- fix "Namespcae" tyop
- get rid of sub_name and default_deny from the main profile struct as
they haven't been used for a long time; also eliminates their output
from the debugging output.
- emit dumped parsing structure with only one -d, users were confuzzled
and it was not documented that you needed to use -dd to get it to
output anything if DEBUG wasn't set when compiling.
removing profiles, as the list is unstable after additions or removals.
- Add the ability to loaded precompiled policy by specifying the -B
option, which can be combined with --add or --replace
- rc.apparmor.functions were not correctly removing profiles on replace and
reload, also convert to using the module interface directly bypassing the
parser.
- fix cx -> named transitions
- fix apparmor_parser -N so that it emits hats as profiles under new kernel
modules. This is the correct behavior as hats are promoted to profiles.
key words. Deny is also used to subtract permissions from the
profiles permission set.
the audit key word can be prepended to any file, network, or capability
rule, to force a selective audit when that rule is matched. Audit
permissions accumulate just like standard permissions.
eg.
audit /bin/foo rw,
will force an audit message when the file /bin/foo is opened for
read or write.
audit /etc/shadow w,
/etc/shadow r,
will force an audit message when /etc/shadow is opened for writing.
The audit message is per permission bit so only opening the file
for read access will not, force an audit message.
audit can also be used in block form instead of prepending audit
to every rule.
audit {
/bin/foo rw,
/etc/shadow w,
}
/etc/shadow r, # don't audit r access to /etc/shadow
the deny key word can be prepended to file, network and capability
rules, to result in a denial of permissions when matching that rule.
The deny rule specifically does 3 things
- it gives AppArmor the ability to remember what has been denied
so that the tools don't prompt for what has been denied in
previous profiling sessions.
- it subtracts globally from the allowed permissions. Deny permissions
accumulate in the the deny set just as allow permissions accumulate
then, the deny set is subtracted from the allow set.
- it quiets known rejects. The default audit behavior of deny rules
is to quiet known rejects so that audit logs are not flooded
with already known rejects. To have known rejects logged prepend
the audit keyword to the deny rule. Deny rules do not have a
block form.
eg.
deny /foo/bar rw,
audit deny /etc/shadow w,
audit {
deny owner /blah w,
deny other /foo w,
deny /etc/shadow w,
}
This (updated) patch to trunk adds support for Px and Ux (toggle
bprm_secure on exec) in the parser, As requested, lowercase p and u
corresponds to an unfiltered environmnet on exec, uppercase will filter
the environment. It applies after the 'm' patch.
As a side effect, I tried to reduce the use of hardcoded characters in
the debugging statements -- there are still a few warnings that have
hard coded letters in them; not sure I can fix them all.
This version issues a warning for every unsafe ux and issues a single
warning for the first 'R', 'W', 'X', 'L', and 'I' it encounters,
except when the "-q" or "--quiet" flag , "--remove" profile flag, or
"-N" report names flags are passed. Unfortunately, it made the logic
somewhat more convoluted. Wordsmithing improvements welcome.
This (updated) patch to trunk adds the m flag to the parser language. The
m flag explicitly does -not- conflict with px, ux, or ix.
It does not add exec mmap as implicit to inherited execs, as it was
asserted that the module should do this.
I have not fixed up the testcases to match.
