mirror of
https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor.git
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1f003c0120
- the base abstraction for common abstract and anonymous rules (comments included per rule) - dbus-session-strict to add a rule for connecting to the dbus session abstract socket. I used 'peer=(label=unconfined)' here, but I could probably lose the explicit label if people preferred that - X to add a rule for connecting to the X abstract socket. Same as for dbus-session-strict - nameservice to add a rule for connecting to a netlink raw. This change could possibly be excluded, but applications using networking (at least on Ubuntu) all seem to need it. Excluding it would mean systems using nscd would need to add this and ones not using it would have a noisy denial Acked-By: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
155 lines
5.8 KiB
Text
155 lines
5.8 KiB
Text
# vim:syntax=apparmor
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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#
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# Copyright (C) 2002-2009 Novell/SUSE
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# Copyright (C) 2009-2011 Canonical Ltd.
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#
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# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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# modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
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# License published by the Free Software Foundation.
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#
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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# (Note that the ldd profile has inlined this file; if you make
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# modifications here, please consider including them in the ldd
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# profile as well.)
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# The __canary_death_handler function writes a time-stamped log
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# message to /dev/log for logging by syslogd. So, /dev/log, timezones,
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# and localisations of date should be available EVERYWHERE, so
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# StackGuard, FormatGuard, etc., alerts can be properly logged.
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/dev/log w,
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/dev/random r,
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/dev/urandom r,
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/etc/locale/** r,
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/etc/locale.alias r,
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/etc/localtime r,
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/usr/share/locale-langpack/** r,
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/usr/share/locale/** r,
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/usr/share/**/locale/** r,
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/usr/share/zoneinfo/ r,
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/usr/share/zoneinfo/** r,
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/usr/share/X11/locale/** r,
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/usr/lib{,32,64}/locale/** mr,
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/usr/lib{,32,64}/gconv/*.so mr,
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/usr/lib{,32,64}/gconv/gconv-modules* mr,
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/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/gconv/*.so mr,
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/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/gconv/gconv-modules* mr,
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# used by glibc when binding to ephemeral ports
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/etc/bindresvport.blacklist r,
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# ld.so.cache and ld are used to load shared libraries; they are best
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# available everywhere
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/etc/ld.so.cache mr,
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/lib{,32,64}/ld{,32,64}-*.so mrix,
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/lib{,32,64}/**/ld{,32,64}-*.so mrix,
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/lib/@{multiarch}/ld{,32,64}-*.so mrix,
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/lib/tls/i686/{cmov,nosegneg}/ld-*.so mrix,
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/lib/i386-linux-gnu/tls/i686/{cmov,nosegneg}/ld-*.so mrix,
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/opt/*-linux-uclibc/lib/ld-uClibc*so* mrix,
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# we might as well allow everything to use common libraries
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/lib{,32,64}/** r,
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/lib{,32,64}/lib*.so* mr,
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/lib{,32,64}/**/lib*.so* mr,
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/lib/@{multiarch}/** r,
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/lib/@{multiarch}/lib*.so* mr,
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/lib/@{multiarch}/**/lib*.so* mr,
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/usr/lib{,32,64}/** r,
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/usr/lib{,32,64}/*.so* mr,
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/usr/lib{,32,64}/**/lib*.so* mr,
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/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/** r,
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/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/lib*.so* mr,
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/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/**/lib*.so* mr,
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/lib/tls/i686/{cmov,nosegneg}/lib*.so* mr,
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/lib/i386-linux-gnu/tls/i686/{cmov,nosegneg}/lib*.so* mr,
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# /dev/null is pretty harmless and frequently used
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/dev/null rw,
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# as is /dev/zero
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/dev/zero rw,
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# recent glibc uses /dev/full in preference to /dev/null for programs
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# that don't have open fds at exec()
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/dev/full rw,
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# Sometimes used to determine kernel/user interfaces to use
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@{PROC}/sys/kernel/version r,
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# Depending on which glibc routine uses this file, base may not be the
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# best place -- but many profiles require it, and it is quite harmless.
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@{PROC}/sys/kernel/ngroups_max r,
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# glibc's sysconf(3) routine to determine free memory, etc
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@{PROC}/meminfo r,
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@{PROC}/stat r,
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@{PROC}/cpuinfo r,
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/sys/devices/system/cpu/online r,
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# glibc's *printf protections read the maps file
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@{PROC}/@{pid}/maps r,
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# libgcrypt reads some flags from /proc
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@{PROC}/sys/crypto/* r,
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# some applications will display license information
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/usr/share/common-licenses/** r,
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# glibc statvfs
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@{PROC}/filesystems r,
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# glibc malloc (man 5 proc)
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@{PROC}/sys/vm/overcommit_memory r,
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# Allow other processes to read our /proc entries, futexes, perf tracing and
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# kcmp for now (they will need 'read' in the first place). Administrators can
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# override with:
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# deny ptrace (readby) ...
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ptrace (readby),
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# Allow other processes to trace us by default (they will need 'trace' in
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# the first place). Administrators can override with:
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# deny ptrace (tracedby) ...
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ptrace (tracedby),
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# Allow us to ptrace read ourselves
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ptrace (read) peer=@{profile_name},
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# Allow unconfined processes to send us signals by default
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signal (receive) peer=unconfined,
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# Allow us to signal ourselves
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signal peer=@{profile_name},
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# Checking for PID existence is quite common so add it by default for now
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signal (receive, send) set=("exists"),
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# Allow us to create and use abstract and anonymous sockets
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unix peer=(label=@{profile_name}),
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# Allow unconfined processes to us via unix sockets
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unix (receive) peer=(label=unconfined),
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# Allow us to create abstract and anonymous sockets
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unix (create),
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# Allow us to getattr, getopt, setop and shutdown for anonymous sockets
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unix (getattr, getopt, setopt, shutdown) peer=(addr=none),
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# Workaround https://launchpad.net/bugs/359338 until upstream handles stacked
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# filesystems generally. This does not appreciably decrease security with
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# Ubuntu profiles because the user is expected to have access to files owned
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# by him/her. Exceptions to this are explicit in the profiles. While this rule
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# grants access to those exceptions, the intended privacy is maintained due to
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# the encrypted contents of the files in this directory. Files in this
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# directory will also use filename encryption by default, so the files are
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# further protected. Also, with the use of 'owner', this rule properly
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# prevents access to the files from processes running under a different uid.
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# encrypted ~/.Private and old-style encrypted $HOME
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owner @{HOME}/.Private/** mrixwlk,
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# new-style encrypted $HOME
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owner @{HOMEDIRS}/.ecryptfs/*/.Private/** mrixwlk,
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