mkprofile.pl helper and take the convoluted code out of the bash
prologue.inc. It also detects if the binary is a script and performs
ldd analysis on the interpreter.
Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
their purpose a little more accurately; renames the dump_flags to
emit_flags for the same reason, and also adds a modicum a function
prototype information to the function declarations.
Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
write access to /proc/*/attr/current to mkprofile.pl from prologue.inc.
Signed-Off-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Profile loads when specifying namespaces currently conflict with caching.
If the profile (ignoring the specified namespace) is in the cache, then
the cached profile will be loaded, replacing the profile in the current
namespace instead of loading the profile to the new namespace.
Fix this by disabling caching when a namespace is specified, forcing the
profile to be compiled.
NOTE: this will not affect profiles loaded from within a namespace using
either the same or a separate directory as the base to load a namespac
from. This only affects loading profiles directly into a child
namespace.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Currently the cache location is fixed and links are needed to move it.
Add an option that can be set in the apparmor_parser.conf file so distros
can locate the cache where ever makes sense for them.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
The behavior for revalidation/revocation of open files has changed
with the current kernel code, resulting in these tests being reported
as failing even though they are showing expected behavior.
Under the current kernel module this form of revalidation/revocation
can not be tested reliably, so just changing the expected result is
not enough, completely disable the tests for now.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
Lenient profile that is intended to be used when 'Ux' is desired but
does not provide enough environment sanitizing. This effectively is an
open profile that blacklists certain known dangerous files and also
does not allow any capabilities. For example, it will not allow 'm' on files
owned be the user invoking the program. While this provides some additional
protection, please use with care as applications running under this profile
are effectively running without any AppArmor protection. Use this profile
only if the process absolutely must be run (effectively) unconfined.
Limitations:
1. This does not work for root owned processes, because of the way we use
owner matching in the sanitized helper. We could do a better job with
this to support root, but it would make the policy harder to understand
and going unconfined as root is not desirable anyway.
2. For this sanitized_helper to work, the program running in the sanitized
environment must open symlinks directly in order for AppArmor to mediate
it. This is confirmed to work with:
- compiled code which can load shared libraries
- python imports
It is known not to work with:
- perl includes
3. Going forward it might be useful to try sanitizing ruby and java
Use at your own risk. This profile was developed as an interim workaround for
LP: #851986 until AppArmor implements proper environment filtering.
Acked-by: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
Adjust ubuntu abstractions to use sanitized_helper instead of (P)Ux.
Acked-by: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
Update launchpad-integration to use a sanitized helper in a similar manner
as that in ubuntu-helpers.
Acked-by: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
creating owner writes on things like ~/.cache and ~/.config
Acked-by: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
add machine script = /usr/sbin/smbldap-useradd -t 5 -w "%u"
smbd obviously needs x permissions for smbldap-useradd.
The commit also adds a new profile for usr.sbin.smbldap-useradd (based on
the audit.log from Alexis Pellicier).
Additionally, I moved the "/etc/samba/* rwk" rule next to the other
/etc-related rules in the smbd profile.
References: https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=738041
Lenient profile that is intended to be used when 'Ux' is desired but
does not provide enough environment sanitizing. This effectively is an
open profile that blacklists certain known dangerous files and also
does not allow any capabilities. For example, it will not allow 'm' on files
owned be the user invoking the program. While this provides some additional
protection, please use with care as applications running under this profile
are effectively running without any AppArmor protection. Use this profile
only if the process absolutely must be run (effectively) unconfined.
Limitations:
1. This does not work for root owned processes, because of the way we use
owner matching in the sanitized helper. We could do a better job with
this to support root, but it would make the policy harder to understand
and going unconfined as root is not desirable any way.
2. For this sanitized_helper to work, the program running in the sanitized
environment must open symlinks directly in order for AppArmor to mediate
it. This is confirmed to work with:
- compiled code which can load shared libraries
- python imports
It is known not to work with:
- perl includes
3. Going forward it might be useful to try sanitizing ruby and java
Use at your own risk. This profile was developed as an interim workaround for
LP: #851986 until AppArmor implements proper environment filtering.
From the README in the toplevel source:
"[P11-KIT] Provides a way to load and enumerate PKCS#11 modules. Provides a
standard configuration setup for installing PKCS#11 modules in such a way that
they're discoverable."
File locatations are described in [1]. There is a global configuration file in
/etc/pkcs11/pkcs11.conf. Per module configuration happens in
/etc/pkcs11/<module name>. There is also user configuration in ~/.pkcs11, but
IMO this should not be allowed in the abstraction. Example configuration can be
seen in the upstream documentation[2].
This will likely need to be refined as more applications use p11-kit.
[1]http://p11-glue.freedesktop.org/doc/p11-kit/config-locations.html
[2]http://p11-glue.freedesktop.org/doc/p11-kit/config-example.html
Acked-by: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
Also add p11-kit to authentication abstraction
Acked-by: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
From the README in the toplevel source:
"[P11-KIT] Provides a way to load and enumerate PKCS#11 modules. Provides a
standard configuration setup for installing PKCS#11 modules in such a way that
they're discoverable."
File locatations are described in [1]. There is a global configuration file in
/etc/pkcs11/pkcs11.conf. Per module configuration happens in
/etc/pkcs11/<module name>. There is also user configuration in ~/.pkcs11, but
IMO this should not be allowed in the abstraction. Example configuration can be
seen in the upstream documentation[2].
This will likely need to be refined as more applications use p11-kit.
[1]http://p11-glue.freedesktop.org/doc/p11-kit/config-locations.html
[2]http://p11-glue.freedesktop.org/doc/p11-kit/config-example.html
Acked-by: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
Currently hfa::match calls hfa::match_len to do matching. However this
requires walking the input string twice. Instead provide a match routine
for input that is supposed to terminate at a given input character.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
Add the ability to match strings directly from the hfa instead of needing
to build a cfha.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
in python abstraction. This script is used by apport aware python applications
Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/860856
Acked-by: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
and systems where /var/run moved to /run. Also allows read of
/etc/default/locale.
Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/817956
Acked-by: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
asprintf is marked with warn_unused_result and its return value should
not be ignored, even casting to (void) will not remove this warning.
The current code ignored the result and used the value of newfmt to
make a decision. This is however not correct in that according to the
asprintf man page newfmt is undefined if asprintf returns an error.
Fix the warning and error by using the return value of asprintf
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-By: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
abstractions/apache2-common. Additionally, add read permissions
for /**/.htaccess and /dev/urandom to apache2-common.
The patch is based on a profile abstraction from darix. I made some
things more strict (compared to darix' profile), and OTOH added some
things that are needed on my servers.
*** BACKWARDS-INCOMPATIBLE CHANGES ***
^HANDLING_UNTRUSTED_INPUT
- don't allow /.htaccess (.htaccess files in subdirectories are still allowed)
- don't allow *.htaccess files (the old /**.htaccess rule was too generous)
