Apply coding standard

Changes include:
- use girara_error everywhere
- two space indentation
This commit is contained in:
Sebastian Ramacher 2018-03-11 16:12:55 +01:00
parent 3e841103ea
commit 89831253f9

View file

@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
#include "seccomp-filters.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef WITH_SECCOMP
#include <girara/log.h>
@ -14,10 +13,9 @@
#define DENY_RULE(call) { if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_KILL, SCMP_SYS(call), 0) < 0) goto out; }
#define ALLOW_RULE(call) { if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(call), 0) < 0) goto out; }
int seccomp_enable_basic_filter(void){
scmp_filter_ctx ctx;
int
seccomp_enable_basic_filter(void)
{
/* prevent child processes from getting more priv e.g. via setuid, capabilities, ... */
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
girara_error("prctl SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS");
@ -25,244 +23,247 @@ int seccomp_enable_basic_filter(void){
}
/* prevent escape via ptrace */
if(prctl (PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)){
if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
girara_error("prctl PR_SET_DUMPABLE");
return -1;
}
/* initialize the filter */
ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
if (ctx == NULL){
scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
if (ctx == NULL) {
girara_error("seccomp_init failed");
return -1;
}
DENY_RULE (_sysctl);
DENY_RULE (acct);
DENY_RULE (add_key);
DENY_RULE (adjtimex);
DENY_RULE (chroot);
DENY_RULE (clock_adjtime);
DENY_RULE (create_module);
DENY_RULE (delete_module);
DENY_RULE (fanotify_init);
DENY_RULE (finit_module);
DENY_RULE (get_kernel_syms);
DENY_RULE (get_mempolicy);
DENY_RULE (init_module);
DENY_RULE (io_cancel);
DENY_RULE (io_destroy);
DENY_RULE (io_getevents);
DENY_RULE (io_setup);
DENY_RULE (io_submit);
DENY_RULE (ioperm);
DENY_RULE (iopl);
DENY_RULE (ioprio_set);
DENY_RULE (kcmp);
DENY_RULE (kexec_file_load);
DENY_RULE (kexec_load);
DENY_RULE (keyctl);
DENY_RULE (lookup_dcookie);
DENY_RULE (mbind);
DENY_RULE (nfsservctl);
DENY_RULE (migrate_pages);
DENY_RULE (modify_ldt);
DENY_RULE (mount);
DENY_RULE (move_pages);
DENY_RULE (name_to_handle_at);
DENY_RULE (open_by_handle_at);
DENY_RULE (perf_event_open);
DENY_RULE (pivot_root);
DENY_RULE (process_vm_readv);
DENY_RULE (process_vm_writev);
DENY_RULE (ptrace);
DENY_RULE (reboot);
DENY_RULE (remap_file_pages);
DENY_RULE (request_key);
DENY_RULE (set_mempolicy);
DENY_RULE (swapoff);
DENY_RULE (swapon);
DENY_RULE (sysfs);
DENY_RULE (syslog);
DENY_RULE (tuxcall);
DENY_RULE (umount2);
DENY_RULE (uselib);
DENY_RULE (vmsplice);
DENY_RULE(_sysctl);
DENY_RULE(acct);
DENY_RULE(add_key);
DENY_RULE(adjtimex);
DENY_RULE(chroot);
DENY_RULE(clock_adjtime);
DENY_RULE(create_module);
DENY_RULE(delete_module);
DENY_RULE(fanotify_init);
DENY_RULE(finit_module);
DENY_RULE(get_kernel_syms);
DENY_RULE(get_mempolicy);
DENY_RULE(init_module);
DENY_RULE(io_cancel);
DENY_RULE(io_destroy);
DENY_RULE(io_getevents);
DENY_RULE(io_setup);
DENY_RULE(io_submit);
DENY_RULE(ioperm);
DENY_RULE(iopl);
DENY_RULE(ioprio_set);
DENY_RULE(kcmp);
DENY_RULE(kexec_file_load);
DENY_RULE(kexec_load);
DENY_RULE(keyctl);
DENY_RULE(lookup_dcookie);
DENY_RULE(mbind);
DENY_RULE(nfsservctl);
DENY_RULE(migrate_pages);
DENY_RULE(modify_ldt);
DENY_RULE(mount);
DENY_RULE(move_pages);
DENY_RULE(name_to_handle_at);
DENY_RULE(open_by_handle_at);
DENY_RULE(perf_event_open);
DENY_RULE(pivot_root);
DENY_RULE(process_vm_readv);
DENY_RULE(process_vm_writev);
DENY_RULE(ptrace);
DENY_RULE(reboot);
DENY_RULE(remap_file_pages);
DENY_RULE(request_key);
DENY_RULE(set_mempolicy);
DENY_RULE(swapoff);
DENY_RULE(swapon);
DENY_RULE(sysfs);
DENY_RULE(syslog);
DENY_RULE(tuxcall);
DENY_RULE(umount2);
DENY_RULE(uselib);
DENY_RULE(vmsplice);
/* TODO: check for additional syscalls to blacklist */
/* DENY_RULE (execve); */
/* applying filter... */
if (seccomp_load (ctx) >= 0){
if (seccomp_load (ctx) >= 0) {
/* free ctx after the filter has been loaded into the kernel */
seccomp_release(ctx);
return 0;
}
out:
out:
/* something went wrong */
seccomp_release(ctx);
return -1;
}
int seccomp_enable_strict_filter(void){
scmp_filter_ctx ctx;
int
seccomp_enable_strict_filter(void)
{
/* prevent child processes from getting more priv e.g. via setuid, capabilities, ... */
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
perror("prctl SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
girara_error("prctl SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS");
return -1;
}
/* prevent escape via ptrace */
if(prctl (PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)){
perror("prctl PR_SET_DUMPABLE");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
girara_error("prctl PR_SET_DUMPABLE");
return -1;
}
/* initialize the filter */
ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_KILL);
scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_KILL);
if (ctx == NULL){
perror("seccomp_init failed");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
girara_error("seccomp_init failed");
return -1;
}
ALLOW_RULE (access);
ALLOW_RULE(access);
/* ALLOW_RULE (arch_prctl); */
ALLOW_RULE (bind);
ALLOW_RULE (brk);
ALLOW_RULE (clock_getres);
ALLOW_RULE (clone); /* TODO: investigate */
ALLOW_RULE (close);
ALLOW_RULE(bind);
ALLOW_RULE(brk);
ALLOW_RULE(clock_getres);
ALLOW_RULE(clone); /* TODO: investigate */
ALLOW_RULE(close);
/* ALLOW_RULE (connect); */
ALLOW_RULE (eventfd2);
ALLOW_RULE (exit);
ALLOW_RULE (exit_group);
ALLOW_RULE (fadvise64);
ALLOW_RULE (fallocate);
ALLOW_RULE (fcntl); /* TODO: build detailed filter */
ALLOW_RULE (fstat);
ALLOW_RULE (fstatfs);
ALLOW_RULE (ftruncate);
ALLOW_RULE (futex);
ALLOW_RULE (getdents);
ALLOW_RULE (getegid);
ALLOW_RULE (geteuid);
ALLOW_RULE (getgid);
ALLOW_RULE (getuid);
ALLOW_RULE (getpid);
ALLOW_RULE(eventfd2);
ALLOW_RULE(exit);
ALLOW_RULE(exit_group);
ALLOW_RULE(fadvise64);
ALLOW_RULE(fallocate);
ALLOW_RULE(fcntl); /* TODO: build detailed filter */
ALLOW_RULE(fstat);
ALLOW_RULE(fstatfs);
ALLOW_RULE(ftruncate);
ALLOW_RULE(futex);
ALLOW_RULE(getdents);
ALLOW_RULE(getegid);
ALLOW_RULE(geteuid);
ALLOW_RULE(getgid);
ALLOW_RULE(getuid);
ALLOW_RULE(getpid);
/* ALLOW_RULE (getpeername); */
ALLOW_RULE (getresgid);
ALLOW_RULE (getresuid);
ALLOW_RULE (getrlimit);
ALLOW_RULE(getresgid);
ALLOW_RULE(getresuid);
ALLOW_RULE(getrlimit);
/* ALLOW_RULE (getsockname); */
/* ALLOW_RULE (getsockopt); needed for access to x11 socket in network namespace (without abstract sockets) */
ALLOW_RULE (inotify_add_watch);
ALLOW_RULE (inotify_init1);
ALLOW_RULE (inotify_rm_watch);
ALLOW_RULE(inotify_add_watch);
ALLOW_RULE(inotify_init1);
ALLOW_RULE(inotify_rm_watch);
/* ALLOW_RULE (ioctl); specified below */
ALLOW_RULE (lseek);
ALLOW_RULE (lstat);
ALLOW_RULE (madvise);
ALLOW_RULE (memfd_create);
ALLOW_RULE (mkdir); /* needed for first run only */
ALLOW_RULE (mmap);
ALLOW_RULE (mprotect);
ALLOW_RULE (mremap);
ALLOW_RULE (munmap);
ALLOW_RULE(lseek);
ALLOW_RULE(lstat);
ALLOW_RULE(madvise);
ALLOW_RULE(memfd_create);
ALLOW_RULE(mkdir); /* needed for first run only */
ALLOW_RULE(mmap);
ALLOW_RULE(mprotect);
ALLOW_RULE(mremap);
ALLOW_RULE(munmap);
//ALLOW_RULE (open); /* (zathura needs to open for writing) TODO: avoid needing this somehow */
//ALLOW_RULE (openat);
ALLOW_RULE (pipe);
ALLOW_RULE (poll);
ALLOW_RULE (pwrite64); /* TODO: build detailed filter */
ALLOW_RULE (pread64);
ALLOW_RULE(pipe);
ALLOW_RULE(poll);
ALLOW_RULE(pwrite64); /* TODO: build detailed filter */
ALLOW_RULE(pread64);
/* ALLOW_RULE (prlimit64); */
/* ALLOW_RULE (prctl); specified below */
ALLOW_RULE (read);
ALLOW_RULE (readlink);
ALLOW_RULE (recvfrom);
ALLOW_RULE (recvmsg);
ALLOW_RULE (restart_syscall);
ALLOW_RULE (rt_sigaction);
ALLOW_RULE (rt_sigprocmask);
ALLOW_RULE (sendmsg);
ALLOW_RULE (sendto);
ALLOW_RULE (select);
ALLOW_RULE (set_robust_list);
ALLOW_RULE(read);
ALLOW_RULE(readlink);
ALLOW_RULE(recvfrom);
ALLOW_RULE(recvmsg);
ALLOW_RULE(restart_syscall);
ALLOW_RULE(rt_sigaction);
ALLOW_RULE(rt_sigprocmask);
ALLOW_RULE(sendmsg);
ALLOW_RULE(sendto);
ALLOW_RULE(select);
ALLOW_RULE(set_robust_list);
/* ALLOW_RULE (set_tid_address); */
/* ALLOW_RULE (setsockopt); */
ALLOW_RULE (shmat);
ALLOW_RULE (shmctl);
ALLOW_RULE (shmdt);
ALLOW_RULE (shmget);
ALLOW_RULE (shutdown);
ALLOW_RULE (stat);
ALLOW_RULE (statfs);
ALLOW_RULE(shmat);
ALLOW_RULE(shmctl);
ALLOW_RULE(shmdt);
ALLOW_RULE(shmget);
ALLOW_RULE(shutdown);
ALLOW_RULE(stat);
ALLOW_RULE(statfs);
/* ALLOW_RULE (socket); */
ALLOW_RULE (sysinfo);
ALLOW_RULE (uname);
ALLOW_RULE (unlink);
ALLOW_RULE (write); /* specified below (zathura needs to write files)*/
ALLOW_RULE (writev);
ALLOW_RULE (wait4); /* trying to open links should not crash the app */
ALLOW_RULE(sysinfo);
ALLOW_RULE(uname);
ALLOW_RULE(unlink);
ALLOW_RULE(write); /* specified below (zathura needs to write files)*/
ALLOW_RULE(writev);
ALLOW_RULE(wait4); /* trying to open links should not crash the app */
/* Special requirements for ioctl, allowed on stdout/stderr */
if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(ioctl), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 1)) < 0)
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(ioctl), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 1)) < 0) {
goto out;
if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(ioctl), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 2)) < 0)
}
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(ioctl), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 2)) < 0) {
goto out;
}
/* needed by gtk??? (does not load content without) */
/* special restrictions for prctl, only allow PR_SET_NAME/PR_SET_PDEATHSIG */
if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(prctl), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_NAME)) < 0)
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(prctl), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_NAME)) < 0) {
goto out;
}
if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(prctl), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_PDEATHSIG)) < 0)
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(prctl), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_PDEATHSIG)) < 0) {
goto out;
}
/* special restrictions for open, prevent opening files for writing */
if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(open), 1,
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_WRONLY | O_RDWR, 0)) < 0)
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(open), 1,
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_WRONLY | O_RDWR, 0)) < 0) {
goto out;
}
if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EACCES), SCMP_SYS(open), 1,
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_WRONLY, O_WRONLY)) < 0)
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EACCES), SCMP_SYS(open), 1,
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_WRONLY, O_WRONLY)) < 0) {
goto out;
}
if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EACCES), SCMP_SYS(open), 1,
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_RDWR, O_RDWR)) < 0)
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EACCES), SCMP_SYS(open), 1,
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_RDWR, O_RDWR)) < 0) {
goto out;
}
/* special restrictions for openat, prevent opening files for writing */
if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_WRONLY | O_RDWR, 0)) < 0)
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_WRONLY | O_RDWR, 0)) < 0) {
goto out;
}
if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EACCES), SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_WRONLY, O_WRONLY)) < 0)
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EACCES), SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_WRONLY, O_WRONLY)) < 0) {
goto out;
}
if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EACCES), SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_RDWR, O_RDWR)) < 0)
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EACCES), SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_RDWR, O_RDWR)) < 0) {
goto out;
}
/* allowed for debugging: */
/* ALLOW_RULE (prctl); */
/* ALLOW_RULE (ioctl); */
/* TODO: test fcntl rules */
/* if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl), 1, */
/* SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_GETFL)) < 0) */
@ -297,11 +298,9 @@ int seccomp_enable_strict_filter(void){
/* SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_PDEATHSIG)) < 0) */
/* goto out; */
/* when zathura is run on wayland, with X11 server available but blocked, unset the DISPLAY variable */
/* otherwise it will try to connect to X11 using inet socket protocol */
/* ------------ experimental filters --------------- */
/* /\* this filter is susceptible to TOCTOU race conditions, providing limited use *\/ */
@ -313,7 +312,6 @@ int seccomp_enable_strict_filter(void){
/* SCMP_CMP(SCMP_CMP_EQ, fd)) < 0) /\* or < 1 ??? *\/ */
/* goto out; */
/* /\* restricting write access *\/ */
/* /\* allow stdin *\/ */
@ -332,7 +330,6 @@ int seccomp_enable_strict_filter(void){
/* SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 2)) < 0 ) */
/* goto out; */
/* /\* restrict writev (write a vector) access *\/ */
/* this does not seem reliable but it surprisingly is. investigate more */
/* if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(writev), 1, */
@ -357,18 +354,16 @@ int seccomp_enable_strict_filter(void){
/* fcntl(3, F_SETFL, O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK) = 0 */
/* fcntl(3, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) = 0 */
/* ------------------ end of experimental filters ------------------ */
/* applying filter... */
if (seccomp_load (ctx) >= 0){
if (seccomp_load(ctx) >= 0) {
/* free ctx after the filter has been loaded into the kernel */
seccomp_release(ctx);
return 0;
}
out:
out:
/* something went wrong */
seccomp_release(ctx);
return -1;