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135 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
135 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: Full system policy (FSP)
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---
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!!! danger
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Full system policy is still under early development:
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- Do not run it outside a development VM!
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- This is an **advanced** feature, you should understand what you are doing
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**You have been warned!!!**
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!!! quote
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AppArmor is also capable of being used for full system policy where processes are by default not running under the `unconfined` profile. This might be useful for high security environments or embedded systems.
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*Source: [AppArmor Wiki][apparmor-wiki]*
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## Overview
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The default mode of `apparmor.d` is the more advanced confinement configuration we can achieve while being as simple as installing a package and doing some minor configuration on your system. By design, a full system confinement does not work this way. Before enabling you need to consider your use case and security objective.
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Particularly:
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- Every system application will be **blocked** if they do not have a profile.
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- Any non-standard system app need to be explicitly profiled and allowed to run. For instance, if you want to use your own proxy or VPN software, you need to ensure it is correctly profiled and allowed to run in the `systemd` profile.
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- Desktop environment must be explicitly supported, your UI will not start otherwise. Again, it is a **feature**.
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- FSP mode will run unknown user application into the `default` profile. It might be enough for your application. If not you have to make a profile for it.
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- In FSP mode, all sandbox manager **must** have a profile. Then user sandboxed application (flatpak, snap...) will work as expected.
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## Install
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This feature is only enabled when the project is built with `make full`. [Early policy](https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/wikis/AppArmorInSystemd#early-policy-loads) load **must** also be enabled. Once `apparmor.d` has been installed in FSP mode, it is required to reboot to apply the changes.
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In `/etc/apparmor/parser.conf` ensure you have:
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```
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write-cache
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cache-loc /etc/apparmor/earlypolicy/
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Optimize=compress-fast
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```
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**:material-arch: Archlinux**
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In `PKGBUILD`, replace `make` by `make full`:
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```diff
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- make
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+ make full
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```
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**:material-ubuntu: Ubuntu & :material-debian: Debian**
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In `debian/rules`, add the following lines:
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```make
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override_dh_auto_build:
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make full
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```
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**:simple-suse: OpenSUSE**
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In `dists/apparmor.d.spec`, replace `%make_build` by `make full`
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```diff
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- %make_build
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+ %make_build full
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```
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**Partial install**
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Use the `make full` command to build instead of `make`
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## Structure
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The profiles dedicated for full system policies are maintained in the **[`_full`][full]** group.
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### Systemd
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**`systemd`**
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This profile aims to confine PID 1. Systemd is (kind of obviously) a highly privileged program. The purpose of this profile is to transition to other less privileged program as soon as possible. On high security environments, it can also be used to strictly limit the list of allowed privileged program.
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- It allows internal systemd access,
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- It allows starting all common root services.
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To work as intended, all privileged services started by systemd **must** have a profile. For a given distribution, the list of these services can be found under:
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```sh
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/usr/lib/systemd/system-generators/*
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/usr/lib/systemd/system-environment-generators/*
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/usr/lib/systemd/system/*.service
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```
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The main [fallback](#fallback) profile (`default`) is not intended to be used by privileged program or service. Such programs must have they dedicated profile and will fail otherwise. This is a **feature**, not a bug.
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**`systemd-user`**
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This profile is for `systemd --user`, it aims to confine userland systemd. It does not require a lot of access and is only intended to handle user services.
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- It allows internal systemd user access,
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- It allows starting all common user services.
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To work as intended, userland services started by `systemd --user` **should** have a profile. For a given distribution, the list of these services can be found under:
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```sh
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/usr/lib/systemd/user-environment-generators/*
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/usr/lib/systemd/user-generators/*
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/usr/lib/systemd/user/*.service
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```
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!!! info
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To be allowed to run, additional root or user services may need to add extra rules inside the `usr/systemd.d` or `usr/systemd-user.d` directory. For example, when installing a new privileged service `foo` with [stacking](#no-new-privileges) you may need to add the following to `/etc/apparmor.d/usr/systemd.d/foo`:
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```
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@{lib}/foo rPx -> systemd//&foo,
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```
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### Fallback
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In addition to the `systemd` profiles, a full system policy needs to ensure that no program run in an unconfined state at any time. The fallback profiles consist of a set generic specialized profiles:
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- **`default`** is used for any *classic* user application with a GUI. It has full access to user home directories.
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- **`bwrap`, `bwrap-app`** are used for *classic* user application that are sandboxed with **bwrap**.
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!!! warning
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The main fallback profile (`default`) is not intended to be used by priviligied program or service. Such programs **must** have they dedicaded profile and would break otherwise.
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Additionally, special user access can be setup using PAM rules set such as a random shell interactively opened (as user or as root).
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[apparmor-wiki]: https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/wikis/FullSystemPolicy
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[full]: https://github.com/roddhjav/apparmor.d/blob/main/apparmor.d/groups/_full
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