apparmor/kernel-patches/for-mainline/file-handle-ops.diff

Index: b/include/linux/fs.h
===================================================================
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -349,6 +349,9 @@ struct iattr {
 	 * Not an attribute, but an auxilary info for filesystems wanting to
 	 * implement an ftruncate() like method.  NOTE: filesystem should
 	 * check for (ia_valid & ATTR_FILE), and not for (ia_file != NULL).
+	 *
+	 * The LSM hooks also use this to distinguish operations on a file
+	 * descriptors from operations on pathnames.
 	 */
 	struct file	*ia_file;
 };
Index: b/fs/open.c
===================================================================
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -520,6 +520,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchmod(unsigned int 
 		mode = inode->i_mode;
 	newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
+	newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_FILE;
+	newattrs.ia_file = file;
 	err = notify_change(dentry, file->f_path.mnt, &newattrs);
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
@@ -570,7 +572,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chmod(const char __u
 }
 
 static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
-			uid_t user, gid_t group)
+			uid_t user, gid_t group, struct file *file)
 {
 	struct inode * inode;
 	int error;
@@ -598,6 +600,10 @@ static int chown_common(struct dentry * 
 	}
 	if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
 		newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID;
+	if (file) {
+		newattrs.ia_file = file;
+		newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_FILE;
+	}
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	error = notify_change(dentry, mnt, &newattrs);
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
@@ -613,7 +619,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chown(const char __u
 	error = user_path_walk(filename, &nd);
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
-	error = chown_common(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, user, group);
+	error = chown_common(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, user, group, NULL);
 	path_release(&nd);
 out:
 	return error;
@@ -633,7 +639,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchownat(int dfd, co
 	error = __user_walk_fd(dfd, filename, follow, &nd);
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
-	error = chown_common(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, user, group);
+	error = chown_common(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, user, group, NULL);
 	path_release(&nd);
 out:
 	return error;
@@ -647,7 +653,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_lchown(const char __
 	error = user_path_walk_link(filename, &nd);
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
-	error = chown_common(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, user, group);
+	error = chown_common(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, user, group, NULL);
 	path_release(&nd);
 out:
 	return error;
@@ -666,7 +672,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchown(unsigned int 
 
 	dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode);
-	error = chown_common(dentry, file->f_path.mnt, user, group);
+	error = chown_common(dentry, file->f_path.mnt, user, group, file);
 	fput(file);
 out:
 	return error;
Index: b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
===================================================================
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace(struct task_s
 	 * under the rules that the kernel normally permits if the two
 	 * processes are running under the same profile, but then we
 	 * would probably have to reject profile changes for processes
-	 * that are being ptraces as well as for processes ptracing
+	 * that are being ptraced as well as for processes ptracing
 	 * others.
 	 */
 
Index: b/security/apparmor/main.c
===================================================================
--- a/security/apparmor/main.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static inline void aa_put_name_buffer(ch
 
 static int aa_perm_dentry(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *dentry,
 			  struct vfsmount *mnt, struct aa_audit *sa, int mask,
-			  int is_dir)
+			  int is_dir, int accessed_through_fd)
 {
 	char *buffer = NULL;
 	int denied_mask, error;
@@ -198,8 +198,11 @@ static int aa_perm_dentry(struct aa_prof
 	sa->name = aa_get_name(dentry, mnt, &buffer, is_dir);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(sa->name)) {
-		/* deleted files are given a pass on permission checks */
-		if (PTR_ERR(sa->name) == -ENOENT)
+		/*
+		 * deleted files are given a pass on permission checks when
+		 * accessed through a file descriptor.
+		 */
+		if (PTR_ERR(sa->name) == -ENOENT && accessed_through_fd)
 			denied_mask = 0;
 		else
 			denied_mask = PTR_ERR(sa->name);
@@ -538,7 +541,8 @@ int aa_attr(struct aa_profile *profile, 
 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
 
 	error = aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, MAY_WRITE,
-			       S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode));
+			       S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode),
+			       iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FILE);
 
 	return error;
 }
@@ -566,7 +570,8 @@ int aa_perm_xattr(struct aa_profile *pro
 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
 
 	error = aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, mask,
-			       S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode));
+			       S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode),
+			       0 /* FIXME */);
 
 	return error;
 }
@@ -608,7 +613,8 @@ int aa_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, 
 	sa.flags = 0;
 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
 	error = aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, mask,
-			       inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode));
+			       inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode),
+			       0 /* FIXME */);
 
 out:
 	return error;
@@ -636,7 +642,8 @@ int aa_perm_dir(struct aa_profile *profi
 	sa.flags = 0;
 	sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
 
-	return aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, mask, 1);
+	return aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, mask, 1,
+			      0 /* FIXME */);
 }
 
 /**