/* SPDX-License-Identifier: Zlib */

#include "seccomp-filters.h"

#ifdef WITH_SECCOMP
#include <girara/log.h>
#include <seccomp.h> /* libseccomp */
#include <sys/prctl.h> /* prctl */
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <girara/utils.h>

#define ADD_RULE(str_action, action, call, ...)                                \
  do {                                                                         \
    girara_debug("adding rule " str_action " to " G_STRINGIFY(call));          \
    const int err =                                                            \
      seccomp_rule_add(ctx, action, SCMP_SYS(call), __VA_ARGS__);              \
    if (err < 0) {                                                             \
      girara_error("failed: %s", g_strerror(-err));                            \
      goto out;                                                                \
    }                                                                          \
  } while (0)

#define DENY_RULE(call) ADD_RULE("kill", SCMP_ACT_KILL, call, 0)
#define ALLOW_RULE(call) ADD_RULE("allow", SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, call, 0)

int
seccomp_enable_basic_filter(void)
{
  /* prevent child processes from getting more priv e.g. via setuid, capabilities, ... */
  if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
    girara_error("prctl SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS");
    return -1;
  }

  /* prevent escape via ptrace */
  if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
    girara_error("prctl PR_SET_DUMPABLE");
    return -1;
  }

  /* initialize the filter */
  scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
  if (ctx == NULL) {
    girara_error("seccomp_init failed");
    return -1;
  }

  DENY_RULE(_sysctl);
  DENY_RULE(acct);
  DENY_RULE(add_key);
  DENY_RULE(adjtimex);
  DENY_RULE(chroot);
  DENY_RULE(clock_adjtime);
  DENY_RULE(create_module);
  DENY_RULE(delete_module);
  DENY_RULE(fanotify_init);
  DENY_RULE(finit_module);
  DENY_RULE(get_kernel_syms);
  DENY_RULE(get_mempolicy);
  DENY_RULE(init_module);
  DENY_RULE(io_cancel);
  DENY_RULE(io_destroy);
  DENY_RULE(io_getevents);
  DENY_RULE(io_setup);
  DENY_RULE(io_submit);
  DENY_RULE(ioperm);
  DENY_RULE(iopl);
  DENY_RULE(ioprio_set);
  DENY_RULE(kcmp);
  DENY_RULE(kexec_file_load);
  DENY_RULE(kexec_load);
  DENY_RULE(keyctl);
  DENY_RULE(lookup_dcookie);
  DENY_RULE(mbind);
  DENY_RULE(nfsservctl);
  DENY_RULE(migrate_pages);
  DENY_RULE(modify_ldt);
  DENY_RULE(mount);
  DENY_RULE(move_pages);
  DENY_RULE(name_to_handle_at);
  DENY_RULE(open_by_handle_at);
  DENY_RULE(perf_event_open);
  DENY_RULE(pivot_root);
  DENY_RULE(process_vm_readv);
  DENY_RULE(process_vm_writev);
  DENY_RULE(ptrace);
  DENY_RULE(reboot);
  DENY_RULE(remap_file_pages);
  DENY_RULE(request_key);
  DENY_RULE(set_mempolicy);
  DENY_RULE(swapoff);
  DENY_RULE(swapon);
  DENY_RULE(sysfs);
  DENY_RULE(syslog);
  DENY_RULE(tuxcall);
  DENY_RULE(umount2);
  DENY_RULE(uselib);
  DENY_RULE(vmsplice);

  /* TODO: check for additional syscalls to blacklist */
  /* DENY_RULE (execve); */

  /* applying filter... */
  if (seccomp_load(ctx) >= 0) {
    /* free ctx after the filter has been loaded into the kernel */
    seccomp_release(ctx);
    return 0;
  }

out:
  /* something went wrong */
  seccomp_release(ctx);
  return -1;
}

int
seccomp_enable_strict_filter(void)
{
  /* prevent child processes from getting more priv e.g. via setuid, capabilities, ... */
  if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
    girara_error("prctl SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS");
    return -1;
  }

  /* prevent escape via ptrace */
  if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
    girara_error("prctl PR_SET_DUMPABLE");
    return -1;
  }

  /* initialize the filter */
  scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_KILL);
  if (ctx == NULL){
    girara_error("seccomp_init failed");
    return -1;
  }

  ALLOW_RULE(access);
  /* ALLOW_RULE (arch_prctl); */
  ALLOW_RULE(bind);
  ALLOW_RULE(brk);
  ALLOW_RULE(clock_getres);
  ALLOW_RULE(clone); /* TODO: investigate */
  ALLOW_RULE(close);
  /* ALLOW_RULE (connect); */
  ALLOW_RULE(eventfd2);
  ALLOW_RULE(exit);
  ALLOW_RULE(exit_group);
  ALLOW_RULE(fadvise64);
  ALLOW_RULE(fallocate);
  ALLOW_RULE(fcntl);  /* TODO: build detailed filter */
  ALLOW_RULE(fstat);
  ALLOW_RULE(fstatfs);
  ALLOW_RULE(ftruncate);
  ALLOW_RULE(futex);
  ALLOW_RULE(getdents);
  ALLOW_RULE(getdents64);
  ALLOW_RULE(getegid);
  ALLOW_RULE(geteuid);
  ALLOW_RULE(getgid);
  ALLOW_RULE(getuid);
  ALLOW_RULE(getpid);
  /* ALLOW_RULE (getpeername); */
  ALLOW_RULE(getresgid);
  ALLOW_RULE(getresuid);
  ALLOW_RULE(getrlimit);
  ALLOW_RULE(getpeername);
  /* ALLOW_RULE (getsockname); */
  /* ALLOW_RULE (getsockopt);   needed for access to x11 socket in network namespace (without abstract sockets) */
  ALLOW_RULE(inotify_add_watch);
  ALLOW_RULE(inotify_init1);
  ALLOW_RULE(inotify_rm_watch);
  /* ALLOW_RULE (ioctl);  specified below  */
  ALLOW_RULE(lseek);
  ALLOW_RULE(lstat);
  ALLOW_RULE(madvise);
  ALLOW_RULE(memfd_create);
  ALLOW_RULE(mkdir); /* needed for first run only */
  ALLOW_RULE(mmap);
  ALLOW_RULE(mprotect);
  ALLOW_RULE(mremap);
  ALLOW_RULE(munmap);
  //ALLOW_RULE (open);  /* (zathura needs to open for writing) TODO: avoid needing this somehow */
  //ALLOW_RULE (openat);
  ALLOW_RULE(pipe);
  ALLOW_RULE(poll);
  ALLOW_RULE(pwrite64); /* TODO: build detailed filter */
  ALLOW_RULE(pread64);
  /* ALLOW_RULE (prlimit64); */
  /* ALLOW_RULE (prctl);   specified below  */
  ALLOW_RULE(read);
  ALLOW_RULE(readlink);
  ALLOW_RULE(recvfrom);
  ALLOW_RULE(recvmsg);
  ALLOW_RULE(restart_syscall);
  ALLOW_RULE(rt_sigaction);
  ALLOW_RULE(rt_sigprocmask);
  ALLOW_RULE(sendmsg);
  ALLOW_RULE(sendto);
  ALLOW_RULE(select);
  ALLOW_RULE(set_robust_list);
  /* ALLOW_RULE (set_tid_address); */
  /* ALLOW_RULE (setsockopt); */
  ALLOW_RULE(shmat);
  ALLOW_RULE(shmctl);
  ALLOW_RULE(shmdt);
  ALLOW_RULE(shmget);
  ALLOW_RULE(shutdown);
  ALLOW_RULE(stat);
  ALLOW_RULE(statfs);
  /* ALLOW_RULE (socket); */
  ALLOW_RULE(sysinfo);
  ALLOW_RULE(uname);
  ALLOW_RULE(unlink);
  ALLOW_RULE(write);  /* specified below (zathura needs to write files)*/
  ALLOW_RULE(writev);
  ALLOW_RULE(wait4);  /* trying to open links should not crash the app */

  /* Special requirements for ioctl, allowed on stdout/stderr */
  ADD_RULE("allow", SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, ioctl, 1, SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 1));
  ADD_RULE("allow", SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, ioctl, 1, SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 2));

  /* needed by gtk??? (does not load content without) */

  /* special restrictions for prctl, only allow PR_SET_NAME/PR_SET_PDEATHSIG */
  ADD_RULE("allow", SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, prctl, 1, SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_NAME));
  ADD_RULE("allow", SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, prctl, 1, SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_PDEATHSIG));

  /* special restrictions for open, prevent opening files for writing */
  ADD_RULE("allow", SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, open, 1, SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_WRONLY | O_RDWR, 0));
  ADD_RULE("errno", SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EACCES), open, 1, SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_WRONLY, O_WRONLY));
  ADD_RULE("errno", SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EACCES), open, 1, SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_RDWR, O_RDWR));

  /* special restrictions for openat, prevent opening files for writing */
  ADD_RULE("allow", SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, openat, 1, SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_WRONLY | O_RDWR, 0));
  ADD_RULE("errno", SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EACCES), openat, 1, SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_WRONLY, O_WRONLY));
  ADD_RULE("errno", SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EACCES), openat, 1, SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_RDWR, O_RDWR));

  /* allowed for debugging: */

  /* ALLOW_RULE (prctl); */
  /* ALLOW_RULE (ioctl); */

  /* TODO: test fcntl rules */
  /* if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl), 1, */
  /*        SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_GETFL)) < 0) */
  /*  goto out; */

  /* if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl), 1, */
  /*        SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_SETFL)) < 0) */
  /*  goto out; */

  /* if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl), 1, */
  /*        SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_SETFD)) < 0) */
  /*  goto out; */

  /* if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl), 1, */
  /*        SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_GETFD)) < 0) */
  /*  goto out; */

  /* if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl), 1, */
  /*        SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_SETLK)) < 0) */
  /*  goto out; */


  /* TODO: build detailed filter for prctl */
  /*  needed by gtk??? (does not load content without) */

  /* /\* special restrictions for prctl, only allow PR_SET_NAME/PR_SET_PDEATHSIG *\/ */
  /*     if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(prctl), 1, */
  /*        SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_NAME)) < 0) */
  /*  goto out; */

  /* if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(prctl), 1, */
  /*        SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_PDEATHSIG)) < 0) */
  /*  goto out; */

  /* when zathura is run on wayland, with X11 server available but blocked, unset the DISPLAY variable */
  /* otherwise it will try to connect to X11 using inet socket protocol */

  /*  ------------ experimental filters --------------- */

  /* /\* this filter is susceptible to TOCTOU race conditions, providing limited use *\/ */
  /* /\* allow opening only specified files identified by their file descriptors*\/ */

  /*  this requires either a list of all files to open (A LOT!!!) */
  /*  or needs to be applied only after initialisation, right before parsing */
  /*  if(seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(read), 1, */
  /*       SCMP_CMP(SCMP_CMP_EQ, fd)) < 0) /\* or < 1 ??? *\/ */
  /*      goto out; */

  /* /\* restricting write access *\/ */

  /* /\* allow stdin *\/ */
  /*  if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(write), 1, */
  /*                          SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0)) < 0 ) */
  /*      goto out; */

  /* /\* allow stdout *\/ */
  /*  if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(write), 1, */
  /*                              SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 1)) < 0 ) */
  /*      goto out; */


  /* /\* allow stderr *\/ */
  /* if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(write), 1, */
  /*                              SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 2)) < 0 ) */
  /*     goto out; */

  /* /\* restrict writev (write a vector) access *\/ */
  /*  this does not seem reliable but it surprisingly is. investigate more */
  /* if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(writev), 1, */
  /*                             SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 3)) < 0 ) */
  /*     goto out; */

  /* test if repeating this after some time or denying it works */


  /*  first attempt to filter poll requests */
  /*  if (seccomp_rule_add (ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(poll), 1, */
  /*                          SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, POLLIN | POLL, 0)) < 0) */
  /*    goto out; */


  /* /\* restrict fcntl calls *\/ */
  /*  this syscall sets the file descriptor to read write */
  /* if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl), 1, */
  /*                             SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 3)) < 0 ) */
  /*     goto out; */
  /*  fcntl(3, F_GETFL)                       = 0x2 (flags O_RDWR) */
  /*  fcntl(3, F_SETFL, O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK)    = 0 */
  /*  fcntl(3, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC)           = 0 */

  /*  ------------------ end of experimental filters ------------------ */

  /* applying filter... */
  if (seccomp_load(ctx) >= 0) {
    /* free ctx after the filter has been loaded into the kernel */
    seccomp_release(ctx);
    return 0;
  }

out:
  /* something went wrong */
  seccomp_release(ctx);
  return -1;
}

#endif /* WITH_SECCOMP */