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https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor.git
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d275dfdd42
When there is a failure output the exact call info used to invoke the parser. To facilitate manually recreating the test. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
948 lines
39 KiB
Bash
Executable file
948 lines
39 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/bin/bash
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#
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# Copyright (c) 2013
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# Canonical, Ltd. (All rights reserved)
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#
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# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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# modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
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# License published by the Free Software Foundation.
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#
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# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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# GNU General Public License for more details.
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#
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# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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# along with this program; if not, contact Canonical Ltd.
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#
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# Tests for post-parser equality among multiple profiles. These tests are
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# useful to verify that keyword aliases, formatting differences, etc., all
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# result in the same parser output.
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set -o pipefail
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_SCRIPTDIR=$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" )
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APPARMOR_PARSER="${APPARMOR_PARSER:-${_SCRIPTDIR}/../apparmor_parser}"
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fails=0
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errors=0
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verbose="${VERBOSE:-}"
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default_features_file="features.all"
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features_file=$default_features_file
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hash_binary_policy()
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{
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printf %s "$1" | ${APPARMOR_PARSER} --features-file "${_SCRIPTDIR}/features_files/$features_file" -qS 2>/dev/null| md5sum | cut -d ' ' -f 1
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return $?
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}
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# verify_binary - compares the binary policy of multiple profiles
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# $1: Test type (equality or inequality)
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# $2: A short description of the test
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# $3: The known-good profile
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# $4..$n: The profiles to compare against $3
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#
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# Upon failure/error, prints out the test description and profiles that failed
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# and increments $fails or $errors for each failure and error, respectively
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verify_binary()
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{
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local t=$1
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local desc=$2
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local good_profile=$3
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local good_hash
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local ret=0
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shift
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shift
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shift
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if [ "$t" != "equality" ] && [ "$t" != "inequality" ] && \
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[ "$t" != "xequality" ] && [ "$t" != "xinequality" ]
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then
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printf "\nERROR: Unknown test mode:\n%s\n\n" "$t" 1>&2
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((errors++))
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return $((ret + 1))
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fi
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if [ -n "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
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if ! good_hash=$(hash_binary_policy "$good_profile")
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then
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if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
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printf "\nERROR: Error hashing the following \"known-good\" profile:\n%s\n\n" \
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"$good_profile" 1>&2
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((errors++))
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return $((ret + 1))
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fi
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for profile in "$@"
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do
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if ! hash=$(hash_binary_policy "$profile")
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then
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if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
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printf "\nERROR: Error hashing the following profile:\n%s\n\n" \
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"$profile" 1>&2
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((errors++))
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((ret++))
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elif [ "$t" == "equality" ] && [ "$hash" != "$good_hash" ]
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then
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if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
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printf "\nFAIL: Hash values do not match\n" 2>&1
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printf "parser: %s --features-file=%s\n" "${APPARMOR_PARSER}" "${_SCRIPTDIR}/features_files/$features_file" 2>&1
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printf "known-good (%s) != profile-under-test (%s) for the following profiles:\nknown-good %s\nprofile-under-test %s\n\n" \
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"$good_hash" "$hash" "$good_profile" "$profile" 1>&2
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((fails++))
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((ret++))
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elif [ "$t" == "xequality" ] && [ "$hash" == "$good_hash" ]
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then
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if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
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printf "\nunexpected PASS: equality test with known problem, Hash values match\n" 2>&1
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printf "parser: %s --features-file=%s\n" "${APPARMOR_PARSER}" "${_SCRIPTDIR}/features_files/$features_file" 2>&1
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printf "known-good (%s) == profile-under-test (%s) for the following profile:\nknown-good %s\nprofile-under-test %s\n\n" \
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"$good_hash" "$hash" "$good_profile" "$profile" 1>&2
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((fails++))
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((ret++))
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elif [ "$t" == "xequality" ] && [ "$hash" != "$good_hash" ]
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then
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printf "\nknown problem %s %s: unchanged" "$t" "$desc" 1>&2
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elif [ "$t" == "inequality" ] && [ "$hash" == "$good_hash" ]
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then
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if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
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printf "\nFAIL: Hash values match\n" 2>&1
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printf "parser: %s --features-file=%s\n" "${APPARMOR_PARSER}" "${_SCRIPTDIR}/features_files/$features_file" 2>&1
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printf "known-good (%s) == profile-under-test (%s) for the following profiles:\nknown-good %s\nprofile-under-test %s\n\n" \
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"$good_hash" "$hash" "$good_profile" "$profile" 1>&2
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((fails++))
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((ret++))
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elif [ "$t" == "xinequality" ] && [ "$hash" != "$good_hash" ]
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then
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if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
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printf "\nunexpected PASS: inequality test with known problem, Hash values do not match\n" 2>&1
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printf "parser: %s --features-file %s\n" "${APPARMOR_PARSER}" "${_SCRIPTDIR}/features_files/$features_file" 2>&1
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printf "known-good (%s) != profile-under-test (%s) for the following profile:\nknown-good %s\nprofile-under-test %s\n\n" \
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"$good_hash" "$hash" "$good_profile" "$profile" 1>&2
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((fails++))
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((ret++))
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elif [ "$t" == "xinequality" ] && [ "$hash" == "$good_hash" ]
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then
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printf "\nknown problem %s %s: unchanged" "$t" "$desc" 1>&2
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printf "parser: %s --features-file=%s\n" "${APPARMOR_PARSER}" "${_SCRIPTDIR}/features_files/$features_file" 2>&1
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fi
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done
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if [ $ret -eq 0 ]
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then
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if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then
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printf "."
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else
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printf " ok\n"
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fi
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fi
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return $ret
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}
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verify_binary_equality()
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{
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verify_binary "equality" "$@"
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}
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# test we want to be equal but is currently a known problem
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verify_binary_xequality()
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{
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verify_binary "xequality" "$@"
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}
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verify_binary_inequality()
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{
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verify_binary "inequality" "$@"
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}
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# test we want to be not equal but is currently a know problem
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verify_binary_xinequality()
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{
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verify_binary "xinequality" "$@"
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}
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# kernel_features - test whether path(s) are present
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# $@: feature path(s) to test
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# Returns: 0 and outputs "true" if all paths exist
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# 1 and error message if features dir is not available
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# 2 and error message if path does not exist
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kernel_features()
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{
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features_dir="/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/features/"
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if [ ! -e "$features_dir" ] ; then
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echo "Kernel feature masks not supported."
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return 1;
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fi
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for f in $@ ; do
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if [ ! -e "$features_dir/$f" ] ; then
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# check if feature is in file
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feature=$(basename "$features_dir/$f")
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file=$(dirname "$features_dir/$f")
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if [ -f $file ]; then
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if ! grep -q $feature $file; then
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echo "Required feature '$f' not available."
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return 2;
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fi
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else
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echo "Required feature '$f' not available."
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return 3;
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fi
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fi
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done
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echo "true"
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return 0;
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}
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##########################################################################
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### wrapper fn, should be indented but isn't to reduce wrap
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verify_set()
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{
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local p1="$1"
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local p2="$2"
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echo -e "\n equality $e of '$p1' vs '$p2'\n"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus send" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus send, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus write, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus w, }"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus receive" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus receive, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus read, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus r, }"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus send + receive" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (read, write), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (r, w), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (rw), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus rw, }" \
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus all accesses" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (read, write, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (r, w, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (rw, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus, }" \
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus implied accesses with a bus conditional" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive, bind, eavesdrop) bus=session, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (read, write, bind, eavesdrop) bus=session, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (r, w, bind, eavesdrop) bus=session, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (rw, bind, eavesdrop) bus=session, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus () bus=session, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus bus=session, }" \
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus implied accesses for services" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus bind name=com.foo, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus name=com.foo, }"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus implied accesses for messages" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo interface=org.foo, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus path=/com/foo interface=org.foo, }"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus implied accesses for messages with peer names" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(name=com.foo), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(name=com.foo), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(name=(com.foo)), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(name=(com.foo)), }"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus implied accesses for messages with peer labels" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(label=/usr/bin/app), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(label=/usr/bin/app), }"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus element parsing" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus bus=b path=/ interface=i member=m peer=(name=n label=l), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus bus=\"b\" path=\"/\" interface=\"i\" member=\"m\" peer=(name=\"n\" label=\"l\"), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus bus=(b) path=(/) interface=(i) member=(m) peer=(name=(n) label=(l)), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus bus=(\"b\") path=(\"/\") interface=(\"i\") member=(\"m\") peer=(name=(\"n\") label=(\"l\")), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus bus =b path =/ interface =i member =m peer =(name =n label =l), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus bus= b path= / interface= i member= m peer= (name= n label= l), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus bus = b path = / interface = i member = m peer = ( name = n label = l ), }"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus access parsing" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send receive bind eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive bind, eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send,receive,bind,eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send,receive,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,bind,eavesdrop), }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send,send,send,send send receive,bind eavesdrop), }" \
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus variable expansion" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo member=spork interface=org.foo peer=(name=com.foo label=/com/foo), }" \
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"@{FOO}=foo
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO} member=spork interface=org.@{FOO} peer=(name=com.@{FOO} label=/com/@{FOO}), }" \
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"@{FOO}=foo
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@{SPORK}=spork
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO} member=@{SPORK} interface=org.@{FOO} peer=(name=com.@{FOO} label=/com/@{FOO}), }" \
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"@{FOO}=/com/foo
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=@{FOO} member=spork interface=org.foo peer=(name=com.foo label=@{FOO}), }" \
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"@{FOO}=com
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/@{FOO}/foo member=spork interface=org.foo peer=(name=@{FOO}.foo label=/@{FOO}/foo), }"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus variable expansion, multiple values/rules" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/{foo,bar}, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path={/com/foo,/com/bar}, }" \
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"@{FOO}=foo
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
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"@{FOO}=foo bar
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
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"@{FOO}=bar foo
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
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"@{FOO}={bar,foo}
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
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"@{FOO}=foo
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@{BAR}=bar
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/{@{FOO},@{BAR}}, }" \
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus variable expansion, ensure rule de-duping occurs" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
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"@{FOO}=bar foo bar foo
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
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"@{FOO}=bar foo bar foo
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus minimization with all perms" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus bus=session, $p2 dbus, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive, bind, eavesdrop), $p2 dbus, }"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus minimization with bind" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus bind, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus bind bus=session, $p2 dbus bind, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus bind bus=system name=com.foo, $p2 dbus bind, }"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus minimization with send and a bus conditional" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus send bus=system, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus send bus=system path=/com/foo interface=com.foo member=bar, dbus send bus=system, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus send bus=system peer=(label=/usr/bin/foo), $p2 dbus send bus=system, }"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus minimization with an audit modifier" \
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"/t { $p1 audit dbus eavesdrop, }" \
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"/t { $p2 audit dbus eavesdrop bus=session, $p2 audit dbus eavesdrop, }"
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus minimization with a deny modifier" \
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"/t { $p1 deny dbus send bus=system peer=(name=com.foo), }" \
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"/t { $p2 deny dbus send bus=system peer=(name=com.foo label=/usr/bin/foo), $p2 deny dbus send bus=system peer=(name=com.foo), }" \
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus minimization found in dbus abstractions" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus send bus=session, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus send
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bus=session
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path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
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interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
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member={Hello,AddMatch,RemoveMatch,GetNameOwner,NameHasOwner,StartServiceByName}
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peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus),
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$p2 dbus send bus=session, }"
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# verify slash filtering for dbus paths.
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verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus slash filtering for paths" \
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"/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com///foo, $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=///com/bar, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com//{foo,bar}, }" \
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"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path={//com/foo,/com//bar}, }" \
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"@{FOO}=/foo
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
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"@{FOO}=/foo /bar
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
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"@{FOO}=/bar //foo
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
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"@{FOO}=//{bar,foo}
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
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"@{FOO}=/foo
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@{BAR}=bar
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/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com//@{BAR}, }"
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# Rules compatible with audit, deny, and audit deny
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# note: change_profile does not support audit/allow/deny atm
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for rule in "capability" "capability mac_admin" \
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"mount" "mount /a" "mount /a -> /b" "mount options in (ro) /a -> b" \
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"remount" "remount /a" \
|
|
"umount" "umount /a" \
|
|
"pivot_root" "pivot_root /a" "pivot_root oldroot=/" \
|
|
"pivot_root oldroot=/ /a" "pivot_root oldroot=/ /a -> foo" \
|
|
"ptrace" "ptrace trace" "ptrace (readby,tracedby) peer=unconfined" \
|
|
"signal" "signal (send,receive)" "signal peer=unconfined" \
|
|
"signal receive set=(kill)" \
|
|
"dbus" "dbus send" "dbus bus=system" "dbus bind name=foo" \
|
|
"dbus peer=(label=foo)" "dbus eavesdrop" \
|
|
"unix" "unix (create, listen, accept)" "unix addr=@*" "unix addr=none" \
|
|
"unix peer=(label=foo)" \
|
|
"/f r" "/f w" "/f rwmlk" "/** r" "/**/ w" \
|
|
"file /f r" "file /f w" "file /f rwmlk" \
|
|
"link /a -> /b" "link subset /a -> /b" \
|
|
"l /a -> /b" "l subset /a -> /b" \
|
|
"file l /a -> /b" "l subset /a -> /b"
|
|
do
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 allow ${rule}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' audit allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 audit ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit allow ${rule}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' audit, deny, and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit allow ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 deny ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit deny ${rule}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' audit vs deny and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 audit ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 deny ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit deny ${rule}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' deny and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 deny ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit deny ${rule}, }"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
####### special case for network TODO: for network above when network
|
|
####### rules fixed
|
|
for rule in "network" "network tcp" "network inet6 tcp"
|
|
do
|
|
verify_binary_equality "allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { allow ${rule}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "audit allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { audit allow ${rule}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "audit, deny, and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { audit allow ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { deny ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { audit deny ${rule}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "audit vs deny and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { deny ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { audit deny ${rule}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "deny and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { deny ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { audit deny ${rule}, }"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# Rules that need special treatment for the deny modifier
|
|
for rule in "/f ux" "/f Ux" "/f px" "/f Px" "/f cx" "/f Cx" "/f ix" \
|
|
"/f pux" "/f Pux" "/f pix" "/f Pix" \
|
|
"/f cux" "/f Cux" "/f cix" "/f Cix" \
|
|
"/* ux" "/* Ux" "/* px" "/* Px" "/* cx" "/* Cx" "/* ix" \
|
|
"/* pux" "/* Pux" "/* pix" "/* Pix" \
|
|
"/* cux" "/* Cux" "/* cix" "/* Cix" \
|
|
"/f px -> b " "/f Px -> b" "/f cx -> b" "/f Cx -> b" \
|
|
"/f pux -> b" "/f Pux -> b" "/f pix -> b" "/f Pix -> b" \
|
|
"/f cux -> b" "/f Cux -> b" "/f cix -> b" "/f Cix -> b" \
|
|
"/* px -> b" "/* Px -> b" "/* cx -> b" "/* Cx -> b" \
|
|
"/* pux -> b" "/* Pux -> b" "/* pix -> b" "/* Pix -> b" \
|
|
"/* cux -> b" "/* Cux -> b" "/* cix -> b" "/* Cix -> b" \
|
|
"file /f ux" "file /f Ux" "file /f px" "file /f Px" \
|
|
"file /f cx" "file /f Cx" "file /f ix" \
|
|
"file /f pux" "file /f Pux" "file /f pix" "file /f Pix" \
|
|
"/f cux" "/f Cux" "/f cix" "/f Cix" \
|
|
"file /* ux" "file /* Ux" "file /* px" "file /* Px" \
|
|
"file /* cx" "file /* Cx" "file /* ix" \
|
|
"file /* pux" "file /* Pux" "file /* pix" "file /* Pix" \
|
|
"file /* cux" "file /* Cux" "file /* cix" "file /* Cix" \
|
|
"file /f px -> b " "file /f Px -> b" "file /f cx -> b" "file /f Cx -> b" \
|
|
"file /f pux -> b" "file /f Pux -> b" "file /f pix -> b" "file /f Pix -> b" \
|
|
"file /f cux -> b" "file /f Cux -> b" "file /f cix -> b" "file /f Cix -> b" \
|
|
"file /* px -> b" "file /* Px -> b" "file /* cx -> b" "file /* Cx -> b" \
|
|
"file /* pux -> b" "file /* Pux -> b" "file /* pix -> b" "file /* Pix -> b" \
|
|
"file /* cux -> b" "file /* Cux -> b" "file /* cix -> b" "file /* Cix -> b"
|
|
|
|
do
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 allow ${rule}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' audit allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 audit ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit allow ${rule}, }"
|
|
|
|
# skip rules that don't end with x perm
|
|
if [ -n "${rule##*x}" ] ; then continue ; fi
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' deny, audit deny modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit allow ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 deny ${rule% *} x, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit deny ${rule% *} x, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' audit vs deny and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 audit ${rule}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 deny ${rule% *} x, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit deny ${rule% *} x, }"
|
|
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
# verify deny and audit deny differ for x perms
|
|
for prefix in "/f" "/*" "file /f" "file /*" ; do
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' deny and audit deny x modifiers for \"${prefix}\"" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 deny ${prefix} x, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit deny ${prefix} x, }"
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
#Test equality of leading and trailing file permissions
|
|
for audit in "" "audit" ; do
|
|
for allow in "" "allow" "deny" ; do
|
|
for owner in "" "owner" ; do
|
|
for f in "" "file" ; do
|
|
prefix="$audit $allow $owner $f"
|
|
for perm in "r" "w" "a" "l" "k" "m" "rw" "ra" \
|
|
"rl" "rk" "rm" "wl" "wk" "wm" \
|
|
"rwl" "rwk" "rwm" "ral" "rak" \
|
|
"ram" "rlk" "rlm" "rkm" "wlk" \
|
|
"wlm" "wkm" "alk" "alm" "akm" \
|
|
"lkm" "rwlk" "rwlm" "rwkm" \
|
|
"ralk" "ralm" "wlkm" "alkm" \
|
|
"rwlkm" "ralkm" ; do
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' leading and trailing perms for \"${perm}\"" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 ${prefix} /f ${perm}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 ${prefix} ${perm} /f, }"
|
|
done
|
|
if [ "$allow" == "deny" ] ; then continue ; fi
|
|
for perm in "ux" "Ux" "px" "Px" "cx" "Cx" \
|
|
"ix" "pux" "Pux" "pix" "Pix" \
|
|
"cux" "Cux" "cix" "Cix"
|
|
do
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' leading and trailing perms for \"${perm}\"" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 ${prefix} /f ${perm}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 ${prefix} ${perm} /f, }"
|
|
done
|
|
for perm in "px" "Px" "cx" "Cx" \
|
|
"pux" "Pux" "pix" "Pix" \
|
|
"cux" "Cux" "cix" "Cix"
|
|
do
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' leading and trailing perms for x-transition \"${perm}\"" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 ${prefix} /f ${perm} -> b, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 ${prefix} ${perm} /f -> b, }"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
#Test rule overlap for x most specific match
|
|
for perm1 in "ux" "Ux" "px" "Px" "cx" "Cx" "ix" "pux" "Pux" \
|
|
"pix" "Pix" "cux" "Cux" "cix" "Cix" "px -> b" \
|
|
"Px -> b" "cx -> b" "Cx -> b" "pux -> b" "Pux ->b" \
|
|
"pix -> b" "Pix -> b" "cux -> b" "Cux -> b" \
|
|
"cix -> b" "Cix -> b"
|
|
do
|
|
for perm2 in "ux" "Ux" "px" "Px" "cx" "Cx" "ix" "pux" "Pux" \
|
|
"pix" "Pix" "cux" "Cux" "cix" "Cix" "px -> b" \
|
|
"Px -> b" "cx -> b" "Cx -> b" "pux -> b" "Pux ->b" \
|
|
"pix -> b" "Pix -> b" "cux -> b" "Cux -> b" \
|
|
"cix -> b" "Cix -> b"
|
|
do
|
|
if [ "$perm1" == "$perm2" ] ; then
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' Exec perm \"${perm1}\" - most specific match: same as glob" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 /* ${perm1}, /f ${perm2}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 /* ${perm1}, }"
|
|
else
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' Exec \"${perm1}\" vs \"${perm2}\" - most specific match: different from glob" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 /* ${perm1}, /f ${perm2}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 /* ${perm1}, }"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' Exec \"${perm1}\" vs deny x - most specific match: different from glob" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 /* ${perm1}, audit deny /f x, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 /* ${perm1}, }"
|
|
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
#Test deny carves out permission
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' Deny removes r perm" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 /foo/[abc] r, audit deny /foo/b r, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 /foo/[abc] r, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' Deny removes r perm" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 /foo/[abc] r, audit deny /foo/b r, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 /foo/[ac] r, }"
|
|
|
|
#this one may not be true in the future depending on if the compiled profile
|
|
#is explicitly including deny permissions for dynamic composition
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' Deny of ungranted perm" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 /foo/[abc] r, audit deny /foo/b w, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 /foo/[abc] r, }"
|
|
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' change_profile == change_profile -> **" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 change_profile, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 change_profile -> **, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' change_profile /** == change_profile /** -> **" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 change_profile /**, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 change_profile /** -> **, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' change_profile /** == change_profile /** -> **" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 change_profile unsafe /**, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 change_profile unsafe /** -> **, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' change_profile /** == change_profile /** -> **" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 change_profile /**, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 change_profile safe /** -> **, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' change_profile /** == change_profile /** -> **" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 change_profile /**, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 change_profile unsafe /**, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' profile name is hname in rule" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { $p1 signal peer=/hname, }" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { $p2 signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' profile name is NOT fq name in rule" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { $p1 signal peer=:ns:/hname, }" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { $p2 signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' profile name is hname in sub pofile rule" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { profile child { $p1 signal peer=/hname//child, } }" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { profile child { $p2 signal peer=@{profile_name}, } }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' profile name is NOT fq name in sub profile rule" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { profile child { $p1 signal peer=:ns:/hname//child, } }" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { profile child { $p2 signal peer=@{profile_name}, } }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' profile name is hname in hat rule" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { ^child { $p1 signal peer=/hname//child, } }" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { ^child { $p2 signal peer=@{profile_name}, } }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' profile name is NOT fq name in hat rule" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { ^child { $p1 signal peer=:ns:/hname//child, } }" \
|
|
":ns:/hname { ^child { $p2 signal peer=@{profile_name}, } }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' @{profile_name} is literal in peer" \
|
|
"/{a,b} { $p1 signal peer=/\{a,b\}, }" \
|
|
"/{a,b} { $p2 signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' @{profile_name} is literal in peer with pattern" \
|
|
"/{a,b} { $p1 signal peer={/\{a,b\},c}, }" \
|
|
"/{a,b} { $p2 signal peer={@{profile_name},c}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "'$p1'x'$p2' @{profile_name} is not pattern in peer" \
|
|
"/{a,b} { $p1 signal peer=/{a,b}, }" \
|
|
"/{a,b} { $p2 signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' @{profile_name} is literal in peer with esc sequence" \
|
|
"/\\\\a { $p1 signal peer=/\\\\a, }" \
|
|
"/\\\\a { $p2 signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' @{profile_name} is literal in peer with esc alt sequence" \
|
|
"/\\{a,b\\},c { $p1 signal peer=/\\{a,b\\},c, }" \
|
|
"/\\{a,b\\},c { $p2 signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Unfortunately we can not just compare an empty profile and hat to a
|
|
# ie. "/t { ^test { /f r, }}"
|
|
# to the second profile with the equivalent rule inserted manually
|
|
# because policy write permission "w" actually expands to multiple permissions
|
|
# under the hood, and the parser is not adding those permissions
|
|
# to the rules it auto generates
|
|
# So we insert the rule with "append" permissions, and rely on the parser
|
|
# merging permissions of rules.
|
|
# If the parser isn't adding the rules "append" is not equivalent to
|
|
# the "write" permission in the second profile and the test will fail.
|
|
# If the parser is adding the change_hat proc attr rules then the
|
|
# rules should merge and be equivalent.
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' change_hat rules automatically inserted"\
|
|
"/t { $p1 owner /proc/[0-9]*/attr/{apparmor/,}current a, ^test { $p2 owner /proc/[0-9]*/attr/{apparmor/,}current a, /f r, }}" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 owner /proc/[0-9]*/attr/{apparmor/,}current w, ^test { $p2 owner /proc/[0-9]*/attr/{apparmor/,}current w, /f r, }}"
|
|
|
|
# verify slash filtering for unix socket address paths.
|
|
# see https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+bug/1856738
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' unix rules addr conditional" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 unix bind addr=@/a/bar, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 unix bind addr=@/a//bar, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 unix bind addr=@//a/bar, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 unix bind addr=@/a///bar, }" \
|
|
"@{HOME}=/a/
|
|
/t { $p2 unix bind addr=@@{HOME}/bar, }" \
|
|
"@{HOME}=/a/
|
|
/t { $p2 unix bind addr=@//@{HOME}bar, }" \
|
|
"@{HOME}=/a/
|
|
/t { $p2 unix bind addr=@/@{HOME}/bar, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' unix rules peer addr conditional" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 unix peer=(addr=@/a/bar), }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 unix peer=(addr=@/a//bar), }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 unix peer=(addr=@//a/bar), }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 unix peer=(addr=@/a///bar), }" \
|
|
"@{HOME}=/a/
|
|
/t { $p2 unix peer=(addr=@@{HOME}/bar), }" \
|
|
"@{HOME}=/a/
|
|
/t { $p2 unix peer=(addr=@//@{HOME}bar), }" \
|
|
"@{HOME}=/a/
|
|
/t { $p2 unix peer=(addr=@/@{HOME}/bar), }"
|
|
|
|
# verify slash filtering for mount rules
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' mount rules slash filtering" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 mount /dev/foo -> /mnt/bar, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 mount ///dev/foo -> /mnt/bar, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 mount /dev/foo -> /mnt//bar, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 mount /dev///foo -> ////mnt/bar, }" \
|
|
"@{MNT}=/mnt/
|
|
/t { $p2 mount /dev///foo -> @{MNT}/bar, }" \
|
|
"@{FOO}=/foo
|
|
/t { $p2 mount /dev//@{FOO} -> /mnt/bar, }"
|
|
|
|
# verify slash filtering for link rules
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' link rules slash filtering" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 link /dev/foo -> /mnt/bar, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 link ///dev/foo -> /mnt/bar, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 link /dev/foo -> /mnt//bar, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 link /dev///foo -> ////mnt/bar, }" \
|
|
"@{BAR}=/mnt/
|
|
/t { $p2 link /dev///foo -> @{BAR}/bar, }" \
|
|
"@{FOO}=/dev/
|
|
/t { $p2 link @{FOO}//foo -> /mnt/bar, }" \
|
|
"@{FOO}=/dev/
|
|
@{BAR}=/mnt/
|
|
/t { $p2 link @{FOO}/foo -> @{BAR}/bar, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' attachment slash filtering" \
|
|
"/t /bin/foo { }" \
|
|
"/t /bin//foo { }" \
|
|
"@{BAR}=/bin/
|
|
/t @{BAR}/foo { }" \
|
|
"@{FOO}=/foo
|
|
/t /bin/@{FOO} { }" \
|
|
"@{BAR}=/bin/
|
|
@{FOO}=/foo
|
|
/t @{BAR}/@{FOO} { }"
|
|
|
|
# verify comment at end of variable assignment is not treated as a value
|
|
verify_binary_equality "comment at end of set var" \
|
|
"/t { /bin/ r, }" \
|
|
"@{BAR}=/bin/ #a tail comment
|
|
/t { @{BAR} r, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "value like comment at end of set var" \
|
|
"/t { /{bin/,#value} r, }" \
|
|
"@{BAR}=bin/ \#value
|
|
/t { /@{BAR} r, }"
|
|
|
|
|
|
# This can potentially fail as ideally it requires a better dfa comparison
|
|
# routine as it can generates hormomorphic dfas. The enumeration of the
|
|
# dfas dumped will be different, even if the binary is the same
|
|
# Note: this test in the future will require -O filter-deny and
|
|
# -O minimize and -O remove-unreachable.
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' mount specific deny doesn't affect non-overlapping" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 mount options=bind /e/ -> /**, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit deny mount /s/** -> /**,
|
|
mount options=bind /e/ -> /**, }"
|
|
|
|
if [ $fails -ne 0 ] || [ $errors -ne 0 ]
|
|
then
|
|
printf "ERRORS: %d\nFAILS: %d\n" $errors $fails 2>&1
|
|
exit $((fails + errors))
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
## priority override equivalence tests
|
|
## compare single rule, to multi-rule profile where one rule overrides
|
|
## the other rule via priority.
|
|
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus variable expansion, multiple values/rules" \
|
|
"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, }" \
|
|
"@{FOO}=foo
|
|
/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, }" \
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus variable expansion, ensure rule de-duping occurs" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
|
|
"@{FOO}=bar foo bar foo
|
|
/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
|
|
"@{FOO}=bar foo bar foo
|
|
/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus minimization with all perms" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 dbus, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 dbus bus=session, $p2 dbus, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive, bind, eavesdrop), $p2 dbus, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus minimization with bind" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 dbus bind, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 dbus bind bus=session, $p2 dbus bind, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 dbus bind bus=system name=com.foo, $p2 dbus bind, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus minimization with send and a bus conditional" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 dbus send bus=system, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 dbus send bus=system path=/com/foo interface=com.foo member=bar, dbus send bus=system, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 dbus send bus=system peer=(label=/usr/bin/foo), $p2 dbus send bus=system, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus minimization with an audit modifier" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 audit dbus eavesdrop, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 audit dbus eavesdrop bus=session, $p2 audit dbus eavesdrop, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus minimization with a deny modifier" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 deny dbus send bus=system peer=(name=com.foo), }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 deny dbus send bus=system peer=(name=com.foo label=/usr/bin/foo), $p2 deny dbus send bus=system peer=(name=com.foo), }" \
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus minimization found in dbus abstractions" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 dbus send bus=session, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 dbus send
|
|
bus=session
|
|
path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
|
|
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
|
|
member={Hello,AddMatch,RemoveMatch,GetNameOwner,NameHasOwner,StartServiceByName}
|
|
peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus),
|
|
$p2 dbus send bus=session, }"
|
|
|
|
# verify slash filtering for dbus paths.
|
|
verify_binary_equality "'$p1'x'$p2' dbus slash filtering for paths" \
|
|
"/t { $p1 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com///foo, dbus (send, receive) path=///com/bar, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com//{foo,bar}, }" \
|
|
"/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path={//com/foo,/com//bar}, }" \
|
|
"@{FOO}=/foo
|
|
/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
|
|
"@{FOO}=/foo /bar
|
|
/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
|
|
"@{FOO}=/bar //foo
|
|
/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
|
|
"@{FOO}=//{bar,foo}
|
|
/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
|
|
"@{FOO}=/foo
|
|
@{BAR}=bar
|
|
/t { $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, $p2 dbus (send, receive) path=/com//@{BAR}, }"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#### end of wrapper fn
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
printf "Equality Tests:\n"
|
|
|
|
#rules that don't support priority
|
|
|
|
# verify rlimit data conversions
|
|
verify_binary_equality "set rlimit rttime <= 12 weeks" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit rttime <= 12 weeks, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7)) days, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7 * 24)) hours, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7 * 24 * 60)) minutes, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60)) seconds, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)) ms, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000 * 1000)) us, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000 * 1000)), }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "set rlimit cpu <= 42 weeks" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit cpu <= 42 weeks, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit cpu <= $((42 * 7)) days, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit cpu <= $((42 * 7 * 24)) hours, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit cpu <= $((42 * 7 * 24 * 60)) minutes, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit cpu <= $((42 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60)) seconds, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit cpu <= $((42 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60)), }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "set rlimit memlock <= 2GB" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit memlock <= 2GB, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit memlock <= $((2 * 1024)) MB, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit memlock <= $((2 * 1024 * 1024)) KB, }" \
|
|
"/t { set rlimit memlock <= $((2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024)) , }"
|
|
|
|
run_port_range=$(kernel_features network_v8/af_inet)
|
|
if [ "$run_port_range" != "true" ]; then
|
|
echo -e "\nSkipping network af_inet tests. $run_port_range\n"
|
|
else
|
|
# network port range
|
|
# select features file that contains netv8 af_inet
|
|
features_file="features.af_inet"
|
|
verify_binary_equality "network port range" \
|
|
"/t { network port=3456-3460, }" \
|
|
"/t { network port=3456, \
|
|
network port=3457, \
|
|
network port=3458, \
|
|
network port=3459, \
|
|
network port=3460, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "network peer port range" \
|
|
"/t { network peer=(port=3456-3460), }" \
|
|
"/t { network peer=(port=3456), \
|
|
network peer=(port=3457), \
|
|
network peer=(port=3458), \
|
|
network peer=(port=3459), \
|
|
network peer=(port=3460), }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "network port range allows more than single port" \
|
|
"/t { network port=3456-3460, }" \
|
|
"/t { network port=3456, }"
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_inequality "network peer port range allows more than single port" \
|
|
"/t { network peer=(port=3456-3460), }" \
|
|
"/t { network peer=(port=3456), }"
|
|
# return to default
|
|
features_file=$default_features_file
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Equality tests that set explicit priority level
|
|
# TODO: priority handling for file paths is currently broken
|
|
|
|
# This test is not actually correct due to two subtle interactions:
|
|
# - /* is special-cased to expand to /[^/\x00]+ with at least one character
|
|
# - Quieting of [^a] in the DFA is different and cannot be manually fixed
|
|
|
|
#verify_binary_xequality "file rule carveout regex vs priority" \
|
|
# "/t { deny /[^a]* rwxlk, /a r, }" \
|
|
# "/t { priority=-1 deny /* rwxlk, /a r, }" \
|
|
|
|
# Not grouping all three together because parser correctly handles
|
|
# the equivalence of carveout regex and default audit deny
|
|
verify_binary_equality "file rule carveout regex vs priority (audit)" \
|
|
"/t { audit deny /[^a]* rwxlk, /a r, }" \
|
|
"/t { priority=-1 audit deny /* rwxlk, /a r, }" \
|
|
|
|
verify_binary_equality "file rule default audit deny vs audit priority carveout" \
|
|
"/t { /a r, }" \
|
|
"/t { priority=-1 audit deny /* rwxlk, /a r, }" \
|
|
|
|
# verify combinations of different priority levels
|
|
# for single rule comparisons, rules should keep same expected result
|
|
# even when the priorities are different.
|
|
# different priorities within a profile comparison resulting in
|
|
# different permission could affected expected results
|
|
|
|
|
|
priorities="none 0 1 -1"
|
|
|
|
for pri1 in $priorities ; do
|
|
if [ "$pri1" = "none" ] ; then
|
|
priority1=""
|
|
else
|
|
priority1="priority=$pri1"
|
|
fi
|
|
for pri2 in $priorities ; do
|
|
if [ "$pri2" = "none" ] ; then
|
|
priority2=""
|
|
else
|
|
priority2="priority=$pri2"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
verify_set "$priority1" "$priority2"
|
|
done
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
[ -z "${verbose}" ] && printf "\n"
|
|
printf "PASS\n"
|
|
exit 0
|