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204c0c5a3a
io_uring and userns mediation are encoding permissions on the class byte. This is a mistake that should never have been allowed. With the addition of rule priorities the class byte mediates rule, that ensure the kernel can determine a class is being mediated is given the highest priority possible, to ensure class mediation can not be removed by a deny rule. See61b7568e1("parser: bug fix mediates_X stub rules.") for details. Unfortunately this breaks rule classes that encode permissions on the class byte, because those rules will always have a lower priority and the class mediates rule will always be selected over them resulting in only the class mediates permission being on the rule class state. Fix this by adding the mediaties class rules for these rule classes with the lowest priority possible. This means that any rule mediating the class will wipe out the mediates class rule. So add a new mediates class rule at the same priority, as the rule being added. This is a naive implementation and does result in more mediates rules being added than necessary. The rule class could keep track of the highest priority rule that had been added, and use that to reduce the number of mediates rules it adds for the class. Technically we could also get away with not adding the rules for allow rules, as the kernel doesn't actually check the encoded permission but whether the class state is not the trap state. But it is required with deny rules to ensure the deny rule doesn't result in permissions being removed from the class, resulting in the kernel thinking it is unmediated. We also want to ensure that mediation is encoded for other rule types like prompt, and in the future the kernel could check the permission so we do want to guarantee that the class state has the MAY_READ permission on it. Note: there is another set of classes (file, mqueue, dbus, ...) which encodes a default rule permission as class .* <perm> this encoding is unfortunate in that it will also add the permission to the class byte, but also sets up following states with the permission. thankfully, this accespt anything, including nothing generally isn't valid in the nothing case (eg. a file without any absolute name). For this set of classes, the high priority mediates rule just ensures that the null match case does not have permission. Fixes:61b7568e1parser: bug fix mediates_X stub rules. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
117 lines
2.6 KiB
C++
117 lines
2.6 KiB
C++
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2022
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* Canonical, Ltd. (All rights reserved)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
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* License published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, contact Novell, Inc. or Canonical
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* Ltd.
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*/
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#include "parser.h"
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#include "profile.h"
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#include "userns.h"
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#include <iomanip>
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#include <string>
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#include <iostream>
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#include <sstream>
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void userns_rule::move_conditionals(struct cond_entry *conds)
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{
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struct cond_entry *cond_ent;
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list_for_each(conds, cond_ent) {
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/* for now disallow keyword 'in' (list) */
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if (!cond_ent->eq)
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yyerror("keyword \"in\" is not allowed in userns rules\n");
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/* no valid conditionals atm */
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yyerror("invalid userns rule conditional \"%s\"\n",
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cond_ent->name);
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}
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}
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userns_rule::userns_rule(perm32_t perms_p, struct cond_entry *conds):
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perms_rule_t(AA_CLASS_NS)
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{
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if (perms_p) {
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if (perms_p & ~AA_VALID_USERNS_PERMS)
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yyerror("perms contains invalid permissions for userns\n");
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perms = perms_p;
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} else {
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/* default to all perms */
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perms = AA_VALID_USERNS_PERMS;
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}
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move_conditionals(conds);
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free_cond_list(conds);
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}
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ostream &userns_rule::dump(ostream &os)
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{
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class_rule_t::dump(os);
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if (perms != AA_VALID_USERNS_PERMS) {
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if (perms & AA_USERNS_CREATE)
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os << " create";
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}
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os << ",\n";
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return os;
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}
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int userns_rule::expand_variables(void)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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void userns_rule::warn_once(const char *name)
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{
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rule_t::warn_once(name, "userns rules not enforced");
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}
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int userns_rule::gen_policy_re(Profile &prof)
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{
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std::ostringstream buffer;
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std::string buf;
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if (!features_supports_userns) {
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warn_once(prof.name);
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return RULE_NOT_SUPPORTED;
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}
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buffer << "\\x" << std::setfill('0') << std::setw(2) << std::hex << AA_CLASS_NS;
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buf = buffer.str();
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if (perms & AA_VALID_USERNS_PERMS) {
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), priority,
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rule_mode, perms,
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audit == AUDIT_FORCE ? perms : 0,
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parseopts))
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goto fail;
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/* add a mediates_userns rule for every rule added. It
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* needs to be the same priority
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*/
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if (!prof.policy.rules->add_rule(buf.c_str(), priority,
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RULE_ALLOW, AA_MAY_READ, 0,
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parseopts))
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goto fail;
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}
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return RULE_OK;
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fail:
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return RULE_ERROR;
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}
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