184,4 +188,10 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry *dentry,
- 	return error;
- }
- 
-+int notify_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+		  struct iattr *attr)
-+{
-+	return fnotify_change(dentry, mnt, attr, NULL);
-+}
-+
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(notify_change);
---- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
-+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
-@@ -1063,21 +1063,22 @@ static int fuse_dir_fsync(struct file *f
- 	return file ? fuse_fsync_common(file, de, datasync, 1) : 0;
- }
- 
--static bool update_mtime(unsigned ivalid)
-+static bool update_mtime(unsigned ivalid, bool have_file)
- {
- 	/* Always update if mtime is explicitly set  */
- 	if (ivalid & ATTR_MTIME_SET)
- 		return true;
- 
- 	/* If it's an open(O_TRUNC) or an ftruncate(), don't update */
--	if ((ivalid & ATTR_SIZE) && (ivalid & (ATTR_OPEN | ATTR_FILE)))
-+	if ((ivalid & ATTR_SIZE) && ((ivalid & ATTR_OPEN) || have_file))
- 		return false;
- 
- 	/* In all other cases update */
- 	return true;
- }
- 
--static void iattr_to_fattr(struct iattr *iattr, struct fuse_setattr_in *arg)
-+static void iattr_to_fattr(struct iattr *iattr, struct fuse_setattr_in *arg,
-+			   bool have_file)
- {
- 	unsigned ivalid = iattr->ia_valid;
- 
-@@ -1096,7 +1097,7 @@ static void iattr_to_fattr(struct iattr 
- 		if (!(ivalid & ATTR_ATIME_SET))
- 			arg->valid |= FATTR_ATIME_NOW;
- 	}
--	if ((ivalid & ATTR_MTIME) && update_mtime(ivalid)) {
-+	if ((ivalid & ATTR_MTIME) && update_mtime(ivalid, have_file)) {
- 		arg->valid |= FATTR_MTIME;
- 		arg->mtime = iattr->ia_mtime.tv_sec;
- 		arg->mtimensec = iattr->ia_mtime.tv_nsec;
-@@ -1113,8 +1114,8 @@ static void iattr_to_fattr(struct iattr 
-  * vmtruncate() doesn't allow for this case, so do the rlimit checking
-  * and the actual truncation by hand.
-  */
--static int fuse_do_setattr(struct dentry *entry, struct iattr *attr,
--			   struct file *file)
-+int fuse_do_setattr(struct dentry *entry, struct iattr *attr,
-+		    struct file *file)
- {
- 	struct inode *inode = entry->d_inode;
- 	struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
-@@ -1152,7 +1153,7 @@ static int fuse_do_setattr(struct dentry
- 
- 	memset(&inarg, 0, sizeof(inarg));
- 	memset(&outarg, 0, sizeof(outarg));
--	iattr_to_fattr(attr, &inarg);
-+	iattr_to_fattr(attr, &inarg, file != NULL);
- 	if (file) {
- 		struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
- 		inarg.valid |= FATTR_FH;
-@@ -1194,10 +1195,7 @@ static int fuse_do_setattr(struct dentry
- 
- static int fuse_setattr(struct dentry *entry, struct iattr *attr)
- {
--	if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_FILE)
--		return fuse_do_setattr(entry, attr, attr->ia_file);
--	else
--		return fuse_do_setattr(entry, attr, NULL);
-+	return fuse_do_setattr(entry, attr, NULL);
- }
- 
- static int fuse_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *entry,
---- a/fs/fuse/file.c
-+++ b/fs/fuse/file.c
-@@ -907,6 +907,11 @@ static sector_t fuse_bmap(struct address
- 	return err ? 0 : outarg.block;
- }
- 
-+static int fuse_fsetattr(struct file *file, struct iattr *attr)
-+{
-+	return fuse_do_setattr(file->f_path.dentry, attr, file);
-+}
-+
- static const struct file_operations fuse_file_operations = {
- 	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
- 	.read		= do_sync_read,
-@@ -920,6 +925,7 @@ static const struct file_operations fuse
- 	.fsync		= fuse_fsync,
- 	.lock		= fuse_file_lock,
- 	.flock		= fuse_file_flock,
-+	.fsetattr       = fuse_fsetattr,
- 	.splice_read	= generic_file_splice_read,
- };
- 
-@@ -933,6 +939,7 @@ static const struct file_operations fuse
- 	.fsync		= fuse_fsync,
- 	.lock		= fuse_file_lock,
- 	.flock		= fuse_file_flock,
-+	.fsetattr       = fuse_fsetattr,
- 	/* no mmap and splice_read */
- };
- 
---- a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
-+++ b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
-@@ -505,6 +505,10 @@ void fuse_change_attributes(struct inode
-  */
- int fuse_dev_init(void);
- 
-+
-+int fuse_do_setattr(struct dentry *entry, struct iattr *attr,
-+		    struct file *file);
-+
- /**
-  * Cleanup the client device
-  */
---- a/fs/open.c
-+++ b/fs/open.c
-@@ -206,16 +206,12 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, s
- 
- 	newattrs.ia_size = length;
- 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | time_attrs;
--	if (filp) {
--		newattrs.ia_file = filp;
--		newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_FILE;
--	}
- 
- 	/* Remove suid/sgid on truncate too */
- 	newattrs.ia_valid |= should_remove_suid(dentry);
- 
- 	mutex_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
--	err = notify_change(dentry, mnt, &newattrs);
-+	err = fnotify_change(dentry, mnt, &newattrs, filp);
- 	mutex_unlock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
- 	return err;
- }
-@@ -583,7 +579,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchmod(unsigned int 
- 		mode = inode->i_mode;
- 	newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
- 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
--	err = notify_change(dentry, file->f_path.mnt, &newattrs);
-+	err = fnotify_change(dentry, file->f_path.mnt, &newattrs, file);
- 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
- 
- out_putf:
-@@ -633,7 +629,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chmod(const char __u
- }
- 
- static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--			uid_t user, gid_t group)
-+			uid_t user, gid_t group, struct file *file)
- {
- 	struct inode * inode;
- 	int error;
-@@ -663,7 +659,7 @@ static int chown_common(struct dentry * 
- 		newattrs.ia_valid |=
- 			ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
- 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
--	error = notify_change(dentry, mnt, &newattrs);
-+	error = fnotify_change(dentry, mnt, &newattrs, file);
- 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
- out:
- 	return error;
-@@ -677,7 +673,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chown(const char __u
- 	error = user_path_walk(filename, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto out;
--	error = chown_common(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, user, group);
-+	error = chown_common(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, user, group, NULL);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- out:
- 	return error;
-@@ -697,7 +693,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchownat(int dfd, co
- 	error = __user_walk_fd(dfd, filename, follow, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto out;
--	error = chown_common(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, user, group);
-+	error = chown_common(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, user, group, NULL);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- out:
- 	return error;
-@@ -711,7 +707,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_lchown(const char __
- 	error = user_path_walk_link(filename, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto out;
--	error = chown_common(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, user, group);
-+	error = chown_common(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, user, group, NULL);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- out:
- 	return error;
-@@ -730,7 +726,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchown(unsigned int 
- 
- 	dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
- 	audit_inode(NULL, dentry);
--	error = chown_common(dentry, file->f_path.mnt, user, group);
-+	error = chown_common(dentry, file->f_path.mnt, user, group, file);
- 	fput(file);
- out:
- 	return error;
---- a/fs/utimes.c
-+++ b/fs/utimes.c
-@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ long do_utimes(int dfd, char __user *fil
- 		}
- 	}
- 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
--	error = notify_change(path.dentry, path.mnt, &newattrs);
-+	error = fnotify_change(path.dentry, path.mnt, &newattrs, f);
- 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
- dput_and_out:
- 	if (f)
---- a/include/linux/fs.h
-+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
-@@ -329,7 +329,6 @@ typedef void (dio_iodone_t)(struct kiocb
- #define ATTR_ATTR_FLAG	1024
- #define ATTR_KILL_SUID	2048
- #define ATTR_KILL_SGID	4096
--#define ATTR_FILE	8192
- #define ATTR_KILL_PRIV	16384
- #define ATTR_OPEN	32768	/* Truncating from open(O_TRUNC) */
- 
-@@ -351,13 +350,6 @@ struct iattr {
- 	struct timespec	ia_atime;
- 	struct timespec	ia_mtime;
- 	struct timespec	ia_ctime;
--
--	/*
--	 * Not an attribute, but an auxilary info for filesystems wanting to
--	 * implement an ftruncate() like method.  NOTE: filesystem should
--	 * check for (ia_valid & ATTR_FILE), and not for (ia_file != NULL).
--	 */
--	struct file	*ia_file;
- };
- 
- /*
-@@ -1188,6 +1180,7 @@ struct file_operations {
- 	ssize_t (*splice_write)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct file *, loff_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
- 	ssize_t (*splice_read)(struct file *, loff_t *, struct pipe_inode_info *, size_t, unsigned int);
- 	int (*setlease)(struct file *, long, struct file_lock **);
-+	int (*fsetattr)(struct file *, struct iattr *);
- };
- 
- struct inode_operations {
-@@ -1694,6 +1687,7 @@ extern int do_remount_sb(struct super_bl
- extern sector_t bmap(struct inode *, sector_t);
- #endif
- extern int notify_change(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, struct iattr *);
-+extern int fnotify_change(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, struct iattr *, struct file *);
- extern int permission(struct inode *, int, struct nameidata *);
- extern int generic_permission(struct inode *, int,
- 		int (*check_acl)(struct inode *, int));

kernel-patches/for-mainline/hat_perm.diff

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/apparmor.h |    5 +++--
- security/apparmor/main.c     |    9 +++++++++
- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-@@ -68,10 +68,11 @@
- #define AA_ALL_EXEC_MODS		(AA_USER_EXEC_MODS | \
- 					 AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS)
- 
--/* shared permissions that are not duplicated in user:group:other */
-+/* shared permissions that are not duplicated in user::other */
-+#define AA_CHANGE_HAT			0x20000000
- #define AA_CHANGE_PROFILE		0x40000000
- 
--#define AA_SHARED_PERMS			(AA_CHANGE_PROFILE)
-+#define AA_SHARED_PERMS			(AA_CHANGE_HAT | AA_CHANGE_PROFILE)
- 
- #define AA_VALID_PERM_MASK		(AA_FILE_PERMS | AA_SHARED_PERMS)
- 
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -1300,6 +1300,15 @@ repeat:
- 
- 	if (hat_name) {
- 		char *name, *profile_name;
-+		/* Not Yet.  This perm check is currently done by searching
-+		   for the hat profile.   When hat style profile names
-+		   become more generic then this will be needed.
-+		if (!(aa_match(profile->file_rules, hat_name) &
-+		      AA_CHANGE_PROFILE)) {
-+			error = -EACCES;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		*/
- 		if (previous_profile)
- 			profile_name = previous_profile->name;
- 		else

kernel-patches/for-mainline/may_create-args.diff

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Remove redundant may_create() argument
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c |   22 ++++++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -1462,16 +1462,14 @@ static int may_delete(struct inode *dir,
-  *  3. We should have write and exec permissions on dir
-  *  4. We can't do it if dir is immutable (done in permission())
-  */
--static inline int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *child,
--			     struct nameidata2 *nd)
-+static inline int may_create(struct nameidata2 *nd, struct dentry *child)
- {
- 	if (child->d_inode)
- 		return -EEXIST;
--	if (IS_DEADDIR(dir))
-+	if (IS_DEADDIR(nd->dentry->d_inode))
- 		return -ENOENT;
--	if (nd)
--		nd->flags |= LOOKUP_CONTINUE;
--	return permission(dir,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC, nd);
-+	nd->flags |= LOOKUP_CONTINUE;
-+	return permission(nd->dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC, nd);
- }
- 
- /* 
-@@ -1537,7 +1535,7 @@ void unlock_rename(struct dentry *p1, st
- int vfs_create(struct nameidata2 *nd, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
- {
- 	struct inode *dir = nd->dentry->d_inode;
--	int error = may_create(dir, dentry, nd);
-+	int error = may_create(nd, dentry);
- 
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
-@@ -1883,7 +1881,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lookup_create);
- int vfs_mknod(struct nameidata2 *nd, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
- {
- 	struct inode *dir = nd->dentry->d_inode;
--	int error = may_create(dir, dentry, nd);
-+	int error = may_create(nd, dentry);
- 
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
-@@ -1963,7 +1961,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknod(const char __u
- int vfs_mkdir(struct nameidata2 *nd, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
- {
- 	struct inode *dir = nd->dentry->d_inode;
--	int error = may_create(dir, dentry, nd);
-+	int error = may_create(nd, dentry);
- 
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
-@@ -2232,7 +2230,7 @@ int vfs_symlink(struct nameidata2 *nd, s
- 		const char *oldname, int mode)
- {
- 	struct inode *dir = nd->dentry->d_inode;
--	int error = may_create(dir, dentry, nd);
-+	int error = may_create(nd, dentry);
- 
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
-@@ -2304,7 +2302,7 @@ int vfs_link(struct nameidata2 *old_nd, 
- 	if (!inode)
- 		return -ENOENT;
- 
--	error = may_create(dir, new_dentry, new_parent);
-+	error = may_create(new_parent, new_dentry);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
-@@ -2522,7 +2520,7 @@ int vfs_rename(struct nameidata2 *old_nd
- 		return error;
- 
- 	if (!new_dentry->d_inode)
--		error = may_create(new_dir, new_dentry, new_nd);
-+		error = may_create(new_nd, new_dentry);
- 	else
- 		error = may_delete(new_dir, new_dentry, is_dir);
- 	if (error)

kernel-patches/for-mainline/may_delete-args.diff

@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass nameidata2 to may_delete()
-
-Pass the nameidata through to may_delete(), and pass it on to the
-permission() call.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c |   18 ++++++++----------
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -1418,8 +1418,9 @@ static inline int check_sticky(struct in
-  * 10. We don't allow removal of NFS sillyrenamed files; it's handled by
-  *     nfs_async_unlink().
-  */
--static int may_delete(struct inode *dir,struct dentry *victim,int isdir)
-+static int may_delete(struct nameidata2 *nd, struct dentry *victim, int isdir)
- {
-+	struct inode *dir = nd->dentry->d_inode;
- 	int error;
- 
- 	if (!victim->d_inode)
-@@ -1428,11 +1429,8 @@ static int may_delete(struct inode *dir,
- 	BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir);
- 	audit_inode_child(victim->d_name.name, victim->d_inode, dir);
- 
--#if 0
--	if (nd)
--		nd->flags |= LOOKUP_CONTINUE;
--#endif
--	error = permission(dir,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC, NULL);
-+	nd->flags |= LOOKUP_CONTINUE;
-+	error = permission(dir,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC, nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 	if (IS_APPEND(dir))
-@@ -2049,7 +2047,7 @@ void dentry_unhash(struct dentry *dentry
- int vfs_rmdir(struct nameidata2 *nd, struct dentry *dentry)
- {
- 	struct inode *dir = nd->dentry->d_inode;
--	int error = may_delete(dir, dentry, 1);
-+	int error = may_delete(nd, dentry, 1);
- 
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
-@@ -2131,7 +2129,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_rmdir(const char __u
- int vfs_unlink(struct nameidata2 *nd, struct dentry *dentry)
- {
- 	struct inode *dir = nd->dentry->d_inode;
--	int error = may_delete(dir, dentry, 0);
-+	int error = may_delete(nd, dentry, 0);
- 
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
-@@ -2517,14 +2515,14 @@ int vfs_rename(struct nameidata2 *old_nd
- 	if (old_dentry->d_inode == new_dentry->d_inode)
-  		return 0;
-  
--	error = may_delete(old_dir, old_dentry, is_dir);
-+	error = may_delete(old_nd, old_dentry, is_dir);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
- 	if (!new_dentry->d_inode)
- 		error = may_create(new_nd, new_dentry);
- 	else
--		error = may_delete(new_dir, new_dentry, is_dir);
-+		error = may_delete(new_nd, new_dentry, is_dir);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 

kernel-patches/for-mainline/mount-consistent-__d_path.diff

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Make d_path() consistent across mount operations
-
-The path that __d_path() computes can become slightly inconsistent when it
-races with mount operations: it grabs the vfsmount_lock when traversing mount
-points but immediately drops it again, only to re-grab it when it reaches the
-next mount point.  The result is that the filename computed is not always
-consisent, and the file may never have had that name. (This is unlikely, but
-still possible.)
-
-Fix this by grabbing the vfsmount_lock when the first mount point is reached,
-and holding onto it until the d_cache lookup is completed.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/dcache.c |   14 ++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/dcache.c
-+++ b/fs/dcache.c
-@@ -1786,7 +1786,7 @@ static char *__d_path(struct dentry *den
- 		      struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt,
- 		      char *buffer, int buflen, int fail_deleted)
- {
--	int namelen, is_slash;
-+	int namelen, is_slash, vfsmount_locked = 0;
- 
- 	if (buflen < 2)
- 		return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
-@@ -1809,14 +1809,14 @@ static char *__d_path(struct dentry *den
- 		struct dentry * parent;
- 
- 		if (dentry == vfsmnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
--			spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
--			if (vfsmnt->mnt_parent == vfsmnt) {
--				spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
--				goto global_root;
-+			if (!vfsmount_locked) {
-+				spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
-+				vfsmount_locked = 1;
- 			}
-+			if (vfsmnt->mnt_parent == vfsmnt)
-+				goto global_root;
- 			dentry = vfsmnt->mnt_mountpoint;
- 			vfsmnt = vfsmnt->mnt_parent;
--			spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
- 			continue;
- 		}
- 		parent = dentry->d_parent;
-@@ -1835,6 +1835,8 @@ static char *__d_path(struct dentry *den
- 		*--buffer = '/';
- 
- out:
-+	if (vfsmount_locked)
-+		spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
- 	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
- 	return buffer;
- 

kernel-patches/for-mainline/nfs-nameidata-check.diff

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: nfs NULL nameidata check?
-
-nfs_lookup() checks for NULL nameidata in one place, but not in another. In 
-nfs_sillyrename() it calls lookup_one_len() -> __lookup_hash(), which passes 
-in a NULL nameidata to nfs_lookup(). Unless I'm overlooking something, 
-fs/nfs/dir.c:923 will dereference this NULL pointer if the sillyrenamed file 
-exists?
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/nfs/dir.c |   12 ++++++------
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
-+++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
-@@ -896,15 +896,15 @@ int nfs_is_exclusive_create(struct inode
- 	return (nd->intent.open.flags & O_EXCL) != 0;
- }
- 
--static inline int nfs_reval_fsid(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct inode *dir,
-+static inline int nfs_reval_fsid(struct nameidata *nd, struct inode *dir,
- 				 struct nfs_fh *fh, struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
- {
- 	struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
- 
--	if (!nfs_fsid_equal(&server->fsid, &fattr->fsid))
--		/* Revalidate fsid on root dir */
--		return __nfs_revalidate_inode(server, mnt->mnt_root->d_inode);
--	return 0;
-+	if (nd == NULL || nfs_fsid_equal(&server->fsid, &fattr->fsid))
-+		return 0;
-+	/* Revalidate fsid on root dir */
-+	return __nfs_revalidate_inode(server, nd->mnt->mnt_root->d_inode);
- }
- 
- static struct dentry *nfs_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry, struct nameidata2 *nd)
-@@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ static struct dentry *nfs_lookup(struct 
- 		res = ERR_PTR(error);
- 		goto out_unlock;
- 	}
--	error = nfs_reval_fsid(nd->mnt, dir, &fhandle, &fattr);
-+	error = nfs_reval_fsid(nd, dir, &fhandle, &fattr);
- 	if (error < 0) {
- 		res = ERR_PTR(error);
- 		goto out_unlock;

kernel-patches/for-mainline/nfsd_permission-nameidata.diff

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass nameidata2 to permission() from nfsd_permission()
-
-Construct a nameidata object and pass it down to permission(), so
-that we can do the proper mount flag checks there.
-
-Note that confining nfsd with AppArmor makes no sense, and so this
-patch is not necessary for AppArmor alone.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/nfsd/vfs.c |    9 +++++++--
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
-+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
-@@ -1804,6 +1804,7 @@ nfsd_statfs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, stru
- __be32
- nfsd_permission(struct svc_export *exp, struct dentry *dentry, int acc)
- {
-+	struct nameidata2 nd;
- 	struct inode	*inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	int		err;
- 
-@@ -1869,12 +1870,16 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_export *exp, 
- 	    inode->i_uid == current->fsuid)
- 		return 0;
- 
--	err = permission(inode, acc & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC), NULL);
-+	nd.dentry = dentry;
-+	nd.mnt = exp->ex_mnt;
-+	nd.flags = LOOKUP_ACCESS;
-+
-+	err = permission(inode, acc & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC), &nd);
- 
- 	/* Allow read access to binaries even when mode 111 */
- 	if (err == -EACCES && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
- 	    acc == (MAY_READ | MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE))
--		err = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, NULL);
-+		err = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, &nd);
- 
- 	return err? nfserrno(err) : 0;
- }

kernel-patches/for-mainline/no-safex-link-subset.diff

@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/apparmor.h |   21 ++++++++++-----------
- security/apparmor/main.c     |   40 ++++++++++++----------------------------
- security/apparmor/match.c    |    9 +++++++--
- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-@@ -42,15 +42,18 @@
- 					 AA_EXEC_MOD_2 | AA_EXEC_MOD_3 | \
- 					 AA_EXEC_MOD_4)
- 
-+#define AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS		(AA_EXEC_MOD_0 | AA_EXEC_MOD_1 | \
-+					 AA_EXEC_MOD_2 | AA_EXEC_MOD_3 | \
-+					 AA_EXEC_MOD_4)
-+
-+#define AA_EXEC_TYPE			(MAY_EXEC | AA_EXEC_UNSAFE | \
-+					 AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS)
-+
- #define AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED		AA_EXEC_MOD_0
- #define AA_EXEC_INHERIT			AA_EXEC_MOD_1
- #define AA_EXEC_PROFILE			(AA_EXEC_MOD_0 | AA_EXEC_MOD_1)
- #define AA_EXEC_PIX			 AA_EXEC_MOD_2
- 
--#define AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS		(AA_EXEC_MOD_0 | AA_EXEC_MOD_1 | \
--					 AA_EXEC_MOD_2 | AA_EXEC_MOD_3 | \
--					 AA_EXEC_MOD_4)
--
- #define AA_USER_SHIFT			0
- #define AA_OTHER_SHIFT			14
- 
-@@ -65,16 +68,12 @@
- #define AA_USER_EXEC			(MAY_EXEC << AA_USER_SHIFT)
- #define AA_OTHER_EXEC			(MAY_EXEC << AA_OTHER_SHIFT)
- 
--#define AA_USER_EXEC_MODS		(AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS << AA_USER_SHIFT)
--#define AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS		(AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS << AA_OTHER_SHIFT)
--
--#define AA_USER_EXEC_UNSAFE		(AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << AA_USER_SHIFT)
--#define AA_OTHER_EXEC_UNSAFE		(AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << AA_OTHER_SHIFT)
-+#define AA_USER_EXEC_TYPE		(AA_EXEC_TYPE << AA_USER_SHIFT)
-+#define AA_OTHER_EXEC_TYPE		(AA_EXEC_TYPE << AA_OTHER_SHIFT)
- 
- #define AA_EXEC_BITS			(AA_USER_EXEC | AA_OTHER_EXEC)
- 
--#define AA_ALL_EXEC_MODS		(AA_USER_EXEC_MODS | \
--					 AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS)
-+#define ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE		(AA_USER_EXEC_TYPE | AA_OTHER_EXEC_TYPE)
- 
- /* overloaded permissions for link pairs */
- #define AA_LINK_SUBSET_TEST		0x0020
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_prof
- 			  int *request_mask)
- {
- 	unsigned int state;
--	int l_mode, t_mode, l_subset, denied_mask = 0;
-+	int l_mode, t_mode, denied_mask = 0;
- 	int link_mask = AA_MAY_LINK << target_mode;
- 
- 	*request_mask = link_mask;
-@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_prof
- 
- 	/* Do link perm subset test
- 	 * If a subset test is required a permission subset test of the
--	 * perms for the link are done against the user:group:other of the
-+	 * perms for the link are done against the user::other of the
- 	 * target's 'r', 'w', 'x', 'a', 'k', and 'm' permissions.
- 	 *
- 	 * If the link has 'x', an exact match of all the execute flags
-@@ -100,38 +100,22 @@ static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_prof
- 
- 	t_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, target);
- 
--
- 	/* For actual subset test ignore valid-profile-transition flags,
- 	 * and link bits
- 	 */
--	l_mode &= ~(AA_SHARED_PERMS | AA_LINK_BITS);
--	t_mode &= ~(AA_SHARED_PERMS | AA_LINK_BITS);
--	l_subset = l_mode & AA_FILE_PERMS;
-+	l_mode &= AA_FILE_PERMS & ~AA_LINK_BITS;
-+	t_mode &= AA_FILE_PERMS & ~AA_LINK_BITS;
- 
- 	*request_mask = l_mode | link_mask;
- 
--	if (l_subset) {
--		denied_mask |= (l_subset) & ~t_mode;
--		if (denied_mask & AA_EXEC_BITS)
--			denied_mask |= l_mode & AA_ALL_EXEC_MODS;
--		else if (l_mode & AA_EXEC_BITS) {
--			if (!(l_mode & AA_USER_EXEC_UNSAFE))
--				l_mode |= t_mode & AA_USER_EXEC_UNSAFE;
--			if (l_mode & AA_USER_EXEC &&
--			    (l_mode & AA_USER_EXEC_MODS) !=
--			    (t_mode & AA_USER_EXEC_MODS))
--				denied_mask |= AA_USER_EXEC |
--					(l_mode & AA_USER_EXEC_MODS);
--			if (!(l_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_UNSAFE))
--				l_mode |= t_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_UNSAFE;
--			if (l_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC &&
--			    (l_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS) !=
--			    (t_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS))
--				denied_mask |= AA_OTHER_EXEC |
--					(l_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS);
--		}
--	} else if (t_mode & AA_FILE_PERMS)
--		denied_mask |= t_mode | link_mask;
-+	if (l_mode) {
-+		denied_mask |= l_mode & ~t_mode;
-+		if ((l_mode & AA_EXEC_BITS) &&
-+		    (l_mode & ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE) !=
-+		    (t_mode & ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE))
-+			denied_mask = (denied_mask & ~ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE) |
-+				      (l_mode & ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE);
-+	}
- 
- 	return denied_mask;
- }
---- a/security/apparmor/match.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
-@@ -175,9 +175,14 @@ int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
- 	for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
- 		int mode = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[i];
- 
--		if (mode & ~AA_VALID_PERM_MASK) {
-+		if (mode & ~AA_VALID_PERM_MASK)
-+			goto out;
-+
-+		/* if any exec modifier is set MAY_EXEC must be set */
-+		if ((mode & AA_USER_EXEC_TYPE) && !(mode & AA_USER_EXEC))
-+			goto out;
-+		if ((mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_TYPE) && !(mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC))
- 			goto out;
--		}
- 	}
- 
- 	error = 0;

kernel-patches/for-mainline/null_module/Kbuild

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_FOOBAR) += foobar.o
-
-foobar-y := foobar-lsm.o

kernel-patches/for-mainline/null_module/Makefile

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-obj-m += foobar.o

kernel-patches/for-mainline/null_module/foobar-lsm.c

@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
-#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/namei.h>
-
-static void log_path(char *op, struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
-	char *page, *name;
-
-	if (!mnt) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "foobar(%s): %p NULL vfsmnt\n", op, dentry);
-		return;
-	}
-			
-        page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-        if (!page) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "foobar(%s): Unable to get page for path %p/%p\n",
-			op, mnt, dentry);
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	name=d_path(dentry, mnt, page, PAGE_SIZE);
-	if (IS_ERR(name)){
-		printk(KERN_ERR "foobar(%s): Error path %p/%p overflowed buffer\n",
-			op, mnt, dentry);
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	printk(KERN_INFO "foobar(%s): %p/%p->'%s'\n",
-		op, mnt, dentry, name);
-
-out:
-	if (page)
-		free_page((unsigned long)page);
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-                                 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask)
-{
-	log_path("inode_mkdir", dentry, mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_rmdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-			      struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
-	log_path("inode_rmdir", dentry, mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-                               struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask)
-{
-	log_path("inode_create", dentry, mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, 
-			     struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
-			     struct inode *inode,
-			     struct dentry *new_dentry,
-			     struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
-{
-	log_path("inode_link (old)", old_dentry, old_mnt);
-	log_path("inode_link (new)", new_dentry, new_mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-                             struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
-	log_path("inode_unlink", dentry, mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_mknod(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-			      struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev)
-{
-	log_path("inode_mknod", dentry, mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
-			       struct dentry *old_dentry, 
-			       struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
-			       struct inode *new_inode,
-			       struct dentry *new_dentry,
-			       struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
-{
-	log_path("inode_rename (old)", old_dentry, old_mnt);
-	log_path("inode_rename (new)", new_dentry, new_mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, 
-				struct iattr *iattr)
-{
-	log_path("inode_setattr", dentry, mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, 
-			         char *name, void *value, size_t size, 
-				 int flags)
-{
-	log_path("inode_setxattr", dentry, mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, 
-				 struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name)
-{
-	log_path("inode_getxattr", dentry, mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-				  struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
-	log_path("inode_listxattr", dentry, mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, 
-				    struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name)
-{
-	log_path("inode_removexattr", dentry, mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir,
-			        struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, 
-				const char *old_name)
-{
-	log_path("inode_symlink", dentry, mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int foobar_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
-                                      struct nameidata *nd)
-{
-	log_path("inode_permission", nd->dentry, nd->mnt);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-struct security_operations foobar_ops = {
-	.inode_create =		foobar_inode_create,
-	.inode_link =		foobar_inode_link,
-	.inode_unlink =		foobar_inode_unlink,
-	.inode_mkdir =		foobar_inode_mkdir,
-	.inode_rmdir =		foobar_inode_rmdir,
-	.inode_mknod =		foobar_inode_mknod,
-	.inode_rename =		foobar_inode_rename,
-	.inode_setattr =	foobar_inode_setattr,
-	.inode_setxattr =	foobar_inode_setxattr,
-	.inode_getxattr =	foobar_inode_getxattr,
-        .inode_listxattr =      foobar_inode_listxattr,
-        .inode_removexattr =    foobar_inode_removexattr,
-        .inode_symlink =        foobar_inode_symlink,
-//	.inode_permission =	foobar_inode_permission,
-};
-
-static int __init foobar_init(void)
-{
-int error;
-
-	if ((error = register_security(&foobar_ops))) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to load dummy module\n");
-	}
-
-	return error;
-}
-
-static void __exit foobar_exit(void)
-{
-	if (unregister_security(&foobar_ops))
-		printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to properly unregister module\n");
-}
-
-module_init(foobar_init);
-module_exit(foobar_exit);
-
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Test module");
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

kernel-patches/for-mainline/owner-perm-set.diff

@@ -1,561 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/apparmor.h         |   60 +++++++---
- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c       |    2 
- security/apparmor/lsm.c              |    2 
- security/apparmor/main.c             |  193 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- security/apparmor/match.c            |    8 -
- security/apparmor/module_interface.c |    3 
- 6 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-@@ -26,22 +26,50 @@
- #define AA_MAY_LINK			0x0010
- #define AA_MAY_LOCK			0x0020
- #define AA_EXEC_MMAP			0x0040
-+#define AA_EXEC_UNSAFE			0x0080
-+#define AA_EXEC_MOD_0			0x0100
-+#define AA_EXEC_MOD_1			0x0200
-+#define AA_BASE_PERMS			(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | \
-+					 MAY_APPEND | AA_MAY_LINK | \
-+					 AA_MAY_LOCK | AA_EXEC_MMAP | \
-+					 AA_EXEC_UNSAFE | AA_EXEC_MOD_0 | \
-+					 AA_EXEC_MOD_1)
- 
--#define AA_CHANGE_PROFILE		0x04000000
--#define AA_EXEC_INHERIT			0x08000000
--#define AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED		0x10000000
--#define AA_EXEC_PROFILE			0x20000000
--#define AA_EXEC_UNSAFE			0x40000000
--
--#define AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS		(AA_EXEC_INHERIT | \
--					 AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED | \
--					 AA_EXEC_PROFILE)
-+#define AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED		0
-+#define AA_EXEC_INHERIT			AA_EXEC_MOD_0
-+#define AA_EXEC_PROFILE			AA_EXEC_MOD_1
-+#define AA_EXEC_PIX			(AA_EXEC_MOD_0 | AA_EXEC_MOD_1)
- 
--#define AA_VALID_PERM_MASK		(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | \
--					 MAY_APPEND | AA_MAY_LINK | \
--					 AA_MAY_LOCK | \
--					 AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS | AA_EXEC_MMAP | \
--					 AA_EXEC_UNSAFE | AA_CHANGE_PROFILE)
-+#define AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS		(AA_EXEC_MOD_0 | AA_EXEC_MOD_1)
-+
-+#define AA_USER_SHIFT			0
-+#define AA_OTHER_SHIFT			10
-+
-+#define AA_USER_PERMS			(AA_BASE_PERMS << AA_USER_SHIFT)
-+#define AA_OTHER_PERMS			(AA_BASE_PERMS << AA_OTHER_SHIFT)
-+
-+#define AA_FILE_PERMS			(AA_USER_PERMS | AA_OTHER_PERMS)
-+
-+#define AA_LINK_BITS			((AA_MAY_LINK << AA_USER_SHIFT) | \
-+					 (AA_MAY_LINK << AA_OTHER_SHIFT))
-+
-+#define AA_USER_EXEC			(MAY_EXEC << AA_USER_SHIFT)
-+#define AA_OTHER_EXEC			(MAY_EXEC << AA_OTHER_SHIFT)
-+
-+#define AA_USER_EXEC_MODS		(AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS << AA_USER_SHIFT)
-+#define AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS		(AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS << AA_OTHER_SHIFT)
-+
-+#define AA_EXEC_BITS			(AA_USER_EXEC | AA_OTHER_EXEC)
-+
-+#define AA_ALL_EXEC_MODS		(AA_USER_EXEC_MODS | \
-+					 AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS)
-+
-+/* shared permissions that are not duplicated in user:group:other */
-+#define AA_CHANGE_PROFILE		0x40000000
-+
-+#define AA_SHARED_PERMS			(AA_CHANGE_PROFILE)
-+
-+#define AA_VALID_PERM_MASK		(AA_FILE_PERMS | AA_SHARED_PERMS)
- 
- #define AA_SECURE_EXEC_NEEDED		1
- 
-@@ -183,7 +211,7 @@ struct aa_audit {
- 	const char *name;
- 	const char *name2;
- 	const char *name3;
--	int requested_mask, denied_mask;
-+	int request_mask, denied_mask;
- 	struct iattr *iattr;
- 	pid_t task, parent;
- 	int family, type, protocol;
-@@ -226,7 +254,7 @@ extern int aa_perm_dir(struct aa_profile
- 		       struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 		       int mask);
- extern int aa_perm_path(struct aa_profile *, const char *operation,
--			const char *name, int);
-+			const char *name, int mask, uid_t uid);
- extern int aa_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
- 		   struct dentry *link, struct vfsmount *link_mnt,
- 		   struct dentry *target, struct vfsmount *target_mnt);
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static struct file_operations apparmorfs
- static ssize_t aa_matching_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
- 			       size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
- {
--	const char *matching = "pattern=aadfa perms=rwxamlz";
-+	const char *matching = "pattern=aadfa perms=rwxamlz user:other";
- 
- 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, matching,
- 				       strlen(matching));
---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int apparmor_sysctl(struct ctl_ta
- 		if (name && name - buffer >= 5) {
- 			name -= 5;
- 			memcpy(name, "/proc", 5);
--			error = aa_perm_path(profile, "sysctl", name, mask);
-+			error = aa_perm_path(profile, "sysctl", name, mask, 0);
- 		}
- 		free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
- 	}
---- a/security/apparmor/main.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
-@@ -31,6 +31,14 @@ static const char *capability_names[] = 
- 
- struct aa_namespace *default_namespace;
- 
-+static int aa_inode_mode(struct inode *inode)
-+{
-+	/* if the inode doesn't exist the user is creating it */
-+	if (!inode || current->fsuid == inode->i_uid)
-+		return AA_USER_SHIFT;
-+	return AA_OTHER_SHIFT;
-+}
-+
- /**
-  * aa_file_denied - check for @mask access on a file
-  * @profile: profile to check against
-@@ -51,39 +59,52 @@ static int aa_file_denied(struct aa_prof
-  * @profile: profile to check against
-  * @link: pathname of link being created
-  * @target: pathname of target to be linked to
-+ * @target_mode: UGO shift for target inode
-  * @request_mask: the permissions subset valid only if link succeeds
-  * Return %0 on success, or else the permissions that the profile denies.
-  */
- static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *link,
--			  const char *target, int *request_mask)
-+			  const char *target, int target_mode,
-+			  int *request_mask)
- {
- 	int l_mode, t_mode, denied_mask;
-+	int link_mask = AA_MAY_LINK << target_mode;
- 
- 	l_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, link);
- 	t_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, target);
- 
- 	/* Ignore valid-profile-transition flags. */
--	l_mode &= ~AA_CHANGE_PROFILE;
--	t_mode &= ~AA_CHANGE_PROFILE;
-+	l_mode &= ~AA_SHARED_PERMS;
-+	t_mode &= ~AA_SHARED_PERMS;
- 
--	*request_mask = l_mode | AA_MAY_LINK;
--
--	/* Link always requires 'l' on the link, a subset of the
--	 * target's 'r', 'w', 'x', 'a', 'z', and 'm' permissions on the link,
--	 * and if the link has 'x', an exact match of all the execute flags
--	 * ('i', 'u', 'U', 'p', 'P').
--	 */
--#define RWXAZM (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND | AA_MAY_LOCK | \
--		AA_EXEC_MMAP)
--	denied_mask = ~l_mode & AA_MAY_LINK;
--	if (l_mode & RWXAZM)
--		denied_mask |= (l_mode & ~ AA_MAY_LINK) & ~t_mode;
--	else
--		denied_mask |= t_mode | AA_MAY_LINK;
--	if (denied_mask & AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS)
--		denied_mask |= MAY_EXEC;
-+	*request_mask = l_mode | link_mask;
- 
--#undef RWXAZM
-+	/* Link always requires 'l' on the link, a subset for user:other
-+	 * of the target's 'r', 'w', 'x', 'a', 'z', and 'm' permissions on
-+	 * the link, and if the link has 'x', an exact match of all the
-+	 * execute flags ('i', 'u', 'U', 'p', 'P').
-+ 	 */
-+#define SUBSET_PERMS (AA_FILE_PERMS & ~AA_LINK_BITS)
-+	denied_mask = ~l_mode & link_mask;
-+	if (l_mode & SUBSET_PERMS) {
-+		denied_mask |= (l_mode & SUBSET_PERMS) & ~t_mode;
-+		if (denied_mask & AA_EXEC_BITS)
-+			denied_mask |= l_mode & AA_ALL_EXEC_MODS;
-+		else if (l_mode & AA_EXEC_BITS) {
-+			if (l_mode & AA_USER_EXEC &&
-+			    (l_mode & AA_USER_EXEC_MODS) !=
-+			    (t_mode & AA_USER_EXEC_MODS))
-+				denied_mask |= AA_USER_EXEC |
-+					(l_mode & AA_USER_EXEC_MODS);
-+			if (l_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC &&
-+			    (l_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS) !=
-+			    (t_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS))
-+				denied_mask |= AA_OTHER_EXEC |
-+					(l_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC_MODS);
-+		}
-+	} else
-+		denied_mask |= t_mode | link_mask;
-+#undef SUBSET_PERMS
- 
- 	return denied_mask;
- }
-@@ -173,7 +194,7 @@ static int aa_perm_dentry(struct aa_prof
- 	char *buffer = NULL;
- 
- 	sa->name = aa_get_name(dentry, mnt, &buffer, check);
--
-+	sa->request_mask <<= aa_inode_mode(dentry->d_inode);
- 	if (IS_ERR(sa->name)) {
- 		/*
- 		 * deleted files are given a pass on permission checks when
-@@ -182,13 +203,13 @@ static int aa_perm_dentry(struct aa_prof
- 		if (PTR_ERR(sa->name) == -ENOENT && (check & AA_CHECK_FD))
- 			sa->denied_mask = 0;
- 		else {
--			sa->denied_mask = sa->requested_mask;
-+			sa->denied_mask = sa->request_mask;
- 			sa->error_code = PTR_ERR(sa->name);
- 		}
- 		sa->name = NULL;
- 	} else
- 		sa->denied_mask = aa_file_denied(profile, sa->name,
--						 sa->requested_mask);
-+						 sa->request_mask);
- 
- 	if (!sa->denied_mask)
- 		sa->error_code = 0;
-@@ -229,10 +250,10 @@ void free_default_namespace(void)
- 	default_namespace = NULL;
- }
- 
--static void aa_audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *name,
--			       int mask)
-+static void aa_audit_file_sub_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *buffer,
-+				   int mask)
- {
--	char mask_str[10], *m = mask_str;
-+	char *m = buffer;
- 
- 	if (mask & AA_EXEC_MMAP)
- 		*m++ = 'm';
-@@ -242,32 +263,58 @@ static void aa_audit_file_mask(struct au
- 		*m++ = 'w';
- 	else if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
- 		*m++ = 'a';
--	if (mask & (MAY_EXEC | AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS)) {
-+	if (mask & MAY_EXEC) {
- 		if (mask & AA_EXEC_UNSAFE) {
--			if (mask & AA_EXEC_INHERIT)
--				*m++ = 'i';
--			if (mask & AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED)
-+			switch(mask & AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS) {
-+			case AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED:
- 				*m++ = 'u';
--			if (mask & AA_EXEC_PROFILE)
-+				break;
-+			case AA_EXEC_PIX:
-+				*m++ = 'p';
-+				/* fall through */
-+			case AA_EXEC_INHERIT:
-+				*m++ = 'i';
-+				break;
-+			case AA_EXEC_PROFILE:
- 				*m++ = 'p';
-+				break;
-+			}
- 		} else {
--			if (mask & AA_EXEC_INHERIT)
--				*m++ = 'I';
--			if (mask & AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED)
-+			switch(mask & AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS) {
-+			case AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED:
- 				*m++ = 'U';
--			if (mask & AA_EXEC_PROFILE)
-+				break;
-+			case AA_EXEC_PIX:
- 				*m++ = 'P';
-+				/* fall through */
-+			case AA_EXEC_INHERIT:
-+				*m++ = 'I';
-+				break;
-+			case AA_EXEC_PROFILE:
-+				*m++ = 'P';
-+				break;
-+			}
- 		}
--		if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
--			*m++ = 'x';
-+		*m++ = 'x';
- 	}
- 	if (mask & AA_MAY_LINK)
- 		*m++ = 'l';
- 	if (mask & AA_MAY_LOCK)
- 		*m++ = 'k';
- 	*m++ = '\0';
-+}
-+
-+static void aa_audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *name,
-+			       int mask)
-+{
-+	char user[10], other[10];
- 
--	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"%s\"", name, mask_str);
-+	aa_audit_file_sub_mask(ab, user,
-+			       (mask & AA_USER_PERMS) >> AA_USER_SHIFT);
-+	aa_audit_file_sub_mask(ab, other,
-+			       (mask & AA_OTHER_PERMS) >> AA_OTHER_SHIFT);
-+
-+	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"%s::%s\"", name, user, other);
- }
- 
- static const char *address_families[] = {
-@@ -316,8 +363,8 @@ static int aa_audit_base(struct aa_profi
- 	if (sa->info)
- 		audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", sa->info);
- 
--	if (sa->requested_mask)
--		aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "requested_mask", sa->requested_mask);
-+	if (sa->request_mask)
-+		aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "request_mask", sa->request_mask);
- 
- 	if (sa->denied_mask)
- 		aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "denied_mask", sa->denied_mask);
-@@ -472,7 +519,7 @@ int aa_attr(struct aa_profile *profile, 
- 	sa.operation = "setattr";
- 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
- 	sa.iattr = iattr;
--	sa.requested_mask = MAY_WRITE;
-+	sa.request_mask = MAY_WRITE;
- 	sa.error_code = -EACCES;
- 
- 	check = 0;
-@@ -506,7 +553,7 @@ int aa_perm_xattr(struct aa_profile *pro
- 	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- 	sa.operation = operation;
- 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
--	sa.requested_mask = mask;
-+	sa.request_mask = mask;
- 	sa.error_code = -EACCES;
- 
- 	if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
-@@ -540,7 +587,7 @@ int aa_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, 
- 	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- 	sa.operation = operation;
- 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
--	sa.requested_mask = mask;
-+	sa.request_mask = mask;
- 	sa.error_code = -EACCES;
- 
- 	error = aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, check);
-@@ -569,24 +616,28 @@ int aa_perm_dir(struct aa_profile *profi
- 	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- 	sa.operation = operation;
- 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
--	sa.requested_mask = mask;
-+	sa.request_mask = mask;
- 	sa.error_code = -EACCES;
- 
- 	return aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, AA_CHECK_DIR);
- }
- 
- int aa_perm_path(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
--		 const char *name, int mask)
-+		 const char *name, int mask, uid_t uid)
- {
- 	struct aa_audit sa;
- 
- 	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- 	sa.operation = operation;
- 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
--	sa.requested_mask = mask;
-+	sa.request_mask = mask;
- 	sa.name = name;
-+	if (current->fsuid == uid)
-+		sa.request_mask = mask << AA_USER_SHIFT;
-+	else
-+		sa.request_mask = mask << AA_OTHER_SHIFT;
- 
--	sa.denied_mask = aa_file_denied(profile, name, mask);
-+	sa.denied_mask = aa_file_denied(profile, name, sa.request_mask) ;
- 	sa.error_code = sa.denied_mask ? -EACCES : 0;
- 
- 	return aa_audit(profile, &sa);
-@@ -672,9 +723,10 @@ int aa_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
- 	}
- 
- 	if (sa.name && sa.name2) {
--		sa.requested_mask = AA_MAY_LINK;
-+		sa.request_mask = AA_MAY_LINK;
- 		sa.denied_mask = aa_link_denied(profile, sa.name, sa.name2,
--						&sa.requested_mask);
-+						aa_inode_mode(target->d_inode),
-+						&sa.request_mask);
- 		sa.error_code = sa.denied_mask ? -EACCES : 0;
- 	}
- 
-@@ -818,7 +870,7 @@ aa_register_find(struct aa_profile *prof
- 			 __FUNCTION__, new_profile->name);
- 	} else if (mandatory && profile) {
- 		sa->info = "mandatory profile missing";
--		sa->denied_mask = MAY_EXEC;
-+		sa->denied_mask = sa->request_mask;	/* shifted MAY_EXEC */
- 		if (complain) {
- 			aa_audit_hint(profile, sa);
- 			new_profile =
-@@ -829,7 +881,7 @@ aa_register_find(struct aa_profile *prof
- 		}
- 	} else {
- 		/* Only way we can get into this code is if task
--		 * is unconfined.
-+		 * is unconfined, or pix.
- 		 */
- 		AA_DEBUG("%s: No profile found for exec image '%s'\n",
- 			 __FUNCTION__,
-@@ -851,7 +903,7 @@ int aa_register(struct linux_binprm *bpr
- 	char  *buffer = NULL;
- 	struct file *filp = bprm->file;
- 	struct aa_profile *profile, *old_profile, *new_profile = NULL;
--	int exec_mode = AA_EXEC_UNSAFE, complain = 0;
-+	int exec_mode, complain = 0, shift;
- 	struct aa_audit sa;
- 
- 	AA_DEBUG("%s\n", __FUNCTION__);
-@@ -862,11 +914,14 @@ int aa_register(struct linux_binprm *bpr
- 		return -ENOENT;
- 	}
- 
-+	shift = aa_inode_mode(filp->f_dentry->d_inode);
-+	exec_mode = AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << shift;
-+
- 	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- 	sa.operation = "exec";
- 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
- 	sa.name = filename;
--	sa.requested_mask = MAY_EXEC;
-+	sa.request_mask = MAY_EXEC << shift;
- 
- repeat:
- 	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
-@@ -878,16 +933,16 @@ repeat:
- 		 */
- 		exec_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, filename);
- 
--		if (exec_mode & (MAY_EXEC | AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS)) {
--			switch (exec_mode & (MAY_EXEC | AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS)) {
--			case MAY_EXEC | AA_EXEC_INHERIT:
-+		if (exec_mode & sa.request_mask) {
-+			switch ((exec_mode >> shift) & AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS) {
-+			case AA_EXEC_INHERIT:
- 				AA_DEBUG("%s: INHERIT %s\n",
- 					 __FUNCTION__,
- 					 filename);
- 				/* nothing to be done here */
- 				goto cleanup;
- 
--			case MAY_EXEC | AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED:
-+			case AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED:
- 				AA_DEBUG("%s: UNCONFINED %s\n",
- 					 __FUNCTION__,
- 					 filename);
-@@ -896,7 +951,7 @@ repeat:
- 				new_profile = NULL;
- 				break;
- 
--			case MAY_EXEC | AA_EXEC_PROFILE:
-+			case AA_EXEC_PROFILE:
- 				AA_DEBUG("%s: PROFILE %s\n",
- 					 __FUNCTION__,
- 					 filename);
-@@ -905,6 +960,18 @@ repeat:
- 							       1, complain,
- 							       &sa);
- 				break;
-+			case AA_EXEC_PIX:
-+				AA_DEBUG("%s: PROFILE %s\n",
-+					 __FUNCTION__,
-+					 filename);
-+				new_profile = aa_register_find(profile,
-+							       filename,
-+							       0, complain,
-+							       &sa);
-+				if (!new_profile)
-+					/* inherit - nothing to be done here */
-+					goto cleanup;
-+				break;
- 			}
- 
- 		} else if (complain) {
-@@ -914,9 +981,9 @@ repeat:
- 			 */
- 			new_profile =
- 			    aa_dup_profile(profile->ns->null_complain_profile);
--			exec_mode |= AA_EXEC_UNSAFE;
-+			exec_mode |= AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << shift;
- 		} else {
--			sa.denied_mask = MAY_EXEC;
-+			sa.denied_mask = sa.request_mask;
- 			aa_audit_reject(profile, &sa);
- 			new_profile = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
- 		}
-@@ -937,7 +1004,7 @@ repeat:
- 		if (PTR_ERR(old_profile) == -ESTALE)
- 			goto repeat;
- 		if (PTR_ERR(old_profile) == -EPERM) {
--			sa.denied_mask = MAY_EXEC;
-+			sa.denied_mask = sa.request_mask;
- 			sa.info = "unable to set profile due to ptrace";
- 			sa.task = current->parent->pid;
- 			aa_audit_reject(profile, &sa);
-@@ -957,7 +1024,7 @@ repeat:
- 	 * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec
- 	 * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec")
- 	 */
--	if (!(exec_mode & AA_EXEC_UNSAFE)) {
-+	if (!(exec_mode & (AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << shift))) {
- 		unsigned long bprm_flags;
- 
- 		bprm_flags = AA_SECURE_EXEC_NEEDED;
-@@ -967,7 +1034,7 @@ repeat:
- 
- 	if (complain && new_profile &&
- 	    new_profile == new_profile->ns->null_complain_profile) {
--		sa.requested_mask = 0;
-+		sa.request_mask = 0;
- 		sa.name = NULL;
- 		sa.info = "set profile";
- 		aa_audit_hint(new_profile, &sa);
---- a/security/apparmor/match.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
-@@ -175,14 +175,8 @@ int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
- 	for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
- 		int mode = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[i];
- 
--		if (mode & ~AA_VALID_PERM_MASK)
-+		if (mode & ~AA_VALID_PERM_MASK) {
- 			goto out;
--
--		/* if MAY_EXEC, exactly one exec modifier must be set */
--		if (mode & MAY_EXEC) {
--			mode &= AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS;
--			if (mode & (mode - 1))
--				goto out;
- 		}
- 	}
- 
---- a/security/apparmor/module_interface.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/module_interface.c
-@@ -349,7 +349,8 @@ fail:
- 	sa.operation = operation;
- 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
- 	sa.name = profile && profile->name ? profile->name : "unknown";
--	sa.info = "failed to unpack profile";
-+	if (!sa.info)
-+		sa.info = "failed to unpack profile";
- 	aa_audit_status(NULL, &sa);
- 
- 	if (profile)

kernel-patches/for-mainline/parent-permission.diff

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Allow permission functions to tell between parent and leaf checks
-
-Set the LOOKUP_CONTINUE flag when checking parent permissions. This allows
-permission functions to tell between parent and leaf checks.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c |    2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -1508,6 +1508,8 @@ static inline int may_create(struct inod
- 		return -EEXIST;
- 	if (IS_DEADDIR(dir))
- 		return -ENOENT;
-+	if (nd)
-+		nd->flags |= LOOKUP_CONTINUE;
- 	return permission(dir,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC, nd);
- }
- 

kernel-patches/for-mainline/proc-mounts-check-d_path-result.diff

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Filter out disconnected paths from /proc/mounts
-
-Use d_path() instead of seq_path when generating /proc/mounts and
-/proc/$id/mountstats, reuse the same buffer for all mounts, and filter out
-disconnected paths.
-
-This path has no net effect in itself because d_path() so far doesn't
-distinguish sconnected and disconnected paths yet. The next patch fixes that
-though; without this patch, the next patch would break /proc/mounts and
-/proc/$id/mountstats.
-
-There is some disagreement what /proc/mounts should include. Currently it
-reports all mounts from the current namespace and doesn't include lazy
-unmounts. This leads to ambiguities with the rootfs (which is an internal mount
-irrelevant to user-space except in the initrd), and in chroots.
-
-With this and the next patch, /proc/mounts only reports the mounts reachable
-for the current process, which makes a lot more sense IMO.  If the current
-process is rooted in the namespace root (which it usually is), it will see all
-mounts except for the rootfs.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namespace.c |   23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
- fs/proc/base.c |   10 +++++++++-
- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/namespace.c
-+++ b/fs/namespace.c
-@@ -348,8 +348,16 @@ static inline void mangle(struct seq_fil
- 	seq_escape(m, s, " \t\n\\");
- }
- 
-+/* Keep in sync with fs/proc/base.c! */
-+struct proc_mounts {
-+	struct seq_file m;
-+	void *page;
-+	int event;
-+};
-+
- static int show_vfsmnt(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
- {
-+	void *page = container_of(m, struct proc_mounts, m)->page;
- 	struct vfsmount *mnt = v;
- 	int err = 0;
- 	static struct proc_fs_info {
-@@ -371,10 +379,15 @@ static int show_vfsmnt(struct seq_file *
- 		{ 0, NULL }
- 	};
- 	struct proc_fs_info *fs_infop;
-+	char *path;
-+
-+	path = d_path(mnt->mnt_root, mnt, page, PAGE_SIZE);
-+	if (IS_ERR(path) || *path != '/')
-+		return err;
- 
- 	mangle(m, mnt->mnt_devname ? mnt->mnt_devname : "none");
- 	seq_putc(m, ' ');
--	seq_path(m, mnt, mnt->mnt_root, " \t\n\\");
-+	mangle(m, path);
- 	seq_putc(m, ' ');
- 	mangle(m, mnt->mnt_sb->s_type->name);
- 	seq_puts(m, mnt->mnt_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY ? " ro" : " rw");
-@@ -401,8 +414,14 @@ struct seq_operations mounts_op = {
- 
- static int show_vfsstat(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
- {
-+	void *page = container_of(m, struct proc_mounts, m)->page;
- 	struct vfsmount *mnt = v;
- 	int err = 0;
-+	char *path;
-+
-+	path = d_path(mnt->mnt_root, mnt, page, PAGE_SIZE);
-+	if (IS_ERR(path) || *path != '/')
-+		return err; /* error or path unreachable from chroot */
- 
- 	/* device */
- 	if (mnt->mnt_devname) {
-@@ -413,7 +432,7 @@ static int show_vfsstat(struct seq_file 
- 
- 	/* mount point */
- 	seq_puts(m, " mounted on ");
--	seq_path(m, mnt, mnt->mnt_root, " \t\n\\");
-+	mangle(m, path);
- 	seq_putc(m, ' ');
- 
- 	/* file system type */
---- a/fs/proc/base.c
-+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
-@@ -354,8 +354,11 @@ static const struct inode_operations pro
- };
- 
- extern struct seq_operations mounts_op;
-+
-+/* Keep in sync with fs/namespace.c! */
- struct proc_mounts {
- 	struct seq_file m;
-+	void *page;
- 	int event;
- };
- 
-@@ -383,12 +386,16 @@ static int __mounts_open(struct inode *i
- 		p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct proc_mounts), GFP_KERNEL);
- 		if (p) {
- 			file->private_data = &p->m;
--			ret = seq_open(file, seq_ops);
-+			p->page = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-+			if (p->page)
-+				ret = seq_open(file, seq_ops);
- 			if (!ret) {
- 				p->m.private = ns;
- 				p->event = ns->event;
- 				return 0;
- 			}
-+			if (p->page)
-+				free_page((unsigned long)p->page);
- 			kfree(p);
- 		}
- 		put_mnt_ns(ns);
-@@ -407,6 +414,7 @@ static int mounts_release(struct inode *
- 		container_of(file->private_data, struct proc_mounts, m);
- 	struct mnt_namespace *ns = p->m.private;
- 
-+	free_page((unsigned long)p->page);
- 	put_mnt_ns(ns);
- 	return seq_release(inode, file);
- }

kernel-patches/for-mainline/proc-mounts-cleanup.diff

@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Remove duplicate proc code
-
-Remove some duplicate code in generating the contents of /proc/mounts and
-/proc/$pid/mountstats.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-
----
-
-This patch is optional, and does not affect the rest of this series.
-
- fs/proc/base.c |   45 +++++++++++++++------------------------------
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/proc/base.c
-+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
-@@ -359,7 +359,8 @@ struct proc_mounts {
- 	int event;
- };
- 
--static int mounts_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-+static int __mounts_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
-+			 struct seq_operations *seq_ops)
- {
- 	struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
- 	struct mnt_namespace *ns = NULL;
-@@ -382,7 +383,7 @@ static int mounts_open(struct inode *ino
- 		p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct proc_mounts), GFP_KERNEL);
- 		if (p) {
- 			file->private_data = &p->m;
--			ret = seq_open(file, &mounts_op);
-+			ret = seq_open(file, seq_ops);
- 			if (!ret) {
- 				p->m.private = ns;
- 				p->event = ns->event;
-@@ -395,17 +396,25 @@ static int mounts_open(struct inode *ino
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-+static int mounts_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-+{
-+	return __mounts_open(inode, file, &mounts_op);
-+}
-+
- static int mounts_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
- {
--	struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
--	struct mnt_namespace *ns = m->private;
-+	struct proc_mounts *p =
-+		container_of(file->private_data, struct proc_mounts, m);
-+	struct mnt_namespace *ns = p->m.private;
-+
- 	put_mnt_ns(ns);
- 	return seq_release(inode, file);
- }
- 
- static unsigned mounts_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
- {
--	struct proc_mounts *p = file->private_data;
-+	struct proc_mounts *p =
-+		container_of(file->private_data, struct proc_mounts, m);
- 	struct mnt_namespace *ns = p->m.private;
- 	unsigned res = 0;
- 
-@@ -432,31 +441,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc
- extern struct seq_operations mountstats_op;
- static int mountstats_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
- {
--	int ret = seq_open(file, &mountstats_op);
--
--	if (!ret) {
--		struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
--		struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns = NULL;
--		struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
--
--		if (task) {
--			task_lock(task);
--			if (task->nsproxy)
--				mnt_ns = task->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
--			if (mnt_ns)
--				get_mnt_ns(mnt_ns);
--			task_unlock(task);
--			put_task_struct(task);
--		}
--
--		if (mnt_ns)
--			m->private = mnt_ns;
--		else {
--			seq_release(inode, file);
--			ret = -EINVAL;
--		}
--	}
--	return ret;
-+	return __mounts_open(inode, file, &mountstats_op);
- }
- 
- static const struct file_operations proc_mountstats_operations = {

kernel-patches/for-mainline/remove_suid.diff

@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct path down to remove_suid and children
-
-Required by a later patch that adds a struct vfsmount parameter to
-notify_change().
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
-
- fs/ntfs/file.c             |    2 +-
- fs/splice.c                |    4 ++--
- fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_lrw.c |    2 +-
- include/linux/fs.h         |    4 ++--
- mm/filemap.c               |   16 ++++++++--------
- mm/filemap_xip.c           |    2 +-
- mm/shmem.c                 |    2 +-
- 7 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/ntfs/file.c
-+++ b/fs/ntfs/file.c
-@@ -2120,7 +2120,7 @@ static ssize_t ntfs_file_aio_write_noloc
- 		goto out;
- 	if (!count)
- 		goto out;
--	err = remove_suid(file->f_path.dentry);
-+	err = remove_suid(&file->f_path);
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out;
- 	file_update_time(file);
---- a/fs/splice.c
-+++ b/fs/splice.c
-@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ generic_file_splice_write_nolock(struct 
- 	ssize_t ret;
- 	int err;
- 
--	err = remove_suid(out->f_path.dentry);
-+	err = remove_suid(&out->f_path);
- 	if (unlikely(err))
- 		return err;
- 
-@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ generic_file_splice_write(struct pipe_in
- 		if (killpriv)
- 			err = security_inode_killpriv(out->f_path.dentry);
- 		if (!err && killsuid)
--			err = __remove_suid(out->f_path.dentry, killsuid);
-+			err = __remove_suid(&out->f_path, killsuid);
- 		mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
- 		if (err)
- 			return err;
---- a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_lrw.c
-+++ b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_lrw.c
-@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ start:
- 	     !capable(CAP_FSETID)) {
- 		error = xfs_write_clear_setuid(xip);
- 		if (likely(!error))
--			error = -remove_suid(file->f_path.dentry);
-+			error = -remove_suid(&file->f_path);
- 		if (unlikely(error)) {
- 			goto out_unlock_internal;
- 		}
---- a/include/linux/fs.h
-+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
-@@ -1766,9 +1766,9 @@ extern void __iget(struct inode * inode)
- extern void clear_inode(struct inode *);
- extern void destroy_inode(struct inode *);
- extern struct inode *new_inode(struct super_block *);
--extern int __remove_suid(struct dentry *, int);
-+extern int __remove_suid(struct path *, int);
- extern int should_remove_suid(struct dentry *);
--extern int remove_suid(struct dentry *);
-+extern int remove_suid(struct path *);
- 
- extern void __insert_inode_hash(struct inode *, unsigned long hashval);
- extern void remove_inode_hash(struct inode *);
---- a/mm/filemap.c
-+++ b/mm/filemap.c
-@@ -1610,26 +1610,26 @@ int should_remove_suid(struct dentry *de
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(should_remove_suid);
- 
--int __remove_suid(struct dentry *dentry, int kill)
-+int __remove_suid(struct path *path, int kill)
- {
- 	struct iattr newattrs;
- 
- 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
--	return notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
-+	return notify_change(path->dentry, &newattrs);
- }
- 
--int remove_suid(struct dentry *dentry)
-+int remove_suid(struct path *path)
- {
--	int killsuid = should_remove_suid(dentry);
--	int killpriv = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
-+	int killsuid = should_remove_suid(path->dentry);
-+	int killpriv = security_inode_need_killpriv(path->dentry);
- 	int error = 0;
- 
- 	if (killpriv < 0)
- 		return killpriv;
- 	if (killpriv)
--		error = security_inode_killpriv(dentry);
-+		error = security_inode_killpriv(path->dentry);
- 	if (!error && killsuid)
--		error = __remove_suid(dentry, killsuid);
-+		error = __remove_suid(path, killsuid);
- 
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -2342,7 +2342,7 @@ __generic_file_aio_write_nolock(struct k
- 	if (count == 0)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	err = remove_suid(file->f_path.dentry);
-+	err = remove_suid(&file->f_path);
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out;
- 
---- a/mm/filemap_xip.c
-+++ b/mm/filemap_xip.c
-@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ xip_file_write(struct file *filp, const 
- 	if (count == 0)
- 		goto out_backing;
- 
--	ret = remove_suid(filp->f_path.dentry);
-+	ret = remove_suid(&filp->f_path);
- 	if (ret)
- 		goto out_backing;
- 
---- a/mm/shmem.c
-+++ b/mm/shmem.c
-@@ -1525,7 +1525,7 @@ shmem_file_write(struct file *file, cons
- 	if (err || !count)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	err = remove_suid(file->f_path.dentry);
-+	err = remove_suid(&file->f_path);
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out;
- 

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-create.diff

@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c               |    2 +-
- include/linux/security.h |    9 ++++++---
- security/dummy.c         |    2 +-
- security/security.c      |    5 +++--
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    3 ++-
- 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c	2007-11-02 17:44:43.000000000 -0400
-+++ b/fs/namei.c	2007-11-02 17:49:23.000000000 -0400
-@@ -1583,7 +1583,7 @@ int vfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct
- 		return -EACCES;	/* shouldn't it be ENOSYS? */
- 	mode &= S_IALLUGO;
- 	mode |= S_IFREG;
--	error = security_inode_create(dir, dentry, mode);
-+	error = security_inode_create(dir, dentry, nd ? nd->mnt : NULL, mode);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 	DQUOT_INIT(dir);
---- a/include/linux/security.h	2007-11-02 17:44:43.000000000 -0400
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h	2007-11-02 17:49:39.000000000 -0400
-@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ struct request_sock;
-  *	Check permission to create a regular file.
-  *	@dir contains inode structure of the parent of the new file.
-  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file to be created.
-+ *	@mnt is the vfsmount corresponding to @dentry (may be NULL).
-  *	@mode contains the file mode of the file to be created.
-  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_link:
-@@ -1247,8 +1248,8 @@ struct security_operations {
- 	void (*inode_free_security) (struct inode *inode);
- 	int (*inode_init_security) (struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- 				    char **name, void **value, size_t *len);
--	int (*inode_create) (struct inode *dir,
--	                     struct dentry *dentry, int mode);
-+	int (*inode_create) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			     struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode);
- 	int (*inode_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry,
- 	                   struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
- 	int (*inode_unlink) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-@@ -1503,7 +1504,8 @@ int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *i
- void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
- int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- 				  char **name, void **value, size_t *len);
--int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode);
-+int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			  struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode);
- int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
- 			 struct dentry *new_dentry);
- int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-@@ -1813,6 +1815,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_init_se
- 	
- static inline int security_inode_create (struct inode *dir,
- 					 struct dentry *dentry,
-+					 struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 					 int mode)
- {
- 	return 0;
---- a/security/dummy.c	2007-11-02 17:44:43.000000000 -0400
-+++ b/security/dummy.c	2007-11-02 17:49:23.000000000 -0400
-@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static int dummy_inode_init_security (st
- }
- 
- static int dummy_inode_create (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
--			       int mask)
-+			       struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/security.c	2007-11-02 17:46:44.000000000 -0400
-+++ b/security/security.c	2007-11-02 17:49:23.000000000 -0400
-@@ -329,11 +329,12 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct 
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
- 
--int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
-+int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			  struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_create(dir, dentry, mode);
-+	return security_ops->inode_create(dir, dentry, mnt, mode);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c	2007-11-02 17:44:43.000000000 -0400
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c	2007-11-02 17:49:23.000000000 -0400
-@@ -2184,7 +2184,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(s
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
-+static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+				 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask)
- {
- 	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
- }

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-getxattr.diff

@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_getxattr LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/xattr.c               |    2 +-
- include/linux/security.h |   11 +++++++----
- security/dummy.c         |    3 ++-
- security/security.c      |    5 +++--
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    3 ++-
- 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/xattr.c
-+++ b/fs/xattr.c
-@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, stru
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
--	error = security_inode_getxattr(dentry, name);
-+	error = security_inode_getxattr(dentry, mnt, name);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ struct request_sock;
-  * 	@value identified by @name for @dentry and @mnt.
-  * @inode_getxattr:
-  * 	Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes
-- * 	identified by @name for @dentry.
-+ * 	identified by @name for @dentry and @mnt.
-  * 	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_listxattr:
-  * 	Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute 
-@@ -1291,7 +1291,8 @@ struct security_operations {
- 				     struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 				     char *name, void *value,
- 				     size_t size, int flags);
--	int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
-+	int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			       char *name);
- 	int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry);
- 	int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
- 	int (*inode_need_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry);
-@@ -1554,7 +1555,8 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentr
- void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 				  char *name, void *value, size_t size,
- 				  int flags);
--int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
-+int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			    char *name);
- int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry);
- int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
- int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
-@@ -1954,7 +1956,8 @@ static inline void security_inode_post_s
- 						 int flags)
- { }
- 
--static inline int security_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
-+static inline int security_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,
-+					    struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -365,7 +365,8 @@ static void dummy_inode_post_setxattr (s
- {
- }
- 
--static int dummy_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
-+static int dummy_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,
-+			          struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -458,11 +458,12 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct
- 	security_ops->inode_post_setxattr(dentry, mnt, name, value, size, flags);
- }
- 
--int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
-+int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			    char *name)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_getxattr(dentry, name);
-+	return security_ops->inode_getxattr(dentry, mnt, name);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2409,7 +2409,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(
- 	return;
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
-+static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				   char *name)
- {
- 	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
- }

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-link.diff

@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass the struct vfsmounts to the inode_link LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c               |    3 ++-
- include/linux/security.h |   16 +++++++++++-----
- security/dummy.c         |    6 ++++--
- security/security.c      |    8 +++++---
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    9 +++++++--
- 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -2356,7 +2356,8 @@ int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, 
- 	if (S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
- 		return -EPERM;
- 
--	error = security_inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
-+	error = security_inode_link(old_dentry, old_mnt, dir, new_dentry,
-+				    new_mnt);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -303,8 +303,10 @@ struct request_sock;
-  * @inode_link:
-  *	Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
-  *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link to the file.
-+ *	@old_mnt is the vfsmount corresponding to @old_dentry (may be NULL).
-  *	@dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory of the new link.
-  *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
-+ *	@new_mnt is the vfsmount corresponding to @new_dentry (may be NULL).
-  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_unlink:
-  *	Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 
-@@ -1255,8 +1257,9 @@ struct security_operations {
- 				    char **name, void **value, size_t *len);
- 	int (*inode_create) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			     struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode);
--	int (*inode_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry,
--	                   struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
-+	int (*inode_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
-+	                   struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+			   struct vfsmount *new_mnt);
- 	int (*inode_unlink) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
- 	int (*inode_symlink) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			      struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *old_name);
-@@ -1513,8 +1516,9 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct 
- 				  char **name, void **value, size_t *len);
- int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			  struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode);
--int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
--			 struct dentry *new_dentry);
-+int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
-+			struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+			struct vfsmount *new_mnt);
- int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
- int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			   struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *old_name);
-@@ -1832,8 +1836,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_create 
- }
- 
- static inline int security_inode_link (struct dentry *old_dentry,
-+				       struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
- 				       struct inode *dir,
--				       struct dentry *new_dentry)
-+				       struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+				       struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -267,8 +267,10 @@ static int dummy_inode_create (struct in
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int dummy_inode_link (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode,
--			     struct dentry *new_dentry)
-+static int dummy_inode_link (struct dentry *old_dentry,
-+			     struct vfsmount *old_mnt, struct inode *inode,
-+			     struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+			     struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -336,12 +336,14 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *
- 	return security_ops->inode_create(dir, dentry, mnt, mode);
- }
- 
--int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
--			 struct dentry *new_dentry)
-+int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
-+			struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+			struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
-+	return security_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, old_mnt, dir,
-+					 new_dentry, new_mnt);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2190,11 +2190,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_create(struct i
- 	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
-+static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry,
-+			      struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
-+			      struct inode *dir,
-+			      struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+			      struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
- {
- 	int rc;
- 
--	rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
-+	rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, old_mnt, dir, new_dentry,
-+				       new_mnt);
- 	if (rc)
- 		return rc;
- 	return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-listxattr.diff

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_listxattr LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/xattr.c               |    2 +-
- include/linux/security.h |    9 +++++----
- security/dummy.c         |    2 +-
- security/security.c      |    4 ++--
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    2 +-
- 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/xattr.c
-+++ b/fs/xattr.c
-@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, str
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	ssize_t error;
- 
--	error = security_inode_listxattr(dentry);
-+	error = security_inode_listxattr(dentry, mnt);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 	error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ struct request_sock;
-  * 	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_listxattr:
-  * 	Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute 
-- * 	names for @dentry.
-+ * 	names for @dentry and @mnt.
-  * 	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_removexattr:
-  * 	Check permission before removing the extended attribute
-@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ struct security_operations {
- 				     size_t size, int flags);
- 	int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 			       char *name);
--	int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry);
-+	int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
- 	int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
- 	int (*inode_need_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry);
- 	int (*inode_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry);
-@@ -1557,7 +1557,7 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct
- 				  int flags);
- int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 			    char *name);
--int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry);
-+int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
- int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
- int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
- int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
-@@ -1962,7 +1962,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_getxatt
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static inline int security_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
-+static inline int security_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry,
-+					    struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static int dummy_inode_getxattr (struct 
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int dummy_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
-+static int dummy_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -466,11 +466,11 @@ int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentr
- 	return security_ops->inode_getxattr(dentry, mnt, name);
- }
- 
--int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
-+int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_listxattr(dentry);
-+	return security_ops->inode_listxattr(dentry, mnt);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2415,7 +2415,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struc
- 	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
-+static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
- }

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-mkdir.diff

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_mkdir LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c               |    2 +-
- include/linux/security.h |    8 ++++++--
- security/dummy.c         |    2 +-
- security/security.c      |    5 +++--
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    3 ++-
- 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -2009,7 +2009,7 @@ int vfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct 
- 		return -EPERM;
- 
- 	mode &= (S_IRWXUGO|S_ISVTX);
--	error = security_inode_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
-+	error = security_inode_mkdir(dir, dentry, mnt, mode);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ struct request_sock;
-  *	associated with inode strcture @dir. 
-  *	@dir containst the inode structure of parent of the directory to be created.
-  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
-+ *	@mnt is the vfsmount corresponding to @dentry (may be NULL).
-  *	@mode contains the mode of new directory.
-  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_rmdir:
-@@ -1256,7 +1257,8 @@ struct security_operations {
- 	int (*inode_unlink) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
- 	int (*inode_symlink) (struct inode *dir,
- 	                      struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name);
--	int (*inode_mkdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode);
-+	int (*inode_mkdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			    struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode);
- 	int (*inode_rmdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
- 	int (*inode_mknod) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 	                    int mode, dev_t dev);
-@@ -1513,7 +1515,8 @@ int security_inode_link(struct dentry *o
- int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
- int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			    const char *old_name);
--int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode);
-+int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode);
- int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
- int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev);
- int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
-@@ -1846,6 +1849,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_symlink
- 
- static inline int security_inode_mkdir (struct inode *dir,
- 					struct dentry *dentry,
-+					struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 					int mode)
- {
- 	return 0;
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static int dummy_inode_symlink (struct i
- }
- 
- static int dummy_inode_mkdir (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
--			      int mask)
-+			      struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -359,11 +359,12 @@ int security_inode_symlink(struct inode 
- 	return security_ops->inode_symlink(dir, dentry, old_name);
- }
- 
--int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
-+int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
-+	return security_ops->inode_mkdir(dir, dentry, mnt, mode);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2215,7 +2215,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct 
- 	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
-+static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			       struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask)
- {
- 	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
- }

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-mknod.diff

@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_mknod LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c               |    2 +-
- include/linux/security.h |    7 +++++--
- security/dummy.c         |    2 +-
- security/security.c      |    5 +++--
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    5 +++--
- 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -1932,7 +1932,7 @@ int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct 
- 	if (!dir->i_op || !dir->i_op->mknod)
- 		return -EPERM;
- 
--	error = security_inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
-+	error = security_inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mnt, mode, dev);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@ struct request_sock;
-  *	and not this hook.
-  *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent of the new file.
-  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file.
-+ *	@mnt is the vfsmount corresponding to @dentry (may be NULL).
-  *	@mode contains the mode of the new file.
-  *	@dev contains the device number.
-  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-@@ -1261,7 +1262,7 @@ struct security_operations {
- 			    struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode);
- 	int (*inode_rmdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
- 	int (*inode_mknod) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
--	                    int mode, dev_t dev);
-+			    struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev);
- 	int (*inode_rename) (struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- 	                     struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
- 	int (*inode_readlink) (struct dentry *dentry);
-@@ -1518,7 +1519,8 @@ int security_inode_symlink(struct inode 
- int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode);
- int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
--int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev);
-+int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev);
- int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- 			   struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
- int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry);
-@@ -1863,6 +1865,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_rmdir (
- 
- static inline int security_inode_mknod (struct inode *dir,
- 					struct dentry *dentry,
-+					struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 					int mode, dev_t dev)
- {
- 	return 0;
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static int dummy_inode_rmdir (struct ino
- }
- 
- static int dummy_inode_mknod (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
--			      int mode, dev_t dev)
-+			      struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -374,11 +374,12 @@ int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *d
- 	return security_ops->inode_rmdir(dir, dentry);
- }
- 
--int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
-+int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
-+	return security_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mnt, mode, dev);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2226,11 +2226,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct in
- 	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
-+static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			       struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev)
- {
- 	int rc;
- 
--	rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
-+	rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mnt, mode, dev);
- 	if (rc)
- 		return rc;
- 

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-readlink.diff

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_readlink LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/stat.c                |    2 +-
- include/linux/security.h |    8 +++++---
- security/dummy.c         |    2 +-
- security/security.c      |    4 ++--
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    2 +-
- 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/stat.c
-+++ b/fs/stat.c
-@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_readlinkat(int dfd, 
- 
- 		error = -EINVAL;
- 		if (inode->i_op && inode->i_op->readlink) {
--			error = security_inode_readlink(nd.dentry);
-+			error = security_inode_readlink(nd.dentry, nd.mnt);
- 			if (!error) {
- 				touch_atime(nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
- 				error = inode->i_op->readlink(nd.dentry, buf, bufsiz);
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ struct request_sock;
-  * @inode_readlink:
-  *	Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
-  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link.
-+ *	@mnt is the vfsmount corresponding to @dentry (may be NULL).
-  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_follow_link:
-  *	Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname.
-@@ -1266,7 +1267,7 @@ struct security_operations {
- 			    struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev);
- 	int (*inode_rename) (struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- 	                     struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
--	int (*inode_readlink) (struct dentry *dentry);
-+	int (*inode_readlink) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
- 	int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd);
- 	int (*inode_permission) (struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd);
- 	int (*inode_setattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-@@ -1524,7 +1525,7 @@ int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *d
- 			 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev);
- int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- 			   struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
--int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry);
-+int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
- int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd);
- int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd);
- int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-@@ -1881,7 +1882,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_rename 
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static inline int security_inode_readlink (struct dentry *dentry)
-+static inline int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry,
-+					   struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ static int dummy_inode_rename (struct in
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int dummy_inode_readlink (struct dentry *dentry)
-+static int dummy_inode_readlink (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -392,11 +392,11 @@ int security_inode_rename(struct inode *
- 					   new_dir, new_dentry);
- }
- 
--int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
-+int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_readlink(dentry);
-+	return security_ops->inode_readlink(dentry, mnt);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2245,7 +2245,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_rename(struct i
- 	return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
-+static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
- }

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-removexattr.diff

@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_removexattr LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/xattr.c               |    2 +-
- include/linux/security.h |   13 ++++++++-----
- security/commoncap.c     |    3 ++-
- security/dummy.c         |    3 ++-
- security/security.c      |    5 +++--
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    3 ++-
- 6 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/xattr.c
-+++ b/fs/xattr.c
-@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, s
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
--	error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
-+	error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, mnt, name);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ extern int cap_bprm_set_security (struct
- extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
- extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
- extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags);
--extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
-+extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name);
- extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
- extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
- extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
-@@ -1294,7 +1294,8 @@ struct security_operations {
- 	int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 			       char *name);
- 	int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
--	int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
-+	int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				  char *name);
- 	int (*inode_need_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry);
- 	int (*inode_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry);
-   	int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
-@@ -1558,7 +1559,8 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct
- int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 			    char *name);
- int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
--int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
-+int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			       char *name);
- int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
- int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
- int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
-@@ -1968,9 +1970,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listxat
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
-+static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,
-+					      struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name)
- {
--	return cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
-+	return cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, mnt, name);
- }
- 
- static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
---- a/security/commoncap.c
-+++ b/security/commoncap.c
-@@ -382,7 +382,8 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *de
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
-+int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			  char *name)
- {
- 	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
- 		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -376,7 +376,8 @@ static int dummy_inode_listxattr (struct
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int dummy_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
-+static int dummy_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				    char *name)
- {
- 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
- 		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -473,11 +473,12 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dent
- 	return security_ops->inode_listxattr(dentry, mnt);
- }
- 
--int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
-+int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			       char *name)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
-+	return security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, mnt, name);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2420,7 +2420,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_listxattr (stru
- 	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
-+static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,
-+				      struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name)
- {
- 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
- 		return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-rename.diff

@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_rename LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c               |    6 ++++--
- include/linux/security.h |   13 ++++++++++---
- security/dummy.c         |    4 +++-
- security/security.c      |    7 ++++---
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    8 ++++++--
- 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -2480,7 +2480,8 @@ static int vfs_rename_dir(struct inode *
- 			return error;
- 	}
- 
--	error = security_inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
-+	error = security_inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, old_mnt,
-+				      new_dir, new_dentry, new_mnt);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
-@@ -2514,7 +2515,8 @@ static int vfs_rename_other(struct inode
- 	struct inode *target;
- 	int error;
- 
--	error = security_inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
-+	error = security_inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, old_mnt,
-+				      new_dir, new_dentry, new_mnt);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -350,8 +350,10 @@ struct request_sock;
-  *	Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
-  *	@old_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the old link.
-  *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
-+ *	@old_mnt is the vfsmount corresponding to @old_dentry (may be NULL).
-  *	@new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link.
-  *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
-+ *	@new_mnt is the vfsmount corresponding to @new_dentry (may be NULL).
-  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_readlink:
-  *	Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
-@@ -1273,7 +1275,9 @@ struct security_operations {
- 	int (*inode_mknod) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			    struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev);
- 	int (*inode_rename) (struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
--	                     struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
-+			     struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
-+	                     struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+			     struct vfsmount *new_mnt);
- 	int (*inode_readlink) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
- 	int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd);
- 	int (*inode_permission) (struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd);
-@@ -1534,7 +1538,8 @@ int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *d
- int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev);
- int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
--			   struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
-+			  struct vfsmount *old_mnt, struct inode *new_dir,
-+			  struct dentry *new_dentry, struct vfsmount *new_mnt);
- int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
- int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd);
- int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd);
-@@ -1890,8 +1895,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_mknod (
- 
- static inline int security_inode_rename (struct inode *old_dir,
- 					 struct dentry *old_dentry,
-+					 struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
- 					 struct inode *new_dir,
--					 struct dentry *new_dentry)
-+					 struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+					 struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -307,8 +307,10 @@ static int dummy_inode_mknod (struct ino
- 
- static int dummy_inode_rename (struct inode *old_inode,
- 			       struct dentry *old_dentry,
-+			       struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
- 			       struct inode *new_inode,
--			       struct dentry *new_dentry)
-+			       struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+			       struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -387,13 +387,14 @@ int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *d
- }
- 
- int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
--			   struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
-+			  struct vfsmount *old_mnt, struct inode *new_dir,
-+			  struct dentry *new_dentry, struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
- {
-         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode) ||
-             (new_dentry->d_inode && IS_PRIVATE(new_dentry->d_inode))))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry,
--					   new_dir, new_dentry);
-+	return security_ops->inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, old_mnt,
-+					   new_dir, new_dentry, new_mnt);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2246,8 +2246,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct in
- 	return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
--                                struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
-+static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
-+				struct dentry *old_dentry,
-+				struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
-+                                struct inode *new_inode,
-+				struct dentry *new_dentry,
-+				struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
- {
- 	return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
- }

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-rmdir.diff

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_rmdir LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c               |    2 +-
- include/linux/security.h |   10 +++++++---
- security/dummy.c         |    3 ++-
- security/security.c      |    5 +++--
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    3 ++-
- 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -2104,7 +2104,7 @@ int vfs_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct 
- 	if (d_mountpoint(dentry))
- 		error = -EBUSY;
- 	else {
--		error = security_inode_rmdir(dir, dentry);
-+		error = security_inode_rmdir(dir, dentry, mnt);
- 		if (!error) {
- 			error = dir->i_op->rmdir(dir, dentry);
- 			if (!error)
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ struct request_sock;
-  *	Check the permission to remove a directory.
-  *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory to be removed.
-  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
-+ *	@mnt is the vfsmount corresponding to @dentry (may be NULL).
-  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_mknod:
-  *	Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo
-@@ -1265,7 +1266,8 @@ struct security_operations {
- 			      struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *old_name);
- 	int (*inode_mkdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			    struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode);
--	int (*inode_rmdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-+	int (*inode_rmdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			    struct vfsmount *mnt);
- 	int (*inode_mknod) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			    struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev);
- 	int (*inode_rename) (struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
-@@ -1524,7 +1526,8 @@ int security_inode_symlink(struct inode 
- 			   struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *old_name);
- int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode);
--int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-+int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			 struct vfsmount *mnt);
- int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode, dev_t dev);
- int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
-@@ -1867,7 +1870,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_mkdir (
- }
- 
- static inline int security_inode_rmdir (struct inode *dir,
--					struct dentry *dentry)
-+					struct dentry *dentry,
-+					struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -292,7 +292,8 @@ static int dummy_inode_mkdir (struct ino
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int dummy_inode_rmdir (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
-+static int dummy_inode_rmdir (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			      struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -369,11 +369,12 @@ int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *d
- 	return security_ops->inode_mkdir(dir, dentry, mnt, mode);
- }
- 
--int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
-+int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			 struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_rmdir(dir, dentry);
-+	return security_ops->inode_rmdir(dir, dentry, mnt);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2227,7 +2227,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct in
- 	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
-+static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			       struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
- }

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-setattr.diff

@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_setattr LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/attr.c                |    4 ++--
- include/linux/security.h |    8 ++++++--
- security/dummy.c         |    3 ++-
- security/security.c      |    5 +++--
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    5 +++--
- 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/attr.c
-+++ b/fs/attr.c
-@@ -159,13 +159,13 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry *dentry,
- 		down_write(&dentry->d_inode->i_alloc_sem);
- 
- 	if (inode->i_op && inode->i_op->setattr) {
--		error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
-+		error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, mnt, attr);
- 		if (!error)
- 			error = inode->i_op->setattr(dentry, attr);
- 	} else {
- 		error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
- 		if (!error)
--			error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
-+			error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, mnt, attr);
- 		if (!error) {
- 			if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID && attr->ia_uid != inode->i_uid) ||
- 			    (ia_valid & ATTR_GID && attr->ia_gid != inode->i_gid))
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ struct request_sock;
-  *	file attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod
-  *	operations, transferring disk quotas, etc).
-  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
-+ *	@mnt is the vfsmount corresponding to @dentry (may be NULL).
-  *	@attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes.
-  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_getattr:
-@@ -1264,7 +1265,8 @@ struct security_operations {
- 	int (*inode_readlink) (struct dentry *dentry);
- 	int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd);
- 	int (*inode_permission) (struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd);
--	int (*inode_setattr)	(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
-+	int (*inode_setattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			      struct iattr *attr);
- 	int (*inode_getattr) (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
-         void (*inode_delete) (struct inode *inode);
- 	int (*inode_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
-@@ -1519,7 +1521,8 @@ int security_inode_rename(struct inode *
- int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry);
- int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd);
- int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd);
--int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
-+int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			   struct iattr *attr);
- int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
- void security_inode_delete(struct inode *inode);
- int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
-@@ -1887,6 +1890,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_permiss
- }
- 
- static inline int security_inode_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,
-+					  struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 					  struct iattr *attr)
- {
- 	return 0;
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -325,7 +325,8 @@ static int dummy_inode_permission (struc
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int dummy_inode_setattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
-+static int dummy_inode_setattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				struct iattr *iattr)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -411,11 +411,12 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct ino
- 	return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
- }
- 
--int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
-+int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			   struct iattr *attr)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
-+	return security_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, mnt, attr);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2275,11 +2275,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(stru
- 			       file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
-+static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				 struct iattr *iattr)
- {
- 	int rc;
- 
--	rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
-+	rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, mnt, iattr);
- 	if (rc)
- 		return rc;
- 

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-setxattr.diff

@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_setxattr LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/xattr.c               |    4 ++--
- include/linux/security.h |   35 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------
- security/commoncap.c     |    4 ++--
- security/dummy.c         |    9 ++++++---
- security/security.c      |   14 ++++++++------
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    8 ++++++--
- 6 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/xattr.c
-+++ b/fs/xattr.c
-@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, stru
- 		return error;
- 
- 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
--	error = security_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
-+	error = security_inode_setxattr(dentry, mnt, name, value, size, flags);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto out;
- 	error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, stru
- 		error = inode->i_op->setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
- 		if (!error) {
- 			fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
--			security_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value,
-+			security_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, mnt, name, value,
- 						     size, flags);
- 		}
- 	} else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ extern void cap_capset_set (struct task_
- extern int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
- extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
- extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
--extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags);
-+extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags);
- extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
- extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
- extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
-@@ -398,11 +398,11 @@ struct request_sock;
-  *	inode.
-  * @inode_setxattr:
-  * 	Check permission before setting the extended attributes
-- * 	@value identified by @name for @dentry.
-+ * 	@value identified by @name for @dentry and @mnt.
-  * 	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_post_setxattr:
-  * 	Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation.
-- * 	@value identified by @name for @dentry.
-+ * 	@value identified by @name for @dentry and @mnt.
-  * @inode_getxattr:
-  * 	Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes
-  * 	identified by @name for @dentry.
-@@ -1285,9 +1285,11 @@ struct security_operations {
- 			      struct iattr *attr);
- 	int (*inode_getattr) (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
-         void (*inode_delete) (struct inode *inode);
--	int (*inode_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
--			       size_t size, int flags);
--	void (*inode_post_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
-+	int (*inode_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			       char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags);
-+	void (*inode_post_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry,
-+				     struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				     char *name, void *value,
- 				     size_t size, int flags);
- 	int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
- 	int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry);
-@@ -1547,10 +1549,11 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry
- 			   struct iattr *attr);
- int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
- void security_inode_delete(struct inode *inode);
--int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
--			     void *value, size_t size, int flags);
--void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
--				   void *value, size_t size, int flags);
-+int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			    char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags);
-+void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				  char *name, void *value, size_t size,
-+				  int flags);
- int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
- int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry);
- int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
-@@ -1937,14 +1940,18 @@ static inline int security_inode_getattr
- static inline void security_inode_delete (struct inode *inode)
- { }
- 
--static inline int security_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
-+static inline int security_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,
-+					   struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name,
- 					   void *value, size_t size, int flags)
- {
--	return cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
-+	return cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, mnt, name, value, size, flags);
- }
- 
--static inline void security_inode_post_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
--						 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-+static inline void security_inode_post_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,
-+						 struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+						 char *name,
-+						 void *value, size_t size,
-+						 int flags)
- { }
- 
- static inline int security_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
---- a/security/commoncap.c
-+++ b/security/commoncap.c
-@@ -368,8 +368,8 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_bi
- 		current->egid != current->gid);
- }
- 
--int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
--		       size_t size, int flags)
-+int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name,
-+		       void *value, size_t size, int flags)
- {
- 	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
- 		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -347,8 +347,9 @@ static void dummy_inode_delete (struct i
- 	return;
- }
- 
--static int dummy_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
--				size_t size, int flags)
-+static int dummy_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				 char *name, void *value, size_t size,
-+				 int flags)
- {
- 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
- 		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
-@@ -357,7 +358,9 @@ static int dummy_inode_setxattr (struct 
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static void dummy_inode_post_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
-+static void dummy_inode_post_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,
-+				       struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				       char *name, void *value,
- 				       size_t size, int flags)
- {
- }
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -440,20 +440,22 @@ void security_inode_delete(struct inode 
- 	security_ops->inode_delete(inode);
- }
- 
--int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
--			     void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-+int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			     char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
-+	return security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, mnt, name, value, size,
-+					    flags);
- }
- 
--void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
--				   void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-+void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				  char *name, void *value, size_t size,
-+				  int flags)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return;
--	security_ops->inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
-+	security_ops->inode_post_setxattr(dentry, mnt, name, value, size, flags);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2332,7 +2332,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(s
- 	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-+static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				  char *name, void *value, size_t size,
-+				  int flags)
- {
- 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-@@ -2381,7 +2383,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct
- 			    &ad);
- }
- 
--static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
-+static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-+					struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+					char *name,
-                                         void *value, size_t size, int flags)
- {
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-symlink.diff

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_symlink LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c               |    2 +-
- include/linux/security.h |    8 +++++---
- security/dummy.c         |    2 +-
- security/security.c      |    4 ++--
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    3 ++-
- 5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -2277,7 +2277,7 @@ int vfs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struc
- 	if (!dir->i_op || !dir->i_op->symlink)
- 		return -EPERM;
- 
--	error = security_inode_symlink(dir, dentry, oldname);
-+	error = security_inode_symlink(dir, dentry, mnt, oldname);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ struct request_sock;
-  *	Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
-  *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the symbolic link.
-  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
-+ *	@mnt is the vfsmount corresponding to @dentry (may be NULL).
-  *	@old_name contains the pathname of file.
-  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_mkdir:
-@@ -1256,8 +1257,8 @@ struct security_operations {
- 	int (*inode_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry,
- 	                   struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
- 	int (*inode_unlink) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
--	int (*inode_symlink) (struct inode *dir,
--	                      struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name);
-+	int (*inode_symlink) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			      struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *old_name);
- 	int (*inode_mkdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			    struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode);
- 	int (*inode_rmdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-@@ -1515,7 +1516,7 @@ int security_inode_link(struct dentry *o
- 			 struct dentry *new_dentry);
- int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
- int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
--			    const char *old_name);
-+			   struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *old_name);
- int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			 struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode);
- int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-@@ -1844,6 +1845,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_unlink 
- 
- static inline int security_inode_symlink (struct inode *dir,
- 					  struct dentry *dentry,
-+					  struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 					  const char *old_name)
- {
- 	return 0;
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static int dummy_inode_unlink (struct in
- }
- 
- static int dummy_inode_symlink (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
--				const char *name)
-+				struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *name)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -352,11 +352,11 @@ int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *
- }
- 
- int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
--			    const char *old_name)
-+			   struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *old_name)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_symlink(dir, dentry, old_name);
-+	return security_ops->inode_symlink(dir, dentry, mnt, old_name);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2210,7 +2210,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct i
- 	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
-+static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+				 struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *name)
- {
- 	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
- }

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-unlink.diff

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_unlink LSM hook
-
-This is needed for computing pathnames in the AppArmor LSM.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/namei.c               |    2 +-
- include/linux/security.h |   10 +++++++---
- security/dummy.c         |    3 ++-
- security/security.c      |    5 +++--
- security/selinux/hooks.c |    5 +++--
- 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -2184,7 +2184,7 @@ int vfs_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct
- 	if (d_mountpoint(dentry))
- 		error = -EBUSY;
- 	else {
--		error = security_inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
-+		error = security_inode_unlink(dir, dentry, mnt);
- 		if (!error)
- 			error = dir->i_op->unlink(dir, dentry);
- 	}
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -312,6 +312,7 @@ struct request_sock;
-  *	Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. 
-  *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the file.
-  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
-+ *	@mnt is the vfsmount corresponding to @dentry (may be NULL).
-  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_symlink:
-  *	Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
-@@ -1261,7 +1262,8 @@ struct security_operations {
- 	int (*inode_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
- 	                   struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
- 			   struct vfsmount *new_mnt);
--	int (*inode_unlink) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-+	int (*inode_unlink) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			     struct vfsmount *mnt);
- 	int (*inode_symlink) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			      struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *old_name);
- 	int (*inode_mkdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-@@ -1521,7 +1523,8 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *
- int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
- 			struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
- 			struct vfsmount *new_mnt);
--int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-+int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			  struct vfsmount *mnt);
- int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- 			   struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *old_name);
- int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-@@ -1848,7 +1851,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_link (s
- }
- 
- static inline int security_inode_unlink (struct inode *dir,
--					 struct dentry *dentry)
-+					 struct dentry *dentry,
-+					 struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -275,7 +275,8 @@ static int dummy_inode_link (struct dent
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int dummy_inode_unlink (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
-+static int dummy_inode_unlink (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			       struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -346,11 +346,12 @@ int security_inode_link(struct dentry *o
- 					 new_dentry, new_mnt);
- }
- 
--int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
-+int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			  struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
-+	return security_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry, mnt);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2205,11 +2205,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_link(struct den
- 	return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
-+static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+			        struct vfsmount *mnt)
- {
- 	int rc;
- 
--	rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
-+	rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry, mnt);
- 	if (rc)
- 		return rc;
- 	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security-xattr-file.diff

@@ -1,540 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct file down the inode_*xattr security LSM hooks
-
-This allows LSMs to also distinguish between file descriptor and path
-access for the xattr operations. (The other relevant operations are
-covered by the setattr hook.)
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/xattr.c               |   58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
- include/linux/security.h |   40 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
- include/linux/xattr.h    |    8 +++---
- security/commoncap.c     |    4 +--
- security/dummy.c         |   10 ++++----
- security/security.c      |   21 +++++++++--------
- security/selinux/hooks.c |   10 ++++----
- 7 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/xattr.c
-+++ b/fs/xattr.c
-@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ xattr_permission(struct inode *inode, co
- 
- int
- vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name,
--	     void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-+	     void *value, size_t size, int flags, struct file *file)
- {
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	int error;
-@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, stru
- 		return error;
- 
- 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
--	error = security_inode_setxattr(dentry, mnt, name, value, size, flags);
-+	error = security_inode_setxattr(dentry, mnt, name, value, size, flags,						file);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto out;
- 	error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_setxattr);
- 
- ssize_t
- vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name,
--	     void *value, size_t size)
-+	     void *value, size_t size, struct file *file)
- {
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	int error;
-@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, stru
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
--	error = security_inode_getxattr(dentry, mnt, name);
-+	error = security_inode_getxattr(dentry, mnt, name, file);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
-@@ -143,12 +143,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_getxattr);
- 
- ssize_t
- vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *list,
--	      size_t size)
-+	      size_t size, struct file *file)
- {
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	ssize_t error;
- 
--	error = security_inode_listxattr(dentry, mnt);
-+	error = security_inode_listxattr(dentry, mnt, file);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 	error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-@@ -164,7 +164,8 @@ vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, str
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_listxattr);
- 
- int
--vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name)
-+vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name,
-+		struct file *file)
- {
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	int error;
-@@ -176,7 +177,7 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, s
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
--	error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, mnt, name);
-+	error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, mnt, name, file);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 
-@@ -196,7 +197,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_removexattr);
-  */
- static long
- setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char __user *name,
--	 void __user *value, size_t size, int flags)
-+	 void __user *value, size_t size, int flags, struct file *file)
- {
- 	int error;
- 	void *kvalue = NULL;
-@@ -223,7 +224,7 @@ setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct v
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--	error = vfs_setxattr(dentry, mnt, kname, kvalue, size, flags);
-+	error = vfs_setxattr(dentry, mnt, kname, kvalue, size, flags, file);
- 	kfree(kvalue);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ sys_setxattr(char __user *path, char __u
- 	error = user_path_walk(path, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
--	error = setxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name, value, size, flags);
-+	error = setxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name, value, size, flags, NULL);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -253,7 +254,7 @@ sys_lsetxattr(char __user *path, char __
- 	error = user_path_walk_link(path, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
--	error = setxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name, value, size, flags);
-+	error = setxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name, value, size, flags, NULL);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -271,7 +272,7 @@ sys_fsetxattr(int fd, char __user *name,
- 		return error;
- 	dentry = f->f_path.dentry;
- 	audit_inode(NULL, dentry);
--	error = setxattr(dentry, f->f_vfsmnt, name, value, size, flags);
-+	error = setxattr(dentry, f->f_vfsmnt, name, value, size, flags, f);
- 	fput(f);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -281,7 +282,7 @@ sys_fsetxattr(int fd, char __user *name,
-  */
- static ssize_t
- getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char __user *name,
--	 void __user *value, size_t size)
-+	 void __user *value, size_t size, struct file *file)
- {
- 	ssize_t error;
- 	void *kvalue = NULL;
-@@ -301,7 +302,7 @@ getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct v
- 			return -ENOMEM;
- 	}
- 
--	error = vfs_getxattr(dentry, mnt, kname, kvalue, size);
-+	error = vfs_getxattr(dentry, mnt, kname, kvalue, size, file);
- 	if (error > 0) {
- 		if (size && copy_to_user(value, kvalue, error))
- 			error = -EFAULT;
-@@ -324,7 +325,7 @@ sys_getxattr(char __user *path, char __u
- 	error = user_path_walk(path, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
--	error = getxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name, value, size);
-+	error = getxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name, value, size, NULL);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -339,7 +340,7 @@ sys_lgetxattr(char __user *path, char __
- 	error = user_path_walk_link(path, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
--	error = getxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name, value, size);
-+	error = getxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name, value, size, NULL);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -354,7 +355,7 @@ sys_fgetxattr(int fd, char __user *name,
- 	if (!f)
- 		return error;
- 	audit_inode(NULL, f->f_path.dentry);
--	error = getxattr(f->f_path.dentry, f->f_path.mnt, name, value, size);
-+	error = getxattr(f->f_path.dentry, f->f_path.mnt, name, value, size, f);
- 	fput(f);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -364,7 +365,7 @@ sys_fgetxattr(int fd, char __user *name,
-  */
- static ssize_t
- listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char __user *list,
--	  size_t size)
-+	  size_t size, struct file *file)
- {
- 	ssize_t error;
- 	char *klist = NULL;
-@@ -377,7 +378,7 @@ listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct 
- 			return -ENOMEM;
- 	}
- 
--	error = vfs_listxattr(dentry, mnt, klist, size);
-+	error = vfs_listxattr(dentry, mnt, klist, size, file);
- 	if (error > 0) {
- 		if (size && copy_to_user(list, klist, error))
- 			error = -EFAULT;
-@@ -399,7 +400,7 @@ sys_listxattr(char __user *path, char __
- 	error = user_path_walk(path, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
--	error = listxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, list, size);
-+	error = listxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, list, size, NULL);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -413,7 +414,7 @@ sys_llistxattr(char __user *path, char _
- 	error = user_path_walk_link(path, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
--	error = listxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, list, size);
-+	error = listxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, list, size, NULL);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -428,7 +429,7 @@ sys_flistxattr(int fd, char __user *list
- 	if (!f)
- 		return error;
- 	audit_inode(NULL, f->f_path.dentry);
--	error = listxattr(f->f_path.dentry, f->f_path.mnt, list, size);
-+	error = listxattr(f->f_path.dentry, f->f_path.mnt, list, size, f);
- 	fput(f);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -437,7 +438,8 @@ sys_flistxattr(int fd, char __user *list
-  * Extended attribute REMOVE operations
-  */
- static long
--removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char __user *name)
-+removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char __user *name,
-+	    struct file *file)
- {
- 	int error;
- 	char kname[XATTR_NAME_MAX + 1];
-@@ -448,7 +450,7 @@ removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struc
- 	if (error < 0)
- 		return error;
- 
--	return vfs_removexattr(dentry, mnt, kname);
-+	return vfs_removexattr(dentry, mnt, kname, file);
- }
- 
- asmlinkage long
-@@ -460,7 +462,7 @@ sys_removexattr(char __user *path, char 
- 	error = user_path_walk(path, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
--	error = removexattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name);
-+	error = removexattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name, NULL);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -474,7 +476,7 @@ sys_lremovexattr(char __user *path, char
- 	error = user_path_walk_link(path, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
--	error = removexattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name);
-+	error = removexattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name, NULL);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -491,7 +493,7 @@ sys_fremovexattr(int fd, char __user *na
- 		return error;
- 	dentry = f->f_path.dentry;
- 	audit_inode(NULL, dentry);
--	error = removexattr(dentry, f->f_path.mnt, name);
-+	error = removexattr(dentry, f->f_path.mnt, name, f);
- 	fput(f);
- 	return error;
- }
---- a/include/linux/security.h
-+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ extern void cap_capset_set (struct task_
- extern int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
- extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
- extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
--extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags);
--extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name);
-+extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags, struct file *file);
-+extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name, struct file *file);
- extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
- extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
- extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
-@@ -1286,16 +1286,18 @@ struct security_operations {
- 	int (*inode_getattr) (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
-         void (*inode_delete) (struct inode *inode);
- 	int (*inode_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--			       char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags);
-+			       char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags,
-+			       struct file *file);
- 	void (*inode_post_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry,
- 				     struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 				     char *name, void *value,
- 				     size_t size, int flags);
- 	int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--			       char *name);
--	int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
-+			       char *name, struct file *file);
-+	int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				struct file *file);
- 	int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--				  char *name);
-+				  char *name, struct file *file);
- 	int (*inode_need_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry);
- 	int (*inode_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry);
-   	int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
-@@ -1552,15 +1554,17 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry
- int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
- void security_inode_delete(struct inode *inode);
- int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--			    char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags);
-+			    char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags,
-+			    struct file *file);
- void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 				  char *name, void *value, size_t size,
- 				  int flags);
- int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--			    char *name);
--int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
-+			    char *name, struct file *file);
-+int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			     struct file *file);
- int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--			       char *name);
-+			       char *name, struct file *file);
- int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
- int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
- int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
-@@ -1946,9 +1950,10 @@ static inline void security_inode_delete
- 
- static inline int security_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,
- 					   struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name,
--					   void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-+					   void *value, size_t size, int flags,
-+					   struct file *file)
- {
--	return cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, mnt, name, value, size, flags);
-+	return cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, mnt, name, value, size, flags, file);
- }
- 
- static inline void security_inode_post_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,
-@@ -1959,21 +1964,24 @@ static inline void security_inode_post_s
- { }
- 
- static inline int security_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,
--					    struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name)
-+					   struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name,
-+					   struct file *file)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
- static inline int security_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry,
--					    struct vfsmount *mnt)
-+					   struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+					   struct file *file)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
- static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,
--					      struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name)
-+					     struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name,
-+					     struct file *file)
- {
--	return cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, mnt, name);
-+	return cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, mnt, name, file);
- }
- 
- static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
---- a/include/linux/xattr.h
-+++ b/include/linux/xattr.h
-@@ -47,12 +47,12 @@ struct xattr_handler {
- };
- 
- ssize_t vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, char *, void *,
--		     size_t);
-+		     size_t, struct file *);
- ssize_t vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, struct vfsmount *, char *list,
--		      size_t size);
-+		      size_t size, struct file *);
- int vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, char *, void *, size_t,
--		 int);
--int vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, char *);
-+		 int, struct file *);
-+int vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, char *, struct file *);
- 
- ssize_t generic_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size);
- ssize_t generic_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
---- a/security/commoncap.c
-+++ b/security/commoncap.c
-@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_bi
- }
- 
- int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name,
--		       void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-+		       void *value, size_t size, int flags, struct file *file)
- {
- 	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
- 		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
-@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *de
- }
- 
- int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--			  char *name)
-+			  char *name, struct file *file)
- {
- 	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
- 		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
---- a/security/dummy.c
-+++ b/security/dummy.c
-@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ static void dummy_inode_delete (struct i
- 
- static int dummy_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 				 char *name, void *value, size_t size,
--				 int flags)
-+				 int flags, struct file *file)
- {
- 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
- 		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
-@@ -366,18 +366,20 @@ static void dummy_inode_post_setxattr (s
- }
- 
- static int dummy_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,
--			          struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name)
-+			          struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name,
-+				  struct file *file)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int dummy_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
-+static int dummy_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				  struct file *file)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
- static int dummy_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--				    char *name)
-+				    char *name, struct file *file)
- {
- 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
- 		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
---- a/security/security.c
-+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -441,12 +441,13 @@ void security_inode_delete(struct inode 
- }
- 
- int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--			     char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-+			    char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags,
-+			    struct file *file)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
- 	return security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, mnt, name, value, size,
--					    flags);
-+					    flags, file);
- }
- 
- void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-@@ -455,30 +456,32 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return;
--	security_ops->inode_post_setxattr(dentry, mnt, name, value, size, flags);
-+	security_ops->inode_post_setxattr(dentry, mnt, name, value, size,
-+					 flags);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--			    char *name)
-+			    char *name, struct file *file)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_getxattr(dentry, mnt, name);
-+	return security_ops->inode_getxattr(dentry, mnt, name, file);
- }
- 
--int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
-+int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			     struct file *file)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_listxattr(dentry, mnt);
-+	return security_ops->inode_listxattr(dentry, mnt, file);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--			       char *name)
-+			       char *name, struct file *file)
- {
- 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, mnt, name);
-+	return security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, mnt, name, file);
- }
- 
- int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2334,7 +2334,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(s
- 
- static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
- 				  char *name, void *value, size_t size,
--				  int flags)
-+				  int flags, struct file *file)
- {
- 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-@@ -2410,18 +2410,20 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(
- }
- 
- static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
--				   char *name)
-+				   char *name, struct file *file)
- {
- 	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
-+static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+				    struct file *file)
- {
- 	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
- }
- 
- static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,
--				      struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name)
-+				      struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name,
-+				      struct file *file)
- {
- 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
- 		return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/security_chroot.diff

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/open.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/open.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/open.c
-@@ -483,6 +483,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __
- 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
- 		goto dput_and_out;
- 
-+	error = security_chroot(&nd);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto dput_and_out;
-+
- 	set_fs_root(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
- 	set_fs_altroot();
- 	error = 0;
-Index: linux-2.6/include/linux/security.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/include/linux/security.h
-+++ linux-2.6/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -247,6 +247,9 @@ struct request_sock;
-  *	Update module state after a successful pivot.
-  *	@old_nd contains the nameidata structure for the old root.
-  *      @new_nd contains the nameidata structure for the new root.
-+ * @sb_chroot:
-+ *	Check permission before chroot to chroot to point named by @nd
-+ *	@nd contains the nameidata object for the new root
-  *
-  * Security hooks for inode operations.
-  *
-@@ -1211,6 +1214,7 @@ struct security_operations {
- 			     struct nameidata * new_nd);
- 	void (*sb_post_pivotroot) (struct nameidata * old_nd,
- 				   struct nameidata * new_nd);
-+	int (*sb_chroot) (struct nameidata * nd);
- 
- 	int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode);	
- 	void (*inode_free_security) (struct inode *inode);
-@@ -1610,6 +1614,11 @@ static inline void security_sb_post_pivo
- 	security_ops->sb_post_pivotroot (old_nd, new_nd);
- }
- 
-+static inline int security_chroot (struct nameidata *nd)
-+{
-+	return security_ops->sb_chroot (nd);
-+}
-+
- static inline int security_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode)
- {
- 	inode->i_security = NULL;
-@@ -2362,6 +2371,11 @@ static inline void security_sb_post_pivo
- 					       struct nameidata *new_nd)
- { }
- 
-+static inline int security_sb_chroot (struct nameidata *nd)
-+{
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- static inline int security_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode)
- {
- 	return 0;
-Index: linux-2.6/security/dummy.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/security/dummy.c
-+++ linux-2.6/security/dummy.c
-@@ -248,6 +248,11 @@ static void dummy_sb_post_pivotroot (str
- 	return;
- }
- 
-+static int dummy_sb_chroot (struct nameidata *nd)
-+{
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- static int dummy_inode_alloc_security (struct inode *inode)
- {
- 	return 0;
-@@ -1004,6 +1009,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security
- 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_post_addmount);
- 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_pivotroot);
- 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_post_pivotroot);
-+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_chroot);
- 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_alloc_security);
- 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_free_security);
- 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_init_security);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/series

@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
-#unionfs-2.2.2_for_2.6.24-rc7.diff
-#unionfs-2.1.11_for_2.6.24-rc4.diff
-security-create.diff
-remove_suid.diff
-vfs-notify_change.diff
-#should_remove_suid.diff
-security-setattr.diff
-vfs-mkdir.diff
-security-mkdir.diff
-vfs-mknod.diff
-security-mknod.diff
-vfs-symlink.diff
-security-symlink.diff
-security-readlink.diff
-vfs-link.diff
-security-link.diff
-vfs-rmdir.diff
-security-rmdir.diff
-fix-vfs_rmdir.diff
-vfs-unlink.diff
-security-unlink.diff
-vfs-rename.diff
-security-rename.diff
-vfs-setxattr.diff
-security-setxattr.diff
-vfs-getxattr.diff
-security-getxattr.diff
-vfs-listxattr.diff
-security-listxattr.diff
-vfs-removexattr.diff
-security-removexattr.diff
-unambiguous-__d_path.diff
-mount-consistent-__d_path.diff
-d_namespace_path.diff
-__d_path-keep-connected.diff
-fsetattr.diff
-#fix-fuse.diff
-fsetattr-reintro-ATTR_FILE.diff
-file-handle-ops.diff
-security-xattr-file.diff
-sysctl-pathname.diff
-parent-permission.diff
-do_path_lookup-nameidata.diff
-sys_fchdir-nameidata.diff
-file_permission-nameidata.diff
-apparmor-audit.diff
-apparmor-main.diff
-apparmor-lsm.diff
-apparmor-module_interface.diff
-apparmor-misc.diff
-apparmor-intree.diff
-
-#fix-rcu-deref.diff
-#fix-name-errorpath.diff
-#change-profile-kernel-v2.diff
-#expand-dfa.diff
-#slash-null-dfa.diff
-#profile-namespaces.diff
-#owner-perm-set.diff
-#apparmor-link-pairs.diff
-#apparmor-bootdisable.diff
-#apparmor-builtin-only.diff
-#apparmor-security-goal.diff
-#apparmor-features.diff
-#split_init.diff
-#apparmor-fix-sysctl-refcount.diff
-#apparmor-fix-lock-letter.diff
-#fix-link-subset.diff
-#hat_perm.diff
-#extend-x-mods.diff
-#no-safex-link-subset.diff
-#apparmor-create-append.diff
-#apparmor-failed-name-error.diff
-#audit-uid.diff
-#apparmor-secondary-accept.diff
-#apparmor-audit-flags2.diff
-#fix-profile-namespaces.diff
-#fix-dfa.diff
-#cap-set.diff
-
-
-#foobar.diff
-# # NOT YET
-# ecryptfs-d_revalidate.diff
-# nfs-nameidata-check.diff
-# # statvfs.diff
-# # statvfs-2.diff
-# # fix-getcwd.diff
-# # proc-mounts-cleanup.diff
-# # proc-mounts-check-d_path-result.diff
-# # fix-d_path.diff
-##split-up-nameidata.diff
-##vfs_create-nameidata.diff
-##xattr_permission.diff
-##nfsd_permission-nameidata.diff
-# vfs_create-args.diff
-# vfs_mknod-args.diff
-# vfs_mkdir-args.diff
-# vfs_symlink-args.diff
-# vfs_link-args.diff
-# vfs_rename-args.diff
-# may_create-args.diff
-# vfs_rmdir-args.diff
-# vfs_unlink-args.diff
-# may_delete-args.diff
-#fix-change_profile-namespace.diff
-
-#audit_denied.diff
-#apparmor-audit-flags.diff
-#FS2.2.2_fix-unionfs-with-AppArmor.patch
-#FS2.1.3_fix-unionfs-with-AppArmor.patch
-
-#named-transitions.diff
-apparmor-network.diff
-#fix-net.diff
-apparmor-rlimits.diff
-audit-log-type-in-syslog.diff
-#fix-named-transitions.diff
-#apparmor-xmods-accept-entry.diff
-#apparmor-split-audit-deny.diff
-#apparmor-cond-uid.diff
-#apparmor-quiet-control.diff
-#apparmor-direct-complain.diff

kernel-patches/for-mainline/should_remove_suid.diff

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Pass struct file down to should_remove_suid and children
-
-Pass struct path to should_remove_suid instead of only the dentry.
-To make should_remove_suid consistent with changes made to
-remove_suid.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/ocfs2/file.c    |    2 +-
- fs/open.c          |    5 ++++-
- fs/splice.c        |    2 +-
- include/linux/fs.h |    2 +-
- mm/filemap.c       |    6 +++---
- 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/ocfs2/file.c
-+++ b/fs/ocfs2/file.c
-@@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ static int ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write
- 		 * inode. There's also the dinode i_size state which
- 		 * can be lost via setattr during extending writes (we
- 		 * set inode->i_size at the end of a write. */
--		if (should_remove_suid(path->dentry)) {
-+		if (should_remove_suid(path)) {
- 			if (meta_level == 0) {
- 				ocfs2_meta_unlock(inode, meta_level);
- 				meta_level = 1;
---- a/fs/open.c
-+++ b/fs/open.c
-@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, s
- {
- 	int err;
- 	struct iattr newattrs;
-+	struct path path;
- 
- 	/* Not pretty: "inode->i_size" shouldn't really be signed. But it is. */
- 	if (length < 0)
-@@ -211,7 +212,9 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, s
- 	}
- 
- 	/* Remove suid/sgid on truncate too */
--	newattrs.ia_valid |= should_remove_suid(dentry);
-+	path.dentry = dentry;
-+	path.mnt = mnt;
-+	newattrs.ia_valid |= should_remove_suid(&path);
- 
- 	mutex_lock(&dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
- 	err = notify_change(dentry, mnt, &newattrs);
---- a/fs/splice.c
-+++ b/fs/splice.c
-@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ generic_file_splice_write(struct pipe_in
- 	ssize_t ret;
- 	int err;
- 
--	err = should_remove_suid(out->f_path.dentry);
-+	err = should_remove_suid(&out->f_path);
- 	if (unlikely(err)) {
- 		mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
- 		err = __remove_suid(&out->f_path, err);
---- a/include/linux/fs.h
-+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
-@@ -1698,7 +1698,7 @@ extern void clear_inode(struct inode *);
- extern void destroy_inode(struct inode *);
- extern struct inode *new_inode(struct super_block *);
- extern int __remove_suid(struct path *, int);
--extern int should_remove_suid(struct dentry *);
-+extern int should_remove_suid(struct path *);
- extern int remove_suid(struct path *);
- 
- extern void __insert_inode_hash(struct inode *, unsigned long hashval);
---- a/mm/filemap.c
-+++ b/mm/filemap.c
-@@ -1882,9 +1882,9 @@ repeat:
-  *	if suid or (sgid and xgrp)
-  *		remove privs
-  */
--int should_remove_suid(struct dentry *dentry)
-+int should_remove_suid(struct path *path)
- {
--	mode_t mode = dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
-+	mode_t mode = path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
- 	int kill = 0;
- 
- 	/* suid always must be killed */
-@@ -1915,7 +1915,7 @@ int __remove_suid(struct path *path, int
- 
- int remove_suid(struct path *path)
- {
--	int kill = should_remove_suid(path->dentry);
-+	int kill = should_remove_suid(path);
- 
- 	if (unlikely(kill))
- 		return __remove_suid(path, kill);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/slash-null-dfa.diff

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-convert the null transition from using the 0 character to "//" until
-the parser gets updated so that it can add a null character transition.
-
----
- security/apparmor/match.c |   24 +-----------------------
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 23 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/match.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
-@@ -262,29 +262,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_next_state(struct aa
-  */
- unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start)
- {
--	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
--	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
--	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
--	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
--	unsigned int state = start, pos;
--
--	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
--	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC - 1]) {
--		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
--		pos = base[state] + equiv[0];
--		if (check[pos] == state)
--			state = next[pos];
--		else
--			state = def[state];
--	} else {
--		pos = base[state] + 0;
--		if (check[pos] == state)
--			state = next[pos];
--		else
--			state = def[state];
--	}
--
--	return state;
-+	return aa_dfa_next_state(dfa, start, "//");
- }
- 
- /**

kernel-patches/for-mainline/split_init.diff

@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
----
- security/apparmor/Kconfig      |   15 ++++++
- security/apparmor/apparmor.h   |    5 ++
- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c |    8 +++
- security/apparmor/lsm.c        |   95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- 4 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
---- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
-+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
-@@ -25,3 +25,18 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
- 	  bootup.
- 
- 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
-+
-+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DISABLE
-+	bool "AppArmor runtime disable"
-+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
-+	default n
-+	help
-+	  This option enables writing to a apparmorfs node 'disable', which
-+	  allows AppArmor to be disabled at runtime prior to the policy load.
-+	  AppArmor will then remain disabled until the next boot.
-+	  This option is similar to the apparmor.enabled=0 boot parameter,
-+	  but is to support runtime disabling of AppArmor, e.g. from
-+	  /sbin/init, for portability across platforms where boot
-+	  parameters are difficult to employ.
-+
-+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmor.h
-@@ -284,6 +284,11 @@ extern int aa_net_perm(struct aa_profile
- 			int family, int type, int protocol);
- extern int aa_revalidate_sk(struct sock *sk, char *operation);
- 
-+/* lsm.c */
-+extern int apparmor_initialized;
-+extern void info_message(const char *str);
-+extern void apparmor_disable(void);
-+
- /* list.c */
- extern struct aa_namespace *__aa_find_namespace(const char *name,
- 						struct list_head *list);
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-@@ -231,6 +231,9 @@ int create_apparmorfs(void)
- {
- 	int error;
- 
-+	if (!apparmor_initialized)
-+		return 0;
-+
- 	if (apparmor_dentry) {
- 		AA_ERROR("%s: AppArmor securityfs already exists\n",
- 			__FUNCTION__);
-@@ -262,11 +265,16 @@ int create_apparmorfs(void)
- 	if (error)
- 		goto error;
- 
-+	/* Report that AppArmor fs is enabled */
-+	info_message("AppArmor Filesystem Enabled");
- 	return 0;
- 
- error:
- 	destroy_apparmorfs();
- 	AA_ERROR("Error creating AppArmor securityfs\n");
-+	apparmor_disable();
- 	return error;
- }
- 
-+fs_initcall(create_apparmorfs);
-+
---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -23,16 +23,8 @@
- #include "apparmor.h"
- #include "inline.h"
- 
--/* Boot time disable flag */
--int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
--
--static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
--{
--	apparmor_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
--	return 1;
--}
--__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
--
-+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
-+int apparmor_initialized = 0;
- 
- static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
- static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-@@ -75,6 +67,25 @@ unsigned int apparmor_path_max = 2 * PAT
- module_param_named(path_max, apparmor_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
- MODULE_PARM_DESC(apparmor_path_max, "Maximum pathname length allowed");
- 
-+/* Boot time disable flag */
-+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DISABLE
-+#define AA_ENABLED_PERMS 0600
-+#else
-+#define AA_ENABLED_PERMS 0400
-+#endif
-+static int param_set_aa_enabled(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+unsigned int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
-+module_param_call(enabled, param_set_aa_enabled, param_get_aauint,
-+		  &apparmor_enabled, AA_ENABLED_PERMS);
-+MODULE_PARM_DESC(apparmor_enabled, "Enable/Disable Apparmor on boot");
-+
-+static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
-+{
-+	apparmor_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
-+
- static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
- {
- 	if (aa_task_context(current))
-@@ -103,6 +114,35 @@ static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer
- 	return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
- }
- 
-+/* allow run time disabling of apparmor */
-+static int param_set_aa_enabled(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+	char *endp;
-+	unsigned long l;
-+
-+	if (!apparmor_initialized) {
-+		apparmor_enabled = 0;
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (aa_task_context(current))
-+		return -EPERM;
-+
-+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	if (!val)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	l = simple_strtoul(val, &endp, 0);
-+	if (endp == val || l != 0)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	apparmor_enabled = 0;
-+	apparmor_disable();
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- static int aa_reject_syscall(struct task_struct *task, gfp_t flags,
- 			     const char *name)
- {
-@@ -879,14 +919,15 @@ struct security_operations apparmor_ops 
- 	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
- };
- 
--static void info_message(const char *str)
-+void info_message(const char *str)
- {
- 	struct aa_audit sa;
- 	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
- 	sa.info = str;
--	printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s", str);
--	aa_audit_message(NULL, &sa, AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS);
-+	printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str);
-+	if (audit_enabled)
-+		aa_audit_message(NULL, &sa, AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS);
- }
- 
- static int __init apparmor_init(void)
-@@ -913,6 +954,8 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
- 		goto register_security_out;
- 	}
- 
-+	/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
-+	apparmor_initialized = 1;
- 	if (apparmor_complain)
- 		info_message("AppArmor initialized: complainmode enabled");
- 	else
-@@ -931,7 +974,31 @@ createfs_out:
- 
- }
- 
--module_init(apparmor_init);
-+security_initcall(apparmor_init);
-+
-+void apparmor_disable(void)
-+{
-+	/* Remove and release all the profiles on the profile list. */
-+	mutex_lock(&aa_interface_lock);
-+	aa_profile_ns_list_release();
-+
-+	/* FIXME: cleanup profiles references on files */
-+	free_default_namespace();
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Delay for an rcu cycle to make sure that all active task
-+	 * context readers have finished, and all profiles have been
-+	 * freed by their rcu callbacks.
-+	 */
-+	synchronize_rcu();
-+
-+	destroy_apparmorfs();
-+	mutex_unlock(&aa_interface_lock);
-+
-+	apparmor_initialized = 0;
-+
-+	info_message("AppArmor protection removed");
-+}
- 
- MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AppArmor process confinement");
- MODULE_AUTHOR("Novell/Immunix, http://bugs.opensuse.org");

kernel-patches/for-mainline/statvfs-2.diff

@@ -1,494 +0,0 @@
----
- arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c  |   11 ++++----
- arch/mips/kernel/sysirix.c   |   12 ++++-----
- arch/parisc/hpux/sys_hpux.c  |   11 ++++----
- arch/sparc64/solaris/fs.c    |   16 ++++--------
- fs/compat.c                  |   13 +++++-----
- fs/ecryptfs/super.c          |    5 +++-
- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c            |    2 -
- fs/nfsd/vfs.c                |    2 -
- fs/open.c                    |   53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
- include/asm-arm/statfs.h     |    6 +++-
- include/asm-generic/statfs.h |    9 ++++---
- include/asm-ia64/compat.h    |    3 +-
- include/asm-ia64/statfs.h    |    9 ++++---
- include/asm-parisc/compat.h  |    3 +-
- include/asm-parisc/statfs.h  |    9 ++++---
- include/asm-powerpc/compat.h |    3 +-
- include/asm-powerpc/statfs.h |    9 ++++---
- include/asm-s390/compat.h    |    3 +-
- include/asm-s390/statfs.h    |    9 ++++---
- include/asm-sparc64/compat.h |    3 +-
- include/asm-sparc64/statfs.h |    9 ++++---
- include/asm-x86_64/compat.h  |    3 +-
- include/asm-x86_64/statfs.h  |    9 ++++---
- include/linux/fs.h           |    2 -
- include/linux/statfs.h       |   13 +++++++++-
- kernel/acct.c                |    2 -
- 26 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)
-
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
-@@ -244,11 +244,11 @@ linux_to_osf_statfs(struct kstatfs *linu
- }
- 
- static int
--do_osf_statfs(struct dentry * dentry, struct osf_statfs __user *buffer,
--	      unsigned long bufsiz)
-+do_osf_statfs(struct dentry * dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+	      struct osf_statfs __user *buffer, unsigned long bufsiz)
- {
- 	struct kstatfs linux_stat;
--	int error = vfs_statfs(dentry, &linux_stat);
-+	int error = vfs_statfs(dentry, mnt, &linux_stat);
- 	if (!error)
- 		error = linux_to_osf_statfs(&linux_stat, buffer, bufsiz);
- 	return error;	
-@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ osf_statfs(char __user *path, struct osf
- 
- 	retval = user_path_walk(path, &nd);
- 	if (!retval) {
--		retval = do_osf_statfs(nd.dentry, buffer, bufsiz);
-+		retval = do_osf_statfs(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, buffer, bufsiz);
- 		path_release(&nd);
- 	}
- 	return retval;
-@@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ osf_fstatfs(unsigned long fd, struct osf
- 	retval = -EBADF;
- 	file = fget(fd);
- 	if (file) {
--		retval = do_osf_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, buffer, bufsiz);
-+		retval = do_osf_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt,
-+				       buffer, bufsiz);
- 		fput(file);
- 	}
- 	return retval;
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/arch/mips/kernel/sysirix.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/arch/mips/kernel/sysirix.c
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/arch/mips/kernel/sysirix.c
-@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ asmlinkage int irix_statfs(const char __
- 	if (error)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	error = vfs_statfs(nd.dentry, &kbuf);
-+	error = vfs_statfs(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, &kbuf);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto dput_and_out;
- 
-@@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ asmlinkage int irix_fstatfs(unsigned int
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	error = vfs_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, &kbuf);
-+	error = vfs_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt, &kbuf);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto out_f;
- 
-@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ asmlinkage int irix_statvfs(char __user 
- 	error = user_path_walk(fname, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto out;
--	error = vfs_statfs(nd.dentry, &kbuf);
-+	error = vfs_statfs(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, &kbuf);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto dput_and_out;
- 
-@@ -1406,7 +1406,7 @@ asmlinkage int irix_fstatvfs(int fd, str
- 		error = -EBADF;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	error = vfs_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, &kbuf);
-+	error = vfs_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt, &kbuf);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto out_f;
- 
-@@ -1611,7 +1611,7 @@ asmlinkage int irix_statvfs64(char __use
- 	error = user_path_walk(fname, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto out;
--	error = vfs_statfs(nd.dentry, &kbuf);
-+	error = vfs_statfs(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, &kbuf);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto dput_and_out;
- 
-@@ -1658,7 +1658,7 @@ asmlinkage int irix_fstatvfs64(int fd, s
- 		error = -EBADF;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	error = vfs_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, &kbuf);
-+	error = vfs_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt, &kbuf);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto out_f;
- 
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/arch/parisc/hpux/sys_hpux.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/arch/parisc/hpux/sys_hpux.c
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/arch/parisc/hpux/sys_hpux.c
-@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int hpux_ustat(dev_t dev, struct 
- 	s = user_get_super(dev);
- 	if (s == NULL)
- 		goto out;
--	err = vfs_statfs(s->s_root, &sbuf);
-+	err = vfs_statfs(s->s_root, NULL, &sbuf);
- 	drop_super(s);
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out;
-@@ -186,12 +186,13 @@ struct hpux_statfs {
-      int16_t f_pad;
- };
- 
--static int vfs_statfs_hpux(struct dentry *dentry, struct hpux_statfs *buf)
-+static int vfs_statfs_hpux(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			   struct hpux_statfs *buf)
- {
- 	struct kstatfs st;
- 	int retval;
- 	
--	retval = vfs_statfs(dentry, &st);
-+	retval = vfs_statfs(dentry, mnt, &st);
- 	if (retval)
- 		return retval;
- 
-@@ -219,7 +220,7 @@ asmlinkage long hpux_statfs(const char _
- 	error = user_path_walk(path, &nd);
- 	if (!error) {
- 		struct hpux_statfs tmp;
--		error = vfs_statfs_hpux(nd.dentry, &tmp);
-+		error = vfs_statfs_hpux(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, &tmp);
- 		if (!error && copy_to_user(buf, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
- 			error = -EFAULT;
- 		path_release(&nd);
-@@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ asmlinkage long hpux_fstatfs(unsigned in
- 	file = fget(fd);
- 	if (!file)
- 		goto out;
--	error = vfs_statfs_hpux(file->f_path.dentry, &tmp);
-+	error = vfs_statfs_hpux(file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt, &tmp);
- 	if (!error && copy_to_user(buf, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
- 		error = -EFAULT;
- 	fput(file);
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/arch/sparc64/solaris/fs.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/arch/sparc64/solaris/fs.c
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/arch/sparc64/solaris/fs.c
-@@ -361,15 +361,12 @@ static int report_statvfs(struct vfsmoun
- 	int error;
- 	struct sol_statvfs __user *ss = A(buf);
- 
--	error = vfs_statfs(mnt->mnt_root, &s);
-+	error = vfs_statfs(mnt->mnt_root, mnt, &s);
- 	if (!error) {
- 		const char *p = mnt->mnt_sb->s_type->name;
--		int i = 0;
- 		int j = strlen (p);
- 		
- 		if (j > 15) j = 15;
--		if (IS_RDONLY(inode)) i = 1;
--		if (mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) i |= 2;
- 		if (!sysv_valid_dev(inode->i_sb->s_dev))
- 			return -EOVERFLOW;
- 		if (put_user (s.f_bsize, &ss->f_bsize)		||
-@@ -384,7 +381,8 @@ static int report_statvfs(struct vfsmoun
- 		    __copy_to_user (ss->f_basetype,p,j)		||
- 		    __put_user (0, (char __user *)&ss->f_basetype[j])	||
- 		    __put_user (s.f_namelen, &ss->f_namemax)	||
--		    __put_user (i, &ss->f_flag)			||		    
-+		    __put_user (s.s_flag & (ST_RDONLY | ST_NOSUID),
-+		    		&ss->f_flag)			||
- 		    __clear_user (&ss->f_fstr, 32))
- 			return -EFAULT;
- 	}
-@@ -397,15 +395,12 @@ static int report_statvfs64(struct vfsmo
- 	int error;
- 	struct sol_statvfs64 __user *ss = A(buf);
- 			
--	error = vfs_statfs(mnt->mnt_root, &s);
-+	error = vfs_statfs(mnt->mnt_root, mnt, &s);
- 	if (!error) {
- 		const char *p = mnt->mnt_sb->s_type->name;
--		int i = 0;
- 		int j = strlen (p);
- 		
- 		if (j > 15) j = 15;
--		if (IS_RDONLY(inode)) i = 1;
--		if (mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) i |= 2;
- 		if (!sysv_valid_dev(inode->i_sb->s_dev))
- 			return -EOVERFLOW;
- 		if (put_user (s.f_bsize, &ss->f_bsize)		||
-@@ -420,7 +415,8 @@ static int report_statvfs64(struct vfsmo
- 		    __copy_to_user (ss->f_basetype,p,j)		||
- 		    __put_user (0, (char __user *)&ss->f_basetype[j])	||
- 		    __put_user (s.f_namelen, &ss->f_namemax)	||
--		    __put_user (i, &ss->f_flag)			||		    
-+		    __put_user (s.s_flag & (ST_RDONLY | ST_NOSUID),
-+		    		&ss->f_flag)			||
- 		    __clear_user (&ss->f_fstr, 32))
- 			return -EFAULT;
- 	}
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-arm/statfs.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/include/asm-arm/statfs.h
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-arm/statfs.h
-@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ struct statfs {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	__u32 f_namelen;
- 	__u32 f_frsize;
--	__u32 f_spare[5];
-+	__u32 f_flag;
-+	__u32 f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- /*
-@@ -36,7 +37,8 @@ struct statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	__u32 f_namelen;
- 	__u32 f_frsize;
--	__u32 f_spare[5];
-+	__u32 f_flag;
-+	__u32 f_spare[4];
- } __attribute__ ((packed,aligned(4)));
- 
- #endif
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-ia64/compat.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/include/asm-ia64/compat.h
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-ia64/compat.h
-@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ struct compat_statfs {
- 	compat_fsid_t	f_fsid;
- 	int		f_namelen;	/* SunOS ignores this field. */
- 	int		f_frsize;
--	int		f_spare[5];
-+	int		f_flag;
-+	int		f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- #define COMPAT_RLIM_OLD_INFINITY       0x7fffffff
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-ia64/statfs.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/include/asm-ia64/statfs.h
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-ia64/statfs.h
-@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ struct statfs {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	long f_namelen;
- 	long f_frsize;
--	long f_spare[5];
-+	long f_flag;
-+	long f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- 
-@@ -42,7 +43,8 @@ struct statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	long f_namelen;
- 	long f_frsize;
--	long f_spare[5];
-+	long f_flag;
-+	long f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct compat_statfs64 {
-@@ -56,7 +58,8 @@ struct compat_statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	__u32 f_namelen;
- 	__u32 f_frsize;
--	__u32 f_spare[5];
-+	__u32 f_flag;
-+	__u32 f_spare[4];
- } __attribute__((packed));
- 
- #endif /* _ASM_IA64_STATFS_H */
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-parisc/compat.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/include/asm-parisc/compat.h
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-parisc/compat.h
-@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ struct compat_statfs {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t	f_fsid;
- 	s32		f_namelen;
- 	s32		f_frsize;
--	s32		f_spare[5];
-+	s32		f_flag;
-+	s32		f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct compat_sigcontext {
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-parisc/statfs.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/include/asm-parisc/statfs.h
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-parisc/statfs.h
-@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ struct statfs {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	long f_namelen;
- 	long f_frsize;
--	long f_spare[5];
-+	long f_flag;
-+	long f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct statfs64 {
-@@ -38,7 +39,8 @@ struct statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	long f_namelen;
- 	long f_frsize;
--	long f_spare[5];
-+	long f_flag;
-+	long f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct compat_statfs64 {
-@@ -52,7 +54,8 @@ struct compat_statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	__u32 f_namelen;
- 	__u32 f_frsize;
--	__u32 f_spare[5];
-+	__u32 f_flag;
-+	__u32 f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- #endif
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-powerpc/compat.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/include/asm-powerpc/compat.h
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-powerpc/compat.h
-@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ struct compat_statfs {
- 	compat_fsid_t	f_fsid;
- 	int		f_namelen;	/* SunOS ignores this field. */
- 	int		f_frsize;
--	int		f_spare[5];
-+	int		f_flag;
-+	int		f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- #define COMPAT_RLIM_OLD_INFINITY	0x7fffffff
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-powerpc/statfs.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/include/asm-powerpc/statfs.h
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-powerpc/statfs.h
-@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ struct statfs {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	long f_namelen;
- 	long f_frsize;
--	long f_spare[5];
-+	long f_flag;
-+	long f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct statfs64 {
-@@ -40,7 +41,8 @@ struct statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	long f_namelen;
- 	long f_frsize;
--	long f_spare[5];
-+	long f_flag;
-+	long f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct compat_statfs64 {
-@@ -54,7 +56,8 @@ struct compat_statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	__u32 f_namelen;
- 	__u32 f_frsize;
--	__u32 f_spare[5];
-+	__u32 f_flag;
-+	__u32 f_spare[4];
- };
- #endif /* ! __powerpc64__ */
- #endif
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-s390/compat.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/include/asm-s390/compat.h
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-s390/compat.h
-@@ -127,7 +127,8 @@ struct compat_statfs {
- 	compat_fsid_t	f_fsid;
- 	s32		f_namelen;
- 	s32		f_frsize;
--	s32		f_spare[6];
-+	s32		f_flag;
-+	s32		f_spare[5];
- };
- 
- #define COMPAT_RLIM_OLD_INFINITY	0x7fffffff
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-s390/statfs.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/include/asm-s390/statfs.h
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-s390/statfs.h
-@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ struct statfs {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	int  f_namelen;
- 	int  f_frsize;
--	int  f_spare[5];
-+	int  f_flag;
-+	int  f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct statfs64 {
-@@ -50,7 +51,8 @@ struct statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	int  f_namelen;
- 	int  f_frsize;
--	int  f_spare[5];
-+	int  f_flag;
-+	int  f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct compat_statfs64 {
-@@ -64,7 +66,8 @@ struct compat_statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	__u32 f_namelen;
- 	__u32 f_frsize;
--	__u32 f_spare[5];
-+	__u32 f_flag;
-+	__u32 f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- #endif /* __s390x__ */
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-sparc64/compat.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/include/asm-sparc64/compat.h
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-sparc64/compat.h
-@@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ struct compat_statfs {
- 	compat_fsid_t	f_fsid;
- 	int		f_namelen;	/* SunOS ignores this field. */
- 	int		f_frsize;
--	int		f_spare[5];
-+	int		f_flag;
-+	int		f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- #define COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY 0x7fffffff
-Index: linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-sparc64/statfs.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6-apparmor.orig/include/asm-sparc64/statfs.h
-+++ linux-2.6-apparmor/include/asm-sparc64/statfs.h
-@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ struct statfs {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	long f_namelen;
- 	long f_frsize;
--	long f_spare[5];
-+	long f_flag;
-+	long f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct statfs64 {
-@@ -35,7 +36,8 @@ struct statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	long f_namelen;
- 	long f_frsize;
--	long f_spare[5];
-+	long f_flag;
-+	long f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct compat_statfs64 {
-@@ -49,7 +51,8 @@ struct compat_statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	__u32 f_namelen;
- 	__u32 f_frsize;
--	__u32 f_spare[5];
-+	__u32 f_flag;
-+	__u32 f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- #endif

kernel-patches/for-mainline/statvfs.diff

@@ -1,370 +0,0 @@
----
- fs/compat.c                  |   13 +++++-----
- fs/ecryptfs/super.c          |    5 +++-
- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c            |    2 -
- fs/nfsd/vfs.c                |    2 -
- fs/open.c                    |   53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
- fs/super.c                   |    2 -
- include/asm-generic/statfs.h |    9 ++++---
- include/asm-x86_64/compat.h  |    3 +-
- include/asm-x86_64/statfs.h  |    9 ++++---
- include/linux/fs.h           |    2 -
- include/linux/statfs.h       |   13 +++++++++-
- kernel/acct.c                |    2 -
- 12 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/compat.c
-+++ b/fs/compat.c
-@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static int put_compat_statfs(struct comp
- 	    __put_user(kbuf->f_fsid.val[0], &ubuf->f_fsid.val[0]) ||
- 	    __put_user(kbuf->f_fsid.val[1], &ubuf->f_fsid.val[1]) ||
- 	    __put_user(kbuf->f_frsize, &ubuf->f_frsize) ||
--	    __put_user(0, &ubuf->f_spare[0]) || 
-+	    __put_user(kbuf->f_flag, &ubuf->f_flag) ||
- 	    __put_user(0, &ubuf->f_spare[1]) || 
- 	    __put_user(0, &ubuf->f_spare[2]) || 
- 	    __put_user(0, &ubuf->f_spare[3]) || 
-@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_statfs(const 
- 	error = user_path_walk(path, &nd);
- 	if (!error) {
- 		struct kstatfs tmp;
--		error = vfs_statfs(nd.dentry, &tmp);
-+		error = vfs_statfs(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, &tmp);
- 		if (!error)
- 			error = put_compat_statfs(buf, &tmp);
- 		path_release(&nd);
-@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_fstatfs(unsig
- 	file = fget(fd);
- 	if (!file)
- 		goto out;
--	error = vfs_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, &tmp);
-+	error = vfs_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt, &tmp);
- 	if (!error)
- 		error = put_compat_statfs(buf, &tmp);
- 	fput(file);
-@@ -267,7 +267,8 @@ static int put_compat_statfs64(struct co
- 	    __put_user(kbuf->f_namelen, &ubuf->f_namelen) ||
- 	    __put_user(kbuf->f_fsid.val[0], &ubuf->f_fsid.val[0]) ||
- 	    __put_user(kbuf->f_fsid.val[1], &ubuf->f_fsid.val[1]) ||
--	    __put_user(kbuf->f_frsize, &ubuf->f_frsize))
-+	    __put_user(kbuf->f_frsize, &ubuf->f_frsize) ||
-+	    __put_user(kbuf->f_flag, &ubuf->f_flag))
- 		return -EFAULT;
- 	return 0;
- }
-@@ -283,7 +284,7 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_statfs64(cons
- 	error = user_path_walk(path, &nd);
- 	if (!error) {
- 		struct kstatfs tmp;
--		error = vfs_statfs(nd.dentry, &tmp);
-+		error = vfs_statfs(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, &tmp);
- 		if (!error)
- 			error = put_compat_statfs64(buf, &tmp);
- 		path_release(&nd);
-@@ -304,7 +305,7 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_fstatfs64(uns
- 	file = fget(fd);
- 	if (!file)
- 		goto out;
--	error = vfs_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, &tmp);
-+	error = vfs_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt, &tmp);
- 	if (!error)
- 		error = put_compat_statfs64(buf, &tmp);
- 	fput(file);
---- a/fs/ecryptfs/super.c
-+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/super.c
-@@ -119,7 +119,10 @@ static void ecryptfs_put_super(struct su
-  */
- static int ecryptfs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
- {
--	return vfs_statfs(ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry), buf);
-+	struct dentry *lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
-+	struct vfsmount *lower_mnt = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_mnt(dentry);
-+
-+	return vfs_statfs(lower_dentry, lower_mnt, buf);
- }
- 
- /**
---- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
-+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
-@@ -1457,7 +1457,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct svc_fh *fhp, s
- 	if ((bmval0 & (FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_FREE | FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_TOTAL)) ||
- 	    (bmval1 & (FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_AVAIL | FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_FREE |
- 		       FATTR4_WORD1_SPACE_TOTAL))) {
--		err = vfs_statfs(dentry, &statfs);
-+		err = vfs_statfs(dentry, exp->ex_mnt, &statfs);
- 		if (err)
- 			goto out_nfserr;
- 	}
---- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
-+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
-@@ -1767,7 +1767,7 @@ __be32
- nfsd_statfs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct kstatfs *stat)
- {
- 	__be32 err = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, 0, MAY_NOP);
--	if (!err && vfs_statfs(fhp->fh_dentry,stat))
-+	if (!err && vfs_statfs(fhp->fh_dentry, fhp->fh_export->ex_mnt, stat))
- 		err = nfserr_io;
- 	return err;
- }
---- a/fs/open.c
-+++ b/fs/open.c
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
- #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
- #include <linux/audit.h>
- 
--int vfs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
-+int vfs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, struct kstatfs *buf)
- {
- 	int retval = -ENODEV;
- 
-@@ -40,8 +40,35 @@ int vfs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, st
- 			if (retval)
- 				return retval;
- 			retval = dentry->d_sb->s_op->statfs(dentry, buf);
--			if (retval == 0 && buf->f_frsize == 0)
--				buf->f_frsize = buf->f_bsize;
-+			if (retval == 0) {
-+				unsigned long f_flag = ST_IN_USE;
-+				unsigned long x;
-+
-+				if (buf->f_frsize == 0)
-+					buf->f_frsize = buf->f_bsize;
-+
-+				x = dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_flags;
-+				if (x & MS_RDONLY)
-+					f_flag |= ST_RDONLY;
-+				if (x & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
-+					f_flag |= ST_SYNCHRONOUS;
-+				if (x & MS_MANDLOCK)
-+					f_flag |= ST_MANDLOCK;
-+
-+				if (mnt) {
-+					int x = mnt->mnt_flags;
-+
-+					if (x & MNT_NOSUID)
-+						f_flag |= ST_NOSUID;
-+					if (x & MNT_NODEV)
-+						f_flag |= ST_NODEV;
-+					if (x & MNT_NOATIME)
-+						f_flag |= ST_NOATIME;
-+					if (x & MNT_NODIRATIME)
-+						f_flag |= ST_NODIRATIME;
-+				}
-+				buf->f_flag = f_flag;
-+			}
- 		}
- 	}
- 	return retval;
-@@ -49,12 +76,13 @@ int vfs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, st
- 
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_statfs);
- 
--static int vfs_statfs_native(struct dentry *dentry, struct statfs *buf)
-+static int vfs_statfs_native(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			     struct statfs *buf)
- {
- 	struct kstatfs st;
- 	int retval;
- 
--	retval = vfs_statfs(dentry, &st);
-+	retval = vfs_statfs(dentry, mnt, &st);
- 	if (retval)
- 		return retval;
- 
-@@ -87,17 +115,19 @@ static int vfs_statfs_native(struct dent
- 		buf->f_fsid = st.f_fsid;
- 		buf->f_namelen = st.f_namelen;
- 		buf->f_frsize = st.f_frsize;
-+		buf->f_flag = st.f_flag;
- 		memset(buf->f_spare, 0, sizeof(buf->f_spare));
- 	}
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int vfs_statfs64(struct dentry *dentry, struct statfs64 *buf)
-+static int vfs_statfs64(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			struct statfs64 *buf)
- {
- 	struct kstatfs st;
- 	int retval;
- 
--	retval = vfs_statfs(dentry, &st);
-+	retval = vfs_statfs(dentry, mnt, &st);
- 	if (retval)
- 		return retval;
- 
-@@ -114,6 +144,7 @@ static int vfs_statfs64(struct dentry *d
- 		buf->f_fsid = st.f_fsid;
- 		buf->f_namelen = st.f_namelen;
- 		buf->f_frsize = st.f_frsize;
-+		buf->f_flag = st.f_flag;
- 		memset(buf->f_spare, 0, sizeof(buf->f_spare));
- 	}
- 	return 0;
-@@ -127,7 +158,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_statfs(const char __
- 	error = user_path_walk(path, &nd);
- 	if (!error) {
- 		struct statfs tmp;
--		error = vfs_statfs_native(nd.dentry, &tmp);
-+		error = vfs_statfs_native(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, &tmp);
- 		if (!error && copy_to_user(buf, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
- 			error = -EFAULT;
- 		path_release(&nd);
-@@ -146,7 +177,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_statfs64(const char 
- 	error = user_path_walk(path, &nd);
- 	if (!error) {
- 		struct statfs64 tmp;
--		error = vfs_statfs64(nd.dentry, &tmp);
-+		error = vfs_statfs64(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, &tmp);
- 		if (!error && copy_to_user(buf, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
- 			error = -EFAULT;
- 		path_release(&nd);
-@@ -165,7 +196,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fstatfs(unsigned int
- 	file = fget(fd);
- 	if (!file)
- 		goto out;
--	error = vfs_statfs_native(file->f_path.dentry, &tmp);
-+	error = vfs_statfs_native(file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt, &tmp);
- 	if (!error && copy_to_user(buf, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
- 		error = -EFAULT;
- 	fput(file);
-@@ -186,7 +217,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fstatfs64(unsigned i
- 	file = fget(fd);
- 	if (!file)
- 		goto out;
--	error = vfs_statfs64(file->f_path.dentry, &tmp);
-+	error = vfs_statfs64(file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt, &tmp);
- 	if (!error && copy_to_user(buf, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
- 		error = -EFAULT;
- 	fput(file);
---- a/fs/super.c
-+++ b/fs/super.c
-@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ustat(unsigned dev, 
-         s = user_get_super(new_decode_dev(dev));
-         if (s == NULL)
-                 goto out;
--	err = vfs_statfs(s->s_root, &sbuf);
-+	err = vfs_statfs(s->s_root, NULL, &sbuf);
- 	drop_super(s);
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out;
---- a/include/asm-generic/statfs.h
-+++ b/include/asm-generic/statfs.h
-@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ struct statfs {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	__u32 f_namelen;
- 	__u32 f_frsize;
--	__u32 f_spare[5];
-+	__u32 f_flag;
-+	__u32 f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct statfs64 {
-@@ -31,7 +32,8 @@ struct statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	__u32 f_namelen;
- 	__u32 f_frsize;
--	__u32 f_spare[5];
-+	__u32 f_flag;
-+	__u32 f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct compat_statfs64 {
-@@ -45,7 +47,8 @@ struct compat_statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	__u32 f_namelen;
- 	__u32 f_frsize;
--	__u32 f_spare[5];
-+	__u32 f_flag;
-+	__u32 f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- #endif
---- a/include/asm-x86_64/compat.h
-+++ b/include/asm-x86_64/compat.h
-@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ struct compat_statfs {
- 	compat_fsid_t	f_fsid;
- 	int		f_namelen;	/* SunOS ignores this field. */
- 	int		f_frsize;
--	int		f_spare[5];
-+	int		f_flag;
-+	int		f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- #define COMPAT_RLIM_OLD_INFINITY	0x7fffffff
---- a/include/asm-x86_64/statfs.h
-+++ b/include/asm-x86_64/statfs.h
-@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ struct statfs {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	long f_namelen;
- 	long f_frsize;
--	long f_spare[5];
-+	long f_flag;
-+	long f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct statfs64 {
-@@ -38,7 +39,8 @@ struct statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	long f_namelen;
- 	long f_frsize;
--	long f_spare[5];
-+	long f_flag;
-+	long f_spare[4];
- };
- 
- struct compat_statfs64 {
-@@ -52,7 +54,8 @@ struct compat_statfs64 {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	__u32 f_namelen;
- 	__u32 f_frsize;
--	__u32 f_spare[5];
-+	__u32 f_flag;
-+	__u32 f_spare[4];
- } __attribute__((packed));
- 
- #endif
---- a/include/linux/fs.h
-+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
-@@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ extern struct vfsmount *copy_tree(struct
- extern void mnt_set_mountpoint(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *,
- 				  struct vfsmount *);
- 
--extern int vfs_statfs(struct dentry *, struct kstatfs *);
-+extern int vfs_statfs(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, struct kstatfs *);
- 
- /* /sys/fs */
- extern struct subsystem fs_subsys;
---- a/include/linux/statfs.h
-+++ b/include/linux/statfs.h
-@@ -16,7 +16,18 @@ struct kstatfs {
- 	__kernel_fsid_t f_fsid;
- 	long f_namelen;
- 	long f_frsize;
--	long f_spare[5];
-+	unsigned long f_flag;
-+	long f_spare[4];
- };
- 
-+#define ST_RDONLY	1
-+#define ST_NOSUID	2
-+#define ST_NODEV	4
-+#define ST_NOEXEC	8
-+#define ST_SYNCHRONOUS	16
-+#define ST_MANDLOCK	64
-+#define ST_NOATIME	1024
-+#define ST_NODIRATIME	2048
-+#define ST_IN_USE	(1 << 31)
-+
- #endif
---- a/kernel/acct.c
-+++ b/kernel/acct.c
-@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static int check_free_space(struct file 
- 	spin_unlock(&acct_globals.lock);
- 
- 	/* May block */
--	if (vfs_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, &sbuf))
-+	if (vfs_statfs(file->f_path.dentry, file->f_path.mnt, &sbuf))
- 		return res;
- 	suspend = sbuf.f_blocks * SUSPEND;
- 	resume = sbuf.f_blocks * RESUME;

kernel-patches/for-mainline/struct_path/series

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-struct_path-nameidata.diff
-struct_path-vfs_getattr.diff
-struct_path-getattr-iop.diff
-struct_path-security-getattr.diff
-struct_path-nfsfh.diff

kernel-patches/for-mainline/struct_path/struct_path-getattr-iop.diff

@@ -1,504 +0,0 @@
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c
-@@ -824,16 +824,15 @@ Release_lock:
- 
- /**
-  * v9fs_vfs_getattr - retrieve file metadata
-- * @mnt - mount information
-- * @dentry - file to get attributes on
-+ * @path - file to get attributes on
-  * @stat - metadata structure to populate
-  *
-  */
- 
- static int
--v9fs_vfs_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
--		 struct kstat *stat)
-+v9fs_vfs_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
-+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
- 	struct v9fs_fcall *fcall = NULL;
- 	struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses = v9fs_inode2v9ses(dentry->d_inode);
- 	struct v9fs_fid *fid = v9fs_fid_clone(dentry);
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/afs/inode.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/afs/inode.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/afs/inode.c
-@@ -218,15 +218,13 @@ inline int afs_iget(struct super_block *
- /*
-  * read the attributes of an inode
-  */
--int afs_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
--		      struct kstat *stat)
-+int afs_inode_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
-+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
-+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	struct afs_vnode *vnode;
--	struct inode *inode;
- 	int ret;
- 
--	inode = dentry->d_inode;
--
- 	_enter("{ ino=%lu v=%lu }", inode->i_ino, inode->i_version);
- 
- 	vnode = AFS_FS_I(inode);
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/afs/internal.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/afs/internal.h
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/afs/internal.h
-@@ -82,8 +82,7 @@ extern int afs_cache_get_page_cookie(str
-  */
- extern int afs_iget(struct super_block *sb, struct afs_fid *fid,
- 		    struct inode **_inode);
--extern int afs_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
--			     struct kstat *stat);
-+extern int afs_inode_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat);
- extern void afs_clear_inode(struct inode *inode);
- 
- /*
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/bad_inode.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/bad_inode.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/bad_inode.c
-@@ -257,8 +257,7 @@ static int bad_inode_permission(struct i
- 	return -EIO;
- }
- 
--static int bad_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
--			struct kstat *stat)
-+static int bad_inode_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
- 	return -EIO;
- }
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/cifs/cifsfs.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/cifs/cifsfs.h
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/cifs/cifsfs.h
-@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ extern int cifs_rmdir(struct inode *, st
- extern int cifs_rename(struct inode *, struct dentry *, struct inode *,
- 		       struct dentry *);
- extern int cifs_revalidate(struct dentry *);
--extern int cifs_getattr(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *, struct kstat *);
-+extern int cifs_getattr(struct path *, struct kstat *);
- extern int cifs_setattr(struct dentry *, struct iattr *);
- 
- extern struct inode_operations cifs_file_inode_ops;
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/cifs/inode.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/cifs/inode.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/cifs/inode.c
-@@ -1091,9 +1091,9 @@ int cifs_revalidate(struct dentry *diren
- 	return rc;
- }
- 
--int cifs_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
--	struct kstat *stat)
-+int cifs_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
-+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
- 	int err = cifs_revalidate(dentry);
- 	if (!err) {
- 		generic_fillattr(dentry->d_inode, stat);
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/coda/inode.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/coda/inode.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/coda/inode.c
-@@ -236,8 +236,9 @@ static void coda_clear_inode(struct inod
- 	coda_cache_clear_inode(inode);
- }
- 
--int coda_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
-+int coda_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
-+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
- 	int err = coda_revalidate_inode(dentry);
- 	if (!err)
- 		generic_fillattr(dentry->d_inode, stat);
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/fat/file.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/fat/file.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/fat/file.c
-@@ -303,8 +303,9 @@ void fat_truncate(struct inode *inode)
- 	fat_flush_inodes(inode->i_sb, inode, NULL);
- }
- 
--int fat_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
-+int fat_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
-+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
- 	stat->blksize = MSDOS_SB(inode->i_sb)->cluster_size;
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/fuse/dir.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/fuse/dir.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/fuse/dir.c
-@@ -1067,11 +1067,11 @@ static int fuse_setattr(struct dentry *e
- 	return err;
- }
- 
--static int fuse_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *entry,
--			struct kstat *stat)
-+static int fuse_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
--	struct inode *inode = entry->d_inode;
--	int err = fuse_revalidate(entry);
-+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
-+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-+	int err = fuse_revalidate(dentry);
- 	if (!err)
- 		generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
- 
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/gfs2/ops_inode.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/gfs2/ops_inode.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/gfs2/ops_inode.c
-@@ -1001,9 +1001,9 @@ out:
-  * Returns: errno
-  */
- 
--static int gfs2_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
--			struct kstat *stat)
-+static int gfs2_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
-+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode);
- 	struct gfs2_holder gh;
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/hostfs/hostfs_kern.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/hostfs/hostfs_kern.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/hostfs/hostfs_kern.c
-@@ -873,10 +873,9 @@ int hostfs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry
- 	return(inode_setattr(dentry->d_inode, attr));
- }
- 
--int hostfs_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
--	   struct kstat *stat)
-+int hostfs_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
--	generic_fillattr(dentry->d_inode, stat);
-+	generic_fillattr(path->dentry->d_inode, stat);
- 	return(0);
- }
- 
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/libfs.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/libfs.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/libfs.c
-@@ -11,10 +11,9 @@
- 
- #include <asm/uaccess.h>
- 
--int simple_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
--		   struct kstat *stat)
-+int simple_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
--	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
- 	generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
- 	stat->blocks = inode->i_mapping->nrpages << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - 9);
- 	return 0;
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/minix/inode.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/minix/inode.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/minix/inode.c
-@@ -535,8 +535,9 @@ int minix_sync_inode(struct inode * inod
- 	return err;
- }
- 
--int minix_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
-+int minix_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
-+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
- 	generic_fillattr(dentry->d_inode, stat);
- 	if (INODE_VERSION(dentry->d_inode) == MINIX_V1)
- 		stat->blocks = (BLOCK_SIZE / 512) * V1_minix_blocks(stat->size);
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/minix/minix.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/minix/minix.h
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/minix/minix.h
-@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ extern int minix_new_block(struct inode 
- extern void minix_free_block(struct inode * inode, int block);
- extern unsigned long minix_count_free_blocks(struct minix_sb_info *sbi);
- 
--extern int minix_getattr(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *, struct kstat *);
-+extern int minix_getattr(struct path *, struct kstat *);
- 
- extern void V2_minix_truncate(struct inode *);
- extern void V1_minix_truncate(struct inode *);
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfs/inode.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfs/inode.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfs/inode.c
-@@ -415,9 +415,9 @@ static void nfs_wake_up_inode(struct ino
- 	wake_up_bit(&nfsi->flags, NFS_INO_REVALIDATING);
- }
- 
--int nfs_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
-+int nfs_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
--	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
- 	int need_atime = NFS_I(inode)->cache_validity & NFS_INO_INVALID_ATIME;
- 	int err;
- 
-@@ -433,8 +433,8 @@ int nfs_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, st
- 	 *  - NFS never sets MS_NOATIME or MS_NODIRATIME so there is
- 	 *    no point in checking those.
- 	 */
-- 	if ((mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOATIME) ||
-- 	    ((mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODIRATIME) && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)))
-+ 	if ((path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOATIME) ||
-+ 	    ((path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODIRATIME) && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)))
- 		need_atime = 0;
- 
- 	if (need_atime)
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/ocfs2/file.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/ocfs2/file.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/ocfs2/file.c
-@@ -935,10 +935,9 @@ bail:
- 	return status;
- }
- 
--int ocfs2_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt,
--		  struct dentry *dentry,
--		  struct kstat *stat)
-+int ocfs2_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
-+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_inode->i_sb;
- 	struct ocfs2_super *osb = sb->s_fs_info;
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/ocfs2/file.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/ocfs2/file.h
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/ocfs2/file.h
-@@ -46,8 +46,7 @@ int ocfs2_do_extend_allocation(struct oc
- 			       struct ocfs2_alloc_context *meta_ac,
- 			       enum ocfs2_alloc_restarted *reason);
- int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
--int ocfs2_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
--		  struct kstat *stat);
-+int ocfs2_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat);
- int ocfs2_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
- 		     struct nameidata *nd);
- 
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/proc/base.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/proc/base.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/proc/base.c
-@@ -1045,9 +1045,9 @@ out_unlock:
- 	return NULL;
- }
- 
--static int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
-+static int pid_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
--	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
- 	struct task_struct *task;
- 	generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
- 
-@@ -2379,9 +2379,9 @@ out_no_task:
- 	return retval;
- }
- 
--static int proc_task_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
-+static int proc_task_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
--	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
- 	struct task_struct *p = get_proc_task(inode);
- 	generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
- 
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/proc/generic.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/proc/generic.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/proc/generic.c
-@@ -253,10 +253,9 @@ out:
- 	return error;
- }
- 
--static int proc_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
--			struct kstat *stat)
-+static int proc_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
--	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
- 	struct proc_dir_entry *de = PROC_I(inode)->pde;
- 	if (de && de->nlink)
- 		inode->i_nlink = de->nlink;
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/proc/root.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/proc/root.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/proc/root.c
-@@ -92,10 +92,9 @@ void __init proc_root_init(void)
- 	proc_bus = proc_mkdir("bus", NULL);
- }
- 
--static int proc_root_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat
--)
-+static int proc_root_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
--	generic_fillattr(dentry->d_inode, stat);
-+	generic_fillattr(path->dentry->d_inode, stat);
- 	stat->nlink = proc_root.nlink + nr_processes();
- 	return 0;
- }
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/smbfs/inode.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/smbfs/inode.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/smbfs/inode.c
-@@ -653,8 +653,9 @@ smb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct
- 	return result;
- }
- 
--int smb_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
-+int smb_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
-+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
- 	int err = smb_revalidate_inode(dentry);
- 	if (!err)
- 		generic_fillattr(dentry->d_inode, stat);
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/smbfs/proto.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/smbfs/proto.h
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/smbfs/proto.h
-@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ extern void smb_get_inode_attr(struct in
- extern void smb_set_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, struct smb_fattr *fattr);
- extern void smb_invalidate_inodes(struct smb_sb_info *server);
- extern int smb_revalidate_inode(struct dentry *dentry);
--extern int smb_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat);
-+extern int smb_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat);
- extern int smb_notify_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
- /* file.c */
- extern const struct address_space_operations smb_file_aops;
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/stat.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/stat.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/stat.c
-@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int vfs_getattr(struct path *path, struc
- 		return retval;
- 
- 	if (inode->i_op->getattr)
--		return inode->i_op->getattr(path->mnt, path->dentry, stat);
-+		return inode->i_op->getattr(path, stat);
- 
- 	generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
- 	return 0;
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/sysv/itree.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/sysv/itree.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/sysv/itree.c
-@@ -440,10 +440,10 @@ static unsigned sysv_nblocks(struct supe
- 	return blocks;
- }
- 
--int sysv_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
-+int sysv_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
--	struct super_block *s = mnt->mnt_sb;
--	generic_fillattr(dentry->d_inode, stat);
-+	struct super_block *s = path->mnt->mnt_sb;
-+	generic_fillattr(path->dentry->d_inode, stat);
- 	stat->blocks = (s->s_blocksize / 512) * sysv_nblocks(s, stat->size);
- 	stat->blksize = s->s_blocksize;
- 	return 0;
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/sysv/sysv.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/sysv/sysv.h
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/sysv/sysv.h
-@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ extern int sysv_write_inode(struct inode
- extern int sysv_sync_inode(struct inode *);
- extern int sysv_sync_file(struct file *, struct dentry *, int);
- extern void sysv_set_inode(struct inode *, dev_t);
--extern int sysv_getattr(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *, struct kstat *);
-+extern int sysv_getattr(struct path *, struct kstat *);
- extern int sysv_init_icache(void);
- extern void sysv_destroy_icache(void);
- 
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c
-@@ -617,11 +617,10 @@ xfs_vn_permission(
- 
- STATIC int
- xfs_vn_getattr(
--	struct vfsmount	*mnt,
--	struct dentry	*dentry,
-+	struct path	*path,
- 	struct kstat	*stat)
- {
--	struct inode	*inode = dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode	*inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
- 	bhv_vnode_t	*vp = vn_from_inode(inode);
- 	bhv_vattr_t	vattr = { .va_mask = XFS_AT_STAT };
- 	int		error;
-Index: linux-2.6/include/linux/coda_linux.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/include/linux/coda_linux.h
-+++ linux-2.6/include/linux/coda_linux.h
-@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ int coda_flush(struct file *f, fl_owner_
- int coda_release(struct inode *i, struct file *f);
- int coda_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd);
- int coda_revalidate_inode(struct dentry *);
--int coda_getattr(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *, struct kstat *);
-+int coda_getattr(struct path *, struct kstat *);
- int coda_setattr(struct dentry *, struct iattr *);
- 
- /* global variables */
-Index: linux-2.6/include/linux/fs.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/include/linux/fs.h
-+++ linux-2.6/include/linux/fs.h
-@@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@ struct inode_operations {
- 	void (*truncate) (struct inode *);
- 	int (*permission) (struct inode *, int, struct nameidata *);
- 	int (*setattr) (struct dentry *, struct iattr *);
--	int (*getattr) (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *, struct kstat *);
-+	int (*getattr) (struct path *path, struct kstat *);
- 	int (*setxattr) (struct dentry *, const char *,const void *,size_t,int);
- 	ssize_t (*getxattr) (struct dentry *, const char *, void *, size_t);
- 	ssize_t (*listxattr) (struct dentry *, char *, size_t);
-@@ -1850,7 +1850,7 @@ extern int dcache_dir_open(struct inode 
- extern int dcache_dir_close(struct inode *, struct file *);
- extern loff_t dcache_dir_lseek(struct file *, loff_t, int);
- extern int dcache_readdir(struct file *, void *, filldir_t);
--extern int simple_getattr(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *, struct kstat *);
-+extern int simple_getattr(struct path *, struct kstat *);
- extern int simple_statfs(struct dentry *, struct kstatfs *);
- extern int simple_link(struct dentry *, struct inode *, struct dentry *);
- extern int simple_unlink(struct inode *, struct dentry *);
-Index: linux-2.6/include/linux/msdos_fs.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/include/linux/msdos_fs.h
-+++ linux-2.6/include/linux/msdos_fs.h
-@@ -402,8 +402,7 @@ extern const struct file_operations fat_
- extern struct inode_operations fat_file_inode_operations;
- extern int fat_notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr);
- extern void fat_truncate(struct inode *inode);
--extern int fat_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
--		       struct kstat *stat);
-+extern int fat_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat);
- 
- /* fat/inode.c */
- extern void fat_attach(struct inode *inode, loff_t i_pos);
-Index: linux-2.6/include/linux/nfs_fs.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/include/linux/nfs_fs.h
-+++ linux-2.6/include/linux/nfs_fs.h
-@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ extern struct inode *nfs_fhget(struct su
- 				struct nfs_fattr *);
- extern int nfs_refresh_inode(struct inode *, struct nfs_fattr *);
- extern int nfs_post_op_update_inode(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_fattr *fattr);
--extern int nfs_getattr(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *, struct kstat *);
-+extern int nfs_getattr(struct path *, struct kstat *);
- extern int nfs_permission(struct inode *, int, struct nameidata *);
- extern int nfs_access_get_cached(struct inode *, struct rpc_cred *, struct nfs_access_entry *);
- extern void nfs_access_add_cache(struct inode *, struct nfs_access_entry *);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/struct_path/struct_path-nfsfh.diff

@@ -1,920 +0,0 @@
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
-@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static __be32 nfsacld_proc_getacl(struct
- 		if (acl == NULL) {
- 			/* Solaris returns the inode's minimum ACL. */
- 
--			struct inode *inode = fh->fh_dentry->d_inode;
-+			struct inode *inode = fh->fh_path.dentry->d_inode;
- 			acl = posix_acl_from_mode(inode->i_mode, GFP_KERNEL);
- 		}
- 		resp->acl_access = acl;
-@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static int nfsaclsvc_decode_accessargs(s
- static int nfsaclsvc_encode_getaclres(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
- 		struct nfsd3_getaclres *resp)
- {
--	struct dentry *dentry = resp->fh.fh_dentry;
-+	struct dentry *dentry = resp->fh.fh_path.dentry;
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	struct kvec *head = rqstp->rq_res.head;
- 	unsigned int base;
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c
-@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static __be32 nfsd3_proc_getacl(struct s
- 		if (acl == NULL) {
- 			/* Solaris returns the inode's minimum ACL. */
- 
--			struct inode *inode = fh->fh_dentry->d_inode;
-+			struct inode *inode = fh->fh_path.dentry->d_inode;
- 			acl = posix_acl_from_mode(inode->i_mode, GFP_KERNEL);
- 		}
- 		resp->acl_access = acl;
-@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static int nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs(str
- static int nfs3svc_encode_getaclres(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
- 		struct nfsd3_getaclres *resp)
- {
--	struct dentry *dentry = resp->fh.fh_dentry;
-+	struct dentry *dentry = resp->fh.fh_path.dentry;
- 
- 	p = nfs3svc_encode_post_op_attr(rqstp, p, &resp->fh);
- 	if (resp->status == 0 && dentry && dentry->d_inode) {
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs3proc.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfs3proc.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs3proc.c
-@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ nfsd3_proc_getattr(struct svc_rqst *rqst
- {
- 	int	err;
- 	__be32	nfserr;
--	struct path path;
- 
- 	dprintk("nfsd: GETATTR(3)  %s\n",
- 		SVCFH_fmt(&argp->fh));
-@@ -68,9 +67,7 @@ nfsd3_proc_getattr(struct svc_rqst *rqst
- 	if (nfserr)
- 		RETURN_STATUS(nfserr);
- 
--	path.mnt = resp->fh.fh_export->ex_mnt;
--	path.dentry = resp->fh.fh_dentry;
--	err = vfs_getattr(&path, &resp->stat);
-+	err = vfs_getattr(&resp->fh.fh_path, &resp->stat);
- 	nfserr = nfserrno(err);
- 
- 	RETURN_STATUS(nfserr);
-@@ -187,7 +184,7 @@ nfsd3_proc_read(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, 
- 			   	  rqstp->rq_vec, argp->vlen,
- 				  &resp->count);
- 	if (nfserr == 0) {
--		struct inode	*inode = resp->fh.fh_dentry->d_inode;
-+		struct inode	*inode = resp->fh.fh_path.dentry->d_inode;
- 
- 		resp->eof = (argp->offset + resp->count) >= inode->i_size;
- 	}
-@@ -566,7 +563,7 @@ nfsd3_proc_fsinfo(struct svc_rqst * rqst
- 	 * different read/write sizes for file systems known to have
- 	 * problems with large blocks */
- 	if (nfserr == 0) {
--		struct super_block *sb = argp->fh.fh_dentry->d_inode->i_sb;
-+		struct super_block *sb = argp->fh.fh_path.dentry->d_inode->i_sb;
- 
- 		/* Note that we don't care for remote fs's here */
- 		if (sb->s_magic == 0x4d44 /* MSDOS_SUPER_MAGIC */) {
-@@ -602,7 +599,7 @@ nfsd3_proc_pathconf(struct svc_rqst * rq
- 	nfserr = fh_verify(rqstp, &argp->fh, 0, MAY_NOP);
- 
- 	if (nfserr == 0) {
--		struct super_block *sb = argp->fh.fh_dentry->d_inode->i_sb;
-+		struct super_block *sb = argp->fh.fh_path.dentry->d_inode->i_sb;
- 
- 		/* Note that we don't care for remote fs's here */
- 		switch (sb->s_magic) {
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c
-@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static __be32 *
- encode_fattr3(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp,
- 	      struct kstat *stat)
- {
--	struct dentry	*dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	struct dentry	*dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	struct timespec time;
- 
- 	*p++ = htonl(nfs3_ftypes[(stat->mode & S_IFMT) >> 12]);
-@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ encode_fattr3(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __
- static __be32 *
- encode_saved_post_attr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp)
- {
--	struct inode	*inode = fhp->fh_dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode	*inode = fhp->fh_path.dentry->d_inode;
- 
- 	/* Attributes to follow */
- 	*p++ = xdr_one;
-@@ -223,15 +223,13 @@ encode_saved_post_attr(struct svc_rqst *
- static __be32 *
- encode_post_op_attr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp)
- {
--	struct path path;
-+	struct dentry *dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 
--	path.dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
--	if (path.dentry && path.dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
-+	if (dentry && dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
- 	        int err;
- 		struct kstat stat;
- 
--		path.mnt = fhp->fh_export->ex_mnt;
--		err = vfs_getattr(&path, &stat);
-+		err = vfs_getattr(&fhp->fh_path, &stat);
- 		if (!err) {
- 			*p++ = xdr_one;		/* attributes follow */
- 			return encode_fattr3(rqstp, p, fhp, &stat);
-@@ -254,7 +252,7 @@ nfs3svc_encode_post_op_attr(struct svc_r
- static __be32 *
- encode_wcc_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp)
- {
--	struct dentry	*dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	struct dentry	*dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 
- 	if (dentry && dentry->d_inode && fhp->fh_post_saved) {
- 		if (fhp->fh_pre_saved) {
-@@ -808,7 +806,7 @@ compose_entry_fh(struct nfsd3_readdirres
- 	struct dentry		*dparent, *dchild;
- 	int rv = 0;
- 
--	dparent = cd->fh.fh_dentry;
-+	dparent = cd->fh.fh_path.dentry;
- 	exp  = cd->fh.fh_export;
- 
- 	fh_init(fhp, NFS3_FHSIZE);
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
-@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static inline void
- fh_dup2(struct svc_fh *dst, struct svc_fh *src)
- {
- 	fh_put(dst);
--	dget(src->fh_dentry);
-+	dget(src->fh_path.dentry);
- 	if (src->fh_export)
- 		cache_get(&src->fh_export->h);
- 	*dst = *src;
-@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static __be32
- nfsd4_getfh(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
- 	    struct svc_fh **getfh)
- {
--	if (!cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry)
-+	if (!cstate->current_fh.fh_path.dentry)
- 		return nfserr_nofilehandle;
- 
- 	*getfh = &cstate->current_fh;
-@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ static __be32
- nfsd4_restorefh(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
- 		void *arg)
- {
--	if (!cstate->save_fh.fh_dentry)
-+	if (!cstate->save_fh.fh_path.dentry)
- 		return nfserr_restorefh;
- 
- 	fh_dup2(&cstate->current_fh, &cstate->save_fh);
-@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static __be32
- nfsd4_savefh(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
- 	     void *arg)
- {
--	if (!cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry)
-+	if (!cstate->current_fh.fh_path.dentry)
- 		return nfserr_nofilehandle;
- 
- 	fh_dup2(&cstate->save_fh, &cstate->current_fh);
-@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ nfsd4_link(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struc
- {
- 	__be32 status = nfserr_nofilehandle;
- 
--	if (!cstate->save_fh.fh_dentry)
-+	if (!cstate->save_fh.fh_path.dentry)
- 		return status;
- 	status = nfsd_link(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh,
- 			   link->li_name, link->li_namelen, &cstate->save_fh);
-@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ nfsd4_lookupp(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, st
- 	if((ret = exp_pseudoroot(rqstp->rq_client, &tmp_fh,
- 			      &rqstp->rq_chandle)) != 0)
- 		return ret;
--	if (tmp_fh.fh_dentry == cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry) {
-+	if (tmp_fh.fh_path.dentry == cstate->current_fh.fh_path.dentry) {
- 		fh_put(&tmp_fh);
- 		return nfserr_noent;
- 	}
-@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ nfsd4_rename(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, str
- {
- 	__be32 status = nfserr_nofilehandle;
- 
--	if (!cstate->save_fh.fh_dentry)
-+	if (!cstate->save_fh.fh_path.dentry)
- 		return status;
- 	if (nfs4_in_grace() && !(cstate->save_fh.fh_export->ex_flags
- 					& NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK))
-@@ -597,8 +597,8 @@ nfsd4_rename(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, str
- 	if (status == nfserr_isdir)
- 		status = nfserr_exist;
- 	else if ((status == nfserr_notdir) &&
--                  (S_ISDIR(cstate->save_fh.fh_dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
--                   S_ISDIR(cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry->d_inode->i_mode)))
-+                  (S_ISDIR(cstate->save_fh.fh_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
-+                   S_ISDIR(cstate->current_fh.fh_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode)))
- 		status = nfserr_exist;
- 	else if (status == nfserr_symlink)
- 		status = nfserr_notdir;
-@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ _nfsd4_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, st
- 
- 	status = nfsd4_encode_fattr(&cstate->current_fh,
- 				    cstate->current_fh.fh_export,
--				    cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry, buf,
-+				    &cstate->current_fh.fh_path, buf,
- 				    &count, verify->ve_bmval,
- 				    rqstp);
- 
-@@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ nfsd4_proc_compound(struct svc_rqst *rqs
- 
- 		opdesc = &nfsd4_ops[op->opnum];
- 
--		if (!cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry) {
-+		if (!cstate->current_fh.fh_path.dentry) {
- 			if (!(opdesc->op_flags & ALLOWED_WITHOUT_FH)) {
- 				op->status = nfserr_nofilehandle;
- 				goto encode_op;
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
-@@ -1286,7 +1286,7 @@ test_share(struct nfs4_stateid *stp, str
- static __be32
- nfs4_share_conflict(struct svc_fh *current_fh, unsigned int deny_type)
- {
--	struct inode *ino = current_fh->fh_dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode *ino = current_fh->fh_path.dentry->d_inode;
- 	struct nfs4_file *fp;
- 	struct nfs4_stateid *stp;
- 	__be32 ret;
-@@ -1745,7 +1745,7 @@ __be32
- nfsd4_process_open2(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *current_fh, struct nfsd4_open *open)
- {
- 	struct nfs4_file *fp = NULL;
--	struct inode *ino = current_fh->fh_dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode *ino = current_fh->fh_path.dentry->d_inode;
- 	struct nfs4_stateid *stp = NULL;
- 	struct nfs4_delegation *dp = NULL;
- 	__be32 status;
-@@ -1969,7 +1969,7 @@ search_close_lru(u32 st_id, int flags)
- static inline int
- nfs4_check_fh(struct svc_fh *fhp, struct nfs4_stateid *stp)
- {
--	return fhp->fh_dentry->d_inode != stp->st_vfs_file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-+	return fhp->fh_path.dentry->d_inode != stp->st_vfs_file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
- }
- 
- static int
-@@ -2052,7 +2052,7 @@ nfs4_preprocess_stateid_op(struct svc_fh
- 	struct nfs4_stateid *stp = NULL;
- 	struct nfs4_delegation *dp = NULL;
- 	stateid_t *stidp;
--	struct inode *ino = current_fh->fh_dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode *ino = current_fh->fh_path.dentry->d_inode;
- 	__be32 status;
- 
- 	dprintk("NFSD: preprocess_stateid_op: stateid = (%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x)\n",
-@@ -2253,8 +2253,8 @@ nfsd4_open_confirm(struct svc_rqst *rqst
- 	struct nfs4_stateid *stp;
- 
- 	dprintk("NFSD: nfsd4_open_confirm on file %.*s\n",
--			(int)cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry->d_name.len,
--			cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry->d_name.name);
-+			(int)cstate->current_fh.fh_path.dentry->d_name.len,
-+			cstate->current_fh.fh_path.dentry->d_name.name);
- 
- 	status = fh_verify(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh, S_IFREG, 0);
- 	if (status)
-@@ -2324,8 +2324,8 @@ nfsd4_open_downgrade(struct svc_rqst *rq
- 	unsigned int share_access;
- 
- 	dprintk("NFSD: nfsd4_open_downgrade on file %.*s\n", 
--			(int)cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry->d_name.len,
--			cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry->d_name.name);
-+			(int)cstate->current_fh.fh_path.dentry->d_name.len,
-+			cstate->current_fh.fh_path.dentry->d_name.name);
- 
- 	if (!access_valid(od->od_share_access)
- 			|| !deny_valid(od->od_share_deny))
-@@ -2380,8 +2380,8 @@ nfsd4_close(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, stru
- 	struct nfs4_stateid *stp;
- 
- 	dprintk("NFSD: nfsd4_close on file %.*s\n", 
--			(int)cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry->d_name.len,
--			cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry->d_name.name);
-+			(int)cstate->current_fh.fh_path.dentry->d_name.len,
-+			cstate->current_fh.fh_path.dentry->d_name.name);
- 
- 	nfs4_lock_state();
- 	/* check close_lru for replay */
-@@ -2837,7 +2837,7 @@ nfsd4_lockt(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, stru
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	inode = cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry->d_inode;
-+	inode = cstate->current_fh.fh_path.dentry->d_inode;
- 	locks_init_lock(&file_lock);
- 	switch (lockt->lt_type) {
- 		case NFS4_READ_LT:
-@@ -2876,7 +2876,7 @@ nfsd4_lockt(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, stru
- 	 * only the dentry:inode set.
- 	 */
- 	memset(&file, 0, sizeof (struct file));
--	file.f_path.dentry = cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry;
-+	file.f_path.dentry = cstate->current_fh.fh_path.dentry;
- 
- 	status = nfs_ok;
- 	if (posix_test_lock(&file, &file_lock, &conflock)) {
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
-@@ -1424,7 +1424,7 @@ static __be32 fattr_handle_absent_fs(u32
-  */
- __be32
- nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct svc_fh *fhp, struct svc_export *exp,
--		struct dentry *dentry, __be32 *buffer, int *countp, u32 *bmval,
-+		struct path *path, __be32 *buffer, int *countp, u32 *bmval,
- 		struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
- {
- 	u32 bmval0 = bmval[0];
-@@ -1442,7 +1442,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct svc_fh *fhp, s
- 	int err;
- 	int aclsupport = 0;
- 	struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
--	struct path path;
-+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
- 
- 	BUG_ON(bmval1 & NFSD_WRITEONLY_ATTRS_WORD1);
- 	BUG_ON(bmval0 & ~NFSD_SUPPORTED_ATTRS_WORD0);
-@@ -1454,9 +1454,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct svc_fh *fhp, s
- 			goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	path.mnt = exp->ex_mnt;
--	path.dentry = dentry;
--	err = vfs_getattr(&path, &stat);
-+	err = vfs_getattr(path, &stat);
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out_nfserr;
- 	if ((bmval0 & (FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_FREE | FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_TOTAL)) ||
-@@ -1839,28 +1837,29 @@ nfsd4_encode_dirent_fattr(struct nfsd4_r
- 		const char *name, int namlen, __be32 *p, int *buflen)
- {
- 	struct svc_export *exp = cd->rd_fhp->fh_export;
--	struct dentry *dentry;
-+	struct path path;
- 	__be32 nfserr;
- 
--	dentry = lookup_one_len(name, cd->rd_fhp->fh_dentry, namlen);
--	if (IS_ERR(dentry))
--		return nfserrno(PTR_ERR(dentry));
-+	path.dentry = lookup_one_len(name, cd->rd_fhp->fh_path.dentry, namlen);
-+	if (IS_ERR(path.dentry))
-+		return nfserrno(PTR_ERR(path.dentry));
- 
- 	exp_get(exp);
--	if (d_mountpoint(dentry)) {
-+	if (d_mountpoint(path.dentry)) {
- 		int err;
- 
--		err = nfsd_cross_mnt(cd->rd_rqstp, &dentry, &exp);
-+		err = nfsd_cross_mnt(cd->rd_rqstp, &path.dentry, &exp);
- 		if (err) {
- 			nfserr = nfserrno(err);
- 			goto out_put;
- 		}
- 
- 	}
--	nfserr = nfsd4_encode_fattr(NULL, exp, dentry, p, buflen, cd->rd_bmval,
-+	path.mnt = exp->ex_mnt;
-+	nfserr = nfsd4_encode_fattr(NULL, exp, &path, p, buflen, cd->rd_bmval,
- 					cd->rd_rqstp);
- out_put:
--	dput(dentry);
-+	dput(path.dentry);
- 	exp_put(exp);
- 	return nfserr;
- }
-@@ -2010,7 +2009,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_getattr(struct nfsd4_compou
- 		return nfserr;
- 
- 	buflen = resp->end - resp->p - (COMPOUND_ERR_SLACK_SPACE >> 2);
--	nfserr = nfsd4_encode_fattr(fhp, fhp->fh_export, fhp->fh_dentry,
-+	nfserr = nfsd4_encode_fattr(fhp, fhp->fh_export, &fhp->fh_path,
- 				    resp->p, &buflen, getattr->ga_bmval,
- 				    resp->rqstp);
- 	if (!nfserr)
-@@ -2248,7 +2247,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_read(struct nfsd4_compoundr
- 	if (nfserr)
- 		return nfserr;
- 	eof = (read->rd_offset + maxcount >=
--	       read->rd_fhp->fh_dentry->d_inode->i_size);
-+	       read->rd_fhp->fh_path.dentry->d_inode->i_size);
- 
- 	WRITE32(eof);
- 	WRITE32(maxcount);
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
-@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct
- 	/* keep this filehandle for possible reference  when encoding attributes */
- 	rqstp->rq_reffh = fh;
- 
--	if (!fhp->fh_dentry) {
-+	if (!fhp->fh_path.dentry) {
- 		__u32 *datap=NULL;
- 		__u32 tfh[3];		/* filehandle fragment for oldstyle filehandles */
- 		int fileid_type;
-@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct
- 		}
- #endif
- 
--		fhp->fh_dentry = dentry;
-+		fhp->fh_path.dentry = dentry;
- 		fhp->fh_export = exp;
- 		nfsd_nr_verified++;
- 	} else {
-@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct
- 		 * (e.g. nfsproc_create calls fh_verify, then nfsd_create does as well)
- 		 */
- 		dprintk("nfsd: fh_verify - just checking\n");
--		dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+		dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 		exp = fhp->fh_export;
- 		/* Set user creds for this exportpoint; necessary even
- 		 * in the "just checking" case because this may be a
-@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ fh_compose(struct svc_fh *fhp, struct sv
- 	if (ref_fh == fhp)
- 		fh_put(ref_fh);
- 
--	if (fhp->fh_locked || fhp->fh_dentry) {
-+	if (fhp->fh_locked || fhp->fh_path.dentry) {
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "fh_compose: fh %s/%s not initialized!\n",
- 			parent->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.name);
- 	}
-@@ -380,7 +380,8 @@ fh_compose(struct svc_fh *fhp, struct sv
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "fh_compose: called with maxsize %d! %s/%s\n",
- 		       fhp->fh_maxsize, parent->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.name);
- 
--	fhp->fh_dentry = dget(dentry); /* our internal copy */
-+	fhp->fh_path.mnt = exp->ex_mnt;  /* FIXME: can this get released while we still keep the copy here? Probably not... */
-+	fhp->fh_path.dentry = dget(dentry); /* our internal copy */
- 	fhp->fh_export = exp;
- 	cache_get(&exp->h);
- 
-@@ -459,10 +460,10 @@ fh_update(struct svc_fh *fhp)
- 	struct dentry *dentry;
- 	__u32 *datap;
- 	
--	if (!fhp->fh_dentry)
-+	if (!fhp->fh_path.dentry)
- 		goto out_bad;
- 
--	dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	if (!dentry->d_inode)
- 		goto out_negative;
- 	if (fhp->fh_handle.fh_version != 1) {
-@@ -498,11 +499,11 @@ out_negative:
- void
- fh_put(struct svc_fh *fhp)
- {
--	struct dentry * dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	struct dentry * dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	struct svc_export * exp = fhp->fh_export;
- 	if (dentry) {
- 		fh_unlock(fhp);
--		fhp->fh_dentry = NULL;
-+		fhp->fh_path.dentry = NULL;
- 		dput(dentry);
- #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V3
- 		fhp->fh_pre_saved = 0;
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c
-@@ -39,25 +39,17 @@ nfsd_proc_null(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, v
- static __be32
- nfsd_return_attrs(__be32 err, struct nfsd_attrstat *resp)
- {
--	struct path path;
--
- 	if (err)
- 		return err;
--	path.mnt = resp->fh.fh_export->ex_mnt;
--	path.dentry = resp->fh.fh_dentry;
--	return nfserrno(vfs_getattr(&path, &resp->stat));
-+	return nfserrno(vfs_getattr(&resp->fh.fh_path, &resp->stat));
- }
- 
- static __be32
- nfsd_return_dirop(__be32 err, struct nfsd_diropres *resp)
- {
--	struct path path;
--
- 	if (err)
- 		return err;
--	path.mnt = resp->fh.fh_export->ex_mnt;
--	path.dentry = resp->fh.fh_dentry;
--	return nfserrno(vfs_getattr(&path, &resp->stat));
-+	return nfserrno(vfs_getattr(&resp->fh.fh_path, &resp->stat));
- }
- /*
-  * Get a file's attributes
-@@ -143,7 +135,6 @@ static __be32
- nfsd_proc_read(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd_readargs *argp,
- 				       struct nfsd_readres  *resp)
- {
--	struct path path;
- 	__be32	nfserr;
- 
- 	dprintk("nfsd: READ    %s %d bytes at %d\n",
-@@ -172,9 +163,7 @@ nfsd_proc_read(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, s
- 
- 	if (nfserr)
- 		return nfserr;
--	path.mnt = resp->fh.fh_export->ex_mnt;
--	path.dentry = resp->fh.fh_dentry;
--	return nfserrno(vfs_getattr(&path, &resp->stat));
-+	return nfserrno(vfs_getattr(&resp->fh.fh_path, &resp->stat));
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -236,7 +225,7 @@ nfsd_proc_create(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- 	if (isdotent(argp->name, argp->len))
- 		goto done;
- 	fh_lock_nested(dirfhp, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
--	dchild = lookup_one_len(argp->name, dirfhp->fh_dentry, argp->len);
-+	dchild = lookup_one_len(argp->name, dirfhp->fh_path.dentry, argp->len);
- 	if (IS_ERR(dchild)) {
- 		nfserr = nfserrno(PTR_ERR(dchild));
- 		goto out_unlock;
-@@ -254,14 +243,14 @@ nfsd_proc_create(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- 		 * whether the file exists or not. Time to bail ...
- 		 */
- 		nfserr = nfserr_acces;
--		if (!newfhp->fh_dentry) {
-+		if (!newfhp->fh_path.dentry) {
- 			printk(KERN_WARNING 
- 				"nfsd_proc_create: file handle not verified\n");
- 			goto out_unlock;
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--	inode = newfhp->fh_dentry->d_inode;
-+	inode = newfhp->fh_path.dentry->d_inode;
- 
- 	/* Unfudge the mode bits */
- 	if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
-@@ -286,9 +275,10 @@ nfsd_proc_create(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- 					 *   echo thing > device-special-file-or-pipe
- 					 * by doing a CREATE with type==0
- 					 */
--					nfserr = nfsd_permission(newfhp->fh_export,
--								 newfhp->fh_dentry,
--								 MAY_WRITE|MAY_LOCAL_ACCESS);
-+					nfserr = nfsd_permission(
-+						newfhp->fh_export,
-+						newfhp->fh_path.dentry,
-+						MAY_WRITE|MAY_LOCAL_ACCESS);
- 					if (nfserr && nfserr != nfserr_rofs)
- 						goto out_unlock;
- 				}
-@@ -448,7 +438,7 @@ nfsd_proc_mkdir(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, 
- 
- 	dprintk("nfsd: MKDIR    %s %.*s\n", SVCFH_fmt(&argp->fh), argp->len, argp->name);
- 
--	if (resp->fh.fh_dentry) {
-+	if (resp->fh.fh_path.dentry) {
- 		printk(KERN_WARNING
- 			"nfsd_proc_mkdir: response already verified??\n");
- 	}
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c
-@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static __be32 *
- encode_fattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp,
- 	     struct kstat *stat)
- {
--	struct dentry	*dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	struct dentry	*dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	int type;
- 	struct timespec time;
- 
-@@ -193,11 +193,8 @@ encode_fattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __b
- __be32 *nfs2svc_encode_fattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp)
- {
- 	struct kstat stat;
--	struct path path;
- 
--	path.mnt = fhp->fh_export->ex_mnt;
--	path.dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
--	vfs_getattr(&path, &stat);
-+	vfs_getattr(&fhp->fh_path, &stat);
- 	return encode_fattr(rqstp, p, fhp, &stat);
- }
- 
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
-@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ nfsd_lookup(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, stru
- 	if (err)
- 		return err;
- 
--	dparent = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	dparent = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	exp  = fhp->fh_export;
- 	exp_get(exp);
- 
-@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ nfsd_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, str
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 
- 	/* Ignore any mode updates on symlinks */
-@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ nfsd4_set_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *rqst
- 	if (error)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
- 		flags = NFS4_ACL_DIR;
-@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ nfsd_access(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, stru
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	export = fhp->fh_export;
--	dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 
- 	if (S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
- 		map = nfs3_regaccess;
-@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 
- 	/* Disallow write access to files with the append-only bit set
-@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ nfsd_read(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct
- 	__be32		err;
- 
- 	if (file) {
--		err = nfsd_permission(fhp->fh_export, fhp->fh_dentry,
-+		err = nfsd_permission(fhp->fh_export, fhp->fh_path.dentry,
- 				MAY_READ|MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE);
- 		if (err)
- 			goto out;
-@@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ nfsd_write(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struc
- 	__be32			err = 0;
- 
- 	if (file) {
--		err = nfsd_permission(fhp->fh_export, fhp->fh_dentry,
-+		err = nfsd_permission(fhp->fh_export, fhp->fh_path.dentry,
- 				MAY_WRITE|MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE);
- 		if (err)
- 			goto out;
-@@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ nfsd_create(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, stru
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	dirp = dentry->d_inode;
- 
- 	err = nfserr_notdir;
-@@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@ nfsd_create(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, stru
- 	 * Check whether the response file handle has been verified yet.
- 	 * If it has, the parent directory should already be locked.
- 	 */
--	if (!resfhp->fh_dentry) {
-+	if (!resfhp->fh_path.dentry) {
- 		/* called from nfsd_proc_mkdir, or possibly nfsd3_proc_create */
- 		fh_lock_nested(fhp, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
- 		dchild = lookup_one_len(fname, dentry, flen);
-@@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@ nfsd_create(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, stru
- 			goto out;
- 	} else {
- 		/* called from nfsd_proc_create */
--		dchild = dget(resfhp->fh_dentry);
-+		dchild = dget(resfhp->fh_path.dentry);
- 		if (!fhp->fh_locked) {
- 			/* not actually possible */
- 			printk(KERN_ERR
-@@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@ nfsd_create_v3(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, s
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	dirp = dentry->d_inode;
- 
- 	/* Get all the sanity checks out of the way before
-@@ -1391,7 +1391,7 @@ nfsd_readlink(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, st
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 
- 	err = nfserr_inval;
-@@ -1446,7 +1446,7 @@ nfsd_symlink(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, str
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out;
- 	fh_lock(fhp);
--	dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	dnew = lookup_one_len(fname, dentry, flen);
- 	host_err = PTR_ERR(dnew);
- 	if (IS_ERR(dnew))
-@@ -1516,7 +1516,7 @@ nfsd_link(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	fh_lock_nested(ffhp, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
--	ddir = ffhp->fh_dentry;
-+	ddir = ffhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	dirp = ddir->d_inode;
- 
- 	dnew = lookup_one_len(name, ddir, len);
-@@ -1524,7 +1524,7 @@ nfsd_link(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct
- 	if (IS_ERR(dnew))
- 		goto out_nfserr;
- 
--	dold = tfhp->fh_dentry;
-+	dold = tfhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	dest = dold->d_inode;
- 
- 	host_err = vfs_link(dold, dirp, dnew);
-@@ -1572,10 +1572,10 @@ nfsd_rename(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, stru
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	fdentry = ffhp->fh_dentry;
-+	fdentry = ffhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	fdir = fdentry->d_inode;
- 
--	tdentry = tfhp->fh_dentry;
-+	tdentry = tfhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	tdir = tdentry->d_inode;
- 
- 	err = (rqstp->rq_vers == 2) ? nfserr_acces : nfserr_xdev;
-@@ -1668,7 +1668,7 @@ nfsd_unlink(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, stru
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	fh_lock_nested(fhp, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
--	dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	dirp = dentry->d_inode;
- 
- 	rdentry = lookup_one_len(fname, dentry, flen);
-@@ -1765,7 +1765,7 @@ __be32
- nfsd_statfs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct kstatfs *stat)
- {
- 	__be32 err = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, 0, MAY_NOP);
--	if (!err && vfs_statfs(fhp->fh_dentry,stat))
-+	if (!err && vfs_statfs(fhp->fh_path.dentry,stat))
- 		err = nfserr_io;
- 	return err;
- }
-@@ -1904,7 +1904,7 @@ nfsd_racache_init(int cache_size)
- struct posix_acl *
- nfsd_get_posix_acl(struct svc_fh *fhp, int type)
- {
--	struct inode *inode = fhp->fh_dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode *inode = fhp->fh_path.dentry->d_inode;
- 	char *name;
- 	void *value = NULL;
- 	ssize_t size;
-@@ -1924,7 +1924,7 @@ nfsd_get_posix_acl(struct svc_fh *fhp, i
- 		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
- 	}
- 
--	size = nfsd_getxattr(fhp->fh_dentry, name, &value);
-+	size = nfsd_getxattr(fhp->fh_path.dentry, name, &value);
- 	if (size < 0)
- 		return ERR_PTR(size);
- 
-@@ -1936,7 +1936,7 @@ nfsd_get_posix_acl(struct svc_fh *fhp, i
- int
- nfsd_set_posix_acl(struct svc_fh *fhp, int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
- {
--	struct inode *inode = fhp->fh_dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode *inode = fhp->fh_path.dentry->d_inode;
- 	char *name;
- 	void *value = NULL;
- 	size_t size;
-@@ -1969,12 +1969,12 @@ nfsd_set_posix_acl(struct svc_fh *fhp, i
- 		size = 0;
- 
- 	if (size)
--		error = vfs_setxattr(fhp->fh_dentry, name, value, size, 0);
-+		error = vfs_setxattr(fhp->fh_path.dentry, name, value, size, 0);
- 	else {
- 		if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)
- 			error = 0;
- 		else {
--			error = vfs_removexattr(fhp->fh_dentry, name);
-+			error = vfs_removexattr(fhp->fh_path.dentry, name);
- 			if (error == -ENODATA)
- 				error = 0;
- 		}
-Index: linux-2.6/include/linux/nfsd/nfsfh.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/include/linux/nfsd/nfsfh.h
-+++ linux-2.6/include/linux/nfsd/nfsfh.h
-@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static inline ino_t u32_to_ino_t(__u32 u
-  */
- typedef struct svc_fh {
- 	struct knfsd_fh		fh_handle;	/* FH data */
--	struct dentry *		fh_dentry;	/* validated dentry */
-+	struct path		fh_path;	/* validated path */
- 	struct svc_export *	fh_export;	/* export pointer */
- 	int			fh_maxsize;	/* max size for fh_handle */
- 
-@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void	fh_put(struct svc_fh *);
- static __inline__ struct svc_fh *
- fh_copy(struct svc_fh *dst, struct svc_fh *src)
- {
--	WARN_ON(src->fh_dentry || src->fh_locked);
-+	WARN_ON(src->fh_path.dentry || src->fh_locked);
- 			
- 	*dst = *src;
- 	return dst;
-@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ fill_pre_wcc(struct svc_fh *fhp)
- {
- 	struct inode    *inode;
- 
--	inode = fhp->fh_dentry->d_inode;
-+	inode = fhp->fh_path.dentry->d_inode;
- 	if (!fhp->fh_pre_saved) {
- 		fhp->fh_pre_mtime = inode->i_mtime;
- 		fhp->fh_pre_ctime = inode->i_ctime;
-@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ fill_pre_wcc(struct svc_fh *fhp)
- static inline void
- fill_post_wcc(struct svc_fh *fhp)
- {
--	struct inode    *inode = fhp->fh_dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode    *inode = fhp->fh_path.dentry->d_inode;
- 
- 	if (fhp->fh_post_saved)
- 		printk("nfsd: inode locked twice during operation.\n");
-@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ fill_post_wcc(struct svc_fh *fhp)
- static inline void
- fh_lock_nested(struct svc_fh *fhp, unsigned int subclass)
- {
--	struct dentry	*dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	struct dentry	*dentry = fhp->fh_path.dentry;
- 	struct inode	*inode;
- 
- 	dfprintk(FILEOP, "nfsd: fh_lock(%s) locked = %d\n",
-@@ -322,11 +322,11 @@ fh_lock(struct svc_fh *fhp)
- static inline void
- fh_unlock(struct svc_fh *fhp)
- {
--	BUG_ON(!fhp->fh_dentry);
-+	BUG_ON(!fhp->fh_path.dentry);
- 
- 	if (fhp->fh_locked) {
- 		fill_post_wcc(fhp);
--		mutex_unlock(&fhp->fh_dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
-+		mutex_unlock(&fhp->fh_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
- 		fhp->fh_locked = 0;
- 	}
- }
-Index: linux-2.6/include/linux/nfsd/xdr4.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/include/linux/nfsd/xdr4.h
-+++ linux-2.6/include/linux/nfsd/xdr4.h
-@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ int nfs4svc_encode_compoundres(struct sv
- void nfsd4_encode_operation(struct nfsd4_compoundres *, struct nfsd4_op *);
- void nfsd4_encode_replay(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, struct nfsd4_op *op);
- __be32 nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct svc_fh *fhp, struct svc_export *exp,
--		       struct dentry *dentry, __be32 *buffer, int *countp,
-+		       struct path *path, __be32 *buffer, int *countp,
- 		       u32 *bmval, struct svc_rqst *);
- extern __be32 nfsd4_setclientid(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
- 		struct nfsd4_compound_state *,

kernel-patches/for-mainline/struct_path/struct_path-security-getattr.diff

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-Index: linux-2.6/include/linux/security.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/include/linux/security.h
-+++ linux-2.6/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -361,8 +361,7 @@ struct request_sock;
-  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_getattr:
-  *	Check permission before obtaining file attributes.
-- *	@mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up
-- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
-+ *	@path contains the vfsmount and dentry of the file.
-  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
-  * @inode_delete:
-  *	@inode contains the inode structure for deleted inode.
-@@ -1221,7 +1220,7 @@ struct security_operations {
- 	int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd);
- 	int (*inode_permission) (struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd);
- 	int (*inode_setattr)	(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
--	int (*inode_getattr) (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
-+	int (*inode_getattr) (struct path *path);
-         void (*inode_delete) (struct inode *inode);
- 	int (*inode_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
- 			       size_t size, int flags);
-@@ -1713,12 +1712,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_setattr
- 	return security_ops->inode_setattr (dentry, attr);
- }
- 
--static inline int security_inode_getattr (struct vfsmount *mnt,
--					  struct dentry *dentry)
-+static inline int security_inode_getattr (struct path *path)
- {
--	if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (dentry->d_inode)))
-+	if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (path->dentry->d_inode)))
- 		return 0;
--	return security_ops->inode_getattr (mnt, dentry);
-+	return security_ops->inode_getattr (path);
- }
- 
- static inline void security_inode_delete (struct inode *inode)
-@@ -2414,8 +2412,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_setattr
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static inline int security_inode_getattr (struct vfsmount *mnt,
--					  struct dentry *dentry)
-+static inline int security_inode_getattr (struct path *path)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
-Index: linux-2.6/security/dummy.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/security/dummy.c
-+++ linux-2.6/security/dummy.c
-@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static int dummy_inode_setattr (struct d
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int dummy_inode_getattr (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
-+static int dummy_inode_getattr (struct path *path)
- {
- 	return 0;
- }
-Index: linux-2.6/security/selinux/hooks.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ linux-2.6/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -2243,9 +2243,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct 
- 	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
- }
- 
--static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
-+static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct path *path)
- {
--	return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
-+	return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
- }
- 
- static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/stat.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/stat.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/stat.c
-@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ int vfs_getattr(struct path *path, struc
- 	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
- 	int retval;
- 
--	retval = security_inode_getattr(path->mnt, path->dentry);
-+	retval = security_inode_getattr(path);
- 	if (retval)
- 		return retval;
- 

kernel-patches/for-mainline/struct_path/struct_path-vfs_getattr.diff

@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
-Index: linux-2.6/drivers/block/loop.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/drivers/block/loop.c
-+++ linux-2.6/drivers/block/loop.c
-@@ -1000,7 +1000,7 @@ loop_get_status(struct loop_device *lo, 
- 
- 	if (lo->lo_state != Lo_bound)
- 		return -ENXIO;
--	error = vfs_getattr(file->f_path.mnt, file->f_path.dentry, &stat);
-+	error = vfs_getattr(&file->f_path, &stat);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 	memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
-@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ static struct super_block* get_gfs2_sb(c
- 		       dev_name);
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	error = vfs_getattr(nd.path.mnt, nd.path.dentry, &stat);
-+	error = vfs_getattr(&nd.path, &stat);
- 
- 	fstype = get_fs_type("gfs2");
- 	list_for_each(l, &fstype->fs_supers) {
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs3proc.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfs3proc.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs3proc.c
-@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ nfsd3_proc_getattr(struct svc_rqst *rqst
- {
- 	int	err;
- 	__be32	nfserr;
-+	struct path path;
- 
- 	dprintk("nfsd: GETATTR(3)  %s\n",
- 		SVCFH_fmt(&argp->fh));
-@@ -67,8 +68,9 @@ nfsd3_proc_getattr(struct svc_rqst *rqst
- 	if (nfserr)
- 		RETURN_STATUS(nfserr);
- 
--	err = vfs_getattr(resp->fh.fh_export->ex_mnt,
--			  resp->fh.fh_dentry, &resp->stat);
-+	path.mnt = resp->fh.fh_export->ex_mnt;
-+	path.dentry = resp->fh.fh_dentry;
-+	err = vfs_getattr(&path, &resp->stat);
- 	nfserr = nfserrno(err);
- 
- 	RETURN_STATUS(nfserr);
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c
-@@ -223,12 +223,15 @@ encode_saved_post_attr(struct svc_rqst *
- static __be32 *
- encode_post_op_attr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp)
- {
--	struct dentry *dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
--	if (dentry && dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
-+	struct path path;
-+
-+	path.dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	if (path.dentry && path.dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
- 	        int err;
- 		struct kstat stat;
- 
--		err = vfs_getattr(fhp->fh_export->ex_mnt, dentry, &stat);
-+		path.mnt = fhp->fh_export->ex_mnt;
-+		err = vfs_getattr(&path, &stat);
- 		if (!err) {
- 			*p++ = xdr_one;		/* attributes follow */
- 			return encode_fattr3(rqstp, p, fhp, &stat);
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
-@@ -1442,6 +1442,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct svc_fh *fhp, s
- 	int err;
- 	int aclsupport = 0;
- 	struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
-+	struct path path;
- 
- 	BUG_ON(bmval1 & NFSD_WRITEONLY_ATTRS_WORD1);
- 	BUG_ON(bmval0 & ~NFSD_SUPPORTED_ATTRS_WORD0);
-@@ -1453,7 +1454,9 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct svc_fh *fhp, s
- 			goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	err = vfs_getattr(exp->ex_mnt, dentry, &stat);
-+	path.mnt = exp->ex_mnt;
-+	path.dentry = dentry;
-+	err = vfs_getattr(&path, &stat);
- 	if (err)
- 		goto out_nfserr;
- 	if ((bmval0 & (FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_FREE | FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_TOTAL)) ||
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfsproc.c
-@@ -39,18 +39,25 @@ nfsd_proc_null(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, v
- static __be32
- nfsd_return_attrs(__be32 err, struct nfsd_attrstat *resp)
- {
--	if (err) return err;
--	return nfserrno(vfs_getattr(resp->fh.fh_export->ex_mnt,
--				    resp->fh.fh_dentry,
--				    &resp->stat));
-+	struct path path;
-+
-+	if (err)
-+		return err;
-+	path.mnt = resp->fh.fh_export->ex_mnt;
-+	path.dentry = resp->fh.fh_dentry;
-+	return nfserrno(vfs_getattr(&path, &resp->stat));
- }
-+
- static __be32
- nfsd_return_dirop(__be32 err, struct nfsd_diropres *resp)
- {
--	if (err) return err;
--	return nfserrno(vfs_getattr(resp->fh.fh_export->ex_mnt,
--				    resp->fh.fh_dentry,
--				    &resp->stat));
-+	struct path path;
-+
-+	if (err)
-+		return err;
-+	path.mnt = resp->fh.fh_export->ex_mnt;
-+	path.dentry = resp->fh.fh_dentry;
-+	return nfserrno(vfs_getattr(&path, &resp->stat));
- }
- /*
-  * Get a file's attributes
-@@ -136,6 +143,7 @@ static __be32
- nfsd_proc_read(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd_readargs *argp,
- 				       struct nfsd_readres  *resp)
- {
-+	struct path path;
- 	__be32	nfserr;
- 
- 	dprintk("nfsd: READ    %s %d bytes at %d\n",
-@@ -162,10 +170,11 @@ nfsd_proc_read(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, s
- 			   	  rqstp->rq_vec, argp->vlen,
- 				  &resp->count);
- 
--	if (nfserr) return nfserr;
--	return nfserrno(vfs_getattr(resp->fh.fh_export->ex_mnt,
--				    resp->fh.fh_dentry,
--				    &resp->stat));
-+	if (nfserr)
-+		return nfserr;
-+	path.mnt = resp->fh.fh_export->ex_mnt;
-+	path.dentry = resp->fh.fh_dentry;
-+	return nfserrno(vfs_getattr(&path, &resp->stat));
- }
- 
- /*
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c
-@@ -193,7 +193,11 @@ encode_fattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __b
- __be32 *nfs2svc_encode_fattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp)
- {
- 	struct kstat stat;
--	vfs_getattr(fhp->fh_export->ex_mnt, fhp->fh_dentry, &stat);
-+	struct path path;
-+
-+	path.mnt = fhp->fh_export->ex_mnt;
-+	path.dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
-+	vfs_getattr(&path, &stat);
- 	return encode_fattr(rqstp, p, fhp, &stat);
- }
- 
-Index: linux-2.6/fs/stat.c
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/fs/stat.c
-+++ linux-2.6/fs/stat.c
-@@ -38,17 +38,17 @@ void generic_fillattr(struct inode *inod
- 
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_fillattr);
- 
--int vfs_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
-+int vfs_getattr(struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
- {
--	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-+	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
- 	int retval;
- 
--	retval = security_inode_getattr(mnt, dentry);
-+	retval = security_inode_getattr(path->mnt, path->dentry);
- 	if (retval)
- 		return retval;
- 
- 	if (inode->i_op->getattr)
--		return inode->i_op->getattr(mnt, dentry, stat);
-+		return inode->i_op->getattr(path->mnt, path->dentry, stat);
- 
- 	generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
- 	return 0;
-@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ int vfs_stat_fd(int dfd, char __user *na
- 
- 	error = __user_walk_fd(dfd, name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd);
- 	if (!error) {
--		error = vfs_getattr(nd.path.mnt, nd.path.dentry, stat);
-+		error = vfs_getattr(&nd.path, stat);
- 		path_release(&nd);
- 	}
- 	return error;
-@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ int vfs_lstat_fd(int dfd, char __user *n
- 
- 	error = __user_walk_fd(dfd, name, 0, &nd);
- 	if (!error) {
--		error = vfs_getattr(nd.path.mnt, nd.path.dentry, stat);
-+		error = vfs_getattr(&nd.path, stat);
- 		path_release(&nd);
- 	}
- 	return error;
-@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ int vfs_fstat(unsigned int fd, struct ks
- 	int error = -EBADF;
- 
- 	if (f) {
--		error = vfs_getattr(f->f_path.mnt, f->f_path.dentry, stat);
-+		error = vfs_getattr(&f->f_path, stat);
- 		fput(f);
- 	}
- 	return error;
-Index: linux-2.6/include/linux/fs.h
-===================================================================
---- linux-2.6.orig/include/linux/fs.h
-+++ linux-2.6/include/linux/fs.h
-@@ -1825,7 +1825,7 @@ extern int page_symlink(struct inode *in
- extern struct inode_operations page_symlink_inode_operations;
- extern int generic_readlink(struct dentry *, char __user *, int);
- extern void generic_fillattr(struct inode *, struct kstat *);
--extern int vfs_getattr(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *, struct kstat *);
-+extern int vfs_getattr(struct path *, struct kstat *);
- void inode_add_bytes(struct inode *inode, loff_t bytes);
- void inode_sub_bytes(struct inode *inode, loff_t bytes);
- loff_t inode_get_bytes(struct inode *inode);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/sys_fchdir-nameidata.diff

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Switch to vfs_permission() in sys_fchdir()
-
-Switch from file_permission() to vfs_permission() in sys_fchdir(): this
-avoids calling permission() with a NULL nameidata here.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/open.c |   16 +++++++---------
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/open.c
-+++ b/fs/open.c
-@@ -501,10 +501,8 @@ out:
- 
- asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned int fd)
- {
-+	struct nameidata nd;
- 	struct file *file;
--	struct dentry *dentry;
--	struct inode *inode;
--	struct vfsmount *mnt;
- 	int error;
- 
- 	error = -EBADF;
-@@ -512,17 +510,17 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned int 
- 	if (!file)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
--	mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
--	inode = dentry->d_inode;
-+	nd.dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
-+	nd.mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
-+	nd.flags = 0;
- 
- 	error = -ENOTDIR;
--	if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
-+	if (!S_ISDIR(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
- 		goto out_putf;
- 
--	error = file_permission(file, MAY_EXEC);
-+	error = vfs_permission(&nd, MAY_EXEC);
- 	if (!error)
--		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry);
-+		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
- out_putf:
- 	fput(file);
- out:

kernel-patches/for-mainline/sysctl-pathname.diff

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Factor out sysctl pathname code
-
-Convert the selinux sysctl pathname computation code into a standalone
-function.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
----
- include/linux/sysctl.h   |    2 ++
- kernel/sysctl.c          |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- security/selinux/hooks.c |   35 +++++------------------------------
- 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
-
---- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
-+++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
-@@ -983,6 +983,8 @@ extern int proc_doulongvec_minmax(struct
- extern int proc_doulongvec_ms_jiffies_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int,
- 				      struct file *, void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
- 
-+extern char *sysctl_pathname(ctl_table *, char *, int);
-+
- extern int do_sysctl (int __user *name, int nlen,
- 		      void __user *oldval, size_t __user *oldlenp,
- 		      void __user *newval, size_t newlen);
---- a/kernel/sysctl.c
-+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
-@@ -1327,6 +1327,33 @@ struct ctl_table_header *sysctl_head_nex
- 	return NULL;
- }
- 
-+char *sysctl_pathname(ctl_table *table, char *buffer, int buflen)
-+{
-+	if (buflen < 1)
-+		return NULL;
-+	buffer += --buflen;
-+	*buffer = '\0';
-+
-+	while (table) {
-+		int namelen = strlen(table->procname);
-+
-+		if (buflen < namelen + 1)
-+			return NULL;
-+		buflen -= namelen + 1;
-+		buffer -= namelen;
-+		memcpy(buffer, table->procname, namelen);
-+		*--buffer = '/';
-+		table = table->parent;
-+	}
-+	if (buflen < 4)
-+		return NULL;
-+	buffer -= 4;
-+	memcpy(buffer, "/sys", 4);
-+
-+	return buffer;
-+}
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_pathname);
-+
- #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL
- int do_sysctl(int __user *name, int nlen, void __user *oldval, size_t __user *oldlenp,
- 	       void __user *newval, size_t newlen)
---- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
-+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
-@@ -1431,40 +1431,15 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_s
- 
- static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
- {
--	int buflen, rc;
--	char *buffer, *path, *end;
-+	char *buffer, *path;
-+	int rc = -ENOMEM;
- 
--	rc = -ENOMEM;
- 	buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- 	if (!buffer)
- 		goto out;
--
--	buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
--	end = buffer+buflen;
--	*--end = '\0';
--	buflen--;
--	path = end-1;
--	*path = '/';
--	while (table) {
--		const char *name = table->procname;
--		size_t namelen = strlen(name);
--		buflen -= namelen + 1;
--		if (buflen < 0)
--			goto out_free;
--		end -= namelen;
--		memcpy(end, name, namelen);
--		*--end = '/';
--		path = end;
--		table = table->parent;
--	}
--	buflen -= 4;
--	if (buflen < 0)
--		goto out_free;
--	end -= 4;
--	memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
--	path = end;
--	rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
--out_free:
-+	path = sysctl_pathname(table, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
-+	if (path)
-+		rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
- 	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
- out:
- 	return rc;

kernel-patches/for-mainline/unambiguous-__d_path.diff

@@ -1,268 +0,0 @@
-From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Subject: Fix __d_path() for lazy unmounts and make it unambiguous
-
-First, when __d_path() hits a lazily unmounted mount point, it tries to prepend
-the name of the lazily unmounted dentry to the path name.  It gets this wrong,
-and also overwrites the slash that separates the name from the following
-pathname component. This patch fixes that; if a process was in directory
-/foo/bar and /foo got lazily unmounted, the old result was ``foobar'' (note the
-missing slash), while the new result with this patch is ``foo/bar''.
-
-Second, it isn't always possible to tell from the __d_path() result whether the
-specified root and rootmnt (i.e., the chroot) was reached.  We need an
-unambiguous result for AppArmor at least though, so we make sure that paths
-will only start with a slash if the path leads all the way up to the root.
-
-We also add a @fail_deleted argument, which allows to get rid of some of the
-mess in sys_getcwd().
-
-This patch leaves getcwd() and d_path() as they were before for everything
-except for bind-mounted directories; for them, it reports ``/foo/bar'' instead
-of ``foobar'' in the example described above.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
-
----
- fs/dcache.c |  169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
- 1 file changed, 98 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/dcache.c
-+++ b/fs/dcache.c
-@@ -1764,52 +1764,51 @@ shouldnt_be_hashed:
- }
- 
- /**
-- * d_path - return the path of a dentry
-+ * __d_path - return the path of a dentry
-  * @dentry: dentry to report
-  * @vfsmnt: vfsmnt to which the dentry belongs
-  * @root: root dentry
-  * @rootmnt: vfsmnt to which the root dentry belongs
-  * @buffer: buffer to return value in
-  * @buflen: buffer length
-+ * @fail_deleted: what to return for deleted files
-  *
-- * Convert a dentry into an ASCII path name. If the entry has been deleted
-+ * Convert a dentry into an ASCII path name. If the entry has been deleted,
-+ * then if @fail_deleted is true, ERR_PTR(-ENOENT) is returned. Otherwise,
-  * the string " (deleted)" is appended. Note that this is ambiguous.
-  *
-- * Returns the buffer or an error code if the path was too long.
-+ * If @dentry is not connected to @root, the path returned will be relative
-+ * (i.e., it will not start with a slash).
-  *
-- * "buflen" should be positive. Caller holds the dcache_lock.
-+ * Returns the buffer or an error code.
-  */
--static char * __d_path( struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
--			struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt,
--			char *buffer, int buflen)
--{
--	char * end = buffer+buflen;
--	char * retval;
--	int namelen;
-+static char *__d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
-+		      struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt,
-+		      char *buffer, int buflen, int fail_deleted)
-+{
-+	int namelen, is_slash;
-+
-+	if (buflen < 2)
-+		return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
-+	buffer += --buflen;
-+	*buffer = '\0';
- 
--	*--end = '\0';
--	buflen--;
-+	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
- 	if (!IS_ROOT(dentry) && d_unhashed(dentry)) {
--		buflen -= 10;
--		end -= 10;
--		if (buflen < 0)
-+		if (fail_deleted) {
-+			buffer = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		if (buflen < 10)
- 			goto Elong;
--		memcpy(end, " (deleted)", 10);
-+		buflen -= 10;
-+		buffer -= 10;
-+		memcpy(buffer, " (deleted)", 10);
- 	}
--
--	if (buflen < 1)
--		goto Elong;
--	/* Get '/' right */
--	retval = end-1;
--	*retval = '/';
--
--	for (;;) {
-+	while (dentry != root || vfsmnt != rootmnt) {
- 		struct dentry * parent;
- 
--		if (dentry == root && vfsmnt == rootmnt)
--			break;
- 		if (dentry == vfsmnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
--			/* Global root? */
- 			spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
- 			if (vfsmnt->mnt_parent == vfsmnt) {
- 				spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
-@@ -1823,33 +1822,72 @@ static char * __d_path( struct dentry *d
- 		parent = dentry->d_parent;
- 		prefetch(parent);
- 		namelen = dentry->d_name.len;
--		buflen -= namelen + 1;
--		if (buflen < 0)
-+		if (buflen < namelen + 1)
- 			goto Elong;
--		end -= namelen;
--		memcpy(end, dentry->d_name.name, namelen);
--		*--end = '/';
--		retval = end;
-+		buflen -= namelen + 1;
-+		buffer -= namelen;
-+		memcpy(buffer, dentry->d_name.name, namelen);
-+		*--buffer = '/';
- 		dentry = parent;
- 	}
-+	/* Get '/' right. */
-+	if (*buffer != '/')
-+		*--buffer = '/';
- 
--	return retval;
-+out:
-+	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
-+	return buffer;
- 
- global_root:
-+	/*
-+	 * We went past the (vfsmount, dentry) we were looking for and have
-+	 * either hit a root dentry, a lazily unmounted dentry, an
-+	 * unconnected dentry, or the file is on a pseudo filesystem.
-+	 */
- 	namelen = dentry->d_name.len;
--	buflen -= namelen;
--	if (buflen < 0)
-+	is_slash = (namelen == 1 && *dentry->d_name.name == '/');
-+	if (is_slash || (dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_NOUSER)) {
-+		/*
-+		 * Make sure we won't return a pathname starting with '/'.
-+		 *
-+		 * Historically, we also glue together the root dentry and
-+		 * remaining name for pseudo filesystems like pipefs, which
-+		 * have the MS_NOUSER flag set. This results in pathnames
-+		 * like "pipe:[439336]".
-+		 */
-+		if (*buffer == '/') {
-+			buffer++;
-+			buflen++;
-+		}
-+		if (is_slash)
-+			goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (buflen < namelen)
- 		goto Elong;
--	retval -= namelen-1;	/* hit the slash */
--	memcpy(retval, dentry->d_name.name, namelen);
--	return retval;
-+	buffer -= namelen;
-+	memcpy(buffer, dentry->d_name.name, namelen);
-+	goto out;
-+
- Elong:
--	return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
-+	buffer = ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
-+	goto out;
-+}
-+
-+static char *__connect_d_path(char *path, char *buffer)
-+{
-+	if (!IS_ERR(path) && *path != '/') {
-+		/* Pretend that disconnected paths are hanging off the root. */
-+		if (path == buffer)
-+			path = ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
-+		else
-+			*--path = '/';
-+	}
-+	return path;
- }
- 
- /* write full pathname into buffer and return start of pathname */
--char * d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
--				char *buf, int buflen)
-+char *d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, char *buf,
-+	     int buflen)
- {
- 	char *res;
- 	struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
-@@ -1869,9 +1907,8 @@ char * d_path(struct dentry *dentry, str
- 	rootmnt = mntget(current->fs->rootmnt);
- 	root = dget(current->fs->root);
- 	read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
--	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
--	res = __d_path(dentry, vfsmnt, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen);
--	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
-+	res = __d_path(dentry, vfsmnt, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen, 0);
-+	res = __connect_d_path(res, buf);
- 	dput(root);
- 	mntput(rootmnt);
- 	return res;
-@@ -1918,10 +1955,10 @@ char *dynamic_dname(struct dentry *dentr
-  */
- asmlinkage long sys_getcwd(char __user *buf, unsigned long size)
- {
--	int error;
-+	int error, len;
- 	struct vfsmount *pwdmnt, *rootmnt;
- 	struct dentry *pwd, *root;
--	char *page = (char *) __get_free_page(GFP_USER);
-+	char *page = (char *) __get_free_page(GFP_USER), *cwd;
- 
- 	if (!page)
- 		return -ENOMEM;
-@@ -1933,29 +1970,19 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getcwd(char __user *
- 	root = dget(current->fs->root);
- 	read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
- 
--	error = -ENOENT;
--	/* Has the current directory has been unlinked? */
--	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
--	if (pwd->d_parent == pwd || !d_unhashed(pwd)) {
--		unsigned long len;
--		char * cwd;
--
--		cwd = __d_path(pwd, pwdmnt, root, rootmnt, page, PAGE_SIZE);
--		spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
--
--		error = PTR_ERR(cwd);
--		if (IS_ERR(cwd))
--			goto out;
--
--		error = -ERANGE;
--		len = PAGE_SIZE + page - cwd;
--		if (len <= size) {
--			error = len;
--			if (copy_to_user(buf, cwd, len))
--				error = -EFAULT;
--		}
--	} else
--		spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
-+	cwd = __d_path(pwd, pwdmnt, root, rootmnt, page, PAGE_SIZE, 1);
-+	cwd = __connect_d_path(cwd, page);
-+	error = PTR_ERR(cwd);
-+	if (IS_ERR(cwd))
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	error = -ERANGE;
-+	len = PAGE_SIZE + page - cwd;
-+	if (len <= size) {
-+		error = len;
-+		if (copy_to_user(buf, cwd, len))
-+			error = -EFAULT;
-+	}
- 
- out:
- 	dput(pwd);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/vfs-getxattr.diff

@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_getxattr()
-
-The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
-pathnames.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c         |    2 +-
- fs/nfsd/vfs.c             |   21 ++++++++++++---------
- fs/xattr.c                |   14 ++++++++------
- include/linux/nfsd/nfsd.h |    3 ++-
- include/linux/xattr.h     |    3 ++-
- 5 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
-+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
-@@ -1496,7 +1496,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct svc_fh *fhp, s
- 	}
- 	if (bmval0 & (FATTR4_WORD0_ACL | FATTR4_WORD0_ACLSUPPORT
- 			| FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS)) {
--		err = nfsd4_get_nfs4_acl(rqstp, dentry, &acl);
-+		err = nfsd4_get_nfs4_acl(rqstp, dentry, exp->ex_mnt, &acl);
- 		aclsupport = (err == 0);
- 		if (bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL) {
- 			if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
---- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
-+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
-@@ -408,11 +408,12 @@ out_nfserr:
- #if defined(CONFIG_NFSD_V2_ACL) || \
-     defined(CONFIG_NFSD_V3_ACL) || \
-     defined(CONFIG_NFSD_V4)
--static ssize_t nfsd_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *key, void **buf)
-+static ssize_t nfsd_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-+			     char *key, void **buf)
- {
- 	ssize_t buflen;
- 
--	buflen = vfs_getxattr(dentry, key, NULL, 0);
-+	buflen = vfs_getxattr(dentry, mnt, key, NULL, 0);
- 	if (buflen <= 0)
- 		return buflen;
- 
-@@ -420,7 +421,7 @@ static ssize_t nfsd_getxattr(struct dent
- 	if (!*buf)
- 		return -ENOMEM;
- 
--	return vfs_getxattr(dentry, key, *buf, buflen);
-+	return vfs_getxattr(dentry, mnt, key, *buf, buflen);
- }
- #endif
- 
-@@ -501,13 +502,13 @@ out_nfserr:
- }
- 
- static struct posix_acl *
--_get_posix_acl(struct dentry *dentry, char *key)
-+_get_posix_acl(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *key)
- {
- 	void *buf = NULL;
- 	struct posix_acl *pacl = NULL;
- 	int buflen;
- 
--	buflen = nfsd_getxattr(dentry, key, &buf);
-+	buflen = nfsd_getxattr(dentry, mnt, key, &buf);
- 	if (!buflen)
- 		buflen = -ENODATA;
- 	if (buflen <= 0)
-@@ -519,14 +520,15 @@ _get_posix_acl(struct dentry *dentry, ch
- }
- 
- int
--nfsd4_get_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct dentry *dentry, struct nfs4_acl **acl)
-+nfsd4_get_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct dentry *dentry,
-+		   struct vfsmount *mnt, struct nfs4_acl **acl)
- {
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	int error = 0;
- 	struct posix_acl *pacl = NULL, *dpacl = NULL;
- 	unsigned int flags = 0;
- 
--	pacl = _get_posix_acl(dentry, POSIX_ACL_XATTR_ACCESS);
-+	pacl = _get_posix_acl(dentry, mnt, POSIX_ACL_XATTR_ACCESS);
- 	if (IS_ERR(pacl) && PTR_ERR(pacl) == -ENODATA)
- 		pacl = posix_acl_from_mode(inode->i_mode, GFP_KERNEL);
- 	if (IS_ERR(pacl)) {
-@@ -536,7 +538,7 @@ nfsd4_get_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *rqst
- 	}
- 
- 	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
--		dpacl = _get_posix_acl(dentry, POSIX_ACL_XATTR_DEFAULT);
-+		dpacl = _get_posix_acl(dentry, mnt, POSIX_ACL_XATTR_DEFAULT);
- 		if (IS_ERR(dpacl) && PTR_ERR(dpacl) == -ENODATA)
- 			dpacl = NULL;
- 		else if (IS_ERR(dpacl)) {
-@@ -2001,7 +2003,8 @@ nfsd_get_posix_acl(struct svc_fh *fhp, i
- 		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
- 	}
- 
--	size = nfsd_getxattr(fhp->fh_dentry, name, &value);
-+	size = nfsd_getxattr(fhp->fh_dentry, fhp->fh_export->ex_mnt, name,
-+			     &value);
- 	if (size < 0)
- 		return ERR_PTR(size);
- 
---- a/fs/xattr.c
-+++ b/fs/xattr.c
-@@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ out:
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_setxattr);
- 
- ssize_t
--vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
-+vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *name,
-+	     void *value, size_t size)
- {
- 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	int error;
-@@ -277,7 +278,8 @@ sys_fsetxattr(int fd, char __user *name,
-  * Extended attribute GET operations
-  */
- static ssize_t
--getxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *name, void __user *value, size_t size)
-+getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char __user *name,
-+	 void __user *value, size_t size)
- {
- 	ssize_t error;
- 	void *kvalue = NULL;
-@@ -297,7 +299,7 @@ getxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *
- 			return -ENOMEM;
- 	}
- 
--	error = vfs_getxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size);
-+	error = vfs_getxattr(dentry, mnt, kname, kvalue, size);
- 	if (error > 0) {
- 		if (size && copy_to_user(value, kvalue, error))
- 			error = -EFAULT;
-@@ -320,7 +322,7 @@ sys_getxattr(char __user *path, char __u
- 	error = user_path_walk(path, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
--	error = getxattr(nd.dentry, name, value, size);
-+	error = getxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name, value, size);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -335,7 +337,7 @@ sys_lgetxattr(char __user *path, char __
- 	error = user_path_walk_link(path, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
--	error = getxattr(nd.dentry, name, value, size);
-+	error = getxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, name, value, size);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -350,7 +352,7 @@ sys_fgetxattr(int fd, char __user *name,
- 	if (!f)
- 		return error;
- 	audit_inode(NULL, f->f_path.dentry);
--	error = getxattr(f->f_path.dentry, name, value, size);
-+	error = getxattr(f->f_path.dentry, f->f_path.mnt, name, value, size);
- 	fput(f);
- 	return error;
- }
---- a/include/linux/nfsd/nfsd.h
-+++ b/include/linux/nfsd/nfsd.h
-@@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ __be32		nfsd_setattr(struct svc_rqst *, 
- #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4
- __be32          nfsd4_set_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *, struct svc_fh *,
-                     struct nfs4_acl *);
--int             nfsd4_get_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *, struct dentry *, struct nfs4_acl **);
-+int             nfsd4_get_nfs4_acl(struct svc_rqst *, struct dentry *,
-+				struct vfsmount *mnt, struct nfs4_acl **);
- #endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4 */
- __be32		nfsd_create(struct svc_rqst *, struct svc_fh *,
- 				char *name, int len, struct iattr *attrs,
---- a/include/linux/xattr.h
-+++ b/include/linux/xattr.h
-@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ struct xattr_handler {
- 		   size_t size, int flags);
- };
- 
--ssize_t vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *, char *, void *, size_t);
-+ssize_t vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, char *, void *,
-+		     size_t);
- ssize_t vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, char *list, size_t size);
- int vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, char *, void *, size_t,
- 		 int);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/vfs-link.diff

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Add struct vfsmount parameters to vfs_link()
-
-The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
-pathnames.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/ecryptfs/inode.c |    9 +++++++--
- fs/namei.c          |    5 +++--
- fs/nfsd/vfs.c       |    3 ++-
- include/linux/fs.h  |    2 +-
- 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c
-+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c
-@@ -402,19 +402,24 @@ static int ecryptfs_link(struct dentry *
- 			 struct dentry *new_dentry)
- {
- 	struct dentry *lower_old_dentry;
-+	struct vfsmount *lower_old_mnt;
- 	struct dentry *lower_new_dentry;
-+	struct vfsmount *lower_new_mnt;
- 	struct dentry *lower_dir_dentry;
- 	u64 file_size_save;
- 	int rc;
- 
- 	file_size_save = i_size_read(old_dentry->d_inode);
- 	lower_old_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(old_dentry);
-+	lower_old_mnt = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_mnt(old_dentry);
- 	lower_new_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(new_dentry);
-+	lower_new_mnt = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_mnt(new_dentry);
- 	dget(lower_old_dentry);
- 	dget(lower_new_dentry);
- 	lower_dir_dentry = lock_parent(lower_new_dentry);
--	rc = vfs_link(lower_old_dentry, lower_dir_dentry->d_inode,
--		      lower_new_dentry);
-+	rc = vfs_link(lower_old_dentry, lower_old_mnt,
-+		      lower_dir_dentry->d_inode, lower_new_dentry,
-+		      lower_new_mnt);
- 	if (rc || !lower_new_dentry->d_inode)
- 		goto out_lock;
- 	rc = ecryptfs_interpose(lower_new_dentry, new_dentry, dir->i_sb, 0);
---- a/fs/namei.c
-+++ b/fs/namei.c
-@@ -2331,7 +2331,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_symlink(const char _
- 	return sys_symlinkat(oldname, AT_FDCWD, newname);
- }
- 
--int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
-+int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct vfsmount *old_mnt, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, struct vfsmount *new_mnt)
- {
- 	struct inode *inode = old_dentry->d_inode;
- 	int error;
-@@ -2409,7 +2409,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_linkat(int olddfd, c
- 	error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry);
- 	if (IS_ERR(new_dentry))
- 		goto out_unlock;
--	error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
-+	error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt, nd.dentry->d_inode,
-+			 new_dentry, nd.mnt);
- 	dput(new_dentry);
- out_unlock:
- 	mutex_unlock(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
---- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
-+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
-@@ -1589,7 +1589,8 @@ nfsd_link(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct
- 	dold = tfhp->fh_dentry;
- 	dest = dold->d_inode;
- 
--	host_err = vfs_link(dold, dirp, dnew);
-+	host_err = vfs_link(dold, tfhp->fh_export->ex_mnt, dirp,
-+			    dnew, ffhp->fh_export->ex_mnt);
- 	if (!host_err) {
- 		if (EX_ISSYNC(ffhp->fh_export)) {
- 			err = nfserrno(nfsd_sync_dir(ddir));
---- a/include/linux/fs.h
-+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
-@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ extern int vfs_create(struct inode *, st
- extern int vfs_mkdir(struct inode *, struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, int);
- extern int vfs_mknod(struct inode *, struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, int, dev_t);
- extern int vfs_symlink(struct inode *, struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, const char *, int);
--extern int vfs_link(struct dentry *, struct inode *, struct dentry *);
-+extern int vfs_link(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, struct inode *, struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *);
- extern int vfs_rmdir(struct inode *, struct dentry *);
- extern int vfs_unlink(struct inode *, struct dentry *);
- extern int vfs_rename(struct inode *, struct dentry *, struct inode *, struct dentry *);

kernel-patches/for-mainline/vfs-listxattr.diff

@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-From: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Subject: Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_listxattr()
-
-The vfsmount will be passed down to the LSM hook so that LSMs can compute
-pathnames.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
-
----
- fs/xattr.c            |   25 ++++++++++++++-----------
- include/linux/xattr.h |    3 ++-
- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
---- a/fs/xattr.c
-+++ b/fs/xattr.c
-@@ -142,18 +142,20 @@ vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, stru
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_getxattr);
- 
- ssize_t
--vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, char *list, size_t size)
-+vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char *list,
-+	      size_t size)
- {
-+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- 	ssize_t error;
- 
--	error = security_inode_listxattr(d);
-+	error = security_inode_listxattr(dentry);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
- 	error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
--	if (d->d_inode->i_op && d->d_inode->i_op->listxattr) {
--		error = d->d_inode->i_op->listxattr(d, list, size);
--	} else {
--		error = security_inode_listsecurity(d->d_inode, list, size);
-+	if (inode->i_op && inode->i_op->listxattr)
-+		error = inode->i_op->listxattr(dentry, list, size);
-+	else {
-+		error = security_inode_listsecurity(inode, list, size);
- 		if (size && error > size)
- 			error = -ERANGE;
- 	}
-@@ -361,7 +363,8 @@ sys_fgetxattr(int fd, char __user *name,
-  * Extended attribute LIST operations
-  */
- static ssize_t
--listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *list, size_t size)
-+listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char __user *list,
-+	  size_t size)
- {
- 	ssize_t error;
- 	char *klist = NULL;
-@@ -374,7 +377,7 @@ listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user 
- 			return -ENOMEM;
- 	}
- 
--	error = vfs_listxattr(d, klist, size);
-+	error = vfs_listxattr(dentry, mnt, klist, size);
- 	if (error > 0) {
- 		if (size && copy_to_user(list, klist, error))
- 			error = -EFAULT;
-@@ -396,7 +399,7 @@ sys_listxattr(char __user *path, char __
- 	error = user_path_walk(path, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
--	error = listxattr(nd.dentry, list, size);
-+	error = listxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, list, size);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -410,7 +413,7 @@ sys_llistxattr(char __user *path, char _
- 	error = user_path_walk_link(path, &nd);
- 	if (error)
- 		return error;
--	error = listxattr(nd.dentry, list, size);
-+	error = listxattr(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, list, size);
- 	path_release(&nd);
- 	return error;
- }
-@@ -425,7 +428,7 @@ sys_flistxattr(int fd, char __user *list
- 	if (!f)
- 		return error;
- 	audit_inode(NULL, f->f_path.dentry);
--	error = listxattr(f->f_path.dentry, list, size);
-+	error = listxattr(f->f_path.dentry, f->f_path.mnt, list, size);
- 	fput(f);
- 	return error;
- }
---- a/include/linux/xattr.h
-+++ b/include/linux/xattr.h
-@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ struct xattr_handler {
- 
- ssize_t vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, char *, void *,
- 		     size_t);
--ssize_t vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, char *list, size_t size);
-+ssize_t vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, struct vfsmount *, char *list,
-+		      size_t size);
- int vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, char *, void *, size_t,
- 		 int);
- int vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *, char *);