apparmor/kernel-patches/for-mainline/apparmor-main.diff

From: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
Subject: AppArmor: Main Part

The underlying functions by which the AppArmor LSM hooks are implemented.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>

---
 security/apparmor/main.c | 1478 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 1478 insertions(+)

--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1478 @@
+/*
+ *	Copyright (C) 2002-2007 Novell/SUSE
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ *	modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ *	published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ *	License.
+ *
+ *	AppArmor Core
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+
+#include "apparmor.h"
+
+#include "inline.h"
+
+/*
+ * Table of capability names: we generate it from capabilities.h.
+ */
+static const char *capability_names[] = {
+#include "capability_names.h"
+};
+
+struct aa_namespace *default_namespace;
+
+static int aa_inode_mode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	/* if the inode doesn't exist the user is creating it */
+	if (!inode || current->fsuid == inode->i_uid)
+		return AA_USER_SHIFT;
+	return AA_OTHER_SHIFT;
+}
+
+int alloc_default_namespace(void)
+{
+	struct aa_namespace *ns;
+	char *name = kstrdup("default", GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!name)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	ns = alloc_aa_namespace(name);
+	if (!ns) {
+		kfree(name);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	write_lock(&profile_ns_list_lock);
+	default_namespace = ns;
+	aa_get_namespace(ns);
+	list_add(&ns->list, &profile_ns_list);
+	write_unlock(&profile_ns_list_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void free_default_namespace(void)
+{
+	write_lock(&profile_ns_list_lock);
+	list_del_init(&default_namespace->list);
+	write_unlock(&profile_ns_list_lock);
+	aa_put_namespace(default_namespace);
+	default_namespace = NULL;
+}
+
+static void aa_audit_file_sub_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *buffer,
+				   int mask)
+{
+	const char unsafex[] = "upcn";
+	const char safex[] = "UPCN";
+	char *m = buffer;
+
+	if (mask & AA_EXEC_MMAP)
+		*m++ = 'm';
+	if (mask & MAY_READ)
+		*m++ = 'r';
+	if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+		*m++ = 'w';
+	else if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
+		*m++ = 'a';
+	if (mask & MAY_EXEC) {
+		int index = AA_EXEC_INDEX(mask);
+		/* all indexes > 4 are also named transitions */
+		if (index > 4)
+			index = 4;
+		if (index > 0) {
+			if (mask & AA_EXEC_UNSAFE)
+				*m++ = unsafex[index - 1];
+			else
+				*m++ = safex[index - 1];
+		}
+		if (mask & AA_EXEC_INHERIT)
+			*m++ = 'i';
+		*m++ = 'x';
+	}
+	if (mask & AA_MAY_LINK)
+		*m++ = 'l';
+	if (mask & AA_MAY_LOCK)
+		*m++ = 'k';
+	*m++ = '\0';
+}
+
+static void aa_audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *name,
+			       int mask)
+{
+	char user[10], other[10];
+
+	aa_audit_file_sub_mask(ab, user,
+			       (mask & AA_USER_PERMS) >> AA_USER_SHIFT);
+	aa_audit_file_sub_mask(ab, other,
+			       (mask & AA_OTHER_PERMS) >> AA_OTHER_SHIFT);
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"%s::%s\"", name, user, other);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit - Log an audit event to the audit subsystem
+ * @profile: profile to check against
+ * @sa: audit event
+ * @audit_cxt: audit context to log message to
+ * @type: audit event number
+ */
+static int aa_audit_base(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa,
+			 struct audit_context *audit_cxt, int type)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab = NULL;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_cxt, sa->gfp_mask, type);
+
+	if (!ab) {
+		AA_ERROR("Unable to log event (%d) to audit subsys\n",
+			 type);
+		 /* don't fail operations in complain mode even if logging
+		  * fails */
+		return type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (sa->operation)
+		audit_log_format(ab, "operation=\"%s\"", sa->operation);
+
+	if (sa->info) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", sa->info);
+		if (sa->error_code)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->error_code);
+	}
+
+	if (sa->request_mask)
+		aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "requested_mask", sa->request_mask);
+
+	if (sa->denied_mask)
+		aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "denied_mask", sa->denied_mask);
+
+	if (sa->request_mask)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", current->fsuid);
+
+	if (sa->iattr) {
+		struct iattr *iattr = sa->iattr;
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, " attribute=\"%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\"",
+			iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE ? "mode," : "",
+			iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_UID ? "uid," : "",
+			iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_GID ? "gid," : "",
+			iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE ? "size," : "",
+			iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_ATIME | ATTR_ATIME_SET) ?
+				"atime," : "",
+			iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_MTIME_SET) ?
+				"mtime," : "",
+			iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME ? "ctime," : "");
+	}
+
+	if (sa->task)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " task=%d", sa->task);
+
+	if (sa->parent)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%d", sa->parent);
+
+	if (sa->name) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->name);
+	}
+
+	if (sa->name2) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name2=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->name2);
+	}
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d", current->pid);
+
+	if (profile) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " profile=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->name);
+
+		if (profile->ns != default_namespace) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->name);
+		}
+	}
+
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+
+	return type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED ? 0 : sa->error_code;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit_syscallreject - Log a syscall rejection to the audit subsystem
+ * @profile: profile to check against
+ * @gfp: memory allocation flags
+ * @msg: string describing syscall being rejected
+ */
+int aa_audit_syscallreject(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
+			   const char *msg)
+{
+	struct aa_audit sa;
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.operation = "syscall";
+	sa.name = msg;
+	sa.gfp_mask = gfp;
+	sa.error_code = -EPERM;
+
+	return aa_audit_base(profile, &sa, current->audit_context,
+			     AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED);
+}
+
+int aa_audit_message(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa,
+		      int type)
+{
+	struct audit_context *audit_cxt;
+
+	audit_cxt = apparmor_logsyscall ? current->audit_context : NULL;
+	return aa_audit_base(profile, sa, audit_cxt, type);
+}
+
+void aa_audit_hint(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa)
+{
+	aa_audit_message(profile, sa, AUDIT_APPARMOR_HINT);
+}
+
+void aa_audit_status(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa)
+{
+	aa_audit_message(profile, sa, AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS);
+}
+
+int aa_audit_reject(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa)
+{
+	return aa_audit_message(profile, sa, AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit - Log an audit event to the audit subsystem
+ * @profile: profile to check against
+ * @sa: audit event
+ */
+int aa_audit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa)
+{
+	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED;
+	struct audit_context *audit_cxt;
+
+	if (likely(!sa->error_code))
+		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+	else if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile))
+		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED;
+
+	audit_cxt = apparmor_logsyscall ? current->audit_context : NULL;
+	return aa_audit_base(profile, sa, audit_cxt, type);
+}
+
+static int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa)
+{
+	if (likely(!sa->error_code)) {
+		int mask = sa->audit_mask & AUDIT_FILE_MASK;
+
+		if (unlikely(PROFILE_AUDIT(profile)))
+			mask |= AUDIT_FILE_MASK;
+
+		if (likely(!(sa->request_mask & mask)))
+			return 0;
+
+		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
+		sa->request_mask &= mask | ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE;
+	} else {
+		int mask = AUDIT_QUIET_MASK(sa->audit_mask);
+
+		if (!(sa->denied_mask & ~mask))
+			return sa->error_code;
+
+		/* mask off perms whose denial is being silenced */
+		sa->denied_mask &= (~mask) | ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE;
+	}
+
+	return aa_audit(profile, sa);
+}
+
+static int aa_audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa,
+			 int cap)
+{
+	if (likely(!sa->error_code)) {
+		if (likely(!PROFILE_AUDIT(profile) &&
+			   !cap_raised(profile->audit_caps, cap)))
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* quieting of capabilities is handled the caps_logged cache */
+	return aa_audit(profile, sa);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_file_denied - check for @mask access on a file
+ * @profile: profile to check against
+ * @name: pathname of file
+ * @mask: permission mask requested for file
+ * @audit_mask: return audit mask for the match
+ *
+ * Return %0 on success, or else the permissions in @mask that the
+ * profile denies.
+ */
+static int aa_file_denied(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
+			  int mask, int *audit_mask)
+{
+	return (mask & ~aa_match(profile->file_rules, name, audit_mask));
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_link_denied - check for permission to link a file
+ * @profile: profile to check against
+ * @link: pathname of link being created
+ * @target: pathname of target to be linked to
+ * @target_mode: UGO shift for target inode
+ * @request_mask: the permissions subset valid only if link succeeds
+ * @audit_mask: return the audit_mask for the link permission
+ * Return %0 on success, or else the permissions that the profile denies.
+ */
+static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *link,
+			  const char *target, int target_mode,
+			  int *request_mask, int *audit_mask)
+{
+	unsigned int state;
+	int l_mode, t_mode, l_x, t_x, denied_mask = 0;
+	int link_mask = AA_MAY_LINK << target_mode;
+
+	*request_mask = link_mask;
+
+	l_mode = aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, DFA_START, link, &state);
+
+	if (l_mode & link_mask) {
+		int mode;
+		/* test to see if target can be paired with link */
+		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file_rules, state);
+		mode = aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, state, target,
+				      &state);
+
+		if (!(mode & link_mask))
+			denied_mask |= link_mask;
+
+		*audit_mask = dfa_audit_mask(profile->file_rules, state);
+
+		/* return if link subset test is not required */
+		if (!(mode & (AA_LINK_SUBSET_TEST << target_mode)))
+			return denied_mask;
+	}
+
+	/* Do link perm subset test requiring permission on link are a
+	 * subset of the permissions on target.
+	 * If a subset test is required a permission subset test of the
+	 * perms for the link are done against the user::other of the
+	 * target's 'r', 'w', 'x', 'a', 'k', and 'm' permissions.
+	 *
+	 * If the link has 'x', an exact match of all the execute flags
+	 * must match.
+ 	 */
+	denied_mask |= ~l_mode & link_mask;
+
+	t_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, target, NULL);
+
+	l_x = l_mode & (ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE | AA_EXEC_BITS);
+	t_x = t_mode & (ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE | AA_EXEC_BITS);
+
+	/* For actual subset test ignore valid-profile-transition flags,
+	 * and link bits
+	 */
+	l_mode &= AA_FILE_PERMS & ~AA_LINK_BITS;
+	t_mode &= AA_FILE_PERMS & ~AA_LINK_BITS;
+
+	*request_mask = l_mode | link_mask;
+
+	if (l_mode) {
+		int x = l_x | (t_x & ALL_AA_EXEC_UNSAFE);
+		denied_mask |= l_mode & ~t_mode;
+		/* mask off x modes not used by link */
+
+		/* handle exec subset
+		 * - link safe exec issubset of unsafe exec
+		 * - no link x perm is subset of target having x perm
+		 */
+		if ((l_mode & AA_USER_EXEC) &&
+		    (x & AA_USER_EXEC_TYPE) != (t_x & AA_USER_EXEC_TYPE))
+			denied_mask = AA_USER_EXEC | (l_x & AA_USER_EXEC_TYPE);
+		if ((l_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC) &&
+		    (x & AA_OTHER_EXEC_TYPE) != (t_x & AA_OTHER_EXEC_TYPE))
+			denied_mask = AA_OTHER_EXEC | (l_x & AA_OTHER_EXEC_TYPE);
+	}
+
+	return denied_mask;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_name - compute the pathname of a file
+ * @dentry: dentry of the file
+ * @mnt: vfsmount of the file
+ * @buffer: buffer that aa_get_name() allocated
+ * @check: AA_CHECK_DIR is set if the file is a directory
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the beginning of the pathname (which usually differs
+ * from the beginning of the buffer), or an error code.
+ *
+ * We need @check to indicate whether the file is a directory or not because
+ * the file may not yet exist, and so we cannot check the inode's file type.
+ */
+static char *aa_get_name(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+			 char **buffer, int check)
+{
+	char *name;
+	int is_dir, size = 256;
+
+	is_dir = (check & AA_CHECK_DIR) ? 1 : 0;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		char *buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!buf)
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+		name = d_namespace_path(dentry, mnt, buf, size - is_dir);
+		if (!IS_ERR(name)) {
+			if (name[0] != '/') {
+				/*
+				 * This dentry is not connected to the
+				 * namespace root -- reject access.
+				 */
+				kfree(buf);
+				return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+			}
+			if (is_dir && name[1] != '\0') {
+				/*
+				 * Append "/" to the pathname. The root
+				 * directory is a special case; it already
+				 * ends in slash.
+				 */
+				buf[size - 2] = '/';
+				buf[size - 1] = '\0';
+			}
+
+			*buffer = buf;
+			return name;
+		}
+		if (PTR_ERR(name) != -ENAMETOOLONG)
+			return name;
+
+		kfree(buf);
+		size <<= 1;
+		if (size > apparmor_path_max)
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
+	}
+}
+
+static char *new_compound_name(const char *n1, const char *n2)
+{
+	char *name = kmalloc(strlen(n1) + strlen(n2) + 3, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (name)
+		sprintf(name, "%s//%s", n1, n2);
+	return name;
+}
+static inline void aa_put_name_buffer(char *buffer)
+{
+	kfree(buffer);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_perm_dentry - check if @profile allows @mask for a file
+ * @profile: profile to check against
+ * @dentry: dentry of the file
+ * @mnt: vfsmount o the file
+ * @sa: audit context
+ * @mask: requested profile permissions
+ * @check: kind of check to perform
+ *
+ * Returns 0 upon success, or else an error code.
+ *
+ * @check indicates the file type, and whether the file was accessed through
+ * an open file descriptor (AA_CHECK_FD) or not.
+ */
+static int aa_perm_dentry(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *dentry,
+			  struct vfsmount *mnt, struct aa_audit *sa, int check)
+{
+	int error;
+	char *buffer = NULL;
+
+	sa->name = aa_get_name(dentry, mnt, &buffer, check);
+	sa->request_mask <<= aa_inode_mode(dentry->d_inode);
+	if (IS_ERR(sa->name)) {
+		/*
+		 * deleted files are given a pass on permission checks when
+		 * accessed through a file descriptor.
+		 */
+		if (PTR_ERR(sa->name) == -ENOENT && (check & AA_CHECK_FD))
+			sa->denied_mask = 0;
+		else {
+			sa->denied_mask = sa->request_mask;
+			sa->error_code = PTR_ERR(sa->name);
+			if (sa->error_code == -ENOENT)
+				sa->info = "Failed name resolution - object not a valid entry";
+			else if (sa->error_code == -ENAMETOOLONG)
+				sa->info = "Failed name resolution - name too long";
+			else
+				sa->info = "Failed name resolution";
+		}
+		sa->name = NULL;
+	} else
+		sa->denied_mask = aa_file_denied(profile, sa->name,
+						 sa->request_mask,
+						 &sa->audit_mask);
+
+	if (!sa->denied_mask)
+		sa->error_code = 0;
+
+	error = aa_audit_file(profile, sa);
+	aa_put_name_buffer(buffer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_attr - check if attribute change is allowed
+ * @profile: profile to check against
+ * @dentry: dentry of the file to check
+ * @mnt: vfsmount of the file to check
+ * @iattr: attribute changes requested
+ */
+int aa_attr(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *dentry,
+	    struct vfsmount *mnt, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	int error, check;
+	struct aa_audit sa;
+
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.operation = "setattr";
+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
+	sa.iattr = iattr;
+	sa.request_mask = MAY_WRITE;
+	sa.error_code = -EACCES;
+
+	check = 0;
+	if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+		check |= AA_CHECK_DIR;
+	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FILE)
+		check |= AA_CHECK_FD;
+
+	error = aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, check);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_perm_xattr - check if xattr attribute change is allowed
+ * @profile: profile to check against
+ * @dentry: dentry of the file to check
+ * @mnt: vfsmount of the file to check
+ * @operation: xattr operation being done
+ * @mask: access mode requested
+ * @check: kind of check to perform
+ */
+int aa_perm_xattr(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
+		  struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask,
+		  int check)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	int error;
+	struct aa_audit sa;
+
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.operation = operation;
+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
+	sa.request_mask = mask;
+	sa.error_code = -EACCES;
+
+	if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+		check |= AA_CHECK_DIR;
+
+	error = aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, check);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_perm - basic apparmor permissions check
+ * @profile: profile to check against
+ * @dentry: dentry of the file to check
+ * @mnt: vfsmount of the file to check
+ * @mask: access mode requested
+ * @check: kind of check to perform
+ *
+ * Determine if access @mask for the file is authorized by @profile.
+ * Returns 0 on success, or else an error code.
+ */
+int aa_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
+	    struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask, int check)
+{
+	struct aa_audit sa;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (mask == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.operation = operation;
+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
+	sa.request_mask = mask;
+	sa.error_code = -EACCES;
+
+	error = aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, check);
+
+out:
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_perm_dir
+ * @profile: profile to check against
+ * @dentry: dentry of directory to check
+ * @mnt: vfsmount of directory to check
+ * @operation: directory operation being performed
+ * @mask: access mode requested
+ *
+ * Determine if directory operation (make/remove) for dentry is authorized
+ * by @profile.
+ * Returns 0 on success, or else an error code.
+ */
+int aa_perm_dir(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
+		struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask)
+{
+	struct aa_audit sa;
+
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.operation = operation;
+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
+	sa.request_mask = mask;
+	sa.error_code = -EACCES;
+
+	return aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, AA_CHECK_DIR);
+}
+
+int aa_perm_path(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
+		 const char *name, int mask, uid_t uid)
+{
+	struct aa_audit sa;
+
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.operation = operation;
+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
+	sa.request_mask = mask;
+	sa.name = name;
+	if (current->fsuid == uid)
+		sa.request_mask = mask << AA_USER_SHIFT;
+	else
+		sa.request_mask = mask << AA_OTHER_SHIFT;
+
+	sa.denied_mask = aa_file_denied(profile, name, sa.request_mask,
+					&sa.audit_mask) ;
+	sa.error_code = sa.denied_mask ? -EACCES : 0;
+
+	return aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_capability - test permission to use capability
+ * @cxt: aa_task_context with profile to check against
+ * @cap: capability to be tested
+ *
+ * Look up capability in profile capability set.
+ * Returns 0 on success, or else an error code.
+ */
+int aa_capability(struct aa_task_context *cxt, int cap)
+{
+	int error = cap_raised(cxt->profile->capabilities, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
+	struct aa_audit sa;
+
+	/* test if cap has alread been logged */
+	if (cap_raised(cxt->caps_logged, cap)) {
+		if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(cxt->profile))
+			error = 0;
+		return error;
+	} else
+		/* don't worry about rcu replacement of the cxt here.
+		 * caps_logged is a cache to reduce the occurence of
+		 * duplicate messages in the log.  The worst that can
+		 * happen is duplicate capability messages shows up in
+		 * the audit log
+		 */
+		cap_raise(cxt->caps_logged, cap);
+
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.operation = "capable";
+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC;
+	sa.name = capability_names[cap];
+	sa.error_code = error;
+
+	error = aa_audit_caps(cxt->profile, &sa, cap);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/* must be used inside rcu_read_lock or task_lock */
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_task_context *cxt, struct aa_profile *tracee)
+{
+	if (!cxt || cxt->profile == tracee)
+		return 0;
+	return aa_capability(cxt, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_link - hard link check
+ * @profile: profile to check against
+ * @link: dentry of link being created
+ * @link_mnt: vfsmount of link being created
+ * @target: dentry of link target
+ * @target_mnt: vfsmunt of link target
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, or else an error code.
+ */
+int aa_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
+	    struct dentry *link, struct vfsmount *link_mnt,
+	    struct dentry *target, struct vfsmount *target_mnt)
+{
+	int error;
+	struct aa_audit sa;
+	char *buffer = NULL, *buffer2 = NULL;
+
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.operation = "inode_link";
+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
+	sa.name = aa_get_name(link, link_mnt, &buffer, 0);
+	sa.name2 = aa_get_name(target, target_mnt, &buffer2, 0);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(sa.name)) {
+		sa.error_code = PTR_ERR(sa.name);
+		sa.name = NULL;
+	}
+	if (IS_ERR(sa.name2)) {
+		sa.error_code = PTR_ERR(sa.name2);
+		sa.name2 = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (sa.name && sa.name2) {
+		sa.denied_mask = aa_link_denied(profile, sa.name, sa.name2,
+						aa_inode_mode(target->d_inode),
+						&sa.request_mask,
+						&sa.audit_mask);
+		sa.error_code = sa.denied_mask ? -EACCES : 0;
+	}
+
+	error = aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
+
+	aa_put_name_buffer(buffer);
+	aa_put_name_buffer(buffer2);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/*******************************
+ * Global task related functions
+ *******************************/
+
+/**
+ * aa_clone - initialize the task context for a new task
+ * @child: task that is being created
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, or else an error code.
+ */
+int aa_clone(struct task_struct *child)
+{
+	struct aa_task_context *cxt, *child_cxt;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+	if (!aa_task_context(current))
+		return 0;
+	child_cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!child_cxt)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+repeat:
+	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
+	if (profile) {
+		lock_profile(profile);
+		cxt = aa_task_context(current);
+		if (unlikely(profile->isstale || !cxt ||
+			     cxt->profile != profile)) {
+			/**
+			 * Race with profile replacement or removal, or with
+			 * task context removal.
+			 */
+			unlock_profile(profile);
+			aa_put_profile(profile);
+			goto repeat;
+		}
+
+		/* No need to grab the child's task lock here. */
+		aa_change_task_context(child, child_cxt, profile,
+				       cxt->cookie, cxt->previous_profile);
+		unlock_profile(profile);
+
+		if (APPARMOR_COMPLAIN(child_cxt) &&
+		    profile == profile->ns->null_complain_profile) {
+			struct aa_audit sa;
+			memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+			sa.operation = "clone";
+			sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
+			sa.task = child->pid;
+			aa_audit_hint(profile, &sa);
+		}
+		aa_put_profile(profile);
+	} else
+		aa_free_task_context(child_cxt);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct aa_profile *
+aa_register_find(struct aa_profile *profile, const char* ns_name,
+		 const char *name, int mandatory, int complain,
+		 struct aa_audit *sa)
+{
+	struct aa_namespace *ns;
+	struct aa_profile *new_profile;
+	int ns_ref = 0;
+
+	if (profile)
+		ns = profile->ns;
+	else
+		ns = default_namespace;
+
+	if (ns_name) {
+		/* locate the profile namespace */
+		ns = aa_find_namespace(ns_name);
+		if (!ns) {
+			if (mandatory) {
+				sa->info = "profile namespace not found";
+				sa->denied_mask = sa->request_mask;
+				sa->error_code = -ENOENT;
+				return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+			} else {
+				return NULL;
+			}
+		}
+		ns_ref++;
+	}
+
+	/* Locate new profile */
+	new_profile = aa_find_profile(ns, name);
+
+	if (new_profile) {
+		AA_DEBUG("%s: setting profile %s\n",
+			 __FUNCTION__, new_profile->name);
+	} else if (mandatory && profile) {
+		sa->info = "mandatory profile missing";
+		sa->denied_mask = sa->request_mask;	/* shifted MAY_EXEC */
+		if (complain) {
+			aa_audit_hint(profile, sa);
+			new_profile =
+			    aa_dup_profile(profile->ns->null_complain_profile);
+		} else {
+			sa->error_code = -EACCES;
+			if (ns_ref)
+				aa_put_namespace(ns);
+			return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Only way we can get into this code is if task
+		 * is unconfined, pix, nix.
+		 */
+		AA_DEBUG("%s: No profile found for exec image '%s'\n",
+			 __FUNCTION__,
+			 name);
+	}
+	if (ns_ref)
+		aa_put_namespace(ns);
+	return new_profile;
+}
+
+static struct aa_profile *
+aa_x_to_profile(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *filename, int xmode,
+		struct aa_audit *sa, char **child)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+	int ix = xmode & AA_EXEC_INHERIT;
+	int complain = PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile);
+	int index;
+
+	*child = NULL;
+	switch (xmode & AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS) {
+	case 0:
+		/* only valid with ix flag */
+		ix = 1;
+		break;
+	case AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED:
+		/* only valid without ix flag */
+		ix = 0;
+		break;
+	case AA_EXEC_PROFILE:
+		new_profile = aa_register_find(profile, NULL, filename, !ix,
+					       complain, sa);
+		break;
+	case AA_EXEC_CHILD:
+		*child = new_compound_name(profile->name, filename);
+		sa->name2 = *child;
+		if (!*child) {
+			sa->info = "Failed name resolution - exec failed";
+			sa->error_code = -ENOMEM;
+			new_profile = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		} else {
+			new_profile = aa_register_find(profile, NULL, *child,
+						       !ix, complain, sa);
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* all other indexes are named transitions */
+		index = AA_EXEC_INDEX(xmode);
+		if (index - 4 > profile->exec_table_size) {
+			sa->info = "invalid named transition - exec failed";
+			sa->error_code = -EACCES;
+			new_profile = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+		} else {
+			char *ns_name = NULL;
+			char *name = profile->exec_table[index - 4];
+			if (*name == ':') {
+				ns_name = name + 1;
+				name = ns_name + strlen(ns_name) + 1;
+			}
+			sa->name2 = name;
+			sa->name3 = ns_name;
+			new_profile =
+				aa_register_find(profile, ns_name, name,
+						 !ix, complain, sa);
+		}
+	}
+	if (IS_ERR(new_profile))
+		/* all these failures must be audited - no quieting */
+		return ERR_PTR(aa_audit_reject(profile, sa));
+	return new_profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_register - register a new program
+ * @bprm: binprm of program being registered
+ *
+ * Try to register a new program during execve().  This should give the
+ * new program a valid aa_task_context if confined.
+ */
+int aa_register(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	const char *filename;
+	char  *buffer = NULL, *child = NULL;
+	struct file *filp = bprm->file;
+	struct aa_profile *profile, *old_profile, *new_profile = NULL;
+	int exec_mode, complain = 0, shift;
+	struct aa_audit sa;
+
+	AA_DEBUG("%s\n", __FUNCTION__);
+
+	profile = aa_get_profile(current);
+
+	shift = aa_inode_mode(filp->f_dentry->d_inode);
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.operation = "exec";
+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
+	sa.request_mask = MAY_EXEC << shift;
+
+	filename = aa_get_name(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, &buffer, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(filename)) {
+		if (profile) {
+			sa.info = "Failed name resolution - exec failed";
+			sa.error_code = PTR_ERR(filename);
+			aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
+			return sa.error_code;
+		} else
+			return 0;
+	}
+	sa.name = filename;
+
+	exec_mode = AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << shift;
+
+repeat:
+	if (profile) {
+		complain = PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile);
+
+		/* Confined task, determine what mode inherit, unconfined or
+		 * mandatory to load new profile
+		 */
+		exec_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, filename,
+				     &sa.audit_mask);
+
+
+		if (exec_mode & sa.request_mask) {
+			int xm = exec_mode >> shift;
+			new_profile = aa_x_to_profile(profile, filename,
+						      xm, &sa, &child);
+
+			if (!new_profile && (xm & AA_EXEC_INHERIT))
+				/* (p|c|n|)ix - don't change profile */
+				goto cleanup;
+			/* error case caught below */
+
+		} else if (sa.request_mask & AUDIT_QUIET_MASK(sa.audit_mask)) {
+			/* quiet failed exit */
+			new_profile = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+		} else if (complain) {
+			/* There was no entry in calling profile
+			 * describing mode to execute image in.
+			 * Drop into null-profile (disabling secure exec).
+			 */
+			new_profile =
+			    aa_dup_profile(profile->ns->null_complain_profile);
+			exec_mode |= AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << shift;
+		} else {
+			sa.denied_mask = sa.request_mask;
+			sa.error_code = -EACCES;
+			new_profile = ERR_PTR(aa_audit_file(profile, &sa));
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Unconfined task, load profile if it exists */
+		new_profile = aa_register_find(NULL, NULL, filename, 0, 0, &sa);
+		if (new_profile == NULL)
+			goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if (IS_ERR(new_profile))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	old_profile = __aa_replace_profile(current, new_profile);
+	if (IS_ERR(old_profile)) {
+		aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+		aa_put_profile(profile);
+		if (PTR_ERR(old_profile) == -ESTALE) {
+			profile = aa_get_profile(current);
+			goto repeat;
+		}
+		if (PTR_ERR(old_profile) == -EPERM) {
+			sa.denied_mask = sa.request_mask;
+			sa.info = "unable to set profile due to ptrace";
+			sa.task = current->parent->pid;
+			aa_audit_reject(profile, &sa);
+		}
+		new_profile = old_profile;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+	aa_put_profile(old_profile);
+	aa_put_profile(profile);
+
+	/* Handle confined exec.
+	 * Can be at this point for the following reasons:
+	 * 1. unconfined switching to confined
+	 * 2. confined switching to different confinement
+	 * 3. confined switching to unconfined
+	 *
+	 * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec
+	 * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec")
+	 */
+	if (!(exec_mode & (AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << shift))) {
+		unsigned long bprm_flags;
+
+		bprm_flags = AA_SECURE_EXEC_NEEDED;
+		bprm->security = (void*)
+			((unsigned long)bprm->security | bprm_flags);
+	}
+
+	if (complain && new_profile &&
+	    new_profile == new_profile->ns->null_complain_profile) {
+		sa.request_mask = 0;
+		sa.name = NULL;
+		sa.info = "set profile";
+		aa_audit_hint(new_profile, &sa);
+	}
+
+cleanup:
+	aa_put_name_buffer(child);
+	aa_put_name_buffer(buffer);
+	if (IS_ERR(new_profile))
+		return PTR_ERR(new_profile);
+	aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_release - release a task context
+ * @task: task being released
+ *
+ * This is called after a task has exited and the parent has reaped it.
+ */
+void aa_release(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	struct aa_task_context *cxt;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	/*
+	 * While the task context is still on a profile's task context
+	 * list, another process could replace the profile under us,
+	 * leaving us with a locked profile that is no longer attached
+	 * to this task. So after locking the profile, we check that
+	 * the profile is still attached.  The profile lock is
+	 * sufficient to prevent the replacement race so we do not lock
+	 * the task.
+	 *
+	 * Use lock subtyping to avoid lockdep reporting a false irq
+	 * possible inversion between the task_lock and profile_lock
+	 *
+	 * We also avoid taking the task_lock here because lock_dep
+	 * would report another false {softirq-on-W} potential irq_lock
+	 * inversion.
+	 *
+	 * If the task does not have a profile attached we are safe;
+	 * nothing can race with us at this point.
+	 */
+
+repeat:
+	profile = aa_get_profile(task);
+	if (profile) {
+		lock_profile_nested(profile, aa_lock_task_release);
+		cxt = aa_task_context(task);
+		if (unlikely(!cxt || cxt->profile != profile)) {
+			unlock_profile(profile);
+			aa_put_profile(profile);
+			goto repeat;
+		}
+		aa_change_task_context(task, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
+		unlock_profile(profile);
+		aa_put_profile(profile);
+	}
+}
+
+static int do_change_profile(struct aa_profile *expected,
+			     struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *name,
+			     u64 cookie, int restore, int hat,
+			     struct aa_audit *sa)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL, *old_profile = NULL,
+		*previous_profile = NULL;
+	struct aa_task_context *new_cxt, *cxt;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	sa->name = name;
+
+	new_cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new_cxt)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	new_profile = aa_find_profile(ns, name);
+	if (!new_profile && !restore) {
+		if (!PROFILE_COMPLAIN(expected)) {
+			aa_free_task_context(new_cxt);
+			return -ENOENT;
+		}
+		new_profile = aa_dup_profile(ns->null_complain_profile);
+	} else if (new_profile && hat && !PROFILE_IS_HAT(new_profile)) {
+		aa_free_task_context(new_cxt);
+		aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+		return error;
+	}
+
+	cxt = lock_task_and_profiles(current, new_profile);
+	if (!cxt) {
+		error = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	old_profile = cxt->profile;
+
+	if (cxt->profile != expected || (new_profile && new_profile->isstale)) {
+		error = -ESTALE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (cxt->previous_profile) {
+		if (cxt->cookie != cookie) {
+			error = -EACCES;
+			sa->info = "killing process";
+			aa_audit_reject(cxt->profile, sa);
+			/* terminate process */
+			(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, current);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (!restore)
+			previous_profile = cxt->previous_profile;
+	} else
+		previous_profile = cxt->profile;
+
+	if ((current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && aa_may_ptrace(cxt, new_profile)) {
+		error = -EACCES;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (new_profile == ns->null_complain_profile)
+		aa_audit_hint(cxt->profile, sa);
+
+	if (APPARMOR_AUDIT(cxt))
+		aa_audit_message(cxt->profile, sa, AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT);
+
+	if (!restore && cookie)
+		aa_change_task_context(current, new_cxt, new_profile, cookie,
+				       previous_profile);
+	else
+		/* either return to previous_profile, or a permanent change */
+		aa_change_task_context(current, new_cxt, new_profile, 0, NULL);
+
+out:
+	if (aa_task_context(current) != new_cxt)
+		aa_free_task_context(new_cxt);
+	task_unlock(current);
+	unlock_both_profiles(old_profile, new_profile);
+	aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
+ * @ns_name: name of the profile namespace to change to
+ * @name: name of profile to change to
+ * Change to new profile @name.  Unlike with hats, there is no way
+ * to change back.
+ *
+ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
+ */
+int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *name)
+{
+	struct aa_task_context *cxt;
+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+	struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
+	struct aa_audit sa;
+	unsigned int state;
+	int error = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC;
+	sa.operation = "change_profile";
+
+repeat:
+	task_lock(current);
+	cxt = aa_task_context(current);
+	if (cxt)
+		profile = aa_dup_profile(cxt->profile);
+	task_unlock(current);
+
+	if (ns_name)
+		ns = aa_find_namespace(ns_name);
+	else if (profile)
+		ns = aa_get_namespace(profile->ns);
+	else
+		ns = aa_get_namespace(default_namespace);
+
+	if (!ns) {
+		aa_put_profile(profile);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (!profile || PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile) ||
+	    (ns == profile->ns &&
+	     (aa_match(profile->file_rules, name, NULL) & AA_CHANGE_PROFILE)))
+		error = do_change_profile(profile, ns, name, 0, 0, 0, &sa);
+	else {
+		/* check for a rule with a namespace prepended */
+		aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, DFA_START, ns->name,
+			       &state);
+		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file_rules, state);
+		if ((aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, state, name, NULL) &
+		      AA_CHANGE_PROFILE))
+			error = do_change_profile(profile, ns, name, 0, 0, 0,
+						  &sa);
+		else
+			/* no permission to transition to profile @name */
+			error = -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	aa_put_namespace(ns);
+	aa_put_profile(profile);
+	if (error == -ESTALE)
+		goto repeat;
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_change_hat - change hat to/from subprofile
+ * @hat_name: hat to change to
+ * @cookie: magic value to validate the hat change
+ *
+ * Change to new @hat_name, and store the @hat_magic in the current task
+ * context.  If the new @hat_name is %NULL and the @cookie matches that
+ * stored in the current task context and is not 0, return to the top level
+ * profile.
+ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
+ */
+int aa_change_hat(const char *hat_name, u64 cookie)
+{
+	struct aa_task_context *cxt;
+	struct aa_profile *profile, *previous_profile;
+	struct aa_audit sa;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC;
+	sa.operation = "change_hat";
+
+repeat:
+	task_lock(current);
+	cxt = aa_task_context(current);
+	if (!cxt) {
+		task_unlock(current);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+	profile = aa_dup_profile(cxt->profile);
+	previous_profile = aa_dup_profile(cxt->previous_profile);
+	task_unlock(current);
+
+	if (hat_name) {
+		char *name, *profile_name;
+
+		if (previous_profile)
+			profile_name = previous_profile->name;
+		else
+			profile_name = profile->name;
+
+		name = new_compound_name(profile_name, hat_name);
+		if (!name) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		error = do_change_profile(profile, profile->ns, name, cookie,
+					  0, 1, &sa);
+		aa_put_name_buffer(name);
+	} else if (previous_profile)
+		error = do_change_profile(profile, profile->ns,
+					  previous_profile->name, cookie, 1, 0,
+					  &sa);
+	/* else ignore restores when there is no saved profile */
+
+out:
+	aa_put_profile(previous_profile);
+	aa_put_profile(profile);
+	if (error == -ESTALE)
+		goto repeat;
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_replace_profile - replace a task's profile
+ * @task: task to switch the profile of
+ * @profile: profile to switch to
+ *
+ * Returns a handle to the previous profile upon success, or else an
+ * error code.
+ */
+struct aa_profile *__aa_replace_profile(struct task_struct *task,
+					struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	struct aa_task_context *cxt, *new_cxt = NULL;
+	struct aa_profile *old_profile = NULL;
+
+	if (profile) {
+		new_cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!new_cxt)
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+
+	cxt = lock_task_and_profiles(task, profile);
+	if (unlikely(profile && profile->isstale)) {
+		task_unlock(task);
+		unlock_both_profiles(profile, cxt ? cxt->profile : NULL);
+		aa_free_task_context(new_cxt);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE);
+	}
+
+	if ((current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && aa_may_ptrace(cxt, profile)) {
+		task_unlock(task);
+		unlock_both_profiles(profile, cxt ? cxt->profile : NULL);
+		aa_free_task_context(new_cxt);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+	}
+
+	if (cxt)
+		old_profile = aa_dup_profile(cxt->profile);
+	aa_change_task_context(task, new_cxt, profile, 0, NULL);
+
+	task_unlock(task);
+	unlock_both_profiles(profile, old_profile);
+	return old_profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lock_task_and_profiles - lock the task and confining profiles and @profile
+ * @task: task to lock
+ * @profile: extra profile to lock in addition to the current profile
+ *
+ * Handle the spinning on locking to make sure the task context and
+ * profile are consistent once all locks are aquired.
+ *
+ * return the aa_task_context currently confining the task.  The task lock
+ * will be held whether or not the task is confined.
+ */
+struct aa_task_context *
+lock_task_and_profiles(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	struct aa_task_context *cxt;
+	struct aa_profile *old_profile = NULL;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+repeat:
+	cxt = aa_task_context(task);
+	if (cxt)
+		old_profile = cxt->profile;
+
+	lock_both_profiles(profile, old_profile);
+	task_lock(task);
+
+	/* check for race with profile transition, replacement or removal */
+	if (unlikely(cxt != aa_task_context(task))) {
+		task_unlock(task);
+		unlock_both_profiles(profile, old_profile);
+		old_profile = NULL;
+		goto repeat;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return cxt;
+}
+
+static void free_aa_task_context_rcu_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct aa_task_context *cxt;
+
+	cxt = container_of(head, struct aa_task_context, rcu);
+	aa_free_task_context(cxt);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_change_task_context - switch a task to use a new context and profile
+ * @task: task that is having its task context changed
+ * @new_cxt: new task context to use after the switch
+ * @profile: new profile to use after the switch
+ * @cookie: magic value to switch to
+ * @previous_profile: profile the task can return to
+ */
+void aa_change_task_context(struct task_struct *task,
+			    struct aa_task_context *new_cxt,
+			    struct aa_profile *profile, u64 cookie,
+			    struct aa_profile *previous_profile)
+{
+	struct aa_task_context *old_cxt = aa_task_context(task);
+
+	if (old_cxt) {
+		list_del_init(&old_cxt->list);
+		call_rcu(&old_cxt->rcu, free_aa_task_context_rcu_callback);
+	}
+	if (new_cxt) {
+		/* set the caps_logged cache to the quiet_caps mask
+		 * this has the effect of quieting caps that are not
+		 * supposed to be logged
+		 */
+		new_cxt->caps_logged = profile->quiet_caps;
+		new_cxt->cookie = cookie;
+		new_cxt->task = task;
+		new_cxt->profile = aa_dup_profile(profile);
+		new_cxt->previous_profile = aa_dup_profile(previous_profile);
+		list_move(&new_cxt->list, &profile->task_contexts);
+	}
+	rcu_assign_pointer(task->security, new_cxt);
+}