so that policy will work on kernels that support network socket controls
but not the extended af_unix rules
however this is currently broken if the socket type is left unspecified
(initialized to -1), resulting in denials for kernels that don't support
the extended af_unix rules.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: timeout
Abstract af_unix socket names can contain a null character, however the
aare to pcre conversion explicitly disallows null characters because they
are not valid characters for pathnames. Fix this so that they type of
globbing is selectable.
this is a partial fix for
Bug: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1413410
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
Currently the apparmor parser warns about rules that are not enforced or
downgraded. This is a problem for distros that are not carrying the out of
tree kernel patches, as most profile loads result in warnings.
Change the behavior to not output a message unless a warn flag is passed.
This patch adds 2 different warn flags
--warn rule-downgraded # warn if a rule is downgraded
--warn rule-not-enforced # warn if a rule is not enforced at all
If the warnings are desired by default the flags can be set in the
parser.conf file.
v2 of patch
- update man page
- add --warn to usage statement
- make --quiet clear warn flags
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
This patch updates the parser code to reject rules that contain local
socket permissions and peer conditional elements. The error message for
that condition is also corrected to resolve a copy and paste mistake
from the D-Bus rule parsing code.
The patch also updates the man page to correctly describe the two sets
of socket permissions and fixes an example rule that resulted in a
parser error after the change described above.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
while it is not possible to specify a rule with local conditionals with
peer conditionals
eg.
unix listen peer=(addr=@foo),
a rule such as
unix peer=(addr=@foo),
is possible, and was setting all permissions for local as well as the peer
condition permissions.
Currently this means the create permission must be specified in a separate
rule from a rule with a peer= condition, if create is to be allowed. This
isn't too much of an issue but it does mean rule such as
unix connect peer=(addr=@foo),
Can not imply the ability to create a socket. Which may indeed be the
behavior if we wish to enforce that the socket was created in another
process and passed in. Is this what we want to do?
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Only reject rules with explicit listen or bind permissions if a peer
conditional is specified.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
The listen and setopts commands have broken encodings because the
tmp stream they use to handle diverging from the other commands
has does not set its write position to to the end of the copied data.
Instead the write head is set to the beginning so that when the
new data for the command is written it overwrites the begging of
the command instead of appending to it.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Fix to allow specifying the unix perm with peer perms. This is allowed
now and even supported, since for unix sockets the peer accept is
mediated in the unix_stream_connect hook (something that is not
possible in the lsm accept hook).
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
This changes/fixes the encoding for unix socket rules. The changes
look larger than they are because it refactors the code, instead
of duplicating.
The major changes are:
- it changes where the accept perm is stored
- it moves anyone_match_pattern to default_match_pattern
- it fixes the layout of the local addr only being written when local
perms are present
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
The old dfa table format has 2 64 bit permission field used to store
all of allow, quiet, audit, owner/!owner and transition mask. This
leaves 7 bits for entry + a few other special bits.
Since policydb entries when using old style dfa permission format
don't use support the !owner permission entries we can map, the
high net work permission bits to these entries.
This allows us to enforce base network permissions on system with
only support for the old dfa table format.
Bits 0-7 inclusive stay put
Bits 8-9 inclusive move (14 - 8) = 6 to 14-15 GETATTR | SETATTR
Bits 20-22 inclusive move -4 to 16-18 ACCEPT | BIND | LISTEN (notice 22 not 23)
Bit 23 is skipped, hence the need to shift 5 for 24-25 instead of 4
Bits 24-25 inclusive move -5 to 19-20
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
This patch fixes a segfault that was occurring in testing over the
weekend. The problem existed in the original patch that adds af_unix
rules (lp:apparmor commit 2615).
Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This patch converts the path= modifier to the af_unix rules to use
addr= instead.
Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
This patch implements parsing of fine grained mediation for unix domain
sockets, that have abstract and anonymous paths. Sockets with file
system paths are handled by regular file access rules.
The unix network rules follow the general fine grained network
rule pattern of
[<qualifiers>] af_name [<access expr>] [<rule conds>] [<local expr>] [<peer expr>]
specifically for af_unix this is
[<qualifiers>] 'unix' [<access expr>] [<rule conds>] [<local expr>] [<peer expr>]
<qualifiers> = [ 'audit' ] [ 'allow' | 'deny' ]
<access expr> = ( <access> | <access list> )
<access> = ( 'server' | 'create' | 'bind' | 'listen' | 'accept' |
'connect' | 'shutdown' | 'getattr' | 'setattr' |
'getopt' | 'setopt' |
'send' | 'receive' | 'r' | 'w' | 'rw' )
(some access modes are incompatible with some rules or require additional
parameters)
<access list> = '(' <access> ( [','] <WS> <access> )* ')'
<WS> = white space
<rule conds> = ( <type cond> | <protocol cond> )*
each cond can appear at most once
<type cond> = 'type' '=' ( <AARE> | '(' ( '"' <AARE> '"' | <AARE> )+ ')' )
<protocol cond> = 'protocol' '=' ( <AARE> | '(' ( '"' <AARE> '"' | <AARE> )+ ')' )
<local expr> = ( <path cond> | <attr cond> | <opt cond> )*
each cond can appear at most once
<peer expr> = 'peer' '=' ( <path cond> | <label cond> )+
each cond can appear at most once
<path cond> = 'path' '=' ( <AARE> | '(' '"' <AARE> '"' | <AARE> ')' )
<label cond> = 'label' '=' ( <AARE> | '(' '"' <AARE> '"' | <AARE> ')')
<attr cond> = 'attr' '=' ( <AARE> | '(' '"' <AARE> '"' | <AARE> ')' )
<opt cond> = 'opt' '=' ( <AARE> | '(' '"' <AARE> '"' | <AARE> ')' )
<AARE> = ?*[]{}^ ( see man page )
unix domain socket rules are accumulated so that the granted unix
socket permissions are the union of all the listed unix rule permissions.
unix domain socket rules are broad and general and become more restrictive
as further information is specified. Policy may be specified down to
the path and label level. The content of the communication is not
examined.
Some permissions are not compatible with all unix rules.
unix socket rule permissions are implied when a rule does not explicitly
state an access list. By default if a rule does not have an access list
all permissions that are compatible with the specified set of local
and peer conditionals are implied.
The 'server', 'r', 'w' and 'rw' permissions are aliases for other permissions.
server = (create, bind, listen, accept)
r = (receive, getattr, getopt)
w = (create, connect, send, setattr, setopt)
In addition it supports the v7 kernel abi semantics around generic
network rules. The v7 abi removes the masking unix and netlink
address families from the generic masking and uses fine grained
mediation for an address type if supplied.
This means that the rules
network unix,
network netlink,
are now enforced instead of ignored. The parser previously could accept
these but the kernel would ignore anything written to them. If a network
rule is supplied it takes precedence over the finer grained mediation
rule. If permission is not granted via a broad network access rule
fine grained mediation is applied.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
