https://launchpad.net/bugs/1584069
This patch allows policy authors to specify how exec transitions should
be handled with respect to setting AT_SECURE in the new process'
auxiliary vector and, ultimately, having libc scrub (or not scrub) the
environment.
An exec mode of 'safe' means that the environment will be scrubbed and
this is the default in kernels that support AppArmor profile stacking.
An exec mode of 'unsafe' means that the environment will not be scrubbed
and this is the default and only supported change_profile exec mode in
kernels that do not support AppArmor profile stacking.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Make future modifications to the change_profile grammar rules easier by
simplifying things. First, the change_profile rule handling is collapsed
into a single grammar rule. The inputs to the grammar rule are given
helpful variable names to make it harder to mix up which variable we're
dealing with. Finally, the two separate calls to new_entry() are unified
into a single call.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Check if the current kernel supports stacking. If not, ensure that named
transitions (exec, change_profile, etc.) do not attempt to stack their
targets.
Also, set up the change_profile vector according to whether or not the
kernel supports stacking. Earlier kernels expect the policy namespace to
be in its own NUL-terminated vector element rather than passing the
entire label (namespace and profile name) as a single string to the
kernel.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Allow for a leading '&' character to be present in the named transition
target strings to indicate that the transition should stack the current
profile with the specified profile.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The parser was splitting up the namespace and profile name from named
transition targets only to rejoin it later when creating the binary
policy. This complicated the changes needed to support the stacking
identifier '&' in named transition targets.
To keep the stacking support simple, this patch keeps the entire named
transition target string intact from initial profile parsing to writing
out the binary.
All of these changes are straightforward except the hunk that removes
the namespace string addition to the vector in the process_dfa_entry()
function. After speaking with John, kernels with stacking have support
for consuming the namespace with the profile name.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Instead of reusing opt_named_transition and be forced to reconstruct the
target path when is looks like ":odd:target", create simpler grammer
rules that have nothing to do with named transitions and namespaces.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
https://launchpad.net/bugs/1540666
Reuse the new parse_label() function to initialize named_transition
structs so that transition targets, when used with change_profile, are
properly seperated into a profile namespace and profile name.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Bug: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1379874
https://launchpad.net/bugs/1544387
Don't split namespaces from profile names using YACC grammar. Instead,
treat the entire string as a label in the grammer. The label can then be
split into a namespace and a profile name using the new parse_label()
function.
This fixes a bug that caused the profile keyword to not be used with a
label containing a namespace in the profile declaration.
Fixing this bug uncovered a bad parser test case at
simple_tests/profile/profile_ns_ok1.sd. The test case mistakenly
included two definitions of the :foo:unattached profile despite being
marked as expected to pass. I've adjusted the name of one of the
profiles to :foo:unattached2.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This patch frees some leaked memory that occur when errors are
detected while adding variables to the parser's symbol table. While not
a significant issue currently due to the parser exiting on failures, as
the process of library-ifying the parser continues, these need to be
addressed. It also makes it easier to use tools like Address Sanitizer
on the parser against our test suite.
Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
https://launchpad.net/bugs/1526085
Revno 2934 'Add fns to handle profile removal to the kernel interface'
introduced a regression in the parser's namespace support by causing the
--namespace-string option to be ignored. This resulted in the profile(s)
being loaded into the global namespace rather than the namespace
specified on the command line.
This patch fixes the bug by setting the Profile object's ns member, if
the --namespace-string option was specified, immediately after the
Profile object is allocated.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
currently the parser supports ambiguous units like m for time,
which could mean minutes or milliseconds. Fix this and refactor the
time parsing into a single routine.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
allow
@{FOO}=bar
/foo@{FOO} { }
to be expanded into
/foobar { }
and
@{FOO}=bar baz
/foo@{FOO} { }
to be expanded into
/foo{bar,baz} { }
which is used as a regular expression for attachment purposes
Further allow variable expansion in attachment specifications
profile foo /foo@{FOO} { }
profile name (if begun with profile keyword) and attachments to begin
with a variable
profile @{FOO} { }
profile /foo @{FOO} { }
profile @{FOO} @{BAR} {}
hats
^@{FOO}
hat @{FOO}
and for subprofiles as well
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
bison isn't properly handling the 3 options of
TOK_CHANGE_PROFILE opt_id TOK_END_OF_RULE
TOK_CHANGE_PROFILE opt_id TOK_ARROW TOK_ID TOK_END_OF_RULE
TOK_CHANGE_PROFILE opt_id TOK_ARROW TOK_COLON TOK_ID TOK_COLON TOK_END_OF_RULE
specifying
change_profile /exec,
results in an unexpected TOK_ID error
refactor so that they share the 3 options share a common head which fixes
the problem.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
Note: this patch currently overlays onexec with link_name to take
advantage of code already being used on link_name. Ideally what needs
to happen is entry needs to be split into file, link and change_profile
entry classes.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
allow specifying the change_profile keyword
change_profile,
to grant all permissions change_profile permissions
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
currently
link @{foo} -> /bar,
link /bar -> @{foo}
link @{foo} -> @{bar},
all fail due to illegal TOK_SET_VAR
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[tyhicks: Forward ported patch to trunk]
[tyhicks: remove commented out code]
[tyhicks: fix use after free]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1378091
The audit flags are not being set correctly by the parser so that
audit capability XXX,
will not result in an audit message being logged when the capability
is used.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
This patch implements parsing of fine grained mediation for unix domain
sockets, that have abstract and anonymous paths. Sockets with file
system paths are handled by regular file access rules.
The unix network rules follow the general fine grained network
rule pattern of
[<qualifiers>] af_name [<access expr>] [<rule conds>] [<local expr>] [<peer expr>]
specifically for af_unix this is
[<qualifiers>] 'unix' [<access expr>] [<rule conds>] [<local expr>] [<peer expr>]
<qualifiers> = [ 'audit' ] [ 'allow' | 'deny' ]
<access expr> = ( <access> | <access list> )
<access> = ( 'server' | 'create' | 'bind' | 'listen' | 'accept' |
'connect' | 'shutdown' | 'getattr' | 'setattr' |
'getopt' | 'setopt' |
'send' | 'receive' | 'r' | 'w' | 'rw' )
(some access modes are incompatible with some rules or require additional
parameters)
<access list> = '(' <access> ( [','] <WS> <access> )* ')'
<WS> = white space
<rule conds> = ( <type cond> | <protocol cond> )*
each cond can appear at most once
<type cond> = 'type' '=' ( <AARE> | '(' ( '"' <AARE> '"' | <AARE> )+ ')' )
<protocol cond> = 'protocol' '=' ( <AARE> | '(' ( '"' <AARE> '"' | <AARE> )+ ')' )
<local expr> = ( <path cond> | <attr cond> | <opt cond> )*
each cond can appear at most once
<peer expr> = 'peer' '=' ( <path cond> | <label cond> )+
each cond can appear at most once
<path cond> = 'path' '=' ( <AARE> | '(' '"' <AARE> '"' | <AARE> ')' )
<label cond> = 'label' '=' ( <AARE> | '(' '"' <AARE> '"' | <AARE> ')')
<attr cond> = 'attr' '=' ( <AARE> | '(' '"' <AARE> '"' | <AARE> ')' )
<opt cond> = 'opt' '=' ( <AARE> | '(' '"' <AARE> '"' | <AARE> ')' )
<AARE> = ?*[]{}^ ( see man page )
unix domain socket rules are accumulated so that the granted unix
socket permissions are the union of all the listed unix rule permissions.
unix domain socket rules are broad and general and become more restrictive
as further information is specified. Policy may be specified down to
the path and label level. The content of the communication is not
examined.
Some permissions are not compatible with all unix rules.
unix socket rule permissions are implied when a rule does not explicitly
state an access list. By default if a rule does not have an access list
all permissions that are compatible with the specified set of local
and peer conditionals are implied.
The 'server', 'r', 'w' and 'rw' permissions are aliases for other permissions.
server = (create, bind, listen, accept)
r = (receive, getattr, getopt)
w = (create, connect, send, setattr, setopt)
In addition it supports the v7 kernel abi semantics around generic
network rules. The v7 abi removes the masking unix and netlink
address families from the generic masking and uses fine grained
mediation for an address type if supplied.
This means that the rules
network unix,
network netlink,
are now enforced instead of ignored. The parser previously could accept
these but the kernel would ignore anything written to them. If a network
rule is supplied it takes precedence over the finer grained mediation
rule. If permission is not granted via a broad network access rule
fine grained mediation is applied.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
ptrace rules currently take the form of
ptrace [<ptrace_perms>] [<peer_profile_name>],
ptrace_perm := read|trace|readby|tracedby
ptrace_perms := ptrace_perm | '(' ptrace_perm+ ')'
After having used the cross check (permission needed in both profiles)
I am not sure it is correct for ptrace.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
The match
{VARIABLE_NAME}/{WS}*={WS}*\(
is too broad causing mount and dbus rules to fail for sets of values eg.
mount options=(ro bind)
Instead of doing a broad match, for now lets lock it down to just
peer=(...) being the only cond that can cause entry into CONDLISTID
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Add signal rules and make sure the parser encodes support for them
if the supported feature set reports supporting them.
The current format of the signal rule is
[audit] [deny] signal [<signal_perms>] [<signal_set>] <target_profile>,
signal_perm := 'send'|'receive'|'r'|'w'|'rw'
signal_perms := <signal_perm> | '(' <signal_perm> ([,]<signal_perm>)* ')'
signal := ("hup"|"int"|"quit"|"ill"|"trap"|"abrt"|"bus"|"fpe"|"kill"|
"usr1"|"segv"|"usr2"|"pipe"|"alrm"|"term"|"tkflt"|"chld"|
"cont"|"stop"|"stp"|"ttin"|"ttou"|"urg"|"xcpu"|"xfsz"|"vtalrm"|
"prof"|"winch"|"io"|"pwr"|"sys"|"emt"|"exists")
signal_set := set=<signal> | '(' <signal> ([,]<signal>)* ')'
it does not currently follow the peer=() format, and there is some question
as to whether it should or not. Input welcome.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
This will allow for the parser to invalidate its caches separate of whether
the kernel policy version has changed. This can be desirable if a parser
bug is discovered, a new version the parser is shipped and we need to
force cache files to be regenerated.
Policy current stores a 32 bit version number in the header binary policy.
For newer policy (> v5 kernel abi) split this number into 3 separate
fields policy_version, parser_abi, kernel_abi.
If binary policy with a split version number is loaded to an older
kernel it will be correctly rejected as unsupported as those kernels
will see it as a none v5 version. For kernels that only support v5
policy on the kernel abi version is written.
The rules for policy versioning should be
policy_version:
Set by text policy language version. Parsers that don't understand
a specified version may fail, or drop rules they are unaware of.
parser_abi_version:
gets bumped when a userspace bug is discovered that requires policy be
recompiled. The policy version could be reset for each new kernel version
but since the parser needs to support multiple kernel versions tracking
this is extra work and should be avoided.
kernel_abi_version:
gets bumped when semantic changes need to be applied. Eg unix domain
sockets being mediated at connect.
the kernel abi version does not encapsulate all supported features.
As kernels could have different sets of patches supplied. Basic feature
support is determined by the policy_mediates() encoding in the policydb.
As such comparing cache features to kernel features is still needed
to determine if cached policy is best matched to the kernel.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
This will simplify add new features as most of the code can reside in
its own class. There are still things to improve but its a start.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
It was never used, never supported, and we are doing it differently now.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
This patch adds support for the rttime rlimit (aka RLIMIT_RTTIME),
available since the 2.6.25 kernel, according to the getrlimit(2)
man page; see that man page for more details on this rlimit.
An acceptance test is also added, as well as an update to the
apparmor.vim input template.
While reviewing to see what made sense in apparmor.vim for the rttime
rlimit, I discovered that RLIMIT_RTTIME's units are microseconds, not
seconds like RLIMIT_CPU (according to the setrlimit(2) manpage). This
necessitated not sharing the case switch with RLIMIT_CPU. I didn't add
a keyword for microseconds, but I did for milliseconds. I also don't
accept any unit larger than minutes, as it didn't seem appropriate
(and even minutes felt... gratuitous). I would appreciate feedback
on what keywords would be useful here.
Patch History:
v1: initial submission
v2: - add apparmor.vim support for rttime keyword
- adjust RLIMIT_TIME value assignment due to its units being
microseconds, not seconds, and add milliseconds keyword.
Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
By default, statically link against the in-tree libapparmor. If the
in-tree libapparmor is not yet built, print a helpful error message. To
build against the system libapparmor, the USE_SYSTEM make
variable can be set on the command line like so:
$ make USE_SYSTEM=1
This patch also fixes issues around the inclusion of the apparmor.h
header. Previously, the in-tree apparmor.h was always being included
even if the parser was being linked against the system libapparmor.
It modifies the apparmor.h include path based on the previous patch
separating them out in the libapparmor source. This was needed because
header file name collisions were already occurring.
For source files needing to include apparmor.h, the make targets were
also updated to depend on the local apparmor.h when building against
the in-tree libapparmor. When building against the system libapparmor,
the variable used in the dependency list is empty. Likewise, a
libapparmor.a dependency is added to the apparmor_parser target when
building against the in-tree apparmor.
Patch history:
v1: from Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
- initial version
v2: revert to altering the include search path rather than including
the apparmor.h header directly via cpp arguments, alter the
include statements to <sys/apparmor.h> which will work against
either in-tree or (default) system paths.
v3: convert controlling variable to USE_SYSTEM from SYSTEM_LIBAPPARMOR
to unify between the parser and the regression tests.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
Now that the parser links against libapparmor, it makes sense to move
all public permission types and flags to libapparmor's apparmor.h. This
prevents duplication across header files for the parser and libapparmor.
Additionally, this patch breaks the connection between
AA_DBUS_{SEND,RECEIVE,BIND} and AA_MAY_{WRITE,READ,BIND} by using raw
values when defining the AA_DBUS_{SEND,RECEIVE,BIND} macros. This makes
sense because the two sets of permission flags are from two distinctly
different mediation types (AA_CLASS_DBUS and AA_CLASS_FILE). While it is
nice that they share some of the same values, the macros don't need to
be linked together. In other words, when you're creating a D-Bus rule,
it would be incorrect to use permission flags from the AA_CLASS_FILE
type.
The change mentioned above allows the AA_MAY_{WRITE,READ,BIND} macros
to be removed from public-facing apparmor.h header.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Allows for the policy writer to grant permission to eavesdrop on the
specified bus. Some example rules for granting the eavesdrop permission
are:
# Grant send, receive, bind, and eavesdrop
dbus,
# Grant send, receive, bind, and eavesdrop on the session bus
dbus bus=session,
# Grant send and eavesdrop on the system bus
dbus (send eavesdrop) bus=system,
# Grant eavesdrop on any bus
dbus eavesdrop,
Eavesdropping rules can contain the bus conditional. Any other
conditionals are not compatible with eavesdropping rules and the parser
will return an error.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Rules that have the audit and deny modifiers are to be explicitly denied
and audited. However, accept states were incorrectly being generated
with the deny and quiet masks set. This resulted in actions being denied
but not audited.
Here's the old parser output for audit deny dbus and mount rules:
$ dbus="/t { audit deny dbus, }"
$ mount="/t { audit deny mount, }"
$ echo $dbus | apparmor_parser -qQD dfa-states 2>&1 | sed '/^$/,$d'
{1} <== (allow/deny/audit/quiet)
{3} (0x 0/40/0/40)
{7} (0x 0/46/0/46)
$ $ echo $mount | apparmor_parser -qQD dfa-states 2>&1 | sed '/^$/,$d'
{1} <== (allow/deny/audit/quiet)
{5} (0x 0/2/0/2)
With this patch, no accept states are generated which means that actions
will be denied and audited:
$ echo $dbus | apparmor_parser -qQD dfa-states 2>&1 | sed '/^$/,$d'
{1} <== (allow/deny/audit/quiet)
$ echo $mount | apparmor_parser -qQD dfa-states 2>&1 | sed '/^$/,$d'
{1} <== (allow/deny/audit/quiet)
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When using the deny rule modifier, accept states were not being
generated for dbus and mount rules. This means that the actions were
being denied, but it was not possible to quiet the auditing of the
actions.
The problem is that the deny and audit members of the dbus_entry and
mnt_entry structs were being used incorrectly. The deny member is a
boolean, not a bitmask. When the deny modifier is exclusively used in a
rule, the deny boolean should be true and the audit mask should be equal
to the perm mask.
Here's the old parser output for denied dbus and mount rules:
$ dbus="/t { deny dbus, }"
$ mount="/t { deny mount, }"
$ echo $dbus | apparmor_parser -qQD dfa-states 2>&1 | sed '/^$/,$d'
{1} <== (allow/deny/audit/quiet)
$ echo $mount | apparmor_parser -qQD dfa-states 2>&1 | sed '/^$/,$d'
{1} <== (allow/deny/audit/quiet)
With this patch, the accept states are generated correctly with deny and
quiet masks:
$ echo $dbus | apparmor_parser -qQD dfa-states 2>&1 | sed '/^$/,$d'
{1} <== (allow/deny/audit/quiet)
{3} (0x 0/40/0/40)
{7} (0x 0/46/0/46)
$ echo $mount | apparmor_parser -qQD dfa-states 2>&1 | sed '/^$/,$d'
{1} <== (allow/deny/audit/quiet)
{5} (0x 0/2/0/2)
https://launchpad.net/bugs/1226356
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Convert the codomain to a class, and the policy lists that store
codomains to stl containers instead of glibc twalk.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[tyhicks: Merge with dbus changes and process_file_entries() cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
This conversion is nothing more than what is required to get it to
compile. Further improvements will come as the code is refactored.
Unfortunately due to C++ not supporting designated initializers, the auto
generation of af names needed to be reworked, and "netlink" and "unix"
domain socket keywords leaked in. Since these where going to be added in
separate patches I have not bothered to do the extra work to replace them
with a temporary place holder.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
[tyhicks: merged with dbus changes and memory leak fixes]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
let allow be used as a prefix in place of deny. Allow is the default
and is implicit so it is not needed but some user keep tripping over
it, and it makes the language more symmetric
eg.
/foo rw,
allow /foo rw,
deny /foo rw,
Patch history:
v1: - initial revision
v2: - rename yacc target rule from opt_deny to opt_perm_mode to
reflect
that it can be either an allow or deny modifier
- break apart tests into more digestible chunks and to clarify
their purpose
- fix some tests to exercise 'audit allow'
- add negative tests for 'allow' and 'deny' in the same rule
- add support for 'allow' keyword to apparmor.vim
- fix a bug in apparmor.vim to let it recognize multiple
capability entries in a single line.
v3: - add support for optional keywords on capability rules in
regression tests, as well as the bare capability keyword (via
'cap:ALL')
- add allow, deny, and conflicting capability behavioral
regression tests
- fix vim syntax modeline to refer to apparmor in parser tests
- adjust FILE regex in vim syntax file creator script
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
This patch fixes a few memory leaks found by valgrind. Most of these
occur in error cases and as such, are not a big deal. The dbus TOK_MODE
and flags TOK_CONDID leaks in parser_yacc.y are legitimate leaks,
if of very small amounts of memory.
Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
This patch implements the parsing of DBus rules.
It attempts to catch all corner cases, such as specifying a bind
permission with an interface conditional or specifying a subject name
conditional and a peer name conditional in the same rule.
It introduces the concept of conditional lists to the lexer and parser
in order to handle 'peer=(label=/usr/bin/foo name=com.foo.bar)', since
the existing list support in the lexer only supports a list of values.
The DBus rules are encoded as follows:
bus,name<bind_perm>,peer_label,path,interface,member<rw_perms>
Bind rules stop matching at name<bind_perm>. Note that name is used for
the subject name in bind rules and the peer name in rw rules. The
function new_dbus_entry() is what does the proper sanitization to make
sure that if a name conditional is specified, that it is the subject
name in the case of a bind rule or that it is the peer name in the case
of a rw rule.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/979135
Currently a change_profile rule does not grant access to the
/proc/<pid>/attr/{current,exec} interfaces that are needed to perform
a change_profile or change_onexec, requiring that an explicit rule allowing
access to the interface be granted.
Make it so change_profile implies the necessary
/proc/@{PID}/attr/{current,exec} w,
rule just like the presence of hats does for change_hat
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
file, should grant access to all files paths on the system but it does
not currently allow access to /
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
Rename the pivotroot rule to pivot_root to match the command and the fn
and fix it to support named transition correctly leveraging the parsing
action used for exec transitions.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
This commit causes policy problems because we do not have chroot rules
and policy extension to support it.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
file,
was not given the correct permissions. It was only being given the owner
set of permissions. This would result in rejects when trying look at
files owned by other users
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
