mirror of
https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor.git
synced 2025-03-04 08:24:42 +01:00
2be46bbabc
The @{profile_name} is incorrectly expanded as a fully qualified path
including its namespace if one was specified in the profile declaration.
ie.
profile :ns://a {
ptrace @{profile_name},
# expands to
# ptrace :ns://a,
}
This is wrong however because within a profile if a rule refers
to a namespace it will be wrt a sub-namespace. That is in the above
example the ptrace rule is refering to a profile in a subnamespace
"ns".
Or from the current profile declaration scope
:ns//ns://a
Instead @{profile_name} should expand into the hname (hierarchical name),
which is the profile hierarchy specification within the namespace the
profile is part of.
In this case
a
or for a child profile case
profile :ns://a {
profile b {
ptrace @{profile_name},
}
}
the hname expansion would be
a//b
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <steve@nxnw.org>
499 lines
19 KiB
Bash
Executable file
499 lines
19 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/bin/bash
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#
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# Copyright (c) 2013
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# Canonical, Ltd. (All rights reserved)
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#
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# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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# modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
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# License published by the Free Software Foundation.
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#
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# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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# GNU General Public License for more details.
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#
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# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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# along with this program; if not, contact Canonical Ltd.
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#
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# Tests for post-parser equality among multiple profiles. These tests are
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# useful to verify that keyword aliases, formatting differences, etc., all
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# result in the same parser output.
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set -o pipefail
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_SCRIPTDIR=$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" )
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APPARMOR_PARSER="${APPARMOR_PARSER:-${_SCRIPTDIR}/../apparmor_parser}"
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fails=0
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errors=0
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verbose="${VERBOSE:-}"
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hash_binary_policy()
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{
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printf %s "$1" | ${APPARMOR_PARSER} --features-file ${_SCRIPTDIR}/features_files/features.all -qS 2>/dev/null| md5sum | cut -d ' ' -f 1
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return $?
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}
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# verify_binary - compares the binary policy of multiple profiles
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# $1: Test type (equality or inequality)
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# $2: A short description of the test
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# $3: The known-good profile
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# $4..$n: The profiles to compare against $3
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#
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# Upon failure/error, prints out the test description and profiles that failed
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# and increments $fails or $errors for each failure and error, respectively
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verify_binary()
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{
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local t=$1
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local desc=$2
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local good_profile=$3
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local good_hash
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local ret=0
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shift
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shift
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shift
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if [ "$t" != "equality" ] && [ "$t" != "inequality" ]
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then
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printf "\nERROR: Unknown test mode:\n%s\n\n" "$t" 1>&2
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((errors++))
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return $((ret + 1))
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fi
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if [ -n "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
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good_hash=$(hash_binary_policy "$good_profile")
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if [ $? -ne 0 ]
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then
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if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
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printf "\nERROR: Error hashing the following \"known-good\" profile:\n%s\n\n" \
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"$good_profile" 1>&2
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((errors++))
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return $((ret + 1))
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fi
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for profile in "$@"
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do
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hash=$(hash_binary_policy "$profile")
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if [ $? -ne 0 ]
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then
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if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
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printf "\nERROR: Error hashing the following profile:\n%s\n\n" \
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"$profile" 1>&2
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((errors++))
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((ret++))
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elif [ "$t" == "equality" ] && [ "$hash" != "$good_hash" ]
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then
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if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
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printf "\nFAIL: Hash values do not match\n" 2>&1
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printf "known-good (%s) != profile-under-test (%s) for the following profile:\n%s\n\n" \
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"$good_hash" "$hash" "$profile" 1>&2
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((fails++))
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((ret++))
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elif [ "$t" == "inequality" ] && [ "$hash" == "$good_hash" ]
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then
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if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
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printf "\nFAIL: Hash values match\n" 2>&1
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printf "known-good (%s) == profile-under-test (%s) for the following profile:\n%s\n\n" \
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"$good_hash" "$hash" "$profile" 1>&2
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((fails++))
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((ret++))
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fi
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done
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if [ $ret -eq 0 ]
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then
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if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then
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printf "."
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else
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printf " ok\n"
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fi
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fi
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return $ret
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}
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verify_binary_equality()
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{
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verify_binary "equality" "$@"
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}
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verify_binary_inequality()
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{
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verify_binary "inequality" "$@"
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}
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printf "Equality Tests:\n"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus send" \
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"/t { dbus send, }" \
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"/t { dbus write, }" \
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"/t { dbus w, }"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus receive" \
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"/t { dbus receive, }" \
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"/t { dbus read, }" \
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"/t { dbus r, }"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus send + receive" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive), }" \
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"/t { dbus (read, write), }" \
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"/t { dbus (r, w), }" \
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"/t { dbus (rw), }" \
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"/t { dbus rw, }" \
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verify_binary_equality "dbus all accesses" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { dbus (read, write, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { dbus (r, w, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { dbus (rw, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { dbus (), }" \
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"/t { dbus, }" \
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verify_binary_equality "dbus implied accesses with a bus conditional" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive, bind, eavesdrop) bus=session, }" \
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"/t { dbus (read, write, bind, eavesdrop) bus=session, }" \
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"/t { dbus (r, w, bind, eavesdrop) bus=session, }" \
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"/t { dbus (rw, bind, eavesdrop) bus=session, }" \
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"/t { dbus () bus=session, }" \
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"/t { dbus bus=session, }" \
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verify_binary_equality "dbus implied accesses for services" \
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"/t { dbus bind name=com.foo, }" \
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"/t { dbus name=com.foo, }"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus implied accesses for messages" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo interface=org.foo, }" \
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"/t { dbus path=/com/foo interface=org.foo, }"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus implied accesses for messages with peer names" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(name=com.foo), }" \
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"/t { dbus path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(name=com.foo), }" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(name=(com.foo)), }" \
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"/t { dbus path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(name=(com.foo)), }"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus implied accesses for messages with peer labels" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(label=/usr/bin/app), }" \
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"/t { dbus path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(label=/usr/bin/app), }"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus element parsing" \
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"/t { dbus bus=b path=/ interface=i member=m peer=(name=n label=l), }" \
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"/t { dbus bus=\"b\" path=\"/\" interface=\"i\" member=\"m\" peer=(name=\"n\" label=\"l\"), }" \
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"/t { dbus bus=(b) path=(/) interface=(i) member=(m) peer=(name=(n) label=(l)), }" \
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"/t { dbus bus=(\"b\") path=(\"/\") interface=(\"i\") member=(\"m\") peer=(name=(\"n\") label=(\"l\")), }" \
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"/t { dbus bus =b path =/ interface =i member =m peer =(name =n label =l), }" \
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"/t { dbus bus= b path= / interface= i member= m peer= (name= n label= l), }" \
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"/t { dbus bus = b path = / interface = i member = m peer = ( name = n label = l ), }"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus access parsing" \
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"/t { dbus, }" \
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"/t { dbus (), }" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { dbus (send receive bind eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive bind, eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { dbus (send,receive,bind,eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { dbus (send,receive,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,bind,eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { dbus (send,send,send,send send receive,bind eavesdrop), }" \
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verify_binary_equality "dbus variable expansion" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo member=spork interface=org.foo peer=(name=com.foo label=/com/foo), }" \
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"@{FOO}=foo
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/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO} member=spork interface=org.@{FOO} peer=(name=com.@{FOO} label=/com/@{FOO}), }" \
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"@{FOO}=foo
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@{SPORK}=spork
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/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO} member=@{SPORK} interface=org.@{FOO} peer=(name=com.@{FOO} label=/com/@{FOO}), }" \
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"@{FOO}=/com/foo
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/t { dbus (send, receive) path=@{FOO} member=spork interface=org.foo peer=(name=com.foo label=@{FOO}), }" \
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"@{FOO}=com
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/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/@{FOO}/foo member=spork interface=org.foo peer=(name=@{FOO}.foo label=/@{FOO}/foo), }"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus variable expansion, multiple values/rules" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/{foo,bar}, }" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive) path={/com/foo,/com/bar}, }" \
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"@{FOO}=foo
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/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
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"@{FOO}=foo bar
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/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
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"@{FOO}=bar foo
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/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
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"@{FOO}={bar,foo}
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/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
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"@{FOO}=foo
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@{BAR}=bar
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/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/{@{FOO},@{BAR}}, }" \
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verify_binary_equality "dbus variable expansion, ensure rule de-duping occurs" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
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"@{FOO}=bar foo bar foo
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/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
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"@{FOO}=bar foo bar foo
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/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus minimization with all perms" \
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"/t { dbus, }" \
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"/t { dbus bus=session, dbus, }" \
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"/t { dbus (send, receive, bind, eavesdrop), dbus, }"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus minimization with bind" \
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"/t { dbus bind, }" \
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"/t { dbus bind bus=session, dbus bind, }" \
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"/t { dbus bind bus=system name=com.foo, dbus bind, }"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus minimization with send and a bus conditional" \
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"/t { dbus send bus=system, }" \
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"/t { dbus send bus=system path=/com/foo interface=com.foo member=bar, dbus send bus=system, }" \
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"/t { dbus send bus=system peer=(label=/usr/bin/foo), dbus send bus=system, }"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus minimization with an audit modifier" \
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"/t { audit dbus eavesdrop, }" \
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"/t { audit dbus eavesdrop bus=session, audit dbus eavesdrop, }"
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verify_binary_equality "dbus minimization with a deny modifier" \
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"/t { deny dbus send bus=system peer=(name=com.foo), }" \
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"/t { deny dbus send bus=system peer=(name=com.foo label=/usr/bin/foo), deny dbus send bus=system peer=(name=com.foo), }" \
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verify_binary_equality "dbus minimization found in dbus abstractions" \
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"/t { dbus send bus=session, }" \
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"/t { dbus send
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bus=session
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path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
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interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
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member={Hello,AddMatch,RemoveMatch,GetNameOwner,NameHasOwner,StartServiceByName}
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peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus),
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dbus send bus=session, }"
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# Rules compatible with audit, deny, and audit deny
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# note: change_profile does not support audit/allow/deny atm
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for rule in "capability" "capability mac_admin" \
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"network" "network tcp" "network inet6 tcp"\
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"mount" "mount /a" "mount /a -> /b" "mount options in (ro) /a -> b" \
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"remount" "remount /a" \
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"umount" "umount /a" \
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"pivot_root" "pivot_root /a" "pivot_root oldroot=/" \
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"pivot_root oldroot=/ /a" "pivot_root oldroot=/ /a -> foo" \
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"ptrace" "ptrace trace" "ptrace (readby,tracedby) peer=unconfined" \
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"signal" "signal (send,receive)" "signal peer=unconfined" \
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"signal receive set=(kill)" \
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"dbus" "dbus send" "dbus bus=system" "dbus bind name=foo" \
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"dbus peer=(label=foo)" "dbus eavesdrop" \
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"unix" "unix (create, listen, accept)" "unix addr=@*" "unix addr=none" \
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"unix peer=(label=foo)" \
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"/f r" "/f w" "/f rwmlk" "/** r" "/**/ w" \
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"file /f r" "file /f w" "file /f rwmlk" \
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"link /a -> /b" "link subset /a -> /b" \
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"l /a -> /b" "l subset /a -> /b" \
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"file l /a -> /b" "l subset /a -> /b"
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do
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verify_binary_equality "allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
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"/t { ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { allow ${rule}, }"
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verify_binary_equality "audit allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
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"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { audit allow ${rule}, }"
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verify_binary_inequality "audit, deny, and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
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"/t { ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { audit allow ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { deny ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { audit deny ${rule}, }"
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verify_binary_inequality "audit vs deny and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
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"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { deny ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { audit deny ${rule}, }"
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verify_binary_inequality "deny and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
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"/t { deny ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { audit deny ${rule}, }"
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done
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# Rules that need special treatment for the deny modifier
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for rule in "/f ux" "/f Ux" "/f px" "/f Px" "/f cx" "/f Cx" "/f ix" \
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"/f pux" "/f Pux" "/f pix" "/f Pix" \
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"/f cux" "/f Cux" "/f cix" "/f Cix" \
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"/* ux" "/* Ux" "/* px" "/* Px" "/* cx" "/* Cx" "/* ix" \
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"/* pux" "/* Pux" "/* pix" "/* Pix" \
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"/* cux" "/* Cux" "/* cix" "/* Cix" \
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"/f px -> b " "/f Px -> b" "/f cx -> b" "/f Cx -> b" \
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"/f pux -> b" "/f Pux -> b" "/f pix -> b" "/f Pix -> b" \
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"/f cux -> b" "/f Cux -> b" "/f cix -> b" "/f Cix -> b" \
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"/* px -> b" "/* Px -> b" "/* cx -> b" "/* Cx -> b" \
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"/* pux -> b" "/* Pux -> b" "/* pix -> b" "/* Pix -> b" \
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"/* cux -> b" "/* Cux -> b" "/* cix -> b" "/* Cix -> b" \
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"file /f ux" "file /f Ux" "file /f px" "file /f Px" \
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"file /f cx" "file /f Cx" "file /f ix" \
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"file /f pux" "file /f Pux" "file /f pix" "file /f Pix" \
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"/f cux" "/f Cux" "/f cix" "/f Cix" \
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"file /* ux" "file /* Ux" "file /* px" "file /* Px" \
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"file /* cx" "file /* Cx" "file /* ix" \
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"file /* pux" "file /* Pux" "file /* pix" "file /* Pix" \
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"file /* cux" "file /* Cux" "file /* cix" "file /* Cix" \
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"file /f px -> b " "file /f Px -> b" "file /f cx -> b" "file /f Cx -> b" \
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"file /f pux -> b" "file /f Pux -> b" "file /f pix -> b" "file /f Pix -> b" \
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"file /f cux -> b" "file /f Cux -> b" "file /f cix -> b" "file /f Cix -> b" \
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"file /* px -> b" "file /* Px -> b" "file /* cx -> b" "file /* Cx -> b" \
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"file /* pux -> b" "file /* Pux -> b" "file /* pix -> b" "file /* Pix -> b" \
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"file /* cux -> b" "file /* Cux -> b" "file /* cix -> b" "file /* Cix -> b"
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do
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verify_binary_equality "allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
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"/t { ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { allow ${rule}, }"
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verify_binary_equality "audit allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
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"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { audit allow ${rule}, }"
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# skip rules that don't end with x perm
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if [ -n "${rule##*x}" ] ; then continue ; fi
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verify_binary_inequality "deny, audit deny modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
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"/t { ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { audit allow ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { deny ${rule% *} x, }" \
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"/t { audit deny ${rule% *} x, }"
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verify_binary_inequality "audit vs deny and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
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"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
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"/t { deny ${rule% *} x, }" \
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"/t { audit deny ${rule% *} x, }"
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done
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# verify deny and audit deny differ for x perms
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for prefix in "/f" "/*" "file /f" "file /*" ; do
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verify_binary_inequality "deny and audit deny x modifiers for \"${prefix}\"" \
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"/t { deny ${prefix} x, }" \
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"/t { audit deny ${prefix} x, }"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
#Test equality of leading and trailing file permissions
|
|
for audit in "" "audit" ; do
|
|
for allow in "" "allow" "deny" ; do
|
|
for owner in "" "owner" ; do
|
|
for f in "" "file" ; do
|
|
prefix="$audit $allow $owner $f"
|
|
for perm in "r" "w" "a" "l" "k" "m" "rw" "ra" \
|
|
"rl" "rk" "rm" "wl" "wk" "wm" \
|
|
"rwl" "rwk" "rwm" "ral" "rak" \
|
|
"ram" "rlk" "rlm" "rkm" "wlk" \
|
|
"wlm" "wkm" "alk" "alm" "akm" \
|
|
"lkm" "rwlk" "rwlm" "rwkm" \
|
|
"ralk" "ralm" "wlkm" "alkm" \
|
|
"rwlkm" "ralkm" ; do
|
|
verify_binary_equality "leading and trailing perms for \"${perm}\"" \
|
|
"/t { ${prefix} /f ${perm}, }" \
|
|
"/t { ${prefix} ${perm} /f, }"
|
|
done
|
|
if [ "$allow" == "deny" ] ; then continue ; fi
|
|
for perm in "ux" "Ux" "px" "Px" "cx" "Cx" \
|
|
"ix" "pux" "Pux" "pix" "Pix" \
|
|
"cux" "Cux" "cix" "Cix"
|
|
do
|
|
verify_binary_equality "leading and trailing perms for \"${perm}\"" \
|
|
"/t { ${prefix} /f ${perm}, }" \
|
|
"/t { ${prefix} ${perm} /f, }"
|
|
done
|
|
for perm in "px" "Px" "cx" "Cx" \
|
|
"pux" "Pux" "pix" "Pix" \
|
|
"cux" "Cux" "cix" "Cix"
|
|
do
|
|
verify_binary_equality "leading and trailing perms for x-transition \"${perm}\"" \
|
|
"/t { ${prefix} /f ${perm} -> b, }" \
|
|
"/t { ${prefix} ${perm} /f -> b, }"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
#Test rule overlap for x most specific match
|
|
for perm1 in "ux" "Ux" "px" "Px" "cx" "Cx" "ix" "pux" "Pux" \
|
|
"pix" "Pix" "cux" "Cux" "cix" "Cix" "px -> b" \
|
|
"Px -> b" "cx -> b" "Cx -> b" "pux -> b" "Pux ->b" \
|
|
"pix -> b" "Pix -> b" "cux -> b" "Cux -> b" \
|
|
"cix -> b" "Cix -> b"
|
|
do
|
|
for perm2 in "ux" "Ux" "px" "Px" "cx" "Cx" "ix" "pux" "Pux" \
|
|
"pix" "Pix" "cux" "Cux" "cix" "Cix" "px -> b" \
|
|
"Px -> b" "cx -> b" "Cx -> b" "pux -> b" "Pux ->b" \
|
|
"pix -> b" "Pix -> b" "cux -> b" "Cux -> b" \
|
|
"cix -> b" "Cix -> b"
|
|
do
|
|
if [ "$perm1" == "$perm2" ] ; then
|
|
verify_binary_equality "Exec perm \"${perm1}\" - most specific match: same as glob" \
|
|
"/t { /* ${perm1}, /f ${perm2}, }" \
|
|
"/t { /* ${perm1}, }"
|
|
else
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "Exec \"${perm1}\" vs \"${perm2}\" - most specific match: different from glob" \
|
|
"/t { /* ${perm1}, /f ${perm2}, }" \
|
|
"/t { /* ${perm1}, }"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "Exec \"${perm1}\" vs deny x - most specific match: different from glob" \
|
|
"/t { /* ${perm1}, audit deny /f x, }" \
|
|
"/t { /* ${perm1}, }"
|
|
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
#Test deny carves out permission
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "Deny removes r perm" \
|
|
"/t { /foo/[abc] r, audit deny /foo/b r, }" \
|
|
"/t { /foo/[abc] r, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "Deny removes r perm" \
|
|
"/t { /foo/[abc] r, audit deny /foo/b r, }" \
|
|
"/t { /foo/[ac] r, }"
|
|
|
|
#this one may not be true in the future depending on if the compiled profile
|
|
#is explicitly including deny permissions for dynamic composition
|
|
verify_binary_equality "Deny of ungranted perm" \
|
|
"/t { /foo/[abc] r, audit deny /foo/b w, }" \
|
|
"/t { /foo/[abc] r, }"
|
|
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "change_profile == change_profile -> **" \
|
|
"/t { change_profile, }" \
|
|
"/t { change_profile -> **, }" \
|
|
"/t { change_profile /**, }" \
|
|
"/t { change_profile /** -> **, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "profile name is hname in rule" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { signal peer=/hname, }" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "profile name is NOT fq name in rule" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { signal peer=:ns:/hname, }" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "profile name is hname in sub pofile rule" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { profile child { signal peer=/hname//child, } }" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { profile child { signal peer=@{profile_name}, } }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "profile name is NOT fq name in sub profile rule" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { profile child { signal peer=:ns:/hname//child, } }" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { profile child { signal peer=@{profile_name}, } }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "profile name is hname in hat rule" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { ^child { signal peer=/hname//child, } }" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { ^child { signal peer=@{profile_name}, } }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "profile name is NOT fq name in hat rule" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { ^child { signal peer=:ns:/hname//child, } }" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { ^child { signal peer=@{profile_name}, } }"
|
|
|
|
if [ $fails -ne 0 -o $errors -ne 0 ]
|
|
then
|
|
printf "ERRORS: %d\nFAILS: %d\n" $errors $fails 2>&1
|
|
exit $(($fails + $errors))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
[ -z "${verbose}" ] && printf "\n"
|
|
printf "PASS\n"
|
|
exit 0
|